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 A/55/305 A-55-305_e.pdf (English) A/55/305 A-55-305_a.pdf (Arabic) United Nations A/55/305–S/2000/809 General Assembly Security Council Distr.: General 21 August 2000 Original: English 00-59470 (E) 180800  General Assembly Security Council Fifty-fifth session Fifty-fifth year Item 87 of the provisional agenda* Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects Identical letters dated 21 August 2000 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council On 7 March 2000, I convened a high-level Panel to undertake a thorough review of the United Nations peace and security activities, and to present a clear set of specific, concrete and practical recommendations to assist the United Nations in conducting such activities better in the future. I asked Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, the former Foreign Minister of Algeria, to chair the Panel, which included the following eminent personalities from around the world, with a wide range of experience in the fields of peacekeeping, peace-building, development and humanitarian assistance: Mr. J. Brian Atwood, Ambassador Colin Granderson, Dame Ann Hercus, Mr. Richard Monk, General Klaus Naumann (retd.), Ms. Hisako Shimura, Ambassador Vladimir Shustov, General Philip Sibanda and Dr. Cornelio Sommaruga. I would be grateful if the Panel’s report, which has been transmitted to me in the enclosed letter dated 17 August 2000 from the Chairman of the Panel, could be brought to the attention of Member States. The Panel’s analysis is frank yet fair; its recommendations are far-reaching yet sensible and practical. The expeditious implementation of the Panel’s recommendations, in my view, is essential to make the United Nations truly credible as a force for peace. Many of the Panel’s recommendations relate to matters fully within the purview of the Secretary-General, while others will need the approval and support of the legislative bodies of the United Nations. I urge all Member States to join me in considering, approving and supporting the implementation of those recommendations. In this connection, I am pleased to inform you that I have designated the Deputy Secretary-General to follow up on the report’s recommendations and to oversee the preparation of a detailed implementation plan, which I shall submit to the General Assembly and the Security Council. * A/55/150.ii A/55/305 S/2000/809 I very much hope that the report of the Panel, in particular its Executive Summary, will be brought to the attention of all the leaders who will be coming to New York in September 2000 to participate in the Millennium Summit. That highleeve and historic meeting presents a unique opportunity for us to commence the process of renewing the United Nations capacity to secure and build peace. I ask for the support of the General Assembly and Security Council in converting into reality the far-reaching agenda laid out in the report. (Signed) Kofi A. Annaniii A/55/305 S/2000/809 Letter dated 17 August 2000 from the Chairman of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations to the Secretary-General The Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, which you convened in March 2000, was privileged to have been asked by you to assess the United Nations ability to conduct peace operations effectively, and to offer frank, specific and realistic recommendations for ways in which to enhance that capacity. Mr. Brian Atwood, Ambassador Colin Granderson, Dame Ann Hercus, Mr. Richard Monk, General (ret.) Klaus Naumann, Ms. Hisako Shimura, Ambassador Vladimir Shustov, General Philip Sibanda, Dr. Cornelio Sommaruga and I accepted this challenge out of deep respect for you and because each of us believes fervently that the United Nations system can do better in the cause of peace. We admired greatly your willingness to undertake past highly critical analyses of United Nations operations in Rwanda and Srebrenica. This degree of self-criticism is rare for any large organization and particularly rare for the United Nations. We also would like to pay tribute to Deputy Secretary-General Louise Fréchette and Chef de Cabinet S. Iqbal Riza, who remained with us throughout our meetings and who answered our many questions with unfailing patience and clarity. They have given us much of their time and we benefited immensely from their intimate knowledge of the United Nations present limitations and future requirements. Producing a review and recommendations for reform of a system with the scope and complexity of United Nations peace operations, in only four months, was a daunting task. It would have been impossible but for the dedication and hard work of Dr. William Durch (with support from staff at the Stimson Center), Mr. Salman Ahmed of the United Nations and the willingness of United Nations officials throughout the system, including serving heads of mission, to share their insights both in interviews and in often comprehensive critiques of their own organizations and experiences. Former heads of peace operations and force commanders, academics and representatives of non-governmental organizations were equally helpful. The Panel engaged in intense discussion and debate. Long hours were devoted to reviewing recommendations and supporting analysis that we knew would be subject to scrutiny and interpretation. Over three separate three-day meetings in New York, Geneva and then New York again, we forged the letter and the spirit of the attached report. Its analysis and recommendations reflect our consensus, which we convey to you with our hope that it serve the cause of systematic reform and renewal of this core function of the United Nations. As we say in the report, we are aware that you are engaged in conducting a comprehensive reform of the Secretariat. We thus hope that our recommendations fit within that wider process, with slight adjustments if necessary. We realize that not all of our recommendations can be implemented overnight, but many of them do require urgent action and the unequivocal support of Member States. Throughout these months, we have read and heard encouraging words from Member States, large and small, from the South and from the North, stressing the necessity for urgent improvement in the ways the United Nations addresses conflictiv A/55/305 S/2000/809 situations. We urge them to act decisively to translate into reality those of our recommendations that require formal action by them. The Panel has full confidence that the official we suggest you designate to oversee the implementation of our recommendations, both inside the Secretariat and with Member States, will have your full support, in line with your conviction to transform the United Nations into the type of twenty-first century institution it needs to be to effectively meet the current and future threats to world peace. Finally, if I may be allowed to add a personal note, I wish to express my deepest gratitude to each of my colleagues on this Panel. Together, they have contributed to the project an impressive sum of knowledge and experience. They have consistently shown the highest degree of commitment to the Organization and a deep understanding of its needs. During our meetings and our contacts from afar, they have all been extremely kind to me, invariably helpful, patient and generous, thus making the otherwise intimidating task as their Chairman relatively easier and truly enjoyable. (Signed) Lakhdar Brahimi Chairman of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operationsv A/55/305 S/2000/809 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations Contents Paragraphs Page Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii I. The need for change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1–8 1 II. Doctrine, strategy and decision-making for peace operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9–83 2 A. Defining the elements of peace operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10–14 2 B. Experience of the past. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15–28 3 C. Implications for preventive action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29–34 5 Summary of key recommendations on preventive action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 6 D. Implications for peace-building strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35–47 6 Summary of key recommendations on peace-building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 8 E. Implications for peacekeeping doctrine and strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48–55 9 Summary of key recommendation on peacekeeping doctrine and strategy. . . . 55 10 F. Clear, credible and achievable mandates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56–64 10 Summary of key recommendations on clear, credible and achievable mandates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 11 G. Information-gathering, analysis and strategic planning capacities . . . . . . . . . . 65–75 12 Summary of key recommendation on information and strategic analysis. . . . . 75 13 H. The challenge of transitional civil administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76–83 13 Summary of key recommendation on transitional civil administration. . . . . . . 83 14 III. United Nations capacities to deploy operations rapidly and effectively . . . . . . . . . . 84–169 14 A. Defining what “rapid and effective deployment” entails . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86–91 15 Summary of key recommendation on determining deployment timelines . . . . . 91 16 B. Effective mission leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92–101 16 Summary of key recommendations on mission leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 17 C. Military personnel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102–117 17 Summary of key recommendations on military personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 20 D. Civilian police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118–126 20 Summary of key recommendations on civilian police personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 21 E. Civilian specialists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127–145 21 1. Lack of standby systems to respond to unexpected or high-volume surge demands. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128–132 22vi A/55/305 S/2000/809 2. Difficulties in attracting and retaining the best external recruits . . . . . . . 133–135 23 3. Shortages in administrative and support functions at the mid-to-senior levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 23 4. Penalizing field deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137–138 23 5. Obsolescence in the Field Service category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139–140 24 6. Lack of a comprehensive staffing strategy for peace operations. . . . . . . . 141–145 24 Summary of key recommendations on civilian specialists . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 25 F. Public information capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146–150 25 Summary of key recommendation on rapidly deployable capacity for public information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150 26 G. Logistics support, the procurement process and expenditure management . . . 151–169 26 Summary of key recommendations on logistics support and expenditure management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 28 IV. Headquarters resources and structure for planning and supporting peacekeeping operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170–245 29 A. Staffing-levels and funding for Headquarters support for peacekeeping operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172–197 29 Summary of key recommendations on funding Headquarters support for peacekeeping operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197 34 B. Need and proposal for the establishment of Integrated Mission Task Forces . 198–217 34 Summary of key recommendation on integrated mission planning and support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217 37 C. Other structural adjustments required in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218–233 37 1. Military and Civilian Police Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219–225 37 2. Field Administration and Logistics Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226–228 38 3. Lessons Learned Unit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229–230 39 4. Senior management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231–233 39 Summary of key recommendations on other structural adjustments in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 39 D. Structural adjustments needed outside the Department of Peacekeeping Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234–245 40 1. Operational support for public information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235–238 40 Summary of key recommendation on structural adjustments in public information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238 40vii A/55/305 S/2000/809 2. Peace-building support in the Department of Political Affairs . . . . . . . . . 239–243 40 Summary of key recommendations for peace-building support in the Department of Political Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243 41 3. Peace operations support in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244–245 41 Summary of key recommendation on strengthening the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245 41 V. Peace operations and the information age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246–264 42 A. Information technology in peace operations: strategy and policy issues . . . . . 247–251 42 Summary of key recommendation on information technology strategy and policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251 42 B. Tools for knowledge management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252–258 43 Summary of key recommendations on information technology tools in peace operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258 43 C. Improving the timeliness of Internet-based public information . . . . . . . . . . . . 259–264 44 Summary of key recommendation on the timeliness of Internet-based public information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263 44 VI. Challenges to implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265–280 44 Annexes I. Members of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 II. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 III. Summary of recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54viii A/55/305 S/2000/809 Executive Summary The United Nations was founded, in the words of its Charter, in order “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” Meeting this challenge is the most important function of the Organization, and to a very significant degree it is the yardstick with which the Organization is judged by the peoples it exists to serve. Over the last decade, the United Nations has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge, and it can do no better today. Without renewed commitment on the part of Member States, significant institutional change and increased financial support, the United Nations will not be capable of executing the critical peacekeeping and peacebuilldin tasks that the Member States assign to it in coming months and years. There are many tasks which United Nations peacekeeping forces should not be asked to undertake and many places they should not go. But when the United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence, with the ability and determination to defeat them.The Secretary-General has asked the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, composed of individuals experienced in various aspects of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace-building, to assess the shortcomings of the existing system and to make frank, specific and realistic recommendations for change. Our recommendations focus not only on politics and strategy but also and perhaps even more so on operational and organizational areas of need. For preventive initiatives to succeed in reducing tension and averting conflict, the Secretary-General needs clear, strong and sustained political support from Member States. Furthermore, as the United Nations has bitterly and repeatedly discovered over the last decade, no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force if complex peacekeeping, in particular, is to succeed. But force alone cannot create peace; it can only create the space in which peace may be built. Moreover, the changes that the Panel recommends will have no lasting impact unless Member States summon the political will to support the United Nations politically, financially and operationally to enable the United Nations to be truly credible as a force for peace. Each of the recommendations contained in the present report is designed to remedy a serious problem in strategic direction, decision-making, rapid deployment, operational planning and support, and the use of modern information technology. Key assessments and recommendations are highlighted below, largely in the order in which they appear in the body of the text (the numbers of the relevant paragraphs in the main text are provided in parentheses). In addition, a summary of recommendations is contained in annex III. Experience of the past (paras. 15-28) It should have come as no surprise to anyone that some of the missions of the past decade would be particularly hard to accomplish: they tended to deploy where conflict had not resulted in victory for any side, where a military stalemate or international pressure or both had brought fighting to a halt but at least some of the parties to the conflict were not seriously committed to ending the confrontation. United Nations operations thus did not deploy into post-conflict situations but tried to create them. In such complex operations, peacekeepers work to maintain a secure local environment while peacebuilders work to make that environment self-sustaining.ix A/55/305 S/2000/809 Only such an environment offers a ready exit to peacekeeping forces, making peacekeepers and peacebuilders inseparable partners. Implications for preventive action and peace-building: the need for strategy and support (paras. 29-47) The United Nations and its members face a pressing need to establish more effective strategies for conflict prevention, in both the long and short terms. In this context, the Panel endorses the recommendations of the Secretary-General with respect to conflict prevention contained in the Millennium Report (A/54/2000) and in his remarks before the Security Council’s second open meeting on conflict prevention in July 2000. It also encourages the Secretary-General’s more frequent use of fact-finding missions to areas of tension in support of short-term crisispreveentiv action. Furthermore, the Security Council and the General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, conscious that the United Nations will continue to face the prospect of having to assist communities and nations in making the transition from war to peace, have each recognized and acknowledged the key role of peace-building in complex peace operations. This will require that the United Nations system address what has hitherto been a fundamental deficiency in the way it has conceived of, funded and implemented peace-building strategies and activities. Thus, the Panel recommends that the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) present to the Secretary-General a plan to strengthen the permanent capacity of the United Nations to develop peace-building strategies and to implement programmes in support of those strategies. Among the changes that the Panel supports are: a doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police and related rule of law elements in peace operations that emphasizes a team approach to upholding the rule of law and respect for human rights and helping communities coming out of a conflict to achieve national reconciliation; consolidation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programmes into the assessed budgets of complex peace operations in their first phase; flexibility for heads of United Nations peace operations to fund “quick impact projects” that make a real difference in the lives of people in the mission area; and better integration of electoral assistance into a broader strategy for the support of governance institutions. Implications for peacekeeping: the need for robust doctrine and realistic mandates (paras. 48-64) The Panel concurs that consent of the local parties, impartiality and the use of force only in self-defence should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping. Experience shows, however, that in the context of intra-State/transnational conflicts, consent may be manipulated in many ways. Impartiality for United Nations operations must therefore mean adherence to the principles of the Charter: where one party to a peace agreement clearly and incontrovertibly is violating its terms, continued equal treatment of all parties by the United Nations can in the best case result in ineffectiveness and in the worst may amount to complicity with evil. No failure did more to damage the standing and credibility of United Nations peacekeeping in the 1990s than its reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor.xA/55/305 S/2000/809 In the past, the United Nations has often found itself unable to respond effectively to such challenges. It is a fundamental premise of the present report, however, that it must be able to do so. Once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandate professionally and successfully. This means that United Nations military units must be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission’s mandate. Rules of engagement should be sufficiently robust and not force United Nations contingents to cede the initiative to their attackers. This means, in turn, that the Secretariat must not apply best-case planning assumptions to situations where the local actors have historically exhibited worstcaas behaviour. It means that mandates should specify an operation’s authority to use force. It means bigger forces, better equipped and more costly but able to be a credible deterrent. In particular, United Nations forces for complex operations should be afforded the field intelligence and other capabilities needed to mount an effective defence against violent challengers. Moreover, United Nations peacekeepers — troops or police — who witness violence against civilians should be presumed to be authorized to stop it, within their means, in support of basic United Nations principles. However, operations given a broad and explicit mandate for civilian protection must be given the specific resources needed to carry out that mandate. The Secretariat must tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear, when recommending force and other resource levels for a new mission, and it must set those levels according to realistic scenarios that take into account likely challenges to implementation. Security Council mandates, in turn, should reflect the clarity that peacekeeping operations require for unity of effort when they deploy into potentially dangerous situations. The current practice is for the Secretary-General to be given a Security Council resolution specifying troop levels on paper, not knowing whether he will be given the troops and other personnel that the mission needs to function effectively, or whether they will be properly equipped. The Panel is of the view that, once realistic mission requirements have been set and agreed to, the Council should leave its authorizing resolution in draft form until the Secretary-General confirms that he has received troop and other commitments from Member States sufficient to meet those requirements. Member States that do commit formed military units to an operation should be invited to consult with the members of the Security Council during mandate formulation; such advice might usefully be institutionalized via the establishment of ad hoc subsidiary organs of the Council, as provided for in Article 29 of the Charter. Troop contributors should also be invited to attend Secretariat briefings of the Security Council pertaining to crises that affect the safety and security of mission personnel or to a change or reinterpretation of the mandate regarding the use of force. New headquarters capacity for information management and strategic analysis (paras. 65-75) The Panel recommends that a new information-gathering and analysis entity be created to support the informational and analytical needs of the Secretary-Generalxi A/55/305 S/2000/809 and the members of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS). Without such capacity, the Secretariat will remain a reactive institution, unable to get ahead of daily events, and the ECPS will not be able to fulfil the role for which it was created. The Panel’s proposed ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS) would create and maintain integrated databases on peace and security issues, distribute that knowledge efficiently within the United Nations system, generate policy analyses, formulate long-term strategies for ECPS and bring budding crises to the attention of the ECPS leadership. It could also propose and manage the agenda of ECPS itself, helping to transform it into the decision-making body anticipated in the Secretary-General’s initial reforms. The Panel proposes that EISAS be created by consolidating the existing Situation Centre of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) with a number of small, scattered policy planning offices, and adding a small team of military analysts, experts in international criminal networks and information systems specialists. EISAS should serve the needs of all members of ECPS. Improved mission guidance and leadership (paras. 92-101) The Panel believes it is essential to assemble the leadership of a new mission as early as possible at United Nations Headquarters, to participate in shaping a mission’s concept of operations, support plan, budget, staffing and Headquarters mission guidance. To that end, the Panel recommends that the Secretary-General compile, in a systematic fashion and with input from Member States, a comprehensive list of potential special representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs), force commanders, civilian police commissioners, their potential deputies and potential heads of other components of a mission, representing a broad geographic and equitable gender distribution. Rapid deployment standards and “on-call” expertise (paras. 86-91 and 102-169) The first 6 to 12 weeks following a ceasefire or peace accord are often the most critical ones for establishing both a stable peace and the credibility of a new operation. Opportunities lost during that period are hard to regain. The Panel recommends that the United Nations define “rapid and effective deployment capacity” as the ability to fully deploy traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing such an operation, and within 90 days in the case of complex peacekeeping operations. The Panel recommends that the United Nations standby arrangements system (UNSAS) be developed further to include several coherent, multinational, brigadesiiz forces and the necessary enabling forces, created by Member States working in partnership, in order to better meet the need for the robust peacekeeping forces that the Panel has advocated. The Panel also recommends that the Secretariat send a team to confirm the readiness of each potential troop contributor to meet the requisite United Nations training and equipment requirements for peacekeeping operations, prior to deployment. Units that do not meet the requirements must not be deployed.xii A/55/305 S/2000/809 To support such rapid and effective deployment, the Panel recommends that a revolving “on-call list” of about 100 experienced, well qualified military officers, carefully vetted and accepted by DPKO, be created within UNSAS. Teams drawn from this list and available for duty on seven days’ notice would translate broad, strategic-level mission concepts developed at Headquarters into concrete operational and tactical plans in advance of the deployment of troop contingents, and would augment a core element from DPKO to serve as part of a mission start-up team. Parallel on-call lists of civilian police, international judicial experts, penal experts and human rights specialists must be available in sufficient numbers to strengthen rule of law institutions, as needed, and should also be part of UNSAS. Pre-trained teams could then be drawn from this list to precede the main body of civilian police and related specialists into a new mission area, facilitating the rapid and effective deployment of the law and order component into the mission. The Panel also calls upon Member States to establish enhanced national “pools” of police officers and related experts, earmarked for deployment to United Nations peace operations, to help meet the high demand for civilian police and related criminal justice/rule of law expertise in peace operations dealing with intra-State conflict. The Panel also urges Member States to consider forming joint regional partnerships and programmes for the purpose of training members of the respective national pools to United Nations civilian police doctrine and standards. The Secretariat should also address, on an urgent basis, the needs: to put in place a transparent and decentralized recruitment mechanism for civilian field personnel; to improve the retention of the civilian specialists that are needed in every complex peace operation; and to create standby arrangements for their rapid deployment. Finally, the Panel recommends that the Secretariat radically alter the systems and procedures in place for peacekeeping procurement in order to facilitate rapid deployment. It recommends that responsibilities for peacekeeping budgeting and procurement be moved out of the Department of Management and placed in DPKO. The Panel proposes the creation of a new and distinct body of streamlined field procurement policies and procedures; increased delegation of procurement authority to the field; and greater flexibility for field missions in the management of their budgets. The Panel also urges that the Secretary-General formulate and submit to the General Assembly, for its approval, a global logistics support strategy governing the stockpiling of equipment reserves and standing contracts with the private sector for common goods and services. In the interim, the Panel recommends that additional “start-up kits” of essential equipment be maintained at the United Nations Logistics Base (UNLB) in Brindisi, Italy. The Panel also recommends that the Secretary-General be given authority, with the approval of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) to commit up to $50 million well in advance of the adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing a new operation once it becomes clear that an operation is likely to be established.xiii A/55/305 S/2000/809 Enhance Headquarters capacity to plan and support peace operations (paras. 170-197) The Panel recommends that Headquarters support for peacekeeping be treated as a core activity of the United Nations, and as such the majority of its resource requirements should be funded through the regular budget of the Organization. DPKO and other offices that plan and support peacekeeping are currently primarily funded by the Support Account, which is renewed each year and funds only temporary posts. That approach to funding and staff seems to confuse the temporary nature of specific operations with the evident permanence of peacekeeping and other peace operations activities as core functions of the United Nations, which is obviously an untenable state of affairs. The total cost of DPKO and related Headquarters support offices for peacekeeping does not exceed$50 million per annum, or roughly 2 per cent of total peacekeeping costs. Additional resources for those offices are urgently needed to ensure that more than 2 billion spent on peacekeeping in 2001 are well spent. The Panel therefore recommends that the Secretary-General submit a proposal to the General Assembly outlining the Organization’s requirements in full. The Panel believes that a methodical management review of DPKO should be conducted but also believes that staff shortages in certain areas are plainly obvious. For example, it is clearly not enough to have 32 officers providing military planning and guidance to 27,000 troops in the field, nine civilian police staff to identify, vet and provide guidance for up to 8,600 police, and 15 political desk officers for 14 current operations and two new ones, or to allocate just 1.25 per cent of the total costs of peacekeeping to Headquarters administrative and logistics support. Establish Integrated Mission Task Forces for mission planning and support (paras. 198-245) The Panel recommends that Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs) be created, with staff from throughout the United Nations system seconded to them, to plan new missions and help them reach full deployment, significantly enhancing the support that Headquarters provides to the field. There is currently no integrated planning or support cell in the Secretariat that brings together those responsible for political analysis, military operations, civilian police, electoral assistance, human rights, development, humanitarian assistance, refugees and displaced persons, public information, logistics, finance and recruitment. Structural adjustments are also required in other elements of DPKO, in particular to the Military and Civilian Police Division, which should be reorganized into two separate divisions, and the Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD), which should be split into two divisions. The Lessons Learned Unit should be strengthened and moved into the DPKO Office of Operations. Public information planning and support at Headquarters also needs strengthening, as do elements in the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), particularly the electoral unit. Outside the Secretariat, the ability of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to plan and support the human rights components of peace operations needs to be reinforced.xiv A/55/305 S/2000/809 Consideration should be given to allocating a third Assistant Secretary-General to DPKO and designating one of them as “Principal Assistant Secretary-General”, functioning as the deputy to the Under-Secretary-General. Adapting peace operations to the information age (paras. 246-264) Modern, well utilized information technology (IT) is a key enabler of many of the above-mentioned objectives, but gaps in strategy, policy and practice impede its effective use. In particular, Headquarters lacks a sufficiently strong responsibility centre for user-level IT strategy and policy in peace operations. A senior official with such responsibility in the peace and security arena should be appointed and located within EISAS, with counterparts in the offices of the SRSG in every United Nations peace operation. Headquarters and the field missions alike also need a substantive, global, Peace Operations Extranet (POE), through which missions would have access to, among other things, EISAS databases and analyses and lessons learned. Challenges to implementation (paras. 