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United Nations A/55/305–S/2000/809 General Assembly Security Council Distr.: General 21 August 2000 Original: English 00-59470 (E) 180800 ````````` General Assembly Security Council Fifty-fifth session Fifty-fifth year Item 87 of the provisional agenda* Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects Identical letters dated 21 August 2000 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council On 7 March 2000, I convened a high-level Panel to undertake a thorough review of the United Nations peace and security activities, and to present a clear set of specific, concrete and practical recommendations to assist the United Nations in conducting such activities better in the future. I asked Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, the former Foreign Minister of Algeria, to chair the Panel, which included the following eminent personalities from around the world, with a wide range of experience in the fields of peacekeeping, peace-building, development and humanitarian assistance: Mr. J. Brian Atwood, Ambassador Colin Granderson, Dame Ann Hercus, Mr. Richard Monk, General Klaus Naumann (retd.), Ms. Hisako Shimura, Ambassador Vladimir Shustov, General Philip Sibanda and Dr. Cornelio Sommaruga. I would be grateful if the Panel’s report, which has been transmitted to me in the enclosed letter dated 17 August 2000 from the Chairman of the Panel, could be brought to the attention of Member States. The Panel’s analysis is frank yet fair; its recommendations are far-reaching yet sensible and practical. The expeditious implementation of the Panel’s recommendations, in my view, is essential to make the United Nations truly credible as a force for peace. Many of the Panel’s recommendations relate to matters fully within the purview of the Secretary-General, while others will need the approval and support of the legislative bodies of the United Nations. I urge all Member States to join me in considering, approving and supporting the implementation of those recommendations. In this connection, I am pleased to inform you that I have designated the Deputy Secretary-General to follow up on the report’s recommendations and to oversee the preparation of a detailed implementation plan, which I shall submit to the General Assembly and the Security Council. * A/55/150.ii A/55/305 S/2000/809 I very much hope that the report of the Panel, in particular its Executive Summary, will be brought to the attention of all the leaders who will be coming to New York in September 2000 to participate in the Millennium Summit. That highleeve and historic meeting presents a unique opportunity for us to commence the process of renewing the United Nations capacity to secure and build peace. I ask for the support of the General Assembly and Security Council in converting into reality the far-reaching agenda laid out in the report. (Signed) Kofi A. Annaniii A/55/305 S/2000/809 Letter dated 17 August 2000 from the Chairman of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations to the Secretary-General The Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, which you convened in March 2000, was privileged to have been asked by you to assess the United Nations ability to conduct peace operations effectively, and to offer frank, specific and realistic recommendations for ways in which to enhance that capacity. Mr. Brian Atwood, Ambassador Colin Granderson, Dame Ann Hercus, Mr. Richard Monk, General (ret.) Klaus Naumann, Ms. Hisako Shimura, Ambassador Vladimir Shustov, General Philip Sibanda, Dr. Cornelio Sommaruga and I accepted this challenge out of deep respect for you and because each of us believes fervently that the United Nations system can do better in the cause of peace. We admired greatly your willingness to undertake past highly critical analyses of United Nations operations in Rwanda and Srebrenica. This degree of self-criticism is rare for any large organization and particularly rare for the United Nations. We also would like to pay tribute to Deputy Secretary-General Louise Fréchette and Chef de Cabinet S. Iqbal Riza, who remained with us throughout our meetings and who answered our many questions with unfailing patience and clarity. They have given us much of their time and we benefited immensely from their intimate knowledge of the United Nations present limitations and future requirements. Producing a review and recommendations for reform of a system with the scope and complexity of United Nations peace operations, in only four months, was a daunting task. It would have been impossible but for the dedication and hard work of Dr. William Durch (with support from staff at the Stimson Center), Mr. Salman Ahmed of the United Nations and the willingness of United Nations officials throughout the system, including serving heads of mission, to share their insights both in interviews and in often comprehensive critiques of their own organizations and experiences. Former heads of peace operations and force commanders, academics and representatives of non-governmental organizations were equally helpful. The Panel engaged in intense discussion and debate. Long hours were devoted to reviewing recommendations and supporting analysis that we knew would be subject to scrutiny and interpretation. Over three separate three-day meetings in New York, Geneva and then New York again, we forged the letter and the spirit of the attached report. Its analysis and recommendations reflect our consensus, which we convey to you with our hope that it serve the cause of systematic reform and renewal of this core function of the United Nations. As we say in the report, we are aware that you are engaged in conducting a comprehensive reform of the Secretariat. We thus hope that our recommendations fit within that wider process, with slight adjustments if necessary. We realize that not all of our recommendations can be implemented overnight, but many of them do require urgent action and the unequivocal support of Member States. Throughout these months, we have read and heard encouraging words from Member States, large and small, from the South and from the North, stressing the necessity for urgent improvement in the ways the United Nations addresses conflictiv A/55/305 S/2000/809 situations. We urge them to act decisively to