265-280) The Panel believes that the above recommendations fall well within the bounds of what can be reasonably demanded of the Organization’s Member States. Implementing some of them will require additional resources for the Organization, but we do not mean to suggest that the best way to solve the problems of the United Nations is merely to throw additional resources at them. Indeed, no amount of money or resources can substitute for the significant changes that are urgently needed in the culture of the Organization. The Panel calls on the Secretariat to heed the Secretary-General’s initiatives to reach out to the institutions of civil society; to constantly keep in mind that the United Nations they serve is the universal organization. People everywhere are fully entitled to consider that it is their organization, and as such to pass judgement on its activities and the people who serve in it. Furthermore, wide disparities in staff quality exist and those in the system are the first to acknowledge it; better performers are given unreasonable workloads to compensate for those who are less capable. Unless the United Nations takes steps to become a true meritocracy, it will not be able to reverse the alarming trend of qualified personnel, the young among them in particular, leaving the Organization. Moreover, qualified people will have no incentive to join it. Unless managers at all levels, beginning with the Secretary-General and his senior staff, seriously address this problem on a priority basis, reward excellence and remove incompetence, additional resources will be wasted and lasting reform will become impossible. Member States also acknowledge that they need to reflect on their working culture and methods. It is incumbent upon Security Council members, for example, and the membership at large to breathe life into the words that they produce, as did, for instance, the Security Council delegation that flew to Jakarta and Dili in the wake of the East Timor crisis in 1999, an example of effective Council action at its best: res, non verba. We — the members of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations — call on the leaders of the world assembled at the Millennium Summit, as they renew their commitment to the ideals of the United Nations, to commit as well toxv A/55/305 S/2000/809 strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to fully accomplish the mission which is, indeed, its very raison d’être: to help communities engulfed in strife and to maintain or restore peace. While building consensus for the recommendations in the present report, we have also come to a shared vision of a United Nations, extending a strong helping hand to a community, country or region to avert conflict or to end violence. We see an SRSG ending a mission well accomplished, having given the people of a country the opportunity to do for themselves what they could not do before: to build and hold onto peace, to find reconciliation, to strengthen democracy, to secure human rights. We see, above all, a United Nations that has not only the will but also the ability to fulfil its great promise, and to justify the confidence and trust placed in it by the overwhelming majority of humankind.1 A/55/305 S/2000/809 I. The need for change 1. The United Nations was founded, in the words of its Charter, in order “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” Meeting this challenge is the most important function of the Organization, and, to a very significant degree, the yardstick by which it is judged by the peoples it exists to serve. Over the last decade, the United Nations has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge; and it can do no better today. Without significant institutional change, increased financial support, and renewed commitment on the part of Member States, the United Nations will not be capable of executing the critical peacekeeping and peace-building tasks that the Member States assign it in coming months and years. There are many tasks which the United Nations peacekeeping forces should not be asked to undertake, and many places they should not go. But when the United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence with the ability and determination to defeat them. 2. The Secretary-General has asked the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, composed of individuals experienced in various aspects of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace-building (Panel members are listed in annex I), to assess the shortcomings of the existing system and to make frank, specific and realistic recommendations for change. Our recommendations focus not only on politics and strategy but also on operational and organizational areas of need. 3. For preventive initiatives to reduce tension and avert conflict, the Secretary-General needs clear, strong and sustained political support from Member States. For peacekeeping to accomplish its mission, as the United Nations has discovered repeatedly over the last decade, no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force. However, force alone cannot create peace; it can only create a space in which peace can be built. 4. In other words, the key conditions for the success of future complex operations are political support, rapid deployment with a robust force posture and a sound peace-building strategy. Every recommendation in the present report is meant, in one way or another, to help ensure that these three conditions are met. The need for change has been rendered even more urgent by recent events in Sierra Leone and by the daunting prospect of expanded United Nations operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 5. These changes — while essential — will have no lasting impact unless the Member States of the Organization take seriously their responsibility to train and equip their own forces and to mandate and enable their collective instrument, so that together they may succeed in meeting threats to peace. They must summon the political will to support the United Nations politically, financially and operationally — once they have decided to act as the United Nations — if the Organization is to be credible as a force for peace. 6. The recommendations that the Panel presents balance principle and pragmatism, while honouring the spirit and letter of the Charter of the United Nations and the respective roles of the Organization’s legislative bodies. They are based on the following premises: (a) The essential responsibility of Member States for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the need to strengthen both the quality and quantity of support provided to the United Nations system to carry out that responsibility; (b) The pivotal importance of clear, credible and adequately resourced Security Council mandates; (c) A focus by the United Nations system on conflict prevention and its early engagement, wherever possible; (d) The need to have more effective collection and assessment of information at United Nations Headquarters, including an enhanced conflict early warning system that can detect and recognize the threat or risk of conflict or genocide; (e) The essential importance of the United Nations system adhering to and promoting international human rights instruments and standards and international humanitarian law in all aspects of its peace and security activities; (f) The need to build the United Nations capacity to contribute to peace-building, both preventive and post-conflict, in a genuinely integrated manner; (g) The critical need to improve Headquarters planning (including contingency planning) for peace operations;2A/55/305 S/2000/809 (h) The recognition that while the United Nations has acquired considerable expertise in planning, mounting and executing traditional peacekeeping operations, it has yet to acquire the capacity needed to deploy more complex operations rapidly and to sustain them effectively; (i) The necessity to provide field missions with high-quality leaders and managers who are granted greater flexibility and autonomy by Headquarters, within clear mandate parameters and with clear standards of accountability for both spending and results; (j) The imperative to set and adhere to a high standard of competence and integrity for both Headquarters and field personnel, who must be provided the training and support necessary to do their jobs and to progress in their careers, guided by modern management practices that reward meritorious performance and weed out incompetence; (k) The importance of holding individual officials at Headquarters and in the field accountable for their performance, recognizing that they need to be given commensurate responsibility, authority and resources to fulfil their assigned tasks. 7. In the present report, the Panel has addressed itself to many compelling needs for change within the United Nations system. The Panel views its recommendations as the minimum threshold of change needed to give the United Nations system the opportunity to be an effective, operational, twenty-first century institution. (Key recommendations are summarized in bold type throughout the text; they are also combined in a single summary in annex III.) 8. The blunt criticisms contained in the present report reflect the Panel’s collective experience as well as interviews conducted at every level of the system. More than 200 people were either interviewed or provided written input to the Panel. Sources included the Permanent Missions of Member States, including the Security Council members; the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations; and personnel in peace and security-related departments at United Nations Headquarters in New York, in the United Nations Office at Geneva, at the headquarters of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), at the headquarters of other United Nations funds and programmes; at the World Bank and in every current United Nations peace operation. (A list of references is contained in annex II.) II. Doctrine, strategy and decisionmakkin for peace operations 9. The United Nations system — namely the Member States, Security Council, General Assembly and Secretariat — must commit to peace operations carefully, reflecting honestly on the record of its performance over the past decade. It must adjust accordingly the doctrine upon which peace operations are established; fine-tune its analytical and decisionmakkin capacities to respond to existing realities and anticipate future requirements; and summon the creativity, imagination and will required to implement new and alternative solutions to those situations into which peacekeepers cannot or should not go. A. Defining the elements of peace operations 10. United Nations peace operations entail three principal activities: conflict prevention and peacemaking; peacekeeping; and peace-building. Longteer conflict prevention addresses the structural sources of conflict in order to build a solid foundation for peace. Where those foundations are crumbling, conflict prevention attempts to reinforce them, usually in the form of a diplomatic initiative. Such preventive action is, by definition, a low-profile activity; when successful, it may even go unnoticed altogether. 11. Peacemaking addresses conflicts in progress, attempting to bring them to a halt, using the tools of diplomacy and mediation. Peacemakers may be envoys of Governments, groups of States, regional organizations or the United Nations, or they may be unofficial and non-governmental groups, as was the case, for example, in the negotiations leading up to a peace accord for Mozambique. Peacemaking may even be the work of a prominent personality, working independently. 12. Peacekeeping is a 50-year-old enterprise that has evolved rapidly in the past decade from a traditional, primarily military model of observing ceasefires and force separations after inter-State wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements, military and3 A/55/305 S/2000/809 civilian, working together to build peace in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars. 13. Peace-building is a term of more recent origin that, as used in the present report, defines activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war. Thus, peace-building includes but is not limited to reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law (for example, through training and restructuring of local police, and judicial and penal reform); improving respect for human rights through the monitoring, education and investigation of past and existing abuses; providing technical assistance for democratic development (including electoral assistance and support for free media); and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques. 14. Essential complements to effective peacebuilldin include support for the fight against corruption, the implementation of humanitarian demining programmes, emphasis on human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) education and control, and action against other infectious diseases. B. Experience of the past 15. The quiet successes of short-term conflict prevention and peacemaking are often, as noted, politically invisible. Personal envoys and representatives of the Secretary-General (RSGs) or special representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs) have at times complemented the diplomatic initiatives of Member States and, at other times, have taken initiatives that Member States could not readily duplicate. Examples of the latter initiatives (drawn from peacemaking as well as preventive diplomacy) include the achievement of a ceasefire in the Islamic Republic of Iran-Iraq war in 1988, the freeing of the last Western hostages in Lebanon in 1991, and avoidance of war between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Afghanistan in 1998. 16. Those who favour focusing on the underlying causes of conflicts argue that such crisis-related efforts often prove either too little or too late. Attempted earlier, however, diplomatic initiatives may be rebuffed by a government that does not see or will not acknowledge a looming problem, or that may itself be part of the problem. Thus, long-term preventive strategies are a necessary complement to short-term initiatives. 17. Until the end of the cold war, United Nations peacekeeping operations mostly had traditional ceasefire-monitoring mandates and no direct peacebuilldin responsibilities. The “entry strategy” or sequence of events and decisions leading to United Nations deployment was straightforward: war, ceasefire, invitation to monitor ceasefire compliance and deployment of military observers or units to do so, while efforts continued for a political settlement. Intelligence requirements were also fairly straightforward and risks to troops were relatively low. But traditional peacekeeping, which treats the symptoms rather than sources of conflict, has no builtii exit strategy and associated peacemaking was often slow to make progress. As a result, traditional peacekeepers have remained in place for 10, 20, 30 or even 50 years (as in Cyprus, the Middle East and India/Pakistan). By the standards of more complex operations, they are relatively low cost and politically easier to maintain than to remove. However, they are also difficult to justify unless accompanied by serious and sustained peacemaking efforts that seek to transform a ceasefire accord into a durable and lasting peace settlement. 18. Since the end of the cold war, United Nations peacekeeping has often combined with peace-building in complex peace operations deployed into settings of intra-State conflict. Those conflict settings, however, both affect and are affected by outside actors: political patrons; arms vendors; buyers of illicit commodity exports; regional powers that send their own forces into the fray; and neighbouring States that host refugees who are sometimes systematically forced to flee their homes. With such significant cross-border effects by state and non-state actors alike, these conflicts are often decidedly “transnational” in character. 19. Risks and costs for operations that must function in such circumstances are much greater than for traditional peacekeeping. Moreover, the complexity of the tasks assigned to these missions and the volatility of the situation on the ground tend to increase together. Since the end of the cold war, such complex and risky mandates have been the rule rather than the exception: United Nations operations have been given reliefesccor duties where the security situation was so4A/55/305 S/2000/809 dangerous that humanitarian operations could not continue without high risk for humanitarian personnel; they have been given mandates to protect civilian victims of conflict where potential victims were at greatest risk, and mandates to control heavy weapons in possession of local parties when those weapons were being used to threaten the mission and the local population alike. In two extreme situations, United Nations operations were given executive law enforcement and administrative authority where local authority did not exist or was not able to function. 20. It should have come as no surprise to anyone that these missions would be hard to accomplish. Initially, the 1990s offered more positive prospects: operations implementing peace accords were time-limited, rather than of indefinite duration, and successful conduct of national elections seemed to offer a ready exit strategy. However, United Nations operations since then have tended to deploy where conflict has not resulted in victory for any side: it may be that the conflict is stalemated militarily or that international pressure has brought fighting to a halt, but in any event the conflict is unfinished. United Nations operations thus do not deploy into post-conflict situations so much as they deploy to create such situations. That is, they work to divert the unfinished conflict, and the personal, political or other agendas that drove it, from the military to the political arena, and to make that diversion permanent. 21. As the United Nations soon discovered, local parties sign peace accords for a variety of reasons, not all of them favourable to peace. “Spoilers” — groups (including signatories) who renege on their commitments or otherwise seek to undermine a peace accord by violence — challenged peace implementation in Cambodia, threw Angola, Somalia and Sierra Leone back into civil war, and orchestrated the murder of no fewer than 800,000 people in Rwanda. The United Nations must be prepared to deal effectively with spoilers if it expects to achieve a consistent record of success in peacekeeping or peacebuilldin in situations of intrastate/transnational conflict. 22. A growing number of reports on such conflicts have highlighted the fact that would-be spoilers have the greatest incentive to defect from peace accords when they have an independent source of income that pays soldiers, buys guns, enriches faction leaders and may even have been the motive for war. Recent history indicates that, where such income streams from the export of illicit narcotics, gemstones or other highvaalu commodities cannot be pinched off, peace is unsustainable. 23. Neighbouring States can contribute to the problem by allowing passage of conflict-supporting contraband, serving as middlemen for it or providing base areas for fighters. To counter such conflictsuppoortin neighbours, a peace operation will require the active political, logistical and/or military support of one or more great powers, or of major regional powers. The tougher the operation, the more important such backing becomes. 24. Other variables that affect the difficulty of peace implementation include, first, the sources of the conflict. These can range from economics (e.g., issues of poverty, distribution, discrimination or corruption), politics (an unalloyed contest for power) and resource and other environmental issues (such as competition for scarce water) to issues of ethnicity, religion or gross violations of human rights. Political and economic objectives may be more fluid and open to compromise than objectives related to resource needs, ethnicity or religion. Second, the complexity of negotiating and implementing peace will tend to rise with the number of local parties and the divergence of their goals (e.g., some may seek unity, others separation). Third, the level of casualties, population displacement and infrastructure damage will affect the level of wargeneerate grievance, and thus the difficulty of reconciliation, which requires that past human rights violations be addressed, as well as the cost and complexity of reconstruction. 25. A relatively less dangerous environment — just two parties, committed to peace, with competitive but congruent aims, lacking illicit sources of income, with neighbours and patrons committed to peace — is a fairly forgiving one. In less forgiving, more dangerous environments — three or more parties, of varying commitment to peace, with divergent aims, with independent sources of income and arms, and with neighbours who are willing to buy, sell and transit illicit goods — United Nations missions put not only their own people but peace itself at risk unless they perform their tasks with the competence and efficiency that the situation requires and have serious great power backing.5 A/55/305 S/2000/809 26. It is vitally important that negotiators, the Security Council, Secretariat mission planners, and mission participants alike understand which of these political-military environments they are entering, how the environment may change under their feet once they arrive, and what they realistically plan to do if and when it does change. Each of these must be factored into an operation’s entry strategy and, indeed, into the basic decision about whether an operation is feasible and should even be attempted. 27. It is equally important, in this context, to judge the extent to which local authorities are willing and able to take difficult but necessary political and economic decisions and to participate in the establishment of processes and mechanisms to manage internal disputes and pre-empt violence or the reemerrgenc of conflict. These are factors over which a field mission and the United Nations have little control, yet such a cooperative environment is critical in determining the successful outcome of a peace operation. 28. When complex peace operations do go into the field, it is the task of the operation’s peacekeepers to maintain a secure local environment for peacebuillding and the peacebuilders’ task to support the political, social and economic changes that create a secure environment that is self-sustaining. Only such an environment offers a ready exit to peacekeeping forces, unless the international community is willing to tolerate recurrence of conflict when such forces depart. History has taught that peacekeepers and peacebuilders are inseparable partners in complex operations: while the peacebuilders may not be able to function without the peacekeepers’ support, the peacekeepers have no exit without the peacebuilders’ work. C. Implications for preventive action 29. United Nations peace operations addressed no more than one third of the conflict situations of the 1990s. Because even much-improved mechanisms for creation and support of United Nations peacekeeping operations will not enable the United Nations system to respond with such operations in the case of all conflict everywhere, there is a pressing need for the United Nations and its Member States to establish a more effective system for long-term conflict prevention. Prevention is clearly far more preferable for those who would otherwise suffer the consequences of war, and is a less costly option for the international community than military action, emergency humanitarian relief or reconstruction after a war has run its course. As the Secretary-General noted in his recent Millennium Report (A/54/2000), “every step taken towards reducing poverty and achieving broad-based economic growth is a step toward conflict prevention”. In many cases of internal conflict, “poverty is coupled with sharp ethnic or religious cleavages”, in which minority rights “are insufficiently respected [and] the institutions of government are insufficiently inclusive”. Long-term preventive strategies in such instances must therefore work “to promote human rights, to protect minority rights and to institute political arrangements in which all groups are represented. ... Every group needs to become convinced that the state belongs to all people”. 30. The Panel wishes to commend the United Nations ongoing internal Task Force on Peace and Security for its work in the area of long-term prevention, in particular the notion that development entities in the United Nations system should view humanitarian and development work through a “conflict prevention lens” and make long-term prevention a key focus of their work, adapting current tools, such as the common country assessment and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), to that end. 31. To improve early United Nations focus on potential new complex emergencies and thus shortteer conflict prevention, about two years ago the Headquarters Departments that sit on the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) created the Inter-Agency/Interdepartmental Framework for Coordination, in which 10 departments, funds, programmes and agencies now participate. The active element, the Framework Team, meets at the Director level monthly to decide on areas at risk, schedule country (or situation) review meetings and identify preventive measures. The Framework mechanism has improved interdepartmental contacts but has not accumulated knowledge in a structured way, and does no strategic planning. This may have contributed to the Secretariat’s difficulty in persuading Member States of the advantages of backing their professed commitment to both long-and short-term conflict prevention measures with the requisite political and financial support. In the interim, the Secretary-General’s annual reports of 1997 and 1999 (A/52/1 and A/54/1) focused6A/55/305 S/2000/809 specifically on conflict prevention. The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict and the United Nations Association of the United States of America, among others, also have contributed valuable studies on the subject. And more than 400 staff in the United Nations have undergone systematic training in “early warning” at the United Nations Staff College in Turin. 32. At the heart of the question of short-term prevention lies the use of fact-finding missions and other key initiatives by the Secretary-General. These have, however, usually met with two key impediments. First, there is the understandable and legitimate concern of Member States, especially the small and weak among them, about sovereignty. Such concerns are all the greater in the face of initiatives taken by another Member State, especially a stronger neighbour, or by a regional organization that is dominated by one of its members. A state facing internal difficulties would more readily accept overtures by the Secretary-General because of the recognized independence and moral high ground of his position and in view of the letter and spirit of the Charter, which requires that the Secretary-General offer his assistance and expects the Member States to give the United Nations “every assistance” as indicated, in particular, in Article 2 (5) of the Charter. Fact-finding missions are one tool by which the Secretary-General can facilitate the provision of his good offices. 33. The second impediment to effective crisispreveentiv action is the gap between verbal postures and financial and political support for prevention. The Millennium Assembly offers all concerned the opportunity to reassess their commitment to this area and consider the prevention-related recommendations contained in the Secretary-General’s Millennium Report and in his recent remarks before the Security Council’s second open meeting on conflict prevention. There, the Secretary-General emphasized the need for closer collaboration between the Security Council and other principal organs of the United Nations on conflict prevention issues, and ways to interact more closely with non-state actors, including the corporate sector, in helping to defuse or avoid conflicts. 34. Summary of key recommendations on preventive action: (a) The Panel endorses the recommendations of the Secretary-General with respect to conflict prevention contained in the Millennium Report and in his remarks before the Security Council’s second open meeting on conflict prevention in July 2000, in particular his appeal to “all who are engaged in conflict prevention and development — the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, Governments and civil society organizations — [to] address these challenges in a more integrated fashion”; (b) The Panel supports the Secretary-General’s more frequent use of fact-finding missions to areas of tension, and stresses Member States’ obligations, under Article 2 (5) of the Charter, to give “every assistance” to such activities of the United Nations. D. Implications for peace-building strategy 35. The Security Council and the General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations have each recognized and acknowledged the importance of peace-building as integral to the success of peacekeeping operations. In this regard, on 29 December 1998 the Security Council adopted a presidential statement that encouraged the Secretary-General to “explore the possibility of establishing postconfflic peace-building structures as part of efforts by the United Nations system to achieve a lasting peaceful solution to conflicts ...”. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, in its own report earlier in 2000, stressed the importance of defining and identifying elements of peace-building before they are incorporated into the mandates of complex peace operations, so as to facilitate later consideration by the General Assembly of continuing support for key elements of peace-building after a complex operation draws to a close. 36. Peace-building support offices or United Nations political offices may be established as follow-ons to other peace operations, as in Tajikistan or Haiti, or as independent initiatives, as in Guatemala or Guinea-Bissau. They help to support the consolidation of peace in post-conflict countries, working with both Governments and non-governmental parties and complementing what may be ongoing United Nations development activities, which strive to remain apart from politics while nonetheless targeting assistance at the sources of conflict.7 A/55/305 S/2000/809 37. Effective peace-building requires active engagement with the local parties, and that engagement should be multidimensional in nature. First, all peace operations should be given the capacity to make a demonstrable difference in the lives of the people in their mission area, relatively early in the life of the mission. The head of mission should have authority to apply a small percentage of mission funds to “quick impact projects” aimed at real improvements in quality of life, to help establish the credibility of a new mission. The resident coordinator/humanitarian coordinator of the pre-existing United Nations country team should serve as chief adviser for such projects in order to ensure efficient spending and to avoid conflict with other development or humanitarian assistance programmes. 38. Second, “free and fair” elections should be viewed as part of broader efforts to strengthen governance institutions. Elections will be successfully held only in an environment in which a population recovering from war comes to accept the ballot over the bullet as an appropriate and credible mechanism through which their views on government are represented. Elections need the support of a broader process of democratization and civil society building that includes effective civilian governance and a culture of respect for basic human rights, lest elections merely ratify a tyranny of the majority or be overturned by force after a peace operation leaves. 39. Third, United Nations civilian police monitors are not peacebuilders if they simply document or attempt to discourage by their presence abusive or other unacceptable behaviour of local police officers — a traditional and somewhat narrow perspective of civilian police capabilities. Today, missions may require civilian police to be tasked to reform, train and restructure local police forces according to international standards for democratic policing and human rights, as well as having the capacity to respond effectively to civil disorder and for self-defence. The courts, too, into which local police officers bring alleged criminals and the penal system to which the law commits prisoners also must be politically impartial and free from intimidation or duress. Where peace-building missions require it, international judicial experts, penal experts and human rights specialists, as well as civilian police, must be available in sufficient numbers to strengthen rule of law institutions. Where justice, reconciliation and the fight against impunity require it, the Security Council should authorize such experts, as well as relevant criminal investigators and forensic specialists, to further the work of apprehension and prosecution of persons indicted for war crimes in support of United Nations international criminal tribunals. 40. While this team approach may seem self-evident, the United Nations has faced situations in the past decade where the Security Council has authorized the deployment of several thousand police in a peacekeeping operation but has resisted the notion of providing the same operations with even 20 or 30 criminal justice experts. Further, the modern role of civilian police needs to be better understood and developed. In short, a doctrinal shift is required in how the Organization conceives of and utilizes civilian police in peace operations, as well as the need for an adequately resourced team approach to upholding the rule of law and respect for human rights, through judicial, penal, human rights and policing experts working together in a coordinated and collegial manner. 41. Fourth, the human rights component of a peace operation is indeed critical to effective peace-building. United Nations human rights personnel can play a leading role, for example, in helping to implement a comprehensive programme for national reconciliation. The human rights components within peace operations have not always received the political and administrative support that they require, however, nor are their functions always clearly understood by other components. Thus, the Panel stresses the importance of training military, police and other civilian personnel on human rights issues and on the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law. In this respect, the Panel commends the Secretary-General’s bulletin of 6 August 1999 entitled “Observance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian law” (ST/SGB/1999/13). 42. Fifth, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants — key to immediate post-conflict stability and reduced likelihood of conflict recurrence — is an area in which peace-building makes a direct contribution to public security and law and order. But the basic objective of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration is not met unless all three elements of the programme are implemented. Demobilized fighters (who almost never fully disarm) will tend to return to a life of violence if8A/55/305 S/2000/809 they find no legitimate livelihood, that is, if they are not “reintegrated” into the local economy. The reintegration element of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration is voluntarily funded, however, and that funding has sometimes badly lagged behind requirements. 43. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration has been a feature of at least 15 peacekeeping operations in the past 10 years. More than a dozen United Nations agencies and programmes as well as international and local NGOs, fund these programmes. Partly because so many actors are involved in planning or supporting disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, it lacks a designated focal point within the United Nations system. 44. Effective peace-building also requires a focal point to coordinate the many different activities that building peace entails. In the view of the Panel, the United Nations should be considered the focal point for peace-building activities by the donor community. To that end, there is great merit in creating a consolidated and permanent institutional capacity within the United Nations system. The Panel therefore believes that the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, in his/her capacity as Convener of ECPS, should serve as the focal point for peace-building. The Panel also supports efforts under way by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to jointly strengthen United Nations capacity in this area, because effective peace-building is, in effect, a hybrid of political and development activities targeted at the sources of conflict. 45. DPA, the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Department of Disarmament Affairs (DDA), the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), UNDP, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), OHCHR, UNHCR, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, and the United Nations Security Coordinator are represented in ECPS; the World Bank Group has been invited to participate as well. ECPS thus provides the ideal forum for the formulation of peace-building strategies. 46. Nonetheless, a distinction should be made between strategy formulation and the implementation of such strategies, based upon a rational division of labour among ECPS members. In the Panel's view, UNDP has untapped potential in this area, and UNDP, in cooperation with other United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and the World Bank, are best placed to take the lead in implementing peace-building activities. The Panel therefore recommends that ECPS propose to the Secretary-General a plan to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to develop peacebuilldin strategies and to implement programmes in support of those strategies. That plan should also indicate the criteria for determining when the appointment of a senior political envoy or representative of the Secretary-General may be warranted to raise the profile and sharpen the political focus of peace-building activities in a particular region or country recovering from conflict. 47. Summary of key recommendations on peacebuillding (a) A small percentage of a mission’s firstyeea budget should be made available to the representative or special representative of the Secretary-General leading the mission to fund quick impact projects in its area of operations, with the advice of the United Nations country team’s resident coordinator; (b) The Panel recommends a doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police, other rule of law elements and human rights experts in complex peace operations to reflect an increased focus on strengthening rule of law institutions and improving respect for human rights in post-conflict environments; (c) The Panel recommends that the legislative bodies consider bringing demobilization and reintegration programmes into the assessed budgets of complex peace operations for the first phase of an operation in order to facilitate the rapid disassembly of fighting factions and reduce the likelihood of resumed conflict; (d) The Panel recommends that the Executive Committee on Peace and Security discuss and recommend to the Secretary-General a plan to strengthen the permanent capacity of the United Nations to develop peace-building strategies and to implement programmes in support of those strategies.9 A/55/305 S/2000/809 E. Implications for peacekeeping doctrine and strategy 48. The Panel concurs that consent of the local parties, impartiality and use of force only in selfdeffenc should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping. Experience shows, however, that in the context of modern peace operations dealing with intra-State/transnational conflicts, consent may be manipulated in many ways by the local parties. A party may give its consent to United Nations presence merely to gain time to retool its fighting forces and withdraw consent when the peacekeeping operation no longer serves its interests. A party may seek to limit an operation’s freedom of movement, adopt a policy of persistent non-compliance with the provisions of an agreement or withdraw its consent altogether. Moreover, regardless of faction leaders’ commitment to the peace, fighting forces may simply be under much looser control than the conventional armies with which traditional peacekeepers work, and such forces may split into factions whose existence and implications were not contemplated in the peace agreement under the colour of which the United Nations mission operates. 49. In the past, the United Nations has often found itself unable to respond effectively to such challenges. It is a fundamental premise of the present report, however, that it must be able to do so. Once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandate professionally and successfully. This means that United Nations military units must be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission’s mandate. Rules of engagement should not limit contingents to stroke-forstrrok responses but should allow ripostes sufficient to silence a source of deadly fire that is directed at United Nations troops or at the people they are charged to protect and, in particularly dangerous situations, should not force United Nations contingents to cede the initiative to their attackers. 50. Impartiality for such operations must therefore mean adherence to the principles of the Charter and to the objectives of a mandate that is rooted in those Charter principles. Such impartiality is not the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time, which can amount to a policy of appeasement. In some cases, local parties consist not of moral equals but of obvious aggressors and victims, and peacekeepers may not only be operationally justified in using force but morally compelled to do so. Genocide in Rwanda went as far as it did in part because the international community failed to use or to reinforce the operation then on the ground in that country to oppose obvious evil. The Security Council has since established, in its resolution 1296 (2000), that the targeting of civilians in armed conflict and the denial of humanitarian access to civilian populations afflicted by war may themselves constitute threats to international peace and security and thus be triggers for Security Council action. If a United Nations peace operation is already on the ground, carrying out those actions may become its responsibility, and it should be prepared. 51. This means, in turn, that the Secretariat must not apply best-case planning assumptions to situations where the local actors have historically exhibited worst-case behaviour. It means that mandates should specify an operation’s authority to use force. It means bigger forces, better equipped and more costly, but able to pose a credible deterrent threat, in contrast to the symbolic and non-threatening presence that characterizes traditional peacekeeping. United Nations forces for complex operations should be sized and configured so as to leave no doubt in the minds of would-be spoilers as to which of the two approaches the Organization has adopted. Such forces should be afforded the field intelligence and other capabilities needed to mount a defence against violent challengers. 52. Willingness of Member States to contribute troops to a credible operation of this sort also implies a willingness to accept the risk of casualties on behalf of the mandate. Reluctance to accept that risk has grown since the difficult missions of the mid-1990s, partly because Member States are not clear about how to define their national interests in taking such risks, and partly because they may be unclear about the risks themselves. In seeking contributions of forces, therefore, the Secretary-General must be able to make the case that troop contributors and indeed all Member States have a stake in the management and resolution of the conflict, if only as part of the larger enterprise of establishing peace that the United Nations represents. In so doing, the Secretary-General should be able to give would-be troop contributors an assessment of risk that describes what the conflict and the peace are about, evaluates the capabilities and objectives of the local parties, and assesses the independent financial10 A/55/305 S/2000/809 resources at their disposal and the implications of those resources for the maintenance of peace. The Security Council and the Secretariat also must be able to win the confidence of troop contributors that the strategy and concept of operations for a new mission are sound and that they will be sending troops or police to serve under a competent mission with effective leadership. 53. The Panel recognizes that the United Nations does not wage war. Where enforcement action is required, it has consistently been entrusted to coalitions of willing States, with the authorization of the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter. 54. The Charter clearly encourages cooperation with regional and subregional organizations to resolve conflict and establish and maintain peace and security. The United Nations is actively and successfully engaged in many such cooperation programmes in the field of conflict prevention, peacemaking, elections and electoral assistance, human rights monitoring and humanitarian work and other peace-building activities in various parts of the world. Where peacekeeping operations are concerned, however, caution seems appropriate, because military resources and capability are unevenly distributed around the world, and troops in the most crisis-prone areas are often less prepared for the demands of modern peacekeeping than is the case elsewhere. Providing training, equipment, logistical support and other resources to regional and subregional organizations could enable peacekeepers from all regions to participate in a United Nations peacekeeping operation or to set up regional peacekeeping operations on the basis of a Security Council resolution. 55. Summary of key recommendation on peacekeeping doctrine and strategy: once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandates professionally and successfully and be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission’s mandate, with robust rules of engagement, against those who renege on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence. F. Clear, credible and achievable mandates 56. As a political body, the Security Council focuses on consensus-building, even though it can take decisions with less than unanimity. But the compromises required to build consensus can be made at the expense of specificity, and the resulting ambiguity can have serious consequences in the field if the mandate is then subject to varying interpretation by different elements of a peace operation, or if local actors perceive a less than complete Council commitment to peace implementation that offers encouragement to spoilers. Ambiguity may also paper over differences that emerge later, under pressure of a crisis, to prevent urgent Council action. While it acknowledges the utility of political compromise in many cases, the Panel comes down in this case on the side of clarity, especially for operations that will deploy into dangerous circumstances. Rather than send an operation into danger with unclear instructions, the Panel urges that the Council refrain from mandating such a mission. 57. The outlines of a possible United Nations peace operation often first appear when negotiators working toward a peace agreement contemplate United Nations implementation of that agreement. Although peace negotiators (peacemakers) may be skilled professionals in their craft, they are much less likely to know in detail the operational requirements of soldiers, police, relief providers or electoral advisers in United Nations field missions. Non-United Nations peacemakers may have even less knowledge of those requirements. Yet the Secretariat has, in recent years, found itself required to execute mandates that were developed elsewhere and delivered to it via the Security Council with but minor changes. 58. The Panel believes that the Secretariat must be able to make a strong case to the Security Council that requests for United Nations implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements need to meet certain minimum conditions before the Council commits United Nations-led forces to implement such accords, including the opportunity to have adviser-observers present at the peace negotiations; that any agreement be consistent with prevailing international human rights standards and humanitarian law; and that tasks to be undertaken by the United Nations are operationally achievable — with local responsibility for supporting11 A/55/305 S/2000/809 them specified — and either contribute to addressing the sources of conflict or provide the space required for others to do so. Since competent advice to negotiators may depend on detailed knowledge of the situation on the ground, the Secretary-General should be preauthoorize to commit funds from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund sufficient to conduct a preliminary site survey in the prospective mission area. 59. In advising the Council on mission requirements, the Secretariat must not set mission force and other resource levels according to what it presumes to be acceptable to the Council politically. By self-censoring in that manner, the Secretariat sets up itself and the mission not just to fail but to be the scapegoats for failure. Although presenting and justifying planning estimates according to high operational standards might reduce the likelihood of an operation going forward, Member States must not be led to believe that they are doing something useful for countries in trouble when — by under-resourcing missions — they are more likely agreeing to a waste of human resources, time and money. 60. Moreover, the Panel believes that until the Secretary-General is able to obtain solid commitments from Member States for the forces that he or she does believe necessary to carry out an operation, it should not go forward at all. To deploy a partial force incapable of solidifying a fragile peace would first raise and then dash the hopes of a population engulfed in conflict or recovering from war, and damage the credibility of the United Nations as a whole. In such circumstances, the Panel believes that the Security Council should leave in draft form a resolution that contemplated sizeable force levels for a new peacekeeping operation until such time as the Secretary-General could confirm that the necessary troop commitments had been received from Member States. 61. There are several ways to diminish the likelihood of such commitment gaps, including better coordination and consultation between potential troop contributors and the members of the Security Council during the mandate formulation process. Troop contributor advice to the Security Council might usefully be institutionalized via the establishment of ad hoc subsidiary organs of the Council, as provided for in Article 29 of the Charter. Member States contributing formed military units to an operation should as a matter of course be invited to attend Secretariat briefings of the Security Council pertaining to crises that affect the safety and security of the mission’s personnel or to a change or reinterpretation of a mission’s mandate with respect to the use of force. 62. Finally, the desire on the part of the Secretary-General to extend additional protection to civilians in armed conflicts and the actions of the Security Council to give United Nations peacekeepers explicit authority to protect civilians in conflict situations are positive developments. Indeed, peacekeepers — troops or police — who witness violence against civilians should be presumed to be authorized to stop it, within their means, in support of basic United Nations principles and, as stated in the report of the Independent Inquiry on Rwanda, consistent with “the perception and the expectation of protection created by [an operation’s] very presence” (see S/1999/1257, p. 51). 63. However, the Panel is concerned about the credibility and achievability of a blanket mandate in this area. There are hundreds of thousands of civilians in current United Nations mission areas who are exposed to potential risk of violence, and United Nations forces currently deployed could not protect more than a small fraction of them even if directed to do so. Promising to extend such protection establishes a very high threshold of expectation. The potentially large mismatch between desired objective and resources available to meet it raises the prospect of continuing disappointment with United Nations followthrroug in this area. If an operation is given a mandate to protect civilians, therefore, it also must be given the specific resources needed to carry out that mandate. 64. Summary of key recommendations on clear, credible and achievable mandates: (a) The Panel recommends that, before the Security Council agrees to implement a ceasefire or peace agreement with a United Nations-led peacekeeping operation, the Council assure itself that the agreement meets threshold conditions, such as consistency with international human rights standards and practicability of specified tasks and timelines; (b) The Security Council should leave in draft form resolutions authorizing missions with sizeable troop levels until such time as the Secretary-General has firm commitments of troops and other critical mission support elements,12 A/55/305 S/2000/809 including peace-building elements, from Member States; (c) Security Council resolutions should meet the requirements of peacekeeping operations when they deploy into potentially dangerous situations, especially the need for a clear chain of command and unity of effort; (d) The Secretariat must tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear, when formulating or changing mission mandates, and countries that have committed military units to an operation should have access to Secretariat briefings to the Council on matters affecting the safety and security of their personnel, especially those meetings with implications for a mission’s use of force. G. Information-gathering, analysis, and strategic planning capacities 65. A strategic approach by the United Nations to conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace-building will require that the Secretariat’s key implementing departments in peace and security work more closely together. To do so, they will need sharper tools to gather and analyse relevant information and to support ECPS, the nominal high-level decision-making forum for peace and security issues. 66. ECPS is one of four “sectoral” executive committees established in the Secretary-General’s initial reform package of early 1997 (see A/51/829, sect. A). The Committees for Economic and Social Affairs, Development Operations, and Humanitarian Affairs were also established. OHCHR is a member of all four. These committees were designed to “facilitate more concerted and coordinated management” across participating departments and were given “executive decision-making as well as coordinating powers.” Chaired by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, ECPS has promoted greater exchange of information across and cooperation between departments, but it has not yet become the decisionmakkin body that the 1997 reforms envisioned, which its participants acknowledge. 67. Current Secretariat staffing levels and job demands in the peace and security sector more or less preclude departmental policy planning. Although most ECPS members have policy or planning units, they tend to be drawn into day-to-day issues. Yet without significant knowledge generating and analytic capacity, the Secretariat will remain a reactive institution unable to get ahead of daily events, and ECPS will not be able to fulfil the role for which it was created. 68. The Secretary-General and the members of ECPS need a professional system in the Secretariat for accumulating knowledge about conflict situations, distributing that knowledge efficiently to a wide user base, generating policy analyses and formulating longteer strategies. That system does not exist at present. The Panel proposes that it be created as the ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat, or EISAS. 69. The bulk of EISAS should be formed by consolidation of the various departmental units that are assigned policy and information analysis roles related to peace and security, including the Policy Analysis Unit and the Situation Centre of DPKO; the Policy Planning Unit of DPA; the Policy Development Unit (or elements thereof) of OCHA; and the Media Monitoring and Analysis Section of the Department of Public Information (DPI). 70. Additional staff would be required to give EISAS expertise that does not exist elsewhere in the system or that cannot be taken from existing structures. These additions would include a head of the staff (at Director level), a small team of military analysts, police experts and highly qualified information systems analysts who would be responsible for managing the design and maintenance of EISAS databases and their accessibility to both Headquarters and field offices and missions. 71. Close affiliates of EISAS should include the Strategic Planning Unit of the Office of the Secretary-General; the Emergency Response Division of UNDP; the Peace-building Unit (see paras. 239-243 below); the Information Analysis Unit of OCHA (which supports Relief Web); the New York liaison offices of OHCHR and UNHCR; the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator; and the Monitoring, Database and Information Branch of DDA. The World Bank Group should be invited to maintain liaison, using appropriate elements, such as the Bank’s Post-Conflict Unit. 72. As a common service, EISAS would be of both short-term and long-term value to ECPS members. It would strengthen the daily reporting function of the DPKO Situation Centre, generating all-source updates13 A/55/305 S/2000/809 on mission activity and relevant global events. It could bring a budding crisis to the attention of ECPS leadership and brief them on that crisis using modern presentation techniques. It could serve as a focal point for timely analysis of cross-cutting thematic issues and preparation of reports for the Secretary-General on such issues. Finally, based on the prevailing mix of missions, crises, interests of the legislative bodies and inputs from ECPS members, EISAS could propose and manage the agenda of ECPS itself, support its deliberations and help to transform it into the decisionmakkin body anticipated in the Secretary-General’s initial reforms. 73. EISAS should be able to draw upon the best available expertise — inside and outside the United Nations system — to fine-tune its analyses with regard to particular places and circumstances. It should provide the Secretary-General and ECPS members with consolidated assessments of United Nations and other efforts to address the sources and symptoms of ongoing and looming conflicts, and should be able to assess the potential utility — and implications — of further United Nations involvement. It should provide the basic background information for the initial work of the Integrated Mission Task Forces (ITMFs) that the Panel recommends below (see paras. 198-217), be established to plan and support the set up of peace operations, and continue to provide analyses and manage the information flow between mission and Task Force once the mission has been established. 74. EISAS should create, maintain and draw upon shared, integrated, databases that would eventually replace the proliferated copies of code cables, daily situation reports, daily news feeds and informal connections with knowledgeable colleagues that desk officers and decision makers alike currently use to keep informed of events in their areas of responsibility. With appropriate safeguards, such databases could be made available to users of a peace operations Intranet (see paras. 255 and 256 below). Such databases, potentially available to Headquarters and field alike via increasingly cheap commercial broadband communications services, would help to revolutionize the manner in which the United Nations accumulates knowledge and analyses key peace and security issues. EISAS should also eventually supersede the Framework for Coordination mechanism. 75. Summary of key recommendation on information and strategic analysis: the Secretary-General should establish an entity, referred to here as the ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS), that would support the information and analysis needs of all members of ECPS; for management purposes, it should be administered by and report jointly to the heads of DPA and DPKO. H. The challenge of transitional civil administration 76. Until mid-1999, the United Nations had conducted just a small handful of field operations with elements of civil administration conduct or oversight. In June 1999, however, the Secretariat found itself directed to develop a transitional civil administration for Kosovo, and three months later for East Timor. The struggles of the United Nations to set up and manage those operations are part of the backdrop to the narratives on rapid deployment and on Headquarters staffing and structure in the present report. 77. These operations face challenges and responsibilities that are unique among United Nations field operations. No other operations must set and enforce the law, establish customs services and regulations, set and collect business and personal taxes, attract foreign investment, adjudicate property disputes and liabilities for war damage, reconstruct and operate all public utilities, create a banking system, run schools and pay teachers and collect the garbage — in a wardammage society, using voluntary contributions, because the assessed mission budget, even for such “transitional administration” missions, does not fund local administration itself. In addition to such tasks, these missions must also try to rebuild civil society and promote respect for human rights, in places where grievance is widespread and grudges run deep. 78. Beyond such challenges lies the larger question of whether the United Nations should be in this business at all, and if so whether it should be considered an element of peace operations or should be managed by some other structure. Although the Security Council may not again direct the United Nations to do transitional civil administration, no one expected it to do so with respect to Kosovo or East Timor either. Intra-State conflicts continue and future instability is hard to predict, so that despite evident ambivalence about civil administration among United Nations Member States and within the Secretariat, other such14 A/55/305 S/2000/809 missions may indeed be established in the future and on an equally urgent basis. Thus, the Secretariat faces an unpleasant dilemma: to assume that transitional administration is a transitory responsibility, not prepare for additional missions and do badly if it is once again flung into the breach, or to prepare well and be asked to undertake them more often because it is well prepared. Certainly, if the Secretariat anticipates future transitional administrations as the rule rather than the exception, then a dedicated and distinct responsibility centre for those tasks must be created somewhere within the United Nations system. In the interim, DPKO has to continue to support this function. 79. Meanwhile, there is a pressing issue in transitional civil administration that must be addressed, and that is the issue of “applicable law.” In the two locales where United Nations operations now have law enforcement responsibility, local judicial and legal capacity was found to be non-existent, out of practice or subject to intimidation by armed elements. Moreover, in both places, the law and legal systems prevailing prior to the conflict were questioned or rejected by key groups considered to be the victims of the conflicts. 80. Even if the choice of local legal code were clear, however, a mission’s justice team would face the prospect of learning that code and its associated procedures well enough to prosecute and adjudicate cases in court. Differences in language, culture, custom and experience mean that the learning process could easily take six months or longer. The United Nations currently has no answer to the question of what such an operation should do while its law and order team inches up such a learning curve. Powerful local political factions can and have taken advantage of the learning period to set up their own parallel administrations, and crime syndicates gladly exploit whatever legal or enforcement vacuums they can find. 81. These missions’ tasks would have been much easier if a common United Nations justice package had allowed them to apply an interim legal code to which mission personnel could have been pre-trained while the final answer to the “applicable law” question was being worked out. Although no work is currently under way within Secretariat legal offices on this issue, interviews with researchers indicate that some headway toward dealing with the problem has been made outside the United Nations system, emphasizing the principles, guidelines, codes and procedures contained in several dozen international conventions and declarations relating to human rights, humanitarian law, and guidelines for police, prosecutors and penal systems. 82. Such research aims at a code that contains the basics of both law and procedure to enable an operation to apply due process using international jurists and internationally agreed standards in the case of such crimes as murder, rape, arson, kidnapping and aggravated assault. Property law would probably remain beyond reach of such a “model code”, but at least an operation would be able to prosecute effectively those who burned their neighbours’ homes while the property law issue was being addressed. 83. Summary of key recommendation on transitional civil administration: the Panel recommends that the Secretary-General invite a panel of international legal experts, including individuals with experience in United Nations operations that have transitional administration mandates, to evaluate the feasibility and utility of developing an interim criminal code, including any regional adaptations potentially required, for use by such operations pending the re-establishment of local rule of law and local law enforcement capacity. III. United Nations capacities to deploy operations rapidly and effectively 84. Many observers have questioned why it takes so long for the United Nations to fully deploy operations following the adoption of a Security Council resolution. The reasons are several. The United Nations does not have a standing army, and it does not have a standing police force designed for field operations. There is no reserve corps of mission leadership: special representatives of the Secretary-General and heads of mission, force commanders, police commissioners, directors of administration and other leadership components are not sought until urgently needed. The Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) currently in place for potential government-provided military, police and civilian expertise has yet to become a dependable supply of resources. The stockpile of essential equipment recycled from the large missions of the mid-1990s to the United Nations Logistics Base (UNLB) at Brindisi, Italy, has been depleted by the current surge in missions and there is as yet no budgetary vehicle for rebuilding it quickly. The15 A/55/305 S/2000/809 peacekeeping procurement process may not adequately balance its responsibilities for cost-effectiveness and financial responsibility against overriding operational needs for timely response and mission credibility. The need for standby arrangements for the recruitment of civilian personnel in substantive and support areas has long been recognized but not yet implemented. And finally, the Secretary-General lacks most of the authority to acquire, hire and preposition the goods and people needed to deploy an operation rapidly before the Security Council adopts the resolution to establish it, however likely such an operation may seem. 85. In short, few of the basic building blocks are in place for the United Nations to rapidly acquire and deploy the human and material resources required to mount any complex peace operation in the future. A. Defining what “rapid and effective deployment” entails 86. The proceedings of the Security Council, the reports of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and input provided to the Panel by the field missions, the Secretariat and the Member States all agree on the need for the United Nations to significantly strengthen capacity to deploy new field operations rapidly and effectively. In order to strengthen these capacities, the United Nations must first agree on basic parameters for defining what “rapidity” and “effectiveness” entail. 87. The first six to 12 weeks following a ceasefire or peace accord is often the most critical period for establishing both a stable peace and the credibility of the peacekeepers. Credibility and political momentum lost during this period can often be difficult to regain. Deployment timelines should thus be tailored accordingly. However, the speedy deployment of military, civilian police and civilian expertise will not help to solidify a fragile peace and establish the credibility of an operation if these personnel are not equipped to do their job. To be effective, the missions’ personnel need materiel (equipment and logistics support), finance (cash in hand to procure goods and services) information assets (training and briefing), an operational strategy and, for operations deploying into uncertain circumstances, a military and political “centre of gravity” sufficient to enable it to anticipate and overcome one or more of the parties’ second thoughts about taking a peace process forward. 88. Timelines for rapid and effective deployment will naturally vary in accordance with the politico-military situations that are unique to each post-conflict environment. Nevertheless, the first step in enhancing the United Nations capacity for rapid deployment must begin with agreeing upon a standard towards which the Organization should strive. No such standard yet exists. The Panel thus proposes that the United Nations develop the operational capabilities to fully deploy “traditional” peacekeeping operations within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution, and complex peacekeeping operations within 90 days. In the case of the latter, the mission headquarters should be fully installed and functioning within 15 days. 89. In order to meet these timelines, the Secretariat would need one or a combination of the following: (a) standing reserves of military, civilian police and civilian expertise, materiel and financing; (b) extremely reliable standby capacities to be called upon on short notice; or (c) sufficient lead-time to acquire these resources, which would require the ability to foresee, plan for and initiate spending for potential new missions several months ahead of time. A number of the Panel’s recommendations are directed at strengthening the Secretariat’s analytical capacities and aligning them with the mission planning process in order to help the United Nations be better prepared for potential new operations. However, neither the outbreak of war nor the conclusion of peace can always be predicted well in advance. In fact, experience has shown that this is often not the case. Thus, the Secretariat must be able to maintain a certain generic level of preparedness, through the establishment of new standing capacities and enhancement of existing standby capacities, so as to be prepared for unforeseen demands. 90. Many Member States have argued against the establishment of a standing United Nations army or police force, resisted entering into reliable standby arrangements, cautioned against the incursion of financial expenses for building a reserve of equipment or discouraged the Secretariat from undertaking planning for potential operations prior to the Secretary-General having been granted specific, crisis-driven legislative authority to do so. Under these circumstances, the United Nations cannot deploy operations “rapidly and effectively” within the timelines suggested. The analysis that follows argues16 A/55/305 S/2000/809 that at least some of these circumstances must change to make rapid and effective deployment possible. 91. Summary of key recommendation on determining deployment timelines: the United Nations should define “rapid and effective deployment capacities” as the ability, from an operational perspective, to fully deploy traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days after the adoption of a Security Council resolution, and within 90 days in the case of complex peacekeeping operations. B. Effective mission leadership 92. Effective, dynamic leadership can make the difference between a cohesive mission with high morale and effectiveness despite adverse circumstances, and one that struggles to maintain any of those attributes. That is, the tenor of an entire mission can be heavily influenced by the character and ability of those who lead it. 93. Given this critical role, the current United Nations approach to recruiting, selecting, training and supporting its mission leaders leaves major room for improvement. Lists of potential candidates are informally maintained. RSGs and SRSGs, heads of mission, force commanders, civilian police commissioners and their respective deputies may not be selected until close to or even after adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing a new mission. They and other heads of substantive and administrative components may not meet one another until they reach the mission area, following a few days of introductory meetings with Headquarters officials. They will be given generic terms of reference that spell out their overall roles and responsibilities, but rarely will they leave Headquarters with mission-specific policy or operational guidance in hand. Initially, at least, they will determine on their own how to implement the Security Council’s mandate and how to deal with potential challenges to implementation. They must develop a strategy for implementing the mandate while trying to establish the mission’s political/military centre of gravity and sustain a potentially fragile peace process. 94. Factoring in the politics of selection makes the process somewhat more understandable. Political sensitivities about a new mission may preclude the Secretary-General’s canvassing potential candidates much before a mission has been established. In selecting SRSGs, RSGs or other heads of mission, the Secretary-General must consider the views of Security Council members, the States within the region and the local parties, the confidence of each of whom an RSG/SRSG needs in order to be effective. The choice of one or more deputy SRSGs may be influenced by the need to achieve geographic distribution within the mission’s leadership. The nationality of the force commander, the police commissioner and their deputies will need to reflect the composition of the military and police components, and will also need to consider the political sensitivities of the local parties. 95. Although political and geographic considerations are legitimate, in the Panel’s view managerial talent and experience must be accorded at least equal priority in choosing mission leadership. Based on the personal experiences of several of its members in leading field operations, the Panel endorses the need to assemble the leadership of a mission as early as possible, so that they can jointly help to shape a mission’s concept of operations, its support plan, its budget and its staffing arrangements. 96. To facilitate early selection, the Panel recommends that the Secretary-General compile, in a systematic fashion, and with input from Member States, a comprehensive list of potential SRSGs, force commanders, police commissioners and potential deputies, as well as candidates to head other substantive components of a mission, representing a broad geographic and equitable gender distribution. Such a database would facilitate early identification and selection of the leadership group. 97. The Secretariat should, as a matter of standard practice, provide mission leadership with strategic guidance and plans for anticipating and overcoming challenges to mandate implementation and, whenever possible, formulate such guidance and plans together with the mission leadership. The leadership should also consult widely with the United Nations resident country team and with NGOs working in the mission area to broaden and deepen its local knowledge, which is critical to implementing a comprehensive strategy for transition from war to peace. The country team’s resident coordinator should be included more frequently in the formal mission planning process.17 A/55/305 S/2000/809 98. The Panel believes that there should always be at least one member of the senior management team of a mission with relevant United Nations experience, preferably both in a field mission and at Headquarters. Such an individual would facilitate the work of those members of the management team from outside the United Nations system, shortening the time they would otherwise need to become familiar with the Organization’s rules, regulations, policies and working methods, answering the sorts of questions that predeplooymen training cannot anticipate. 99. The Panel notes the precedent of appointing the resident coordinator/humanitarian coordinator of the team of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes engaged in development work and humanitarian assistance in a particular country as one of the deputies to the SRSG of a complex peace operation. In our view, this practice should be emulated wherever possible. 100. Conversely, it is critical that field representatives of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes facilitate the work of an SRSG or RSG in his or her role as the coordinator of all United Nations activities in the country concerned. On a number of occasions, attempts to perform this role have been hampered by overly bureaucratic resistance to coordination. Such tendencies do not do justice to the concept of the United Nations family that the Secretary-General has tried hard to encourage. 101. Summary of key recommendations on mission leadership: (a) The Secretary-General should systematize the method of selecting mission leaders, beginning with the compilation of a comprehensive list of potential representatives or special representatives of the Secretary-General, force commanders, civilian police commissioners and their deputies and other heads of substantive and administrative components, within a fair geographic and gender distribution and with input from Member States; (b) The entire leadership of a mission should be selected and assembled at Headquarters as early as possible in order to enable their participation in key aspects of the mission planning process, for briefings on the situation in the mission area and to meet and work with their colleagues in mission leadership; (c) The Secretariat should routinely provide the mission leadership with strategic guidance and plans for anticipating and overcoming challenges to mandate implementation and, whenever possible, should formulate such guidance and plans together with the mission leadership. C. Military personnel 102. The United Nations launched UNSAS in the mid-1990s in order to enhance its rapid deployment capabilities and to enable it to respond to the unpredictable and exponential growth in the establishment of the new generation of complex peacekeeping operations. UNSAS is a database of military, civilian police and civilian assets and expertise indicated by Governments to be available, in theory, for deployment to United Nations peacekeeping operations at seven, 15, 30, 60 or 90 days’ notice. The database currently includes 147,900 personnel from 87 Member States: 85,000 in military combat units; 56,700 in military support elements; 1,600 military observers; 2,150 civilian police; and 2,450 other civilian specialists. Of the 87 participating States, 31 have concluded memoranda of understanding with the United Nations enumerating their responsibilities for preparedness of the personnel concerned, but the same memoranda also codify the conditional nature of their commitment. In essence, the memorandum of understanding confirms that States maintain their sovereign right to “just say no” to a request from the Secretary-General to contribute those assets to an operation. 103. The absence of detailed statistics on responses notwithstanding, many Member States are saying “no” to deploying formed military units to United Nationslle peacekeeping operations, far more often than they are saying “yes”. In contrast to the long tradition of developed countries providing the bulk of the troops for United Nations peacekeeping operations during the Organization’s first 50 years, in the last few years 77 per cent of the troops in formed military units deployed in United Nations peacekeeping operations, as of end-June 2000, were contributed by developing countries. 104. The five Permanent Members of the Security Council are currently contributing far fewer troops to United Nations-led operations, but four of the five have contributed sizeable forces to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led operations in Bosnia and18 A/55/305 S/2000/809 Herzegovina and Kosovo that provide a secure environment in which the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) can function. The United Kingdom also deployed troops to Sierra Leone at a critical point in the crisis (outside United Nations operational control), providing a valuable stabilizing influence, but no developed country currently contributes troops to the most difficult United Nations-led peacekeeping operations from a security perspective, namely the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). 105. Memories of peacekeepers murdered in Mogadishu and Kigali and taken hostage in Sierra Leone help to explain the difficulties Member States are having in convincing their national legislatures and public that they should support the deployment of their troops to United Nations-led operations, particularly in Africa. Moreover, developed States tend not to see strategic national interests at stake. The downsizing of national military forces and the growth in European regional peacekeeping initiatives further depletes the pool of well-trained and well-equipped military contingents from developed countries to serve in United Nations-led operations. 106. Thus, the United Nations is facing a very serious dilemma. A mission such as UNAMSIL would probably not have faced the difficulties that it did in spring 2000 had it been provided with forces as strong as those currently keeping the peace as part of KFOR in Kosovo. The Panel is convinced that NATO military planners would not have agreed to deploy to Sierra Leone with only the 6,000 troops initially authorized. Yet, the likelihood of a KFOR-type operation being deployed in Africa in the near future seems remote given current trends. Even if the United Nations were to attempt to deploy a KFOR-type force, it is not clear, given current standby arrangements, where the troops and equipment would come from. 107. A number of developing countries do respond to requests for peacekeeping forces with troops who serve with distinction and dedication according to very high professional standards, and in accord with new contingent-owned equipment (COE) procedures (“wet lease” agreements) adopted by the General Assembly, which provide that national troop contingents are to bring with them almost all the equipment and supplies required to sustain their troops. The United Nations commits to reimburse troop contributors for use of their equipment and to provide those services and support not covered under the new COE procedures. In return, the troop contributing nations undertake to honour the memoranda of understanding on COE procedures that they sign. 108. Yet, the Secretary-General finds himself in an untenable position. He is given a Security Council resolution specifying troop levels on paper, but without knowing whether he will be given the troops to put on the ground. The troops that eventually arrive in theatre may still be underequipped: Some countries have provided soldiers without rifles, or with rifles but no helmets, or with helmets but no flak jackets, or with no organic transport capability (trucks or troops carriers). Troops may be untrained in peacekeeping operations, and in any case the various contingents in an operation are unlikely to have trained or worked together before. Some units may have no personnel who can speak the mission language. Even if language is not a problem, they may lack common operating procedures and have differing interpretations of key elements of command and control and of the mission’s rules of engagement, and may have differing expectations about mission requirements for the use of force. 109. This must stop. Troop-contributing countries that cannot meet the terms of their memoranda of understanding should so indicate to the United Nations, and must not deploy. To that end, the Secretary-General should be given the resources and support needed to assess potential troop contributors’ preparedness prior to deployment, and to confirm that the provisions of the memoranda will be met. 110. A further step towards improving the current situation would be to give the Secretary-General a capability for assembling, on short notice, military planners, staff officers and other military technical experts, preferably with prior United Nations mission experience, to liaise with mission planners at Headquarters and to then deploy to the field with a core element from DPKO to help establish a mission’s military headquarters, as authorized by the Security Council. Using the current Standby Arrangements System, an “on-call list” of such personnel, nominated by Member States within a fair geographic distribution and carefully vetted and accepted by DPKO, could be formed for this purpose and for strengthening ongoing missions in times of crisis. Personnel assigned to this19 A/55/305 S/2000/809 on-call list of about 100 officers would be at the rank of Major to Colonel and would be treated, upon their short-notice call-up, as United Nations military observers, with appropriate modifications. 111. Personnel selected for inclusion in the on-call list would be pre-qualified medically and administratively for deployment worldwide, would participate in advance training and would incur a commitment of up to two years for immediate deployment within 7-days notification. Every three months, the on-call list would be updated with some 10 to 15 new personnel, as nominated by Member States, to be trained during an initial three-month period. With continuous updating every three months, the on-call list would contain about five to seven teams ready for short-notice deployment. Initial team training would include at the outset a pre-qualification and education phase (brief one-week classroom and apprentice instruction in United Nations systems), followed by a hands-on professional development phase (deployment to an ongoing United Nations peacekeeping operation as a military observer team for about 10 weeks). After this initial three-month team training period, individual officers would then return to their countries and assume an on-call status. 112. Upon Security Council authorization, one or more of these teams could be called up for immediate duty. They would travel to United Nations Headquarters for refresher orientation and specific mission guidance, as necessary, and interaction with the planners of the Integrated Mission Task Force (see paras. 198-217 below) for that operation, before deploying to the field. The teams’ mission would be to translate the broad strategic-level concepts of the mission developed by IMTF into concrete operational and tactical plans, and to undertake immediate coordination and liaison tasks in advance of the deployment of troop contingents. Once deployed, an advance team would remain operational until replaced by deploying contingents (usually about 2 to 3 months, but longer if necessary, up to a six-month term). 113. Funding for a team's initial training would come from the budget of the ongoing mission in which the team is deployed for initial training, and funding for an on-call deployment would come from the prospective peacekeeping mission budget. The United Nations would incur no costs for such personnel while they were on on-call status in their home country as they would be performing normal duties in their national armed forces. The Panel recommends that the Secretary-General outline this proposal with implementing details to the Member States for immediate implementation within the parameters of the existing Standby Arrangements System. 114. Such an emergency military field planning and liaison staff capacity would not be enough, however, to ensure force coherence. In our view, in order to function as a coherent force the troop contingents themselves should at least have been trained and equipped according to a common standard, supplemented by joint planning at the contingents’ command level. Ideally, they will have had the opportunity to conduct joint training field exercises. 115. If United Nations military planners assess that a brigade (approximately 5,000 troops) is what is required to effectively deter or deal with violent challenges to the implementation of an operation’s mandate, then the military component of that United Nations operation ought to deploy as a brigade formation, not as a collection of battalions that are unfamiliar with one another’s doctrine, leadership and operational practices. That brigade would have to come from a group of countries that have been working together as suggested above to develop common training and equipment standards, common doctrine, and common arrangements for the operational control of the force. Ideally, UNSAS should contain several coherent such brigade-size forces, with the necessary enabling forces, available for full deployment to an operation within 30 days in the case of traditional peacekeeping operations and within 90 days in the case of complex operations. 116. To that end, the United Nations should establish the minimum training, equipment and other standards required for forces to participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Member States with the means to do so could form partnerships, within the context of UNSAS, to provide financial, equipment, training and other assistance to troop contributors from less developed countries to enable them to reach and maintain that minimum standard, with the goal that each of the brigades so established should be of comparably high quality and be able to call upon effective levels of operational support. Such a formation has been the objective of the Standing High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) group of States, who have also established a command-level planning element that works together routinely. However, the20 A/55/305 S/2000/809 proposed arrangement is not intended as a mechanism for relieving some States from their responsibilities to participate actively in United Nations peacekeeping operations or for precluding the participation of smaller States in such operations. 117. Summary of key recommendations on military personnel: (a) Member States should be encouraged, where appropriate, to enter into partnerships with one another, within the context of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS), to form several coherent brigade-size forces, with necessary enabling forces, ready for effective deployment within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing a traditional peacekeeping operation and within 90 days for complex peacekeeping operations; (b) The Secretary-General should be given the authority to formally canvass Member States participating in UNSAS regarding their willingness to contribute troops to a potential operation once it appeared likely that a ceasefire accord or agreement envisaging an implementing role for the United Nations might be reached; (c) The Secretariat should, as a standard practice, send a team to confirm the preparedness of each potential troop contributor to meet the provisions of the memoranda of understanding on the requisite training and equipment requirements, prior to deployment; those that do not meet the requirements must not deploy; (d) The Panel recommends that a revolving “on-call list” of about 100 military officers be created in UNSAS to be available on seven days’ notice to augment nuclei of DPKO planners with teams trained to create a mission headquarters for a new peacekeeping operation. D. Civilian police 118. Civilian police are second only to military forces in numbers of international personnel involved in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Demand for civilian police operations dealing with intra-State conflict is likely to remain high on any list of requirements for helping a war-torn society restore conditions for social, economic and political stability. The fairness and impartiality of the local police force, which civilian police monitor and train, is crucial to maintaining a safe and secure environment, and its effectiveness is vital where intimidation and criminal networks continue to obstruct progress on the political and economic fronts. 119. The Panel has accordingly argued (see paras. 39, 40 and 47 (b) above) for a doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police in United Nations peace operations, to focus primarily on the reform and restructuring of local police forces in addition to traditional advisory, training and monitoring tasks. This shift will require Member States to provide the United Nations with even more well-trained and specialized police experts, at a time when they face difficulties meeting current requirements. As of 1 August 2000, 25 per cent of the 8,641 police positions authorized for United Nations operations remained vacant. 120. Whereas Member States may face domestic political difficulties in sending military units to United Nations peace operations, Governments tend to face fewer political constraints in contributing their civilian police to peace operations. However, Member States still have practical difficulties doing so, because the size and configuration of their police forces tend to be tailored to domestic needs alone. 121. Under the circumstances, the process of identifying, securing the release of and training police and related justice experts for mission service is often time-consuming, and prevents the United Nations from deploying a mission’s civilian police component rapidly and effectively. Moreover, the police component of a mission may comprise officers drawn from up to 40 countries who have never met one another before, have little or no United Nations experience, and have received little relevant training or mission-specific briefings, and whose policing practices and doctrines may vary widely. Moreover, civilian police generally rotate out of operations after six months to one year. All of those factors make it extremely difficult for missions’ civilian police commissioners to transform a disparate group of officers into a cohesive and effective force. 122. The Panel therefore calls upon Member States to establish national pools of serving police officers (augmented, if necessary, by recently retired police officers who meet the professional and physical requirements) who are administratively and medically21 A/55/305 S/2000/809 ready for deployment to United Nations peace operations, within the context of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System. The size of the pool will naturally vary with each country’s size and capacity. The Civilian Police Unit of DPKO should assist Member States in determining the selection criteria and training requirements for police officers within these pools, by identifying the specialities and expertise required and issuing common guidelines on the professional standards to be met. Once deployed in a United Nations mission, civilian police officers should serve for at least one year to ensure a minimum level of continuity. 123. The Panel believes that the cohesion of police components would be further enhanced if policecontriibutin States were to develop joint training exercises, and therefore recommends that Member States, where appropriate, enter into new regional training partnerships and strengthen existing ones. The Panel also calls upon Member States in a position to do so to offer assistance (e.g., training and equipment) to smaller police-contributing States to maintain the requisite level of preparedness, according to guidelines, standard operating procedures and performance standards promulgated by the United Nations. 124. The Panel also recommends that Member States designate a single point of contact within their governmental structures to be responsible for coordinating and managing the provision of police personnel to United Nations peace operations. 125. The Panel believes that the Secretary-General should be given a capability for assembling, on short notice, senior civilian police planners and technical experts, preferably with prior United Nations mission experience, to liaise with mission planners at Headquarters and to then deploy to the field to help establish a mission’s civilian police headquarters, as authorized by the Security Council, in a standby arrangement that parallels the military headquarters oncaal list and its procedures. Upon call-up, members of the on-call list would have the same contractual and legal status as other civilian police in United Nations operations. The training and deployment arrangements for members of the on-call list also could be the same as those of its military counterpart. Furthermore, joint training and planning between the military and civilian police officers on the respective lists would further enhance mission cohesion and cooperation across components at the start-up of a new operation. 126. Summary of key recommendations on civilian police personnel: (a) Member States are encouraged to each establish a national pool of civilian police officers that would be ready for deployment to United Nations peace operations on short notice, within the context of the United Nations standby arrangements system; (b) Member States are encouraged to enter into regional training partnerships for civilian police in the respective national pools in order to promote a common level of preparedness in accordance with guidelines, standard operating procedures and performance standards to be promulgated by the United Nations; (c) Members States are encouraged to designate a single point of contact within their governmental structures for the provision of civilian police to United Nations peace operations; (d) The Panel recommends that a revolving on-call list of about 100 police officers and related experts be created in UNSAS to be available on seven days’ notice with teams trained to create the civilian police component of a new peacekeeping operation, train incoming personnel and give the component greater coherence at an early date; (e) The Panel recommends that parallel arrangements to recommendations (a), (b) and (c) above be established for judicial, penal, human rights and other relevant specialists, who with specialist civilian police will make up collegial “rule of law” teams. E. Civilian specialists 127. To date, the Secretariat has been unable to identify, recruit and deploy suitably qualified civilian personnel in substantive and support functions either at the right time or in the numbers required. Currently, about 50 per cent of field positions in substantive areas and up to 40 per cent of the positions in administrative and logistics areas are vacant, in missions that were established six months to one year ago and remain in desperate need of the requisite specialists. Some of those who have been deployed have found themselves in positions that do not match their previous experience, such as in the civil administration22 A/55/305 S/2000/809 components of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and UNMIK. Furthermore, the rate of recruitment is nearly matched by the rate of departure by mission personnel fed up with the working conditions that they face, including the short-staffing itself. High vacancy and turnover rates foreshadow a disturbing scenario for the start-up and maintenance of the next complex peacekeeping operation, and hamper the full deployment of current missions. Those problems are compounded by several factors. 1. Lack of standby systems to respond to unexpected or high-volume surge demands 128. Each new complex task assigned to the new generation of peacekeeping operations creates demands that the United Nations system is not able to meet on short notice. This phenomenon first emerged in the early 1990s, with the establishment of the following operations to implement peace accords: the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) and the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). The system struggled to recruit experts on short notice in electoral assistance, economic reconstruction and rehabilitation, human rights monitoring, radio and television production, judicial affairs and institution-building. By middeccade the system had created a cadre of individuals, which had acquired on-the-job expertise in these areas, hitherto not present in the system. However, for reasons explained below, many of those individuals have since left the system. 129. The Secretariat was again taken by surprise in 1999, when it had to staff missions with responsibilities for governance in East Timor and Kosovo. Few staff within the Secretariat, or within United Nations agencies, funds or programmes possess the technical expertise and experience required to run a municipality or national ministry. Neither could Member States themselves fill the gap immediately, because they, too, had done no advance planning to identify qualified and available candidates within their national structures. Moreover, the understaffed transitional administration missions themselves took some time to even specify precisely what they required. Eventually, a few Member States offered to provide candidates (some at no cost to the United Nations) to satisfy substantial elements of the demand. However, the Secretariat did not fully avail itself of those offers, partly to avoid the resulting lopsided geographic distribution in the missions’ staffing. The idea of individual Member States taking over entire sectors of administration (sectoral responsibility) was also floated, apparently too late in the process to iron out the details. This idea is worth revisiting, at least for the provision of small teams of civil administrators with specialized expertise. 130. In order to respond quickly, ensure quality control and satisfy the volume of even foreseeable demands, the Secretariat would require the existence and maintenance of a roster of civilian candidates. The roster (which would be distinct from UNSAS) should include the names of individuals in a variety of fields, who have been actively sought out (on an individual basis or through partnerships with and/or the assistance of the members of the United Nations family, governmental, intergovernmental and nongovernnmenta organizations), pre-vetted, interviewed, pre-selected, medically cleared and provided with the basic orientation material applicable to field mission service in general, and who have indicated their availability on short notice. 131. No such roster currently exists. As a result, urgent phone calls have to be made to Member States, United Nations departments and agencies and the field missions themselves to identify suitable candidates at the last minute, and to then expect those candidates to be in a position to drop everything overnight. Through this method, the Secretariat has managed to recruit and deploy at least 1,500 new staff over the last year, not including the managed reassignments of existing staff within the United Nations system, but quality control has suffered. 132. A central Intranet-based roster should be created, along the lines proposed above, that is accessible to and maintained by the relevant members of ECPS. The roster should include the names of their own staff whom ECPS members would agree to release for mission service. Some additional resources would be required to maintain these rosters, but accepted external candidates could be reminded automatically to update their own records via the Internet, particularly as regards availability, and they should be able to access on-line briefing and training materials via the Internet, as well. Field missions should be granted access and delegated the authority to recruit candidates23 A/55/305 S/2000/809 from the roster, in accordance with guidelines to be promulgated by the Secretariat for ensuring fair geographic and gender distribution. 2. Difficulties in attracting and retaining the best external recruits 133. As ad hoc as the recruitment system has been, the United Nations has managed to recruit some very qualified and dedicated individuals for field assignments throughout the 1990s. They have managed ballots in Cambodia, dodged bullets in Somalia, evacuated just in time from Liberia and came to accept artillery fire in former Yugoslavia as a feature of their daily life. Yet, the United Nations system has not yet found a contractual mechanism to appropriately recognize and reward their service by offering them some job security. While it is true that mission recruits are explicitly told not to harbour false expectations about future employment because external recruits are brought in to fill a “temporary” demand, such conditions of service do not attract and retain the best performers for long. In general, there is a need to rethink the historically prevailing view of peacekeeping as a temporary aberration rather than a core function of the United Nations. 134. Thus, at least a percentage of the best external recruits should be offered longer-term career prospects beyond the limited-duration contracts that they are currently offered, and some of them should be actively recruited for positions in the Secretariat’s complex emergency departments in order to increase the number of Headquarters staff with field experience. A limited number of mission recruits have managed to secure positions at Headquarters, but apparently on an ad hoc and individual basis rather than according to a concerted and transparent strategy. 135. Proposals are currently being formulated to address this situation by enabling mission recruits who have served for four years in the field to be offered “continuing appointments”, whenever possible; unlike current contracts, these would not be restricted to the duration of a specific mission mandate. Such initiatives, if adopted, would help to address the problem for those who joined the field in mid-decade and remain in the system. They might not, however, go far enough to attract new recruits, who would generally have to take up six-month to one-year assignments at a time, without necessarily knowing if there would be a position for them once the assignment had been completed. The thought of having to live in limbo for four years might be inhibiting for some of the best candidates, particularly for those with families, who have ample alternative employment opportunities (often with more competitive conditions of service). Consideration should therefore be given to offering continuing appointments to those external recruits who have served with particular distinction for at least two years in a peace operation. 3. Shortages in administrative and support functions at the mid-to senior-levels 136. Critical shortfalls in key administrative areas (procurement, finance, budget, personnel) and in logistics support areas (contracts managers, engineers, information systems analysts, logistics planners) plagued United Nations peace operations throughout the 1990s. The unique and specific nature of the Organization’s administrative rules, regulations and internal procedures preclude new recruits from taking on these administrative and logistics functions in the dynamic conditions of mission start-up, without a substantial amount of training. While ad hoc training programmes for such personnel were initiated in 1995, they have yet to be institutionalized because the most experienced individuals, the would-be trainers, could not be spared from their full-time line responsibilities. In general, training and the production of user-friendly guidance documents are the first projects to be set aside when new missions have to be staffed on an urgent basis. Accordingly, the updated version of the 1992 field administration handbook still remains in draft form. 4. Penalizing field deployment 137. Headquarters staff who are familiar with the rules, regulations and procedures do not readily deploy to the field. Staff in both administrative and substantive areas must volunteer for field duty and their managers must agree to release them. Heads of departments often discourage, dissuade and/or refuse to release their best performers for field assignments because of shortages of competent staff in their own offices, which they fear temporary replacements cannot resolve. Potential volunteers are further discouraged because they know colleagues who were passed over for promotion because they were “out of sight, out of mind.” Most field operations are “non-family assignments” given security considerations, another factor which reduces24 A/55/305 S/2000/809 the numbers of volunteers. A number of the fieldorieente United Nations agencies, funds and programmes (UNHCR, the World Food Programme (WFP), UNICEF, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), UNDP) do have a number of potentially well qualified candidates for peacekeeping service, but also face resource constraints, and the staffing needs of their own field operations generally take first priority. 138. The Office of Human Resources Management, supported by a number of interdepartmental task forces, has proposed a series of progressive reforms that address some of these problems. They require mobility within the Secretariat, and aim to encourage rotation between Headquarters and the field by rewarding mission service during promotion considerations. They seek to reduce recruitment delays and grant full recruitment authority to heads of departments. The Panel feels it is essential that these initiatives be approved expeditiously. 5. Obsolescence in the Field Service category 139. The Field Service is the only category of staff within the United Nations designed specifically for service in peacekeeping operations (and whose conditions of service and contracts are designed accordingly and whose salaries and benefits are paid for entirely from mission budgets). It has lost much of its value, however, because the Organization has not dedicated enough resources to career development for the Field Service Officers. This category was developed in the 1950s to provide a highly mobile cadre of technical specialists to support in particular the military contingents of peacekeeping operations. As the nature of the operations changed, so too did the functions the Field Service Officers were asked to perform. Eventually, some ascended through the ranks by the late 1980s and early 1990s to assume managerial functions in the administrative and logistics components of peacekeeping operations. 140. The most experienced and seasoned of the group are now in limited supply, deployed in current missions, and many are at or near retirement. Many of those who remain lack the managerial skills or training required to effectively run the key administrative components of complex peace operations. Others’ technical knowledge is dated. Thus, the Field Service’s composition no longer matches all or many of the administrative and logistics support needs of the newer generation of peacekeeping operations. The Panel therefore encourages the urgent revision of the Field Service’s composition and raison d’être, to better match the present and future demands of field operations, with particular emphasis on mid-to seniorleeve managers in key administrative and logistics areas. Staff development and training for this category of personnel, on a continual basis, should also be treated as a high priority, and the conditions of service should be revised to attract and retain the best candidates. 6. Lack of a comprehensive staffing strategy for peace operations 141. There is no comprehensive staffing strategy to ensure the right mix of civilian personnel in any operation. There are talents within the United Nations system that must be tapped, gaps to be filled through external recruitment and a range of other options that fall in between, such as the use of United Nations Volunteers, subcontracted personnel, commercial services, and nationally-recruited staff. The United Nations has turned to all of these sources of personnel throughout the past decade, but on a case-by-case basis rather than according to a global strategy. Such a strategy is required to ensure cost-effectiveness and efficiency, as well as to promote mission cohesion and staff morale. 142. This staffing strategy should address the use of United Nations Volunteers in peacekeeping operations, on a priority basis. Since 1992, more than 4,000 United Nations Volunteers have served in 19 different peacekeeping operations. Approximately 1,500 United Nations Volunteers have been assigned to new missions in East Timor, Kosovo and Sierra Leone in the last 18 months alone, in civil administration, electoral affairs, human rights, administrative and logistics support roles. United Nations Volunteers have historically proven to be dedicated and competent in their fields of work. The legislative bodies have encouraged greater use of United Nations Volunteers in peacekeeping operations based on their exemplary past performance, but using United Nations Volunteers as a form of cheap labour risks corrupting the programme and can be damaging to mission morale. Many United Nations Volunteers work alongside colleagues who are making three or four times their salary for similar functions. DPKO is currently in discussion with the United Nations Volunteers Programme on the conclusion of a global memorandum of understanding for the use of25 A/55/305 S/2000/809 United Nations Volunteers in peacekeeping operations. It is essential that such a memorandum be part of a broader comprehensive staffing strategy for peace operations. 143. This strategy should also include, in particular, detailed proposals for the establishment of a Civilian Standby Arrangements System (CSAS). CSAS should contain a list of personnel within the United Nations system who have been pre-selected, medically cleared and committed by their parent offices to join a mission start-up team on 72 hours’ notice. The relevant members of the United Nations family should be delegated authority and responsibility, for occupational groups within their respective expertise, to initiate partnerships and memoranda of understanding with intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, for the provision of personnel to supplement mission start-up teams drawn from within the United Nations system. 144. The fact that responsibility for developing a global staffing strategy and civilian standby arrangements has rested solely within the Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD), acting on its own initiative whenever there are a few moments to spare, is itself an indication that the Secretariat has not dedicated enough attention to this critical issue. The staffing of a mission, from the top down, is perhaps one of the most important building blocks for successful mission execution. This subject should therefore be accorded the highest priority by the Secretariat’s senior management. 145. Summary of key recommendations on civilian specialists: (a) The Secretariat should establish a central Internet/Intranet-based roster of pre-selected civilian candidates available to deploy to peace operations on short notice. The field missions should be granted access to and delegated authority to recruit candidates from it, in accordance with guidelines on fair geographic and gender distribution to be promulgated by the Secretariat; (b) The Field Service category of personnel should be reformed to mirror the recurrent demands faced by all peace operations, especially at the mid-to senior-levels in the administrative and logistics areas; (c) Conditions of service for externally recruited civilian staff should be revised to enable the United Nations to attract the most highly qualified candidates, and to then offer those who have served with distinction greater career prospects; (d) DPKO should formulate a comprehensive staffing strategy for peace operations, outlining, among other issues, the use of United Nations Volunteers, standby arrangements for the provision of civilian personnel on 72 hours’ notice to facilitate mission start-up, and the divisions of responsibility among the members of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security for implementing that strategy. F. Public information capacity 146. An effective public information and communications capacity in mission areas is an operational necessity for virtually all United Nations peace operations. Effective communication helps to dispel rumour, to counter disinformation and to secure the cooperation of local populations. It can provide leverage in dealing with leaders of rival groups, enhance security of United Nations personnel and serve as a force multiplier. It is thus essential that every peace operation formulate public information campaign strategies, particularly for key aspects of a mission’s mandate, and that such strategies and the personnel required to implement them be included in the very first elements deployed to help start up a new mission. 147. Field missions need competent spokespeople who are integrated into the senior management team and project its daily face to the world. To be effective, the spokesperson must have journalistic experience and instincts, and knowledge of how both the mission and United Nations Headquarters work. He or she must also enjoy the confidence of the SRSG and establish good relationship with other members of the mission leadership. The Secretariat must therefore increase its efforts to develop and retain a pool of such personnel. 148. United Nations field operations also need to be able to speak effectively to their own people, to keep staff informed of mission policy and developments and to build links between components and both up and down the chain of command. New information technology provides effective tools for such communications, and should be included in the start-up kits and equipment reserves at UNLB in Brindisi.26 A/55/305 S/2000/809 149. Resources devoted to public information and the associated personnel and information technology required to get an operation’s message out and build effective internal communications links, which now infrequently exceed one per cent of a mission’s operating budget, should be increased in accordance with a mission’s mandate, size and needs. 150. Summary of key recommendation on rapidly deployable capacity for public information: additional resources should be devoted in mission budgets to public information and the associated personnel and information technology required to get an operation’s message out and build effective internal communications links. G. Logistics support, the procurement process and expenditure management 151. The depletion of the United Nations reserve of equipment, long lead-times even for systems contracts, bottlenecks in the procurement process and delays in obtaining cash in hand to conduct procurement in the field further constrain the rapid deployment and effective functioning of missions that do actually manage to reach authorized staffing levels. Without effective logistics support, missions cannot function effectively. 152. The lead-times required for the United Nations to provide field missions with basic equipment and commercial services required for mission start-up and full deployment are dictated by the United Nations procurement process. That process is governed by the Financial Regulations and Rules promulgated by the General Assembly and the Secretariat’s interpretations of those regulations and rules (known as “policies and procedures” in United Nations parlance). The regulations, rules, policies and procedures have been translated into a roughly eight-step process that Headquarters must follow to provide field missions with the equipment and services it requires, as follows: 1. Identify the requirements and raise a requisition. 2. Certify that finances are available to procure the item. 3. Initiate an invitation to bid (ITB) or request for proposal (RFP). 4. Evaluate tenders. 5. Present cases to the Headquarters Committee on Contracts (HCC). 6. Award a contract and place an order for production. 7. Await production of the item. 8. Deliver the item to the mission. 153. Most governmental organizations and commercial companies follow similar processes, though not all of them take as long as that of the United Nations. For example, this entire process in the United Nations can take 20 weeks in the case of office furniture, 17 to 21 weeks for generators, 23 to 27 weeks for prefabricated buildings, 27 weeks for heavy vehicles and 17 to 21 weeks for communications equipment. Naturally, none of these lead-times enable full mission deployment within the timelines suggested if the majority of the processes are commencing only after an operation has been established. 154. The United Nations launched the “start-up kit” concept during the boom in peacekeeping operations in the mid-1990s to partially address this problem. The start-up kits contain the basic equipment required to establish and sustain a 100-person mission headquarters for the first 100 days of deployment, prepurchhased packaged and waiting and ready to deploy at a moment’s notice at Brindisi. Assessed contributions from the mission to which the kits are deployed are then used to reconstitute new start-up kits, and once liquidated a mission’s non-disposable and durable equipment is returned to Brindisi and held in reserve, in addition to the start-up kits. 155. However, the wear and tear on light vehicles and other items in post-war environments may sometimes render the shipping and servicing costs more expensive than selling off the item or cannibalizing it for parts and then purchasing a new item altogether. Thus, the United Nations has moved towards auctioning such items in situ more frequently, although the Secretariat is not authorized to use the funds acquired through this process to purchase new equipment but must return it to Member States. Consideration should be given to enabling the Secretariat to use the funds acquired through these means to purchase new equipment to be held in reserve at Brindisi. Furthermore, consideration should also be given to a general authorization for field missions to donate, in consultation with the United Nations resident coordinator, at least a percentage of27 A/55/305 S/2000/809 such equipment to reputable local non-governmental organizations as a means of assisting the development of nascent civil society. 156. Nonetheless, the existence of these start-up kits and reserves of equipment appears to have greatly facilitated the rapid deployment of the smaller operations mounted in the mid-to-late 1990s. However, the establishment and expansion of new missions has now outpaced the closure of existing operations, so that UNLB has been virtually depleted of the long lead-time items required for full mission deployment. Unless one of the large operations currently in place closes down today and its equipment is all shipped to UNLB in good condition, the United Nations will not have in hand the equipment required to support the start-up and rapid full deployment of a large mission in the near future. 157. There are, of course, limits to how much equipment the United Nations can and should keep in reserve at UNLB or elsewhere. Mechanical equipment in storage needs to be maintained, which can be an expensive proposition, and if not addressed properly can result in missions receiving long awaited items that are inoperable. Furthermore, the commercial and public sectors at the national level have moved increasingly towards “just-in-time” inventory and/or “just-in-time delivery” because of the high opportunity costs of keeping funds tied up in equipment that may not be deployed for some time. Furthermore, the current pace of technological advancements renders certain items, such as communications equipment and information systems hardware, obsolete within a matter of months, let alone years. 158. The United Nations has accordingly also moved in that direction over the past few years, and has concluded some 20 standing commercial systems contracts for the provision of common equipment for peace operations, particularly those required for mission start-up and expansion. Under the systems contracts, the United Nations has been able to cut down lead-times considerably by selecting the vendors ahead of time, and keeping them on standby for production requests. Nevertheless, the production of light vehicles under the current systems contract takes 14 weeks and requires an additional four weeks for delivery. 159. The General Assembly has taken a number of steps to address this lead-time issue. The establishment of the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, which when fully capitalized amounts to150 million, provided a standing pool of money from which to draw quickly. The Secretary-General can seek the approval of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) to draw up to $50 million from the Fund to facilitate the start-up of a new mission or for unforeseen expansion of an existing one. The Fund is then replenished from the mission budgets once it has been approved or increased. For commitment requests in excess of$50 million, the General Assembly’s approval is required. 160. In exceptional cases, the General Assembly, on the advice of ACABQ, has granted the Secretary-General authority to commit up to $200 million in spending to facilitate the start-up of larger missions (UNTAET, UNMIK and MONUC), pending submission of the necessary detailed budget proposals, which can take months of preparation. These are all welcome developments and are indicative of the Member States’ support for enhancing the Organization’s rapid deployment capacities. 161. At the same time, all of these developments are only applicable after a Security Council resolution has been adopted authorizing the establishment of a mission or its advance elements. Unless some of these measures are applied well in advance of the desired date of mission deployment or are modified to help and maintain a minimum reserve of equipment requiring long lead-times to procure, the suggested targets for rapid and effective deployment cannot be met. 162. The Secretariat should thus formulate a global logistics support strategy to enable rapid and effective mission deployment within the deployment timelines proposed. That strategy should be formulated based on a cost-benefit analysis of the appropriate level of long lead-time items that should be kept in reserve and those best acquired through standing contracts, factoring in the cost of compressed delivery times, as required, to support such a strategy. The substantive elements of the peace and security departments would need to give logistics planners an estimate of the number and types of operations that might need to be established over 12 to 18 months. The Secretary-General should submit periodically to the General Assembly, for its review and approval, a detailed proposal for implementing that strategy, which could entail considerable financial implications.28 A/55/305 S/2000/809 163. In the interim, the General Assembly should authorize and approve a one-time expenditure for the creation of three new start-up kits at Brindisi (for a total of five), which would then automatically be replenished from the budgets of the missions that drew upon the kits. 164. The Secretary-General should be given authority to draw up to$50 million from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, prior to the adoption of a Security Council resolution authorizing a mission’s establishment but with the approval of ACABQ, to facilitate the rapid and effective deployment of operations within the proposed timelines. The Fund should be automatically replenished from assessed contributions to the missions that used it. The Secretary-General should request that the General Assembly consider augmenting the size of the Fund, should he determine that it had been depleted due to the establishment of a number of missions in rapid succession. 165. Well beyond mission start-up, the field missions often wait for months to receive items that they need, particularly when initial planning assumptions prove to be inaccurate or mission requirements change in response to new developments. Even if such items are available locally, there are several constraints on local procurement. First, field missions have limited flexibility and authority, for example, to quickly transfer savings from one line item in a budget to another to meet unforeseen demands. Second, missions are generally delegated procurement authority for no more than $200,000 per purchase order. Purchases above that amount must be referred to Headquarters and its eight-step decision process (see para. 152 above). 166. The Panel supports measures that reduce Headquarters micro-management of the field missions and provide them with the authority and flexibility required to maintain mission credibility and effectiveness, while at the same time holding them accountable. Where Headquarters’ involvement adds real value, however, as with respect to standing contracts, Headquarters should retain procurement responsibility. 167. Statistics from the Procurement Division indicate that of the 184 purchase orders raised by Headquarters in 1999 in support of peacekeeping operations, for values of goods and services between US$ 200,000 and US$500,000, 93 per cent related to aircraft and shipping services, motor vehicles and computers, which were either handled through international tenders or are currently covered under systems contracts. Provided that systems contracts are activated quickly and result in the timely provision of goods and services, it appears that the Headquarters’ involvement in those instances makes good sense. The systems contracts and international tenders presumably enable bulk purchases of items and services more cheaply than would be possible locally, and in many instances involve goods and services not available in the mission areas at all. 168. However, it is not entirely clear what real value Headquarters involvement adds to the procurement process for those goods and services that are not covered under systems contracts or standing commercial services contracts and are more readily available locally at cheaper prices. In such instances, it would make sense to delegate the authority to the field to procure those items, and to monitor the process and its financial controls through the audit mechanism. Accordingly, the Secretariat should assign priority to building capacity in the field to assume a higher level of procurement authority as quickly as possible (e.g., through recruitment and training of the appropriate field personnel and the production of user-friendly guidance documents) for all goods and services that are available locally and not covered under systems contracts or standing commercial services contracts (up to US$ 1 million, depending on mission size and needs). 169. Summary of key recommendations on logistics support and expenditure management: (a) The Secretariat should prepare a global logistics support strategy to enable rapid and effective mission deployment within the timelines proposed and corresponding to planning assumptions established by the substantive offices of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; (b) The General Assembly should authorize and approve a one-time expenditure to maintain at least five mission start-up kits in Brindisi, which should include rapidly deployable communications equipment. The start-up kits should then be routinely replenished with funding from the assessed contributions to the operations that drew on them;29 A/55/305 S/2000/809 (c) The Secretary-General should be given authority to draw up to US$50 million from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund once it became clear that an operation was likely to be established, with the approval of ACABQ but prior to the adoption of a Security Council resolution; (d) The Secretariat should undertake a review of the entire procurement policies and procedures (with proposals to the General Assembly for amendments to the Financial Rules and Regulations, as required), to facilitate in particular the rapid and full deployment of an operation within the proposed timelines; (e) The Secretariat should conduct a review of the policies and procedures governing the management of financial resources in the field missions with a view to providing field missions with much greater flexibility in the management of their budgets; (f) The Secretariat should increase the level of procurement authority delegated to the field missions (from$200,000 to as high as $1 million, depending on mission size and needs) for all goods and services that are available locally and are not covered under systems contracts or standing commercial services contracts. IV. Headquarters resources and structure for planning and supporting peacekeeping operations 170. Creating effective Headquarters support capacity for peace operations means addressing the three issues of quantity, structure and quality, that is, the number of staff needed to get the job done; the organizational structures and procedures that facilitate effective support; and quality people and methods of work within those structures. In the present section, the Panel examines and makes recommendations on primarily the first two issues; in section VI below, it addresses the issue of personnel quality and organizational culture. 171. The Panel sees a clear need for increased resources in support of peacekeeping operations. There is particular need for increased resources in DPKO, the primary department responsible for the planning and support of the United Nations’ most complex and highproofil field operations. A. Staffing-levels and funding for Headquarters support for peacekeeping operations 172. Expenditures for Headquarters staffing and related costs to plan and support all peacekeeping operations in the field can be considered the United Nations direct, non-field support costs for peacekeeping operations. They have not exceeded 6 per cent of the total cost of peacekeeping operations in the last half decade (see table 4.1). They are currently closer to three per cent and will fall below two per cent in the current peacekeeping budget year, based on existing plans for expansion of some missions, such as MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the full deployment of others, such as UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, and the establishment of a new operation in Eritrea and Ethiopia. A management analyst familiar with the operational requirements of large organizations, public or private, that operate substantial field-deployed elements might well conclude that an organization trying to run a field-oriented enterprise on two per cent central support costs was undersupporting its field people and very likely burning out its support structures in the process. 173. Table 4.1 lists the total budgets for peacekeeping operations from mid-1996 through mid-2001 (peacekeeping budget cycles run from July to June, offset six months from the United Nations regular budget cycle). It also lists total Headquarters costs in support of peacekeeping, whether inside or outside of DPKO, and whether funded from the regular budget or the Support Account for Peacekeeping Operations (the regular budget covers two years and its costs are apportioned among Member States according to the regular scale of assessment; the Support Account covers one year — the intent being that Secretariat staffing levels should ebb and flow with the level of field operations — and its costs are apportioned according to the peacekeeping scale of assessment).30 A/55/305 S/2000/809 Table 4.1 Ratio of total Headquarters support costs to total peacekeeping operations budgets, 1996-2001 (Millions of United States dollars) July 1996-June 1997 July 1997-June 1998 July 1998-June 1999 July 1999-June 2000 July 2000-June 2001a Peacekeeping budgets 1 260 911.7 812.9 1 417 2 582b Related Headquarters support costsc 49.2 52.8 41.0 41.7 50.2 Headquarters: field cost ratio 3.90% 5.79% 5.05% 2.95% 1.94% a Based on financing reports of the Secretary-General; excluding missions completed by 30 June 2000; including rough estimate for full deployment of MONUC, for which a budget has not yet been prepared. b Estimated. c Figures obtained from the Financial Controller of the United Nations, including all posts in the Secretariat (primarily in DPKO) funded through the regular biennium budget and the Support Account; figures also factor in what the costs would have been for in-kind contributions or “gratis personnel” had they been fully funded. 174. The Support Account funds 85 per cent of the DPKO budget, or about$40 million annually. Another $6 million for DPKO comes from the regular biennium budget. This$46 million combined largely funds the salaries and associated costs of DPKO’s 231 civilian, military and police Professionals and 173 General Service staff (but does not include the Mine Action Service, which is funded through voluntary contributions). The Support Account also funds posts in other parts of the Secretariat engaged in peacekeeping support, such as the Peacekeeping Financing Division and parts of the Procurement Division in the Department of Management, the Office of Legal Affairs and DPI. 175. Until mid-decade, the Support Account was calculated as 8.5 per cent of the total civilian staff costs of peacekeeping operations, but it did not take into consideration the costs of supporting civilian police personnel and United Nations Volunteers, or the costs of supporting private contractors or military troops. The fixed-percentage approach was replaced by the annual justification of every post funded by the Support Account. DPKO staffing levels grew little under the new system, however, partly because the Secretariat seems to have tailored its submissions to what it thought the political market would bear. 176. Clearly, DPKO and the other Secretariat offices supporting peacekeeping should expand and contract to some degree in relation to the level of activity in the field, but to require DPKO to rejustify, every year, seven out of eight posts in the Department is to treat it as though it were a temporary creation and peacekeeping a temporary responsibility of the Organization. Fifty-two years of operations would argue otherwise and recent history would argue further that continuing preparedness is essential, even during downturns in field activity, because events are only marginally predictable and staff capacity and experience, once lost, can take a long time to rebuild, as DPKO has painfully learned in the past two years. 177. Because the Support Account funds virtually all of DPKO on a year-by-year basis, that Department and the other offices funded by the Support Account have no predictable baseline level of funding and posts against which they can recruit and retain staff. Personnel brought in from the field on Support Account-funded posts do not know if those posts will exist for them one year later. Given current working conditions and the career uncertainty that Support Account funding entails, it is impressive that DPKO has managed to hold together at all. 178. Member States and the Secretariat have long recognized the need to define a baseline staffing/funding level and a separate mechanism to enable growth and retrenchment in DPKO in response to changing needs. However, without a review of DPKO staffing needs based on some objective management and productivity criteria, an appropriate baseline is difficult to define. While it is not in a position to conduct such a methodical management review of DPKO, the Panel believes that such a review should be conducted. In the meantime, the Panel believes that certain current staff shortages are plainly obvious and merit highlighting. 179. The Military and Civilian Police Division in DPKO, headed by the United Nations Military Adviser, has an authorized strength of 32 military officers and nine civilian police officers. The Civilian Police Unit has been assigned to support all aspects of United Nations international police operations, from doctrinal development through selection and deployment of31 A/55/305 S/2000/809 officers into field operations. It can, at present, do little more than identify personnel, attempt to pre-screen them with visiting selection assistance teams (an effort that occupies roughly half of the staff) and then see that they get to the field. Moreover, there is no unit within DPKO (or any other part of the United Nations system) that is responsible for planning and supporting the rule of law elements of an operation that in turn support effective police work, whether advisory or executive. 180. Eleven officers in the Military Adviser’s office support the identification and rotation of military units for all peacekeeping operations, and provide military advice to the political officers in DPKO. DPKO’s military officers are also supposed to find time to “train the trainers” at the Member State level, to draft guidelines, manuals and other briefing material, and to work with FALD to identify the logistics and other operational requirements of the military and police components of field missions. However, under existing staffing levels, the Training Unit consists of only five military officers in total. Ten officers in the Military Planning Service are the principal operational-level military mission planners within DPKO; six more posts have been authorized but have not yet all been filled. These 16 planning officers combined represent the full complement of military staff available to determine force requirements for mission start-up and expansion, participate in technical surveys and assess the preparedness of potential troop contributors. Of the 10 military planners originally authorized, one was assigned to draft the rules of engagement and directives to force commanders for all operations. Only one officer is available, part time, to manage the UNSAS database. 181. Table 4.2 contrasts the deployed strength of military and police contingents with the authorized strength of their respective Headquarters support staffs. No national Government would send 27,000 troops into the field with just 32 officers back home to provide them with substantive and operational military guidance. No police organization would deploy 8,000 police officers with only nine headquarters staff to provide them with substantive and operational policing support. Table 4.2 Ratio of military and civilian police staff at Headquarters to military and civilian police personnel in the fielda Military personnel Civilian police Peacekeeping operations 27 365 8 641 Headquarters 32 9 Headquarters: field ratio 0.1% 0.1% a Authorized military strength as of 15 June 2000 and civilian police as of 1 August 2000. 182. The Office of Operations in DPKO, in which the political Desk Officers or substantive focal points for particular peacekeeping operations reside, is another area that seems considerably understaffed. It currently has 15 Professionals serving as the focal points for 14 current and two potential new peace operations, or less than one officer per mission on average. While one officer may be able to handle the needs of one or even two smaller missions, this seems untenable in the case of the larger missions, such as UNTAET in East Timor, UNMIK in Kosovo, UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone and MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Similar circumstances apply to the logistics and personnel officers in DPKO’s Field Administration and Logistics Division, and to related support personnel in the Department of Management, the Office of Legal Affairs, the Department of Public Information and other offices which support their work. Table 4.3 depicts the total number of staff in DPKO and elsewhere in the Secretariat dedicated, full-time, to supporting the larger missions, along with their annual mission budgets and authorized staffing levels. 183. The general shortage of staff means that in many instances key personnel have no back-up, no way to cover more than one shift in a day when a crisis occurs six to 12 time zones away except by covering two shifts themselves, and no way to take a vacation, get sick or visit the mission without leaving their32 A/55/305 S/2000/809 Table 4.3 Total staff assigned on a full-time basis to support complex peacekeeping operations established in 1999 UNMIK (Kosovo) UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone) UNTAET (East Timor) MONUC (Democratic Republic of the Congo) Budget (estimated) July 2000-June 2001 $410 million$465 million $540 million$535 million Current authorized strength of key components 4 718 police 1 000-plus international civilians 13 000 military 8 950 military 1 640 police 1 185 international civilians 5 537 military 500 military observers Professional staff at Headquarters assigned full-time to support the operation Total Headquarters support staff 1 political officer 2 civilian police 1 logistics coord. 1 civilian recruitment specialist 1 finance specialist _______ 6 1 political officer 2 military 1 logistics coord. 1 finance specialist _______ 5 1 political officer 2 military 1 civilian police 1 logistics coord. 1 civilian recruitment specialist 1 finance specialist _______ 7 1 political officer 3 military 1 civilian police 1 logistics coord. 1 civilian recruitment specialist 1 finance specialist _______ 8 backstopping duties largely uncovered. In the current arrangements, compromises among competing demands are inevitable and support for the field may suffer as a result. In New York, Headquarters-related tasks, such as reporting obligations to the legislative bodies, tend to get priority because Member States’ representatives press for action, often in person. The field, by contrast, is represented in New York by an emaail a cable or the jotted notes of a phone conversation. Thus, in the war for a desk officer’s time, field operations often lose out and are left to solve problems on their own. Yet they should be accorded first priority. People in the field face difficult circumstances, sometimes life-threatening. They deserve better, as do the staff at Headquarters who wish to support them more effectively. 184. Although there appears to be some duplication in the functions performed by desk officers in DPKO and their counterparts in the regional divisions of DPA, closer examination suggests otherwise. The UNMIK desk officer’s counterpart in DPA, for example, follows developments in all of Southeastern Europe and the counterpart in OCHA covers all of the Balkans plus parts of the Commonwealth of Independent States. While it is essential that the officers in DPA and OCHA be given the opportunity to contribute what they can, their efforts combined yield less than one additional full-time-equivalent officer to support UNMIK. 185. The three Regional Directors in the Office of Operations should be visiting the missions regularly and engaging in a constant policy dialogue with the SRSGs and heads of components on the obstacles that Headquarters could help them overcome. Instead, they are drawn into the processes that occupy their desk officers’ time because the latter need the back-up. 186. These competing demands are even more pronounced for the Under-Secretary-General and Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. The Under-Secretary-General and Assistant Secretary-General provide advice to the Secretary-General, liaise with Member State delegations and capitals, and one or the other vets every report on peacekeeping operations (40 in the first half of 2000) submitted to the Secretary-General for his approval and signature, prior to submission to the legislative bodies. Since January 2000, the two have briefed the Council in person over 50 times, in sessions lasting up to three hours and requiring several hours of staff preparation in the field and at Headquarters. Coordination meetings take further time away from substantive dialogue with the field missions, from field visits, from reflection on ways to improve the United Nations conduct of peacekeeping and from attentive management.33 A/55/305 S/2000/809 187. The staff shortages faced by the substantive side of DPKO may be exceeded by those in the administrative and logistics support areas, particularly in FALD. At this juncture, FALD provides support not only to peacekeeping operations but also to other field offices, such as the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories (UNSCO) in Gaza, the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) and a dozen other small offices, not to mention continuing involvement in managing and reconciling the liquidation of terminated missions. All of FALD adds approximately 1.25 per cent to the total cost of peacekeeping and other field operations. If the United Nations were to subcontract the administrative and logistics support functions performed by FALD, the Panel is convinced that it would be hard pressed to find a commercial company to take on the equivalent task for the equivalent fee. 188. A few examples will illustrate FALD’s pronounced staff shortages: the Staffing Section in FALD’s Personnel Management and Support Service (PMSS), which handles recruitment and travel for all civilian personnel as well as travel for civilian police and military observers, has just 10 professional recruitment officers, four of whom have been assigned to review and acknowledge the 150 unsolicited employment applications that the office now receives every day. The other six officers handle the actual selection process: one full-time and one half-time for Kosovo, one full-time and one half-time for East Timor, and three to cover all other field missions combined. Three recruitment officers are trying to identify suitable candidates to staff two civil administration missions that need hundreds of experienced administrators across a multitude of fields and disciplines. Nine to 12 months after they got under way, neither UNMIK nor UNTAET is fully deployed. 189. The Member States must give the Secretary-General some flexibility and the financial resources to bring in the staff he needs to ensure that the credibility of the Organization is not tarnished by its failure to respond to emergencies as a professional organization should. The Secretary-General must be given the resources to increase the capacity of the Secretariat to react immediately to unforeseen demands. 190. The responsibility for providing the people in the field the goods and services they need to do their jobs falls primarily on FALD’s Logistics and Communications Service (LCS). The job description of one of the 14 logistics coordinators in LCS might help to illustrate the workload that the entire Service currently endures. This individual is the lead logistics planner for the expansion of both the mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) and for the expansion of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in Lebanon. The same individual is also responsible for drafting the logistics policies and procedures for the critical United Nations Logistics Base in Brindisi and for coordinating the preparation of the entire Service’s annual budget submissions. 191. Based on this cursory review alone and bearing in mind that the total support cost for DPKO and related Headquarters peacekeeping support offices does not even exceed $50 million per annum, the Panel is convinced that additional resources for that Department and the others which support it would be an essential investment to ensure that the over$2 billion the Member States will spend on peacekeeping operations in 2001 will be well spent. The Panel therefore recommends a substantial increase in resources for this purpose, and urge the Secretary-General to submit a proposal to the General Assembly outlining the Organization’s requirements in full. 192. The Panel also believes that peacekeeping should cease to be treated as a temporary requirement and DPKO a temporary organizational structure. It requires a consistent and predictable baseline of funding to do more than keep existing missions afloat. It should have resources to plan for potential contingencies six months to a year down the road; to develop managerial tools to help missions perform better in the future; to study the potential impact of modern technology on different aspects of peacekeeping; to implement the lessons learned from previous operations; and to implement recommendations contained in the evaluation reports of the Office of Internal Oversight Services over the past five years. Staff should be given the opportunity to design and conduct training programmes for newly recruited staff at Headquarters and in the field. They should finish the guidelines and handbooks that could help new mission personnel do their jobs more professionally and in accordance with United Nations rules, regulations and procedures, but that now sit half finished in a dozen offices all around DPKO, because their authors are busy meeting other needs. 193. The Panel therefore recommends that Headquarters support for peacekeeping be treated as a34 A/55/305 S/2000/809 core activity of the United Nations, and as such that the majority of its resource requirements be funded through the mechanism of the regular biennial programme budget of the Organization. Pending the preparation of the next regular budget, it recommends that the Secretary-General approach the General Assembly as soon as possible with a request for an emergency supplemental increase to the last Support Account submission. 194. The specific allocation of resources should be determined according to a professional and objective review of requirements, but gross levels should reflect historical experience of peacekeeping. One approach would be to calculate the regular budget baseline for Headquarters support of peacekeeping as a percentage of the average cost of peacekeeping over the preceding five years. The resulting baseline budget would reflect the expected level of activity for which the Secretariat should be prepared. Based on the figures provided by the Controller (see table 4.1), the average for the last five years (including the current budget year) is $1.4 billion. Pegging the baseline at five per cent of the average cost would yield, for example, a baseline budget of$70 million, roughly $20 million more than the current annual Headquarters support budget for peacekeeping. 195. To fund above-average or “surge” activity levels, consideration should be given to a simple percentage charge against missions whose budgets carry peacekeeping operations spending above the baseline level. For example, the roughly$2.6 billion in peacekeeping activity estimated for the current budget year exceeds the $1.4 billion hypothetical baseline by$1.2 billion. A one per cent surcharge on that $1.2 billion would yield an additional$12 million to enable Headquarters to deal effectively with that increase. A two per cent surcharge would yield $24 million. 196. Such a direct method of providing for surge capacity should replace the current, annual, post-bypoos justification required for the Support Account submissions. The Secretary-General should be given the flexibility to determine how such funds should best be utilized to meet a surge in activity, and emergency recruitment measures should apply in such instances so that temporary posts associated with surge requirements could be filled immediately. 197. Summary of key recommendations on funding headquarters support for peacekeeping operations: (a) The Panel recommends a substantial increase in resources for Headquarters support of peacekeeping operations, and urges the Secretary-General to submit a proposal to the General Assembly outlining his requirements in full; (b) Headquarters support for peacekeeping should be treated as a core activity of the United Nations, and as such the majority of its resource requirements for that purpose should be funded through the mechanism of the regular biennium programme budget of the Organization; (c) Pending the preparation of the next regular budget submission, the Panel recommends that the Secretary-General approach the General Assembly with a request for an emergency supplemental increase to the Support Account to allow immediate recruitment of additional personnel, particularly in DPKO. B. Need and proposal for the establishment of Integrated Mission Task Forces 198. There is currently no integrated planning or support cell in DPKO in which those responsible for political analysis, military operations, civilian police, electoral assistance, human rights, development, humanitarian assistance, refugees and displaced persons, public information, logistics, finance and personnel recruitment, among others, are represented. On the contrary, as described above, DPKO has no more than a handful of officers dedicated full-time to planning and supporting even the large complex operations, such as those in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), Kosovo (UNMIK) and East Timor (UNTAET). In the case of a political peace mission or peace-building office, these functions are discharged within DPA, with equally limited human resources. 199. DPKO’s Office of Operations is responsible for pulling together an overall concept of operations for new peacekeeping missions. In this regard, it bears a heavy dual burden for political analysis and for internal coordination with the other elements of DPKO that are responsible for military and civilian police matters, logistics, finance and personnel. But each of these other elements has a separate organizational reporting chain, and many of them, in fact, are physically scattered across several different buildings. Moreover,35 A/55/305 S/2000/809 DPA, UNDP, OCHA, UNHCR, OHCHR, DPI, and several other departments, agencies, funds and programmes have an increasingly important role to play in planning for any future operation, especially complex operations, and need to be formally included in the planning process. 200. Collaboration across divisions, departments and agencies does occur, but relies too heavily on personal networks and ad hoc support. There are task forces convened for planning major peacekeeping operations, pulling together various parts of the system, but they function more as sounding boards than executive bodies. Moreover, current task forces tend to meet infrequently or even disperse once an operation has begun to deploy, and well before it has fully deployed. 201. Reversing the perspective, once an operation has been deployed, SRSGs in the field have overall coordinating authority for United Nations activities in their mission area but have no single working-level focal point at Headquarters that can address all of their concerns quickly. For example, the desk officer or his/her regional director in DPKO fields political questions for peacekeeping operations but usually cannot directly respond to queries about military, police, humanitarian, human rights, electoral, legal or other elements of an operation, and they do not necessarily have a ready counterpart in each of those areas. A mission impatient for answers will eventually find the right primary contacts themselves and may do so in dozens of instances, building its own networks with different parts of the Secretariat and relevant agencies. 202. The missions should not feel the need to build their own contact networks. They should know exactly who to turn to for the answers and support that they need, especially in the critical early months when a mission is working towards full deployment and coping with daily crises. Moreover, they should be able to contact just one place for those answers, an entity that includes all of the backstopping people and expertise for the mission, drawn from an array of Headquarters elements that mirrors the functions of the mission itself. The Panel would call that entity an Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF). 203. This concept builds upon but considerably extends the cooperative measures contained in the guidelines for implementing the “lead” department concept that DPKO and DPA agreed to in June 2000, in a joint departmental meeting chaired by the Secretary-General. The Panel would recommend, for example, that DPKO and DPA jointly determine the leader of each new Task Force but not necessarily limit their choice to the current staff of either Department. There may be occasions when the existing workloads of the regional directors or political officers in either department preclude them from taking on the role fulltiime In those instances, it might be best to bring in someone from the field for this purpose. Such flexibility, including the flexibility to assign the task to the most qualified person for the job, would require the approval of funding mechanisms to respond to surge demands, as recommended above. 204. ECPS or a designated subgroup thereof should collectively determine the general composition of an IMTF, which the Panel envisages forming quite early in a process of conflict prevention, peacemaking, prospective peacekeeping or prospective deployment of a peace-building support office. That is, the notion of integrated, one-stop support for United Nations peaceanndsecurity field activities should extend across the whole range of peace operations, with the size, substantive composition, meeting venue and leadership matching the needs of the operation. 205. Leadership and the lead department concept have posed some problems in the past when the principal focus of United Nations presence on the ground has changed from political to peacekeeping or vice versa, causing not only a shift in the field’s primary Headquarters contact but a shift in the whole Headquarters supporting cast. As the Panel sees the IMTF working, the supporting cast would remain substantially the same during and after such transitions, with additions or subtractions as the nature of the operation changed but with no changes in core Task Force personnel for those functions that bridge the transition. IMTF leadership would pass from one member of the group to another (e.g., from a DPKO regional director or political officer to his or her DPA counterpart). 206. Size and composition would match the nature and the phase of the field activity being supported. Crisisrellate preventive action would require well informed political support that would keep a United Nations envoy apprised of political evolution within the region and other factors key to the success of his or her effort. Peacemakers working to end a conflict would need to know more about peacekeeping and peace-building36 A/55/305 S/2000/809 options, so that their potential and their limitations are both reflected in any peace accord that would involve United Nations implementation. Adviser-observers from the Secretariat working with the peacemaker would be affiliated with the IMTF that supports the negotiations, and keep it posted on progress. The IMTF leader could, in turn, serve as the peacemaker’s routine contact point at Headquarters, with rapid access to higher echelons of the Secretariat for answers to sensitive political queries. 207. An IMTF of the sort just described could be a “virtual” body, meeting periodically but not physically co-located, its members operating from their workday offices and tied together by modern information technology. To support their work, each should feed as well as have access to the data and analyses created and placed on the United Nations Intranet by EISAS, the ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat proposed in paragraphs 65 to 75 above. 208. IMTFs created to plan potential peace operations could also begin as virtual bodies. As an operation seemed more likely to go forward, the Task Force should assume physical form, with all of its members co-located in one space, prepared to work together as a team on a continuing basis for as long as needed to bring a new mission to full deployment. That period may be up to six months, assuming that the rapid deployment reforms recommended in paragraphs 84-169 above have been implemented. 209. Task Force members should be formally seconded to IMTF for such duration by their home division, department, agency, fund or programme. That is, an IMTF should be much more than a coordinating committee or task force of the type now set up at Headquarters. It should be a temporary but coherent staff created for a specific purpose, able to be increased or decreased in size or composition in response to mission needs. 210. Each Task Force member should be authorized to serve not only as a liaison between the Task Force and his or her home base but as its key working-level decision maker for the mission in question. The leader of the IMTF — reporting to the Assistant Secretary-General for Operations of DPKO in the case of peacekeeping operations, and the relevant Assistant Secretary-General of DPA in the case of peacemaking efforts, peace-building support offices and special political missions — should in turn have line authority over his or her Task Force members for the period of their secondment, and should serve as the first level of contact for the peace operations for all aspects of their work. Matters related to long-term policy and strategy should be dealt with at the Assistant Secretary-General/Under-Secretary-General level in ECPS, supported by EISAS. 211. For the United Nations system to be prepared to contribute staff to an IMTF, responsibility centres for each major substantive component of peace operations need to be established. Departments and agencies need to agree in advance on procedures for secondment and on their support for the IMTF concept, in writing if necessary. 212. The Panel is not in a position to suggest “lead” offices for each potential component of a peace operation but believes that ECPS should think through this issue collectively and assign one of its members responsibility for maintaining a level of preparedness for each potential component of a peace operation other than the military, police and judicial, and logistics/administration areas, which should remain DPKO’s responsibility. The designated lead agency should be responsible for devising generic concepts of operations, job descriptions, staffing and equipment requirements, critical path/deployment timetables, standard databases, civilian standby arrangements and rosters of other potential candidates for that component, as well as for participation in the IMTFs. 213. IMTFs offer a flexible approach to dealing with time-critical, resource-intensive but ultimately temporary requirements to support mission planning, start-up and initial sustainment. The concept borrows heavily from the notion of “matrix management”, used extensively by large organizations that need to be able to assign the necessary talent to specific projects without reorganizing themselves every time a project arises. Used by such diverse entities as the RAND Corporation and the World Bank, it gives each staff member a permanent “home” or “parent” department but allows — indeed, expects — staff to function in support of projects as the need arises. A matrix management approach to Headquarters planning and support of peace operations would allow departments, agencies, funds and programmes — internally organized as suits their overall needs — to contribute staff to coherent, interdepartmental/inter-agency task forces built to provide that support.37 A/55/305 S/2000/809 214. The IMTF structure could have significant implications for how DPKO’s Office of Operations is currently structured, and in effect would supplant the Regional Divisions structure. For example, the larger operations, such as those in Sierra Leone, East Timor and Kosovo, each would warrant separate IMTFs, headed by Director-level officers. Other missions, such as the long-established “traditional” peacekeeping operations in Asia and the Middle East, might be grouped into another IMTF. The number of IMTFs that could be formed would largely depend on the amount of additional resources allocated to DPKO, DPA and related departments, agencies, funds and programmes. As the number of IMTFs increased, the organizational structure of the Office of Operations would become flatter. There could be similar implications for the Assistant Secretaries-General of DPA, to whom the heads of the IMTFs would report during the peacemaking phase or when setting up a large peacebuilldin support operation either as a follow-on presence to a peacekeeping operation or as a separate initiative. 215. While the regional directors of DPKO (and DPA in those cases where they were appointed as IMTF heads) would be in charge of overseeing fewer missions than at present, they would actually be managing a larger number of staff, such as those seconded full-time from the Military and Civilian Police Advisers’ Offices, FALD (or its successor divisions) and other departments, agencies, funds and programmes, as required. The size of the IMTFs will also depend on the amount of additional resources provided, without which participating entities would not be in a position to second their staff on a full-time basis. 216. It should also be noted that in order for the IMTF concept to work effectively, its members must be physically co-located during the planning and initial deployment phases. This will not be possible at present without major adjustments to current office space allocations in the Secretariat. 217. Summary of key recommendation on integrated mission planning and support: Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs), with members seconded from throughout the United Nations system, as necessary, should be the standard vehicle for mission-specific planning and support. IMTFs should serve as the first point of contact for all such support, and IMTF leaders should have temporary line authority over seconded personnel, in accordance with agreements between DPKO, DPA and other contributing departments, programmes, funds and agencies. C. Other structural adjustments required in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations 218. The IMTF concept would strengthen the capacity of DPKO’s Office of Operations to function as a real focal point for all aspects of a peacekeeping operation. However, structural adjustments are also required in other elements of DPKO, in particular to the Military and Civilian Police Division, FALD and the Lessons Learned Unit. 1. Military and Civilian Police Division 219. All civilian police officials interviewed at Headquarters and in the field expressed frustration with having police functions in DPKO included in a military reporting chain. The Panel agrees that there seems to be little administrative or substantive value added in this arrangement. 220. Military and civilian police officers in DPKO serve for three years because the United Nations requires that they be on active duty. If they wish to remain longer and would even leave their national military or police services to do so, United Nations personnel policy precludes their being hired into their previous position. Hence the turnover rate in the military and police offices of DPKO is high. Since lessons learned in Headquarters practice are not routinely captured, since comprehensive training programmes for new arrivals are non-existent and since user-friendly manuals and standard operating procedures remain half-complete, high turnover means routine loss of institutional memory that takes months of on-the-job learning to replace. Current staff shortages also mean that military and civilian police officers find themselves assigned to functions that do not necessarily match their expertise. Those who have specialized in operations (J3) or plans (J5) might find themselves engaged in quasi-diplomatic work or functioning as personnel and administration officers (J1), managing the continual turnover of people and units in the field, to the detriment of their ability to monitor operational activity in the field.38 A/55/305 S/2000/809 221. DPKO’s lack of continuity in these areas may also explain why, after over 50 years of deploying military observers to monitor ceasefire violations, DPKO still does not have a standard database that could be provided to military observers in the field to document ceasefire violations and generate statistics. At present, if one wanted to know how many violations had occurred over a six-month period in a particular country where an operation is deployed, someone would have to physically count each one in the paper copies of the daily situation reports for that period. Where such databases do exist, they have been created by the missions themselves on an ad hoc basis. The same applies to the variety of crime statistics and other information common to most civilian police missions. Technological advances have also revolutionized the way in which ceasefire violations and movements in demilitarized zones and removal of weapons from storage sites can be monitored. However, there is no one in DPKO’s Military and Civilian Police Division currently assigned to addressing these issues. 222. The Panel recommends that the Military and Police Division be separated into two separate entities, one for the military and the other for the civilian police. The Military Adviser’s Office of DPKO should be enlarged and restructured to correspond more closely to the way in which the military headquarters in United Nations peacekeeping operations are structured, so as to provide more effective support to the field and better informed military advice to senior officials in the Secretariat. The Civilian Police Unit should also be provided with substantial additional resources, and consideration should be given to upgrading the rank and level of the Civilian Police Adviser. 223. To ensure a minimum of continuity of DPKO’s military and civilian police capacity, the Panel recommends that a percentage of the added positions in these two units be reserved for military and civilian police personnel who have prior United Nations experience and have recently left their national services, to be appointed as regular staff members. This would follow the precedent set in the Logistics and Communications Service of FALD, which includes a number of former military officers. 224. Civilian police in the field are increasingly involved in the restructuring and reform of local police forces, and the Panel has recommended a doctrinal shift that would make such activities a primary focus for civilian police in future peace operations (see paras. 39, 40 and 47 (b) above). However, to date, the Civilian Police Unit formulates plans and requirements for the police components of peace operations without the benefit of the requisite legal advice on local judicial structures, criminal laws, codes and procedures in effect in the country concerned. This is vital information for civilian police planners, yet it is not a function for which resources have hitherto been allocated from the Support Account, either to OLA, DPKO or any other department in the Secretariat. 225. The Panel therefore recommends that a new, separate unit be established in DPKO, staffed with the requisite experts in criminal law, specifically for the purpose of providing advice to the Civilian Police Adviser’s Office on those rule of law issues that are critical to the effective use of civilian police in peace operations. This unit should also work closely with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva, the Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention in Vienna, and other parts of the United Nations system that focus on the reform of rule of law institutions and respect for human rights. 2. Field Administration and Logistics Division 226. FALD does not have the authority to finalize and present the budgets for the field operations that it plans, nor to actually procure the goods and services they need. That authority rests with the Peacekeeping Financing and Procurement Divisions of DM. All Headquarters-based procurement requests are processed by the 16 Support Account-funded procurement officers in the Procurement Division, who prepare the larger contracts (roughly 300 in 1999) for presentation to the Headquarters Committee on Contracts, negotiate and award contracts for goods and services not procured locally by the field missions, and formulate United Nations policies and procedures for both global and local mission procurement. The combination of staffing constraints and the extra steps entailed in this process appears to contribute to the procurement delays reported by field missions. 227. Procurement efficiency could be enhanced by delegating peacekeeping budgeting and presentation, allotment issuance and procurement authority to DPKO for a two-year trial period, with the corresponding transfer of posts and staff. In order to ensure accountability and transparency, DM should retain authority for accounts, assessment of Member States and treasury functions. It should also retain its overall39 A/55/305 S/2000/809 policy setting and monitoring role, as it has in the case of recruitment and administration of field personnel, authority and responsibility, which are already delegated to DPKO. 228. Furthermore, to avoid allegations of impropriety that may arise from having those responsible for budgeting and procurement working in the same division as those identifying the requirements, the Panel recommends that FALD be separated into two divisions: one for Administrative Services, in which the personnel, budget/finance and procurement functions would reside, and the other for Integrated Support Services (e.g., logistics, transport, communications). 3. Lessons Learned Unit 229. All are agreed on the need to exploit cumulating field experience but not enough has been done to improve the system’s ability to tap that experience or to feed it back into the development of operational doctrine, plans, procedures or mandates. The work of DPKO’s existing Lessons Learned Unit does not seem to have had a great deal of impact on peace operations practice, and the compilation of lessons learned seems to occur mostly after a mission has ended. This is unfortunate because the peacekeeping system is generating new experience — new lessons — on a daily basis. That experience should be captured and retained for the benefit of other current operators and future operations. Lessons learned should be thought of as a facet of information management that contributes to improving operations on a daily basis. Post-action reports would then be just one part of a larger learning process, the capstone summary rather than the principal objective of the entire process. 230. The Panel feels that this function is in urgent need of enhancement and recommends that it be located where it can work closely with and contribute effectively to ongoing operations as well as mission planning and doctrine/guidelines development. The Panel suggests that this might best be in the Office of Operations, which will oversee the functions of the Integrated Mission Task Forces that the Panel has proposed to integrate Headquarters planning and support for peace operations (see paras. 198-217 above). Located in an element of DPKO that will routinely incorporate representatives from many departments and agencies, the unit could serve as the peace operations “learning manager” for all of those entities, maintaining and updating the institutional memory that missions and task forces alike could draw upon for problem solving, best practices and practices to avoid. 4. Senior management 231. There are currently two Assistant Secretaries-General in DPKO: one for the Office of Operations and the other for the Office of Logistics, Management and Mine Action (FALD and the Mine Action Service). The Military Adviser, who concurrently serves as the Director of the Military and Civilian Police Division, currently reports to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations through one of the two Assistant Secretaries-General or directly to the Under-Secretary-General, depending on the nature of the issue concerned. 232. In the light of the various staff increases and structural adjustments proposed in the preceding sections, the Panel believes that there is a strong case to be made for the Department to be provided with a third Assistant Secretary-General. The Panel further believes that one of the three Assistant Secretaries-General should be designated as a “Principal Assistant Secretary-General” and function as deputy to the Under-Secretary-General. 233. Summary of key recommendations on other structural adjustments in DPKO: (a) The current Military and Civilian Police Division should be restructured, moving the Civilian Police Unit out of the military reporting chain. Consideration should be given to upgrading the rank and level of the Civilian Police Adviser; (b) The Military Adviser’s Office in DPKO should be restructured to correspond more closely to the way in which the military field headquarters in United Nations peacekeeping operations are structured; (c) A new unit should be established in DPKO and staffed with the relevant expertise for the provision of advice on criminal law issues that are critical to the effective use of civilian police in United Nations peace operations; (d) The Under-Secretary-General for Management should delegate authority and responsibility for peacekeeping-related budgeting and procurement functions to the Under-Secretary40 A/55/305 S/2000/809 General for Peacekeeping Operations for a two-year trial period; (e) The Lessons Learned Unit should be substantially enhanced and moved into a revamped DPKO Office of Operations; (f) Consideration should be given to increasing the number of Assistant Secretaries-General in DPKO from two to three, with one of the three designated as the “Principal Assistant Secretary-General” and functioning as the deputy to the Under-Secretary-General. D. Structural adjustments needed outside the Department of Peacekeeping Operations 234. Public information planning and support at Headquarters needs strengthening, as do elements in DPA that support and coordinate peace-building activities and provide electoral support. Outside the Secretariat, the ability of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to plan and support the human rights components of peace operations needs to be reinforced. 1. Operational support for public information 235. Unlike military, civilian police, mine action, logistics, telecommunications and other mission components, no unit at Headquarters has specific line responsibility for the operational requirements of public information components in peace operations. The most concentrated responsibility for missionrellate public information rests with the Office of the Spokesman of the Secretary General and the respective spokespersons and public information offices in the missions themselves. At Headquarters, four professional officers in the Peace and Security Section, nested within the Promotion and Planning Service of the Public Affairs Division in DPI, are responsible for producing publications, developing and updating web site content on peace operations, and dealing with other issues ranging from disarmament to humanitarian assistance. While the Section produces and manages information about peacekeeping, it has had little capacity to create doctrine, strategy or standard operating procedures for public information functions in the field, other than on a sporadic and ad hoc basis. 236. The DPI Peace and Security Section is being expanded somewhat through internal DPI redeployment of staff, but it should either be substantially expanded and made operational or the support function should be moved into DPKO, with some of its officers perhaps seconded from DPI. 237. Wherever the function is located, it should anticipate public information needs and the technology and people to meet them, set priorities and standard field operating procedures, provide support in the startuu phase of new missions, and provide continuing support and guidance through participation in the Integrated Mission Task Forces. 238. Summary of key recommendation on structural adjustments in public information: a unit for operational planning and support of public information in peace operations should be established, either within DPKO or within a new Peace and Security Information Service in DPI reporting directly to the Under-Secretary-General for Communication and Public Information. 2. Peace-building support in the Department of Political Affairs 239. The Department of Political Affairs (DPA) is the designated focal point for United Nations peacebuilldin efforts and currently has responsibility for setting up, supporting and/or advising peace-building offices and special political missions in a dozen countries, plus the activities of five envoys and representatives of the Secretary-General who have been given peacemaking or conflict prevention assignments. Regular budget funds that support these activities through the next calendar year are expected to fall$31 million or 25 per cent below need. Such assessed funding is in fact relatively rare in peace-building, where most activities are funded by voluntary donations. 240. DPA’s nascent Peace-building Support Unit is one such activity. In his capacity as Convener of ECPS and focal point for peace-building strategies, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs must be able to coordinate the formulation of such strategies with the members of ECPS and other elements of the United Nations system, particularly those in the development and humanitarian fields given the cross-cutting nature of peace-building itself. To do so, the Secretariat is assembling voluntary funds from a number of donors41 A/55/305 S/2000/809 for a three-year pilot project in support of the unit. As the planning for this pilot unit evolves, the Panel urges DPA to consult with all stakeholders in the United Nations system that can contribute to its success, in particular UNDP, which is placing renewed emphasis on democracy/governance and other transition-related areas. 241. DPA’s executive office supports some of the operational efforts for which it is responsible, but it is neither designed nor equipped to be a field support office. FALD also provides support to some of the field missions managed by DPA, but neither those missions’ budgets nor DPA’s budget allocate additional resources to FALD for this purpose. FALD attempts to meet the demands of the smaller peace-building operations but acknowledges that the larger operations make severe, high-priority demands on its current staffing. Thus the needs of smaller missions tend to suffer. DPA has had satisfactory experience with support from the United Nations Office of Project Services (UNOPS), a fiveyeearold spin-off from UNDP that manages programmes and funds for many clients within the United Nations system, using modern management practices and drawing all of its core funding from a management charge of up to 13 per cent. UNOPS can provide logistics, management and recruitment support for smaller missions fairly quickly. 242. DPA’s Electoral Assistance Division (EAD) also relies on voluntary money to meet growing demand for its technical advice, needs assessment missions and other activities not directly involving electoral observation. As of June 2000, 41 requests for assistance were pending from Member States but the trust fund supporting such “non-earmarked” activities held just 8 per cent of the funding required to meet current requests through the end of calendar year 2001. So, as demand surges for a key element of democratic institution-building endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 46/137, EAD staff must first raise the programme funds needed to do their jobs. 243. Summary of key recommendations for peacebuilldin support in the Department of Political Affairs: (a) The Panel supports the Secretariat’s effort to create a pilot Peace-building Unit within DPA in cooperation with other integral United Nations elements, and suggests that regular budgetary support for the unit be revisited by the membership if the pilot programme works well. The programme should be evaluated in the context of guidance the Panel has provided in paragraph 46 above, and if considered the best available option for strengthening United Nations peace-building capacity it should be presented to the Secretary-General as per the recommendation contained in paragraph 47 (d) above; (b) The Panel recommends that regular budget resources for Electoral Assistance Division programmatic expenses be substantially increased to meet the rapidly growing demand for its services, in lieu of voluntary contributions; (c) To relieve demand on FALD and the executive office of DPA, and to improve support services rendered to smaller political and peacebuilldin field offices, the Panel recommends that procurement, logistics, staff recruitment and other support services for all such smaller, non-military field missions be provided by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). 3. Peace operations support in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 244. OHCHR needs to be more closely involved in planning and executing the elements of peace operations that address human rights, especially complex operations. At present, OHCHR has inadequate resources to be so involved or to provide personnel for service in the field. If United Nations operations are to have effective human rights components, OHCHR should be able to coordinate and institutionalize human rights field work in peace operations; second personnel to Integrated Mission Task Forces in New York; recruit human rights field personnel; organize human rights training for all personnel in peace operations, including the law and order components; and create model databases for human rights field work. 245. Summary of key recommendation on strengthening the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: the Panel recommends substantially enhancing the field mission planning and preparation capacity of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, with funding partly from the42 A/55/305 S/2000/809 regular budget and partly from peace operations mission budgets. V. Peace operations and the information age 246. Threaded through many parts of the present report are references to the need to better link the peace and security system together; to facilitate communications and data sharing; to give staff the tools that they need to do their work; and ultimately to allow the United Nations to be more effective at preventing conflict and helping societies find their way back from war. Modern, well utilized information technology (IT) is a key enabler of many of these objectives. The present section notes the gaps in strategy, policy and practice that impede the United Nations effective use of IT, and offers recommendations to bridge them. A. Information technology in peace operations: strategy and policy issues 247. The problem of IT strategy and policy is bigger than peace operations and extends to the entire United Nations system. That larger IT context is generally beyond the Panel’s mandate, but the larger issues should not preclude the adoption of common IT user standards for peace operations and for the Headquarters units that give support to them. FALD’s Communications Service can provide the satellite links and the local connectivity upon which missions can build effective IT networks and databases, but a better strategy and policy needs to be developed for the user community to help it take advantage of the technology foundations that are now being laid. 248. When the United Nations deploys a mission into the field, it is critical that its elements be able to exchange data easily. All complex peace operations bring together many different actors: agencies, funds, and programmes from throughout the United Nations system, as well as the Departments of the Secretariat; mission recruits who are new to the United Nations system; on occasion, regional organizations; frequently, bilateral aid agencies; and always, dozens to hundreds of humanitarian and development NGOs. All of them need a mechanism that makes it easier to share information and ideas efficiently, the more so because each is but the small tip of a very large bureaucratic iceberg with its own culture, working methods and objectives. 249. Poorly planned and poorly integrated IT can pose obstacles to such cooperation. When there are no agreed standards for data structure and interchange at the application level, the “interface” between the two is laborious manual recoding, which tends to defeat the purposes of investing in a networked and computerheeav working environment. The consequences can also be more serious than wasted labour, ranging from miscommunication of policy to a failure to “get the word” on security threats or other major changes in the operational environment. 250. The irony of distributed and decentralized data systems is that they need such common standards to function. Common solutions to common IT problems are difficult to produce at higher levels — between substantive components of an operation, between substantive offices at Headquarters, or between Headquarters and the rest of the United Nations system — in part because existing operational information systems policy formulation is scattered. Headquarters lacks a sufficiently strong responsibility centre for user-level IT strategy and policy in peace operations, in particular. In government or industry, such responsibility would rest with a “Chief Information Officer”. The Panel believes the United Nations needs someone at Headquarters, most usefully in EISAS, to play such a role, supervising development and implementation of IT strategy and user standards. He or she should also develop and oversee IT training programmes, both field manuals and hands-on training — the need for which is substantial and not to be underestimated. Counterparts in the SRSG’s office in each field mission should oversee implementation of the common IT strategy and supervise field training, both complementing and building on the work of FALD and the Information Technology Services Division (ITSD) in the Department of Management in providing basic IT structures and services. 251. Summary of key recommendation on information technology strategy and policy: Headquarters peace and security departments need a responsibility centre to devise and oversee the implementation of common information technology strategy and training for peace operations, residing in EISAS. Mission counterparts to that responsibility centre should also be appointed to43 A/55/305 S/2000/809 serve in the offices of the SRSGs in complex peace operations to oversee the implementation of that strategy. B. Tools for knowledge management 252. Technology can help to capture as well as disseminate information and experience. It could be much better utilized to help a wide variety of actors working in a United Nations mission’s area of operation to acquire and share data in a systematic and mutually supportive manner. United Nations development and humanitarian relief communities, for example, work in most of the places where the United Nations has deployed peace operations. These United Nations country teams, plus the NGOs that do complementary work at the grass-roots level, will have been in the region long before a complex peace operation arrives and will remain after it has left. Together, they hold a wealth of local knowledge and experience that could be helpful to peace operations planning and implementation. An electronic data clearing house, managed by EISAS to share this data, could assist mission planning and execution and also aid conflict prevention and assessment. Proper melding of these data and data gathered subsequent to deployment by the various components of a peace operation and their use with geographic information systems (GIS) could create powerful tools for tracking needs and problems in the mission area and for tracking the impact of action plans. GIS specialists should be assigned to every mission team, together with GIS training resources. 253. Current examples of GIS applications can be seen in the humanitarian and reconstruction work done in Kosovo since 1998. The Humanitarian Community Information Centre has pooled GIS data produced by such sources as the Western European Satellite Centre, the Geneva Centre for Humanitarian Demining, KFOR, the Yugoslav Institute of Statistics and the International Management Group. Those data have been combined to create an atlas that is available publicly on their web site, on CD-ROMs for those with slow or non-existent Internet access and in hard copy. 254. Computer simulations can be powerful learning tools for mission personnel and for the local parties. Simulations can, in principle, be created for any component of an operation. They can facilitate group problem-solving and reveal to local parties the sometimes unintended consequences of their policy choices. With appropriate broadband Internet links, simulations can be part of distance learning packages tailored to a new operation and used to pre-train new mission recruits. 255. An enhanced peace and security area on the United Nations Intranet (the Organization’s information network that is open to a specified set of users) would be a valuable addition to peace operations planning, analysis, and execution. A subset of the larger network, it would focus on drawing together issues and information that directly pertain to peace and security, including EISAS analyses, situation reports, GIS maps and linkages to lessons learned. Varying levels of security access could facilitate the sharing of sensitive information among restricted groups. 256. The data in the Intranet should be linked to a Peace Operations Extranet (POE) that would use existing and planned wide area network communications to link Headquarters databases in EISAS and the substantive offices with the field, and field missions with one another. POE could easily contain all administrative, procedural and legal information for peace operations, and could provide single-point access to information generated by many sources, give planners the ability to produce comprehensive reports more quickly and improve response time to emergency situations. 257. Some mission components, such as civilian police and related criminal justice units and human rights investigators, require added network security, as well as the hardware and software that can support the required levels of data storage, transmission and analysis. Two key technologies for civilian police are GIS and crime mapping software, used to convert raw data into geographical representations that illustrate crime trends and other key information, facilitate recognition of patterns of events, or highlight special features of problem areas, improving the ability of civilian police to fight crime or to advise their local counterparts. 258. Summary of key recommendations on information technology tools in peace operations: (a) EISAS, in cooperation with ITSD, should implement an enhanced peace operations element on the current United Nations Intranet and link it44 A/55/305 S/2000/809 to the missions through a Peace Operations Extranet (POE); (b) Peace operations could benefit greatly from more extensive use of geographic information systems (GIS) technology, which quickly integrates operational information with electronic maps of the mission area, for applications as diverse as demobilization, civilian policing, voter registration, human rights monitoring and reconstruction; (c) The IT needs of mission components with unique information technology needs, such as civilian police and human rights, should be anticipated and met more consistently in mission planning and implementation. C. Improving the timeliness of Internetbaase public information 259. As the Panel noted in section III above, effectively communicating the work of United Nations peace operations to the public is essential to creating and maintaining support for current and future missions. Not only is it essential to develop a positive image early on to promote a conducive working environment but it is also important to maintain a solid public information campaign to garner and retain support from the international community. 260. The body now officially responsible for communicating the work of United Nations peace operations is the Peace and Security Section of DPI in Headquarters, as discussed in section IV above. One person in DPI is responsible for the actual posting of all peace and security content on the web site, as well as for posting all mission inputs to the web, to ensure that information posted is consistent and compatible with Headquarters web standards. 261. The Panel endorses the application of standards but standardized need not mean centralized. The current process of news production and posting of data to the United Nations web site slows down the cycle of updates, yet daily updates could be important to a mission in a fast-moving situation. It also limits the amount of information that can be presented on each mission. 262. DPI and field staff have expressed interest in relieving this bottleneck through the development of a “web site co-management” model. This seems to the Panel to be an appropriate solution to this particular information bottleneck. 263. Summary of key recommendation on timeliness of Internet-based public information: the Panel encourages the development of web site comanaggemen by Headquarters and the field missions, in which Headquarters would maintain oversight but individual missions would have staff authorized to produce and post web content that conforms to basic presentational standards and policy. * * * 264. In the present report, the Panel has emphasized the need to change the structure and practices of the Organization in order to enable it to pursue more effectively its responsibilities in support of international peace and security and respect for human rights. Some of those changes would not be feasible without the new capacities that networked information technologies provide. The report itself would have been impossible to produce without the technologies already in place at United Nations Headquarters and accessible to members of the Panel in every region of the world. People use effective tools, and effective information technology could be much better utilized in the service of peace. VI. Challenges to implementation 265. The present report targets two groups in presenting its recommendations for reform: the Member States and the Secretariat. We recognize that reform will not occur unless Member States genuinely pursue it. At the same time, we believe that the changes we recommend for the Secretariat must be actively advanced by the Secretary-General and implemented by his senior staff. 266. Member States must recognize that the United Nations is the sum of its parts and accept that the primary responsibility for reform lies with them. The failures of the United Nations are not those of the Secretariat alone, or troop commanders or the leaders of field missions. Most occurred because the Security Council and the Member States crafted and supported ambiguous, inconsistent and under-funded mandates and then stood back and watched as they failed, sometimes even adding critical public commentary as45 A/55/305 S/2000/809 the credibility of the United Nations underwent its severest tests. 267. The problems of command and control that recently arose in Sierra Leone are the most recent illustration of what cannot be tolerated any longer. Troop contributors must ensure that the troops they provide fully understand the importance of an integrated chain of command, the operational control of the Secretary-General and the standard operating procedures and rules of engagement of the mission. It is essential that the chain of command in an operation be understood and respected, and the onus is on national capitals to refrain from instructing their contingent commanders on operational matters. 268. We are aware that the Secretary-General is implementing a comprehensive reform programme and realize that our recommendations may need to be adjusted to fit within this bigger picture. Furthermore, the reforms we have recommended for the Secretariat and the United Nations system in general will not be accomplished overnight, though some require urgent action. We recognize that there is a normal resistance to change in any bureaucracy, and are encouraged that some of the changes we have embraced as recommendations originate from within the system. We are also encouraged by the commitment of the Secretary-General to lead the Secretariat toward reform even if it means that long-standing organizational and procedural lines will have to be breached, and that aspects of the Secretariat’s priorities and culture will need to be challenged and changed. In this connection, we urge the Secretary-General to appoint a senior official with responsibility for overseeing the implementation of the recommendations contained in the present report. 269. The Secretary-General has consistently emphasized the need for the United Nations to reach out to civil society and to strengthen relations with non-governmental organizations, academic institutions and the media, who can be useful partners in the promotion of peace and security for all. We call on the Secretariat to take heed of the Secretary-General’s approach and implement it in its work in peace and security. We call on them to constantly keep in mind that the United Nations they serve is the universal organization. People everywhere are fully entitled to consider that it is their organization, and as such to pass judgement on its activities and the people who serve in it. 270. There is wide variation in quality among Secretariat staff supporting the peace and security functions in DPKO, DPA and the other departments concerned. This observation applies to the civilians recruited by the Secretariat as well as to the military and civilian police personnel proposed by Member States. These disparities are widely recognized by those in the system. Better performers are given unreasonable workloads to compensate for those who are less capable. Naturally, this can be bad for morale and can create resentment, particularly among those who rightly point out that the United Nations has not dedicated enough attention over the years to career development, training and mentoring or the institution of modern management practices. Put simply, the United Nations is far from being a meritocracy today, and unless it takes steps to become one it will not be able to reverse the alarming trend of qualified personnel, the young among them in particular, leaving the Organization. If the hiring, promotion and delegation of responsibility rely heavily on seniority or personal or political connections, qualified people will have no incentive to join the Organization or stay with it. Unless managers at all levels, beginning with the Secretary-General and his senior staff, seriously address this problem on a priority basis, reward excellence and remove incompetent staff, additional resources will be wasted and lasting reform will become impossible. 271. The same level of scrutiny should apply to United Nations personnel in the field missions. The majority of them embody the spirit of what it means to be an international civil servant, travelling to war-torn lands and dangerous environments to help improve the lives of the world’s most vulnerable communities. They do so with considerable personal sacrifice, and at times with great risks to their own physical safety and mental health. They deserve the world’s recognition and appreciation. Over the years, many of them have given their lives in the service of peace and we take this opportunity to honour their memory. 272. United Nations personnel in the field, perhaps more than any others, are obliged to respect local norms, culture and practices. They must go out of their way to demonstrate that respect, as a start, by getting to know their host environment and trying to learn as much of the local culture and language as they can. They must behave with the understanding that they are guests in someone else’s home, however destroyed that46 A/55/305 S/2000/809 home might be, particularly when the United Nations takes on a transitional administration role. And they must also treat one another with respect and dignity, with particular sensitivity towards gender and cultural differences. 273. In short, we believe that a very high standard should be maintained for the selection and conduct of personnel at Headquarters and in the field. When United Nations personnel fail to meet such standards, they should be held accountable. In the past, the Secretariat has had difficulty in holding senior officials in the field accountable for their performance because those officials could point to insufficient resources, unclear instructions or lack of appropriate command and control arrangements as the main impediments to successful implementation of a mission’s mandate. These deficiencies should be addressed but should not be allowed to offer cover to poor performers. The future of nations, the lives of those whom the United Nations has come to help and protect, the success of a mission and the credibility of the Organization can all hinge on what a few individuals do or fail to do. Anyone who turns out to be unsuited to the task that he or she has agreed to perform must be removed from a mission, no matter how high or how low they may be on the ladder. 274. Member States themselves acknowledge that they, too, need to reflect on their working culture and methods, at least as concerns the conduct of United Nations peace and security activities. The tradition of the recitation of statements, followed by a painstaking process of achieving consensus, places considerable emphasis on the diplomatic process over operational product. While one of the United Nations main virtues is that it provides a forum for 189 Member States to exchange views on pressing global issues, sometimes dialogue alone is not enough to ensure that billiondollla peacekeeping operations, vital conflict prevention measures or critical peacemaking efforts succeed in the face of great odds. Expressions of general support in the form of statements and resolutions must be followed up with tangible action. 275. Moreover, Member States may send conflicting messages regarding the actions they advocate, with their representatives voicing political support in one body but denying financial support in another. Such inconsistencies have appeared between the Fifth Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Matters on the one hand, and the Security Council and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations on the other. 276. On the political level, many of the local parties with whom peacekeepers and peacemakers are dealing on a daily basis may neither respect nor fear verbal condemnation by the Security Council. It is therefore incumbent that Council members and the membership at large breathe life into the words that they produce, as did the Security Council delegation that flew to Jakarta and Dili in the wake of the East Timor crisis last year, an example of effective Council action at its best: res, non verba. 277. Meanwhile, the financial constraints under which the United Nations labours continue to cause serious damage to its ability to conduct peace operations in a credible and professional manner. We therefore urge that Member States uphold their treaty obligations and pay their dues in full, on time and without condition. 278. We are also aware that there are other issues which, directly or indirectly, hamper effective United Nations action in the field of peace and security, including two unresolved issues that are beyond the scope of the Panel’s mandate but critical to peace operations and that only the Member States can address. They are the disagreements about how assessments in support of peacekeeping operations are apportioned and about equitable representation on the Security Council. We can only hope that the Member States will find a way to resolve their differences on these issues in the interests of upholding their collective international responsibility as prescribed in the Charter. 279. We call on the leaders of the world assembled at the Millennium Summit, as they renew their commitment to the ideals of the United Nations, to commit as well to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to fully accomplish the mission which is, indeed, its very raison d’être: to help communities engulfed in strife and to maintain or restore peace. 280. While building consensus for the recommendations in the present report, we — the members of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations — have also come to a shared vision of a United Nations, extending a strong helping hand to a community, country or region to avert conflict or to end violence. We see an SRSG ending a mission well accomplished, having given the people of a country the opportunity to do for themselves what they could not47 A/55/305 S/2000/809 do before: to build and hold onto peace, to find reconciliation, to strengthen democracy, to secure human rights. We see, above all, a United Nations that has not only the will but also the ability to fulfil its great promise and to justify the confidence and trust placed in it by the overwhelming majority of humankind.48 A/55/305 S/2000/809 Annex I Members of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations Mr. J. Brian Atwood (United States), President, Citizens International; former President, National Democratic Institute; former Administrator, United States Agency for International Development. Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria), former Foreign Minister; Chairman of the Panel. Ambassador Colin Granderson (Trinidad and Tobago), Executive Director of Organization of American States (OAS)/United Nations International Civilian Mission in Haiti, 1993-2000; head of OAS election observation missions in Haiti (1995 and 1997) and Suriname (2000). Dame Ann Hercus (New Zealand), former Cabinet Minister and Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United Nations; Head of Mission of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), 1998-1999. Mr. Richard Monk (United Kingdom), former member of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Government adviser on international policing matters; Commissioner of the United Nations International Police Task Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1998-1999. General (ret.) Klaus Naumann (Germany), Chief of Defence, 1991-1996; Chairman of the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1996-1999, with oversight responsibility for NATO Implementation Force/Stabilization Force operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the NATO Kosovo air campaign. Ms. Hisako Shimura (Japan), President of Tsuda College, Tokyo; served for 24 years in the United Nations Secretariat, retiring from United Nations service in 1995 as Director, Europe and Latin America Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Ambassador Vladimir Shustov (Russian Federation), Ambassador at large, with 30 years association with the United Nations; former Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York; former representative of the Russian Federation to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. General Philip Sibanda (Zimbabwe), Chief of Staff, Operations and Training, Zimbabwe Army Headquarters, Harare; former Force Commander of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) and the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), 1995-1998. Dr. Cornelio Sommaruga (Switzerland), President of the Foundation of Moral Rearmament, Caux, and of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining; former President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 1987-1999. * * *49 A/55/305 S/2000/809 Office of the Chairman of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations Dr. William Durch, Senior Associate, Henry L. Stimson Center; Project Director Mr. Salman Ahmed, Political Affairs Officer, United Nations Secretariat Ms. Clare Kane, Personal Assistant, United Nations Secretariat Ms. Caroline Earle, Research Associate, Stimson Center Mr. J. Edward Palmisano, Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow, Stimson Center50 A/55/305 S/2000/809 Annex II References United Nations documents Annan, Kofi A. Preventing war and disaster: a growing global challenge. Annual report on the work of the Organization, 1999. (A/54/1) ________ Partnerships for global community. Annual report on the work of the Organization, 1998. (A/53/1) ________ Facing the humanitarian challenge: towards a culture of prevention. (ST/DPI/2070) ________ We the peoples: the role of the United Nations in the twenty-first century. The Millennium Report. (A/54/2000) Economic and Social Council: Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services entitled “In-depth evaluation of peacekeeping operations: start-up phase”. (E/AC.51/1995/2 and Corr.1) ________ Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services entitled “In-depth evaluation of peacekeeping operations: termination phase”. (E/AC.51/1996/3 and Corr.1) ________ Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services entitled “Triennial review of the implementation of the recommendations made by the Committee for Programme and Coordination at its thirty-fifth session on the evaluation of peacekeeping operations: start-up phase”. (E/AC.51/1998/4 and Corr.1) ________ Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services entitled “Triennial review of the implementation of the recommendations made by the Committee for Programme and Coordination at its thirty-sixth session on the evaluation of peacekeeping operations: termination phase”. (E/AC.51/1999/5) General Assembly. Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the review of the Field Administration and Logistics Division, Department of Peacekeeping Operations. (A/49/959) ________ Report of the Secretary-General entitled “Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform”. (A/51/950) ________ Report of the Secretary-General on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa. (A/52/871) ________ Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. (A/54/87 and Corr.1) ________ Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the audit of the management of service and ration contracts in peacekeeping missions. (A/54/335) ________ Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the annual report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services for the period 1 July 1998 to 30 June 1999. (A/54/393) ________ Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict entitled “Protection of children affected by armed conflict”. (A/54/430) ________ Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/55, entitled “The fall of Srebrenica”. (A/54/549) ________ Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. (A/54/839) ________ Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. (A/54/670) General Assembly and Security Council. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, entitled “An Agenda for Peace: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping”. (A/47/277-S/24111)51 A/55/305 S/2000/809 ________ Position paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, entitled “Supplement to an Agenda for Peace”. (A/50/60-S/1995/1) ________ Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict. (A/55/163-S/2000/712) Security Council. Report of the Secretary-General on protection for humanitarian assistance to refugees and others in conflict situations. (S/1998/883) ________ Report of the Secretary-General on the enhancement of African peacekeeping capacity. (S/1999/171) ________ Progress report of the Secretary-General on standby arrangements for peacekeeping. (S/1999/361) ________ Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. (S/1999/957) ________ Letter dated 15 December 1999 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, enclosing the report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. (S/1999/1257) ________ Report of the Secretary-General on the role of United Nations peacekeeping in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. (S/2000/101) Letter dated 10 March 2000 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning the situation in Angola addressed to the President of the Security Council, enclosing the report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions against UNITA. (S/2000/203) Secretary-General’s press release. Statement made by the Secretary-General at Georgetown University. (SG/SM/6901) Secretary-General’s Bulletin. Observance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian law. (ST/SGB/1999/13) United Nations Development Programme. Governance foundations for post-conflict situations: UNDP’s experience. Discussion paper prepared by the UNDP Management Development and Governance Division, January 2000. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Annual appeal 2000: overview of activities and financial requirements. Geneva. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Catalogue of emergency response tools. Document prepared by the Emergency Preparedness and Response Section. Geneva, 2000. United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), Institute of Policy Studies of Singapore (IPS) and National Institute for Research Advancement of Japan. Report of the 1997 Singapore Conference: humanitarian action and peacekeeping operations. New York, 1997. UNITAR, IPS and Japan Institute of International Affairs. The nexus between peacekeeping and peace-building: debriefing and lessons. Draft report of the 1999 Singapore Conference. New York, 2000. Goulding, Marrack. Practical measures to enhance the United Nations effectiveness in the field of peace and security. Report submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. New York, 30 June 1997. Other sources Berdal, Mats, and David M. Malone, eds. Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000. Berman, Eric G., and Katie E. Sams. Peacekeeping in Africa: capabilities and culpabilities. (UNIDIR/2000/3) Bigombe, Betty, Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis. Policies for building post-conflict peace. Paper presented at an ad hoc expert group meeting on the economics of civil conflicts in Africa, 7 and 8 April 2000, organized by the Economic Commission for Africa. Blechman, Barry M., William J. Durch, Wendy Eaton and Julie Werbel. Effective transitions from peace operations to sustainable peace: final report. DFI International, Washington, D.C., September 1997. Childers, Erskine, and Brian Urquhart. Towards a More Effective United Nations: Two Studies. Uppsala, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1992.52 A/55/305 S/2000/809 Collier, Paul. Economic causes of civil conflict and their implications for policy. In Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, Managing Global Chaos. Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace, forthcoming. Cousens, Elizabeth M., Donald Rothchild and Stephen John Stedman, eds. Ending Civil Wars, vol. II, Evaluating Peace Implementation. New York, Center for International Security and Cooperation of Stanford University and International Peace Academy, forthcoming. DeSoto, Alvaro, and Graciana del Castillo. Implementation of comprehensive peace agreements: staying the course in El Salvador. Global Governance, vol. 1, No. 2 (May-June 1995). Doyle, Michael W., and Nicholas Sambanis. International peace-building: a theoretical and quantitative analysis. Paper presented at a conference of the Center of International Studies and the World Bank, Princeton University, 17 and 18 March 2000. Fafo Programme for International Cooperation and Conflict Resolution. Command from the saddle: managing United Nations peace-building missions. Recommendations report of a forum on special representatives of the Secretary-General on the theme “Shaping the United Nations role in peace implementation”. Oslo, Peace Implementation Network, 1999. Fainberg, Anthony, Alan Shaw, Dean Cheng, Xavier Maruyama and Donald Gallagher. Technology for international peace operations. Washington, D.C., Institute for Technology Assessment, March 1998. Forman, Shepard, Stewart Patrick and Dirk Salomons. Recovering from conflict: strategy for an international response. New York University, Center on International Cooperation, February 2000. Government of Canada. Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations. Ottawa, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and Department of National Defence, 1995. Griffin, Michèle and Bruce Jones. Building peace through transitional authority: new directions, major challenges. International Peacekeeping, vol. 7, No. 3 (Summer 2000). Henkin, Alice H., ed. Honouring Human Rights and Keeping the Peace: Lessons from El Salvador, Cambodia and Haiti. Washington, D.C., Aspen Institute, 1995. ________ Honouring Human Rights, from Peace to Justice: Recommendations to the International Community. Summary edition of Henkin, op. cit., Washington, D.C., Aspen Institute, 1999. Holm, Tor Tanke, and Espen Barth Eide, eds. Peacebuilding and Police Reform. International Peacekeeping, vol. 6, No. 4 (Special issue, Winter 1999). Humanitarian Community Information Centre, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat. Kosovo atlas. Pristina, February 2000. Jett, Dennis C. Why Peacekeeping Fails. New York, St. Martin’s Press, 2000. Latter, Richard. Monitoring and verifying peace agreements. Report based on a Wilton Park conference 597 on the monitoring and verification of peace agreements, 24-26 March 2000, April 2000. Lehman, Ingrid A. Peacekeeping and Public Information: Caught in the Crossfire. London, Frank Cass, 1999. Lord Christopher. Advisory note for Stimson Center/United Nations Panel on Peace Operations. Prague, Prague Project on Emergency Criminal Justice Principles, Institute of International Relations, 27 June 2000. Moore, Jonathan, ed. Hard Choices. Lanham, Maryland, Rowman and Littlefield for the International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1998. Plunkett, Mark. Justice re-establishment in United Nations peacekeeping: methods and techniques for the re-establishment of the rule of law in United Nations peace operations. 18 April 2000. Salerno, Reynolds M., Michael G. Vannoni, David S. Barber, Randall R. Parish and Rebecca L.53 A/55/305 S/2000/809 Frerichs. Enhanced peacekeeping with monitoring technologies. Sandia report. Albuquerque, Sandia National Laboratories, 2000. Smillie, Ian, Lansana Gberie and Ralph Hazleton. The heart of the matter: Sierra Leone, diamonds and human security. Ottawa, Partnership Africa Canada, January 2000. Stedman, Stephen John. Spoiler problems in peace processes. International Security, vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997). Stewart, Frances and A. Berry. The real causes of inequality. Challenge, vol. 43, No. 1 (2000). Stewart, Frances, Frank P. Humphreys and Nick Lee. Civil conflict in developing countries over the last quarter of a century: an empirical overview of economic and social consequences. Oxford Journal of Development Studies, vol. 25, No. 1 (February 1997). Thant, Myint-U and Elizabeth Sellwood. Knowledge and Multilateral Interventions: The United Nations Experiences in Cambodia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Royal Institute of International Affairs Discussion Paper, No. 83. London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000. Wallensteen, Peter, and Margareta Sollenberg. Armed conflict and regional conflict complexes, 1989-1997. Journal of Peace Research, vol. 35, No. 5 (1998). World Bank Institute and Interworks. The Transition from War to Peace: An Overview. Washington, D.C., 1999.54 A/55/305 S/2000/809 Annex III Summary of recommendations 1. Preventive action: (a) The Panel endorses the recommendations of the Secretary-General with respect to conflict prevention contained in the Millennium Report and in his remarks before the Security Council’s second open meeting on conflict prevention in July 2000, in particular his appeal to “all who are engaged in conflict prevention and development — the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, Governments and civil society organizations — [to] address these challenges in a more integrated fashion”; (b) The Panel supports the Secretary-General’s more frequent use of fact-finding missions to areas of tension, and stresses Member States’ obligations, under Article 2(5) of the Charter, to give “every assistance” to such activities of the United Nations. 2. Peace-building strategy: (a) A small percentage of a mission’s first-year budget should be made available to the representative or special representative of the Secretary-General leading the mission to fund quick impact projects in its area of operations, with the advice of the United Nations country team’s resident coordinator; (b) The Panel recommends a doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police, other rule of law elements and human rights experts in complex peace operations to reflect an increased focus on strengthening rule of law institutions and improving respect for human rights in post-conflict environments; (c) The Panel recommends that the legislative bodies consider bringing demobilization and reintegration programmes into the assessed budgets of complex peace operations for the first phase of an operation in order to facilitate the rapid disassembly of fighting factions and reduce the likelihood of resumed conflict; (d) The Panel recommends that the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) discuss and recommend to the Secretary-General a plan to strengthen the permanent capacity of the United Nations to develop peace-building strategies and to implement programmes in support of those strategies. 3. Peacekeeping doctrine and strategy: once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandates professionally and successfully and be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission’s mandate, with robust rules of engagement, against those who renege on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence. 4. Clear, credible and achievable mandates: (a) The Panel recommends that, before the Security Council agrees to implement a ceasefire or peace agreement with a United Nations-led peacekeeping operation, the Council assure itself that the agreement meets threshold conditions, such as consistency with international human rights standards and practicability of specified tasks and timelines; (b) The Security Council should leave in draft form resolutions authorizing missions with sizeable troop levels until such time as the Secretary-General has firm commitments of troops and other critical mission support elements, including peace-building elements, from Member States; (c) Security Council resolutions should meet the requirements of peacekeeping operations when they deploy into potentially dangerous situations, especially the need for a clear chain of command and unity of effort;(d) The Secretariat must tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear, when formulating or changing mission mandates, and countries that have committed military units to an operation should have access to Secretariat briefings to the Council on matters affecting the safety and security of their personnel, especially those meetings with implications for a mission’s use of force. 5. Information and strategic analysis: the Secretary-General should establish an entity, referred to here as the ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS), which would support the information and analysis needs of all members of ECPS; for management purposes, it should be administered by and report jointly to the heads of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).55 A/55/305 S/2000/809 6. Transitional civil administration: the Panel recommends that the Secretary-General invite a panel of international legal experts, including individuals with experience in United Nations operations that have transitional administration mandates, to evaluate the feasibility and utility of developing an interim criminal code, including any regional adaptations potentially required, for use by such operations pending the reestabllishmen of local rule of law and local law enforcement capacity. 7. Determining deployment timelines: the United Nations should define “rapid and effective deployment capacities” as the ability, from an operational perspective, to fully deploy traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days after the adoption of a Security Council resolution, and within 90 days in the case of complex peacekeeping operations. 8. Mission leadership: (a) The Secretary-General should systematize the method of selecting mission leaders, beginning with the compilation of a comprehensive list of potential representatives or special representatives of the Secretary-General, force commanders, civilian police commissioners, and their deputies and other heads of substantive and administrative components, within a fair geographic and gender distribution and with input from Member States; (b) The entire leadership of a mission should be selected and assembled at Headquarters as early as possible in order to enable their participation in key aspects of the mission planning process, for briefings on the situation in the mission area and to meet and work with their colleagues in mission leadership; (c) The Secretariat should routinely provide the mission leadership with strategic guidance and plans for anticipating and overcoming challenges to mandate implementation, and whenever possible should formulate such guidance and plans together with the mission leadership. 9. Military personnel: (a) Member States should be encouraged, where appropriate, to enter into partnerships with one another, within the context of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS), to form several coherent brigade-size forces, with necessary enabling forces, ready for effective deployment within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing a traditional peacekeeping operation and within 90 days for complex peacekeeping operations; (b) The Secretary-General should be given the authority to formally canvass Member States participating in UNSAS regarding their willingness to contribute troops to a potential operation, once it appeared likely that a ceasefire accord or agreement envisaging an implementing role for the United Nations, might be reached; (c) The Secretariat should, as a standard practice, send a team to confirm the preparedness of each potential troop contributor to meet the provisions of the memoranda of understanding on the requisite training and equipment requirements, prior to deployment; those that do not meet the requirements must not deploy; (d) The Panel recommends that a revolving “on-call list” of about 100 military officers be created in UNSAS to be available on seven days’ notice to augment nuclei of DPKO planners with teams trained to create a mission headquarters for a new peacekeeping operation. 10. Civilian police personnel: (a) Member States are encouraged to each establish a national pool of civilian police officers that would be ready for deployment to United Nations peace operations on short notice, within the context of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System; (b) Member States are encouraged to enter into regional training partnerships for civilian police in the respective national pools, to promote a common level of preparedness in accordance with guidelines, standard operating procedures and performance standards to be promulgated by the United Nations; (c) Members States are encouraged to designate a single point of contact within their governmental structures for the provision of civilian police to United Nations peace operations; (d) The Panel recommends that a revolving on-call list of about 100 police officers and related experts be created in UNSAS to be available on seven days’ notice with teams trained to create the civilian police component of a new peacekeeping operation, train incoming personnel and give the component greater coherence at an early date;56 A/55/305 S/2000/809 (e) The Panel recommends that parallel arrangements to recommendations (a), (b) and (c) above be established for judicial, penal, human rights and other relevant specialists, who with specialist civilian police will make up collegial “rule of law” teams. 11. Civilian specialists: (a) The Secretariat should establish a central Internet/Intranet-based roster of pre-selected civilian candidates available to deploy to peace operations on short notice. The field missions should be granted access to and delegated authority to recruit candidates from it, in accordance with guidelines on fair geographic and gender distribution to be promulgated by the Secretariat; (b) The Field Service category of personnel should be reformed to mirror the recurrent demands faced by all peace operations, especially at the mid-to senior-levels in the administrative and logistics areas; (c) Conditions of service for externally recruited civilian staff should be revised to enable the United Nations to attract the most highly qualified candidates, and to then offer those who have served with distinction greater career prospects; (d) DPKO should formulate a comprehensive staffing strategy for peace operations, outlining, among other issues, the use of United Nations Volunteers, standby arrangements for the provision of civilian personnel on 72 hours' notice to facilitate mission startuup and the divisions of responsibility among the members of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security for implementing that strategy. 12. Rapidly deployable capacity for public information: additional resources should be devoted in mission budgets to public information and the associated personnel and information technology required to get an operation’s message out and build effective internal communications links. 13. Logistics support and expenditure management: (a) The Secretariat should prepare a global logistics support strategy to enable rapid and effective mission deployment within the timelines proposed and corresponding to planning assumptions established by the substantive offices of DPKO; (b) The General Assembly should authorize and approve a one-time expenditure to maintain at least five mission start-up kits in Brindisi, which should include rapidly deployable communications equipment. These start-up kits should then be routinely replenished with funding from the assessed contributions to the operations that drew on them; (c) The Secretary-General should be given authority to draw up to US$50 million from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, once it became clear that an operation was likely to be established, with the approval of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) but prior to the adoption of a Security Council resolution; (d) The Secretariat should undertake a review of the entire procurement policies and procedures (with proposals to the General Assembly for amendments to the Financial Rules and Regulations, as required), to facilitate in particular the rapid and full deployment of an operation within the proposed timelines; (e) The Secretariat should conduct a review of the policies and procedures governing the management of financial resources in the field missions with a view to providing field missions with much greater flexibility in the management of their budgets; (f) The Secretariat should increase the level of procurement authority delegated to the field missions (from$200,000 to as high as $1 million, depending on mission size and needs) for all goods and services that are available locally and are not covered under systems contracts or standing commercial services contracts. 14. Funding Headquarters support for peacekeeping operations: (a) The Panel recommends a substantial increase in resources for Headquarters support of peacekeeping operations, and urges the Secretary-General to submit a proposal to the General Assembly outlining his requirements in full; (b) Headquarters support for peacekeeping should be treated as a core activity of the United Nations, and as such the majority of its resource requirements for this purpose should be funded through the mechanism of the regular biennial programme budget of the Organization; (c) Pending the preparation of the next regular budget submission, the Panel recommends that the57 A/55/305 S/2000/809 Secretary-General approach the General Assembly with a request for an emergency supplemental increase to the Support Account to allow immediate recruitment of additional personnel, particularly in DPKO. 15. Integrated mission planning and support: Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs), with members seconded from throughout the United Nations system, as necessary, should be the standard vehicle for mission-specific planning and support. IMTFs should serve as the first point of contact for all such support, and IMTF leaders should have temporary line authority over seconded personnel, in accordance with agreements between DPKO, DPA and other contributing departments, programmes, funds and agencies. 16. Other structural adjustments in DPKO: (a) The current Military and Civilian Police Division should be restructured, moving the Civilian Police Unit out of the military reporting chain. Consideration should be given to upgrading the rank and level of the Civilian Police Adviser; (b) The Military Adviser’s Office in DPKO should be restructured to correspond more closely to the way in which the military field headquarters in United Nations peacekeeping operations are structured; (c) A new unit should be established in DPKO and staffed with the relevant expertise for the provision of advice on criminal law issues that are critical to the effective use of civilian police in the United Nations peace operations; (d) The Under-Secretary-General for Management should delegate authority and responsibility for peacekeeping-related budgeting and procurement functions to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations for a two-year trial period; (e) The Lessons Learned Unit should be substantially enhanced and moved into a revamped DPKO Office of Operations; (f) Consideration should be given to increasing the number of Assistant Secretaries-General in DPKO from two to three, with one of the three designated as the “Principal Assistant Secretary-General” and functioning as the deputy to the Under-Secretary-General. 17. Operational support for public information: a unit for operational planning and support of public information in peace operations should be established, either within DPKO or within a new Peace and Security Information Service in the Department of Public Information (DPI) reporting directly to the Under-Secretary-General for Communication and Public Information. 18. Peace-building support in the Department of Political Affairs: (a) The Panel supports the Secretariat’s effort to create a pilot Peace-building Unit within DPA, in cooperation with other integral United Nations elements, and suggests that regular budgetary support for this unit be revisited by the membership if the pilot programme works well. This programme should be evaluated in the context of guidance the Panel has provided in paragraph 46 above, and if considered the best available option for strengthening United Nations peace-building capacity it should be presented to the Secretary-General within the context of the Panel’s recommendation contained in paragraph 47 (d) above; (b) The Panel recommends that regular budget resources for Electoral Assistance Division programmatic expenses be substantially increased to meet the rapidly growing demand for its services, in lieu of voluntary contributions; (c) To relieve demand on the Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD) and the executive office of DPA, and to improve support services rendered to smaller political and peacebuilldin field offices, the Panel recommends that procurement, logistics, staff recruitment and other support services for all such smaller, non-military field missions be provided by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). 19. Peace operations support in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: the Panel recommends substantially enhancing the field mission planning and preparation capacity of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, with funding partly from the regular budget and partly from peace operations mission budgets. 20. Peace operations and the information age: (a) Headquarters peace and security departments need a responsibility centre to devise and58 A/55/305 S/2000/809 oversee the implementation of common information technology strategy and training for peace operations, residing in EISAS. Mission counterparts to the responsibility centre should also be appointed to serve in the offices of the special representatives of the Secretary-General in complex peace operations to oversee the implementation of that strategy; (b) EISAS, in cooperation with the Information Technology Services Division (ITSD), should implement an enhanced peace operations element on the current United Nations Intranet and link it to the missions through a Peace Operations Extranet (POE); (c) Peace operations could benefit greatly from more extensive use of geographic information systems (GIS) technology, which quickly integrates operational information with electronic maps of the mission area, for applications as diverse as demobilization, civilian policing, voter registration, human rights monitoring and reconstruction; (d) The IT needs of mission components with unique information technology needs, such as civilian police and human rights, should be anticipated and met more consistently in mission planning and implementation; (e) The Panel encourages the development of web site co-management by Headquarters and the field missions, in which Headquarters would maintain oversight but individual missions would have staff authorized to produce and post web content that conforms to basic presentational standards and policy. 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