translate into reality those of our recommendations that require formal action by them. The Panel has full confidence that the official we suggest you designate to oversee the implementation of our recommendations, both inside the Secretariat and with Member States, will have your full support, in line with your conviction to transform the United Nations into the type of twenty-first century institution it needs to be to effectively meet the current and future threats to world peace. Finally, if I may be allowed to add a personal note, I wish to express my deepest gratitude to each of my colleagues on this Panel. Together, they have contributed to the project an impressive sum of knowledge and experience. They have consistently shown the highest degree of commitment to the Organization and a deep understanding of its needs. During our meetings and our contacts from afar, they have all been extremely kind to me, invariably helpful, patient and generous, thus making the otherwise intimidating task as their Chairman relatively easier and truly enjoyable. (Signed) Lakhdar Brahimi Chairman of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operationsv A/55/305 S/2000/809 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations Contents Paragraphs Page Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii I. The need for change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1–8 1 II. Doctrine, strategy and decision-making for peace operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9–83 2 A. Defining the elements of peace operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10–14 2 B. Experience of the past. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15–28 3 C. Implications for preventive action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29–34 5 Summary of key recommendations on preventive action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 6 D. Implications for peace-building strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35–47 6 Summary of key recommendations on peace-building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 8 E. Implications for peacekeeping doctrine and strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48–55 9 Summary of key recommendation on peacekeeping doctrine and strategy. . . . 55 10 F. Clear, credible and achievable mandates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56–64 10 Summary of key recommendations on clear, credible and achievable mandates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 11 G. Information-gathering, analysis and strategic planning capacities . . . . . . . . . . 65–75 12 Summary of key recommendation on information and strategic analysis. . . . . 75 13 H. The challenge of transitional civil administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76–83 13 Summary of key recommendation on transitional civil administration. . . . . . . 83 14 III. United Nations capacities to deploy operations rapidly and effectively . . . . . . . . . . 84–169 14 A. Defining what “rapid and effective deployment” entails . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86–91 15 Summary of key recommendation on determining deployment timelines . . . . . 91 16 B. Effective mission leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92–101 16 Summary of key recommendations on mission leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 17 C. Military personnel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102–117 17 Summary of key recommendations on military personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 20 D. Civilian police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118–126 20 Summary of key recommendations on civilian police personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 21 E. Civilian specialists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127–145 21 1. Lack of standby systems to respond to unexpected or high-volume surge demands. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128–132 22vi A/55/305 S/2000/809 2. Difficulties in attracting and retaining the best external recruits . . . . . . . 133–135 23 3. Shortages in administrative and support functions at the mid-to-senior levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 23 4. Penalizing field deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137–138 23 5. Obsolescence in the Field Service category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139–140 24 6. Lack of a comprehensive staffing strategy for peace operations. . . . . . . . 141–145 24 Summary of key recommendations on civilian specialists . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 25 F. Public information capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146–150 25 Summary of key recommendation on rapidly deployable capacity for public information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150 26 G. Logistics support, the procurement process and expenditure management . . . 151–169 26 Summary of key recommendations on logistics support and expenditure management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 28 IV. Headquarters resources and structure for planning and supporting peacekeeping operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170–245 29 A. Staffing-levels and funding for Headquarters support for peacekeeping operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172–197 29 Summary of key recommendations on funding Headquarters support for peacekeeping operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197 34 B. Need and proposal for the establishment of Integrated Mission Task Forces . 198–217 34 Summary of key recommendation on integrated mission planning and support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217 37 C. Other structural adjustments required in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218–233 37 1. Military and Civilian Police Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219–225 37 2. Field Administration and Logistics Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226–228 38 3. Lessons Learned Unit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229–230 39 4. Senior management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231–233 39 Summary of key recommendations on other structural adjustments in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 39 D. Structural adjustments needed outside the Department of Peacekeeping Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234–245 40 1. Operational support for public information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235–238 40 Summary of key recommendation on structural adjustments in public information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238 40vii A/55/305 S/2000/809 2. Peace-building support in the Department of Political Affairs . . . . . . . . . 239–243 40 Summary of key recommendations for peace-building support in the Department of Political Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243 41 3. Peace operations support in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244–245 41 Summary of key recommendation on strengthening the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245 41 V. Peace operations and the information age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246–264 42 A. Information technology in peace operations: strategy and policy issues . . . . . 247–251 42 Summary of key recommendation on information technology strategy and policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251 42 B. Tools for knowledge management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252–258 43 Summary of key recommendations on information technology tools in peace operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258 43 C. Improving the timeliness of Internet-based public information . . . . . . . . . . . . 259–264 44 Summary of key recommendation on the timeliness of Internet-based public information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263 44 VI. Challenges to implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265–280 44 Annexes I. Members of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 II. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 III. Summary of recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54viii A/55/305 S/2000/809 Executive Summary The United Nations was founded, in the words of its Charter, in order “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” Meeting this challenge is the most important function of the Organization, and to a very significant degree it is the yardstick with which the Organization is judged by the peoples it exists to serve. Over the last decade, the United Nations has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge, and it can do no better today. Without renewed commitment on the part of Member States, significant institutional change and increased financial support, the United Nations will not be capable of executing the critical peacekeeping and peacebuilldin tasks that the Member States assign to it in coming months and years. There are many tasks which United Nations peacekeeping forces should not be asked to undertake and many places they should not go. But when the United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence, with the ability and determination to defeat them.The Secretary-General has asked the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, composed of individuals experienced in various aspects of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace-building, to assess the shortcomings of the existing system and to make frank, specific and realistic recommendations for change. Our recommendations focus not only on politics and strategy but also and perhaps even more so on operational and organizational areas of need. For preventive initiatives to succeed in reducing tension and averting conflict, the Secretary-General needs clear, strong and sustained political support from Member States. Furthermore, as the United Nations has bitterly and repeatedly discovered over the last decade, no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force if complex peacekeeping, in particular, is to succeed. But force alone cannot create peace; it can only create the space in which peace may be built. Moreover, the changes that the Panel recommends will have no lasting impact unless Member States summon the political will to support the United Nations politically, financially and operationally to enable the United Nations to be truly credible as a force for peace. Each of the recommendations contained in the present report is designed to remedy a serious problem in strategic direction, decision-making, rapid deployment, operational planning and support, and the use of modern information technology. Key assessments and recommendations are highlighted below, largely in the order in which they appear in the body of the text (the numbers of the relevant paragraphs in the main text are provided in parentheses). In addition, a summary of recommendations is contained in annex III. Experience of the past (paras. 15-28) It should have come as no surprise to anyone that some of the missions of the past decade would be particularly hard to accomplish: they tended to deploy where conflict had not resulted in victory for any side, where a military stalemate or international pressure or both had brought fighting to a halt but at least some of the parties to the conflict were not seriously committed to ending the confrontation. United Nations operations thus did not deploy into post-conflict situations but tried to create them. In such complex operations, peacekeepers work to maintain a secure local environment while peacebuilders work to make that environment self-sustaining.ix A/55/305 S/2000/809 Only such an environment offers a ready exit to peacekeeping forces, making peacekeepers and peacebuilders inseparable partners. Implications for preventive action and peace-building: the need for strategy and support (paras. 29-47) The United Nations and its members face a pressing need to establish more effective strategies for conflict prevention, in both the long and short terms. In this context, the Panel endorses the recommendations of the Secretary-General with respect to conflict prevention contained in the Millennium Report (A/54/2000) and in his remarks before the Security Council’s second open meeting on conflict prevention in July 2000. It also encourages the Secretary-General’s more frequent use of fact-finding missions to areas of tension in support of short-term crisispreveentiv action. Furthermore, the Security Council and the General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, conscious that the United Nations will continue to face the prospect of having to assist communities and nations in making the transition from war to peace, have each recognized and acknowledged the key role of peace-building in complex peace operations. This will require that the United Nations system address what has hitherto been a fundamental deficiency in the way it has conceived of, funded and implemented peace-building strategies and activities. Thus, the Panel recommends that the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) present to the Secretary-General a plan to strengthen the permanent capacity of the United Nations to develop peace-building strategies and to implement programmes in support of those strategies. Among the changes that the Panel supports are: a doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police and related rule of law elements in peace operations that emphasizes a team approach to upholding the rule of law and respect for human rights and helping communities coming out of a conflict to achieve national reconciliation; consolidation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programmes into the assessed budgets of complex peace operations in their first phase; flexibility for heads of United Nations peace operations to fund “quick impact projects” that make a real difference in the lives of people in the mission area; and better integration of electoral assistance into a broader strategy for the support of governance institutions. Implications for peacekeeping: the need for robust doctrine and realistic mandates (paras. 48-64) The Panel concurs that consent of the local parties, impartiality and the use of force only in self-defence should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping. Experience shows, however, that in the context of intra-State/transnational conflicts, consent may be manipulated in many ways. Impartiality for United Nations operations must therefore mean adherence to the principles of the Charter: where one party to a peace agreement clearly and incontrovertibly is violating its terms, continued equal treatment of all parties by the United Nations can in the best case result in ineffectiveness and in the worst may amount to complicity with evil. No failure did more to damage the standing and credibility of United Nations peacekeeping in the 1990s than its reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor.xA/55/305 S/2000/809 In the past, the United Nations has often found itself unable to respond effectively to such challenges. It is a fundamental premise of the present report, however, that it must be able to do so. Once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandate professionally and successfully. This means that United Nations military units must be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission’s mandate. Rules of engagement should be sufficiently robust and not force United Nations contingents to cede the initiative to their attackers. This means, in turn, that the Secretariat must not apply best-case planning assumptions to situations where the local actors have historically exhibited worstcaas behaviour. It means that mandates should specify an operation’s authority to use force. It means bigger forces, better equipped and more costly but able to be a credible deterrent. In particular, United Nations forces for complex operations should be afforded the field intelligence and other capabilities needed to mount an effective defence against violent challengers. Moreover, United Nations peacekeepers — troops or police — who witness violence against civilians should be presumed to be authorized to stop it, within their means, in support of basic United Nations principles. However, operations given a broad and explicit mandate for civilian protection must be given the specific resources needed to carry out that mandate. The Secretariat must tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear, when recommending force and other resource levels for a new mission, and it must set those levels according to realistic scenarios that take into account likely challenges to implementation. Security Council mandates, in turn, should reflect the clarity that peacekeeping operations require for unity of effort when they deploy into potentially dangerous situations. The current practice is for the Secretary-General to be given a Security Council resolution specifying troop levels on paper, not knowing whether he will be given the troops and other personnel that the mission needs to function effectively, or whether they will be properly equipped. The Panel is of the view that, once realistic mission requirements have been set and agreed to, the Council should leave its authorizing resolution in draft form until the Secretary-General confirms that he has received troop and other commitments from Member States sufficient to meet those requirements. Member States that do commit formed military units to an operation should be invited to consult with the members of the Security Council during mandate formulation; such advice might usefully be institutionalized via the establishment of ad hoc subsidiary organs of the Council, as provided for in Article 29 of the Charter. Troop contributors should also be invited to attend Secretariat briefings of the Security Council pertaining to crises that affect the safety and security of mission personnel or to a change or reinterpretation of the mandate regarding the use of force. New headquarters capacity for information management and strategic analysis (paras. 65-75) The Panel recommends that a new information-gathering and analysis entity be created to support the informational and analytical needs of the Secretary-Generalxi A/55/305 S/2000/809 and the members of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS). Without such capacity, the Secretariat will remain a reactive institution, unable to get ahead of daily events, and the ECPS will not be able to fulfil the role for which it was created. The Panel’s proposed ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS) would create and maintain integrated databases on peace and security issues, distribute that knowledge efficiently within the United Nations system, generate policy analyses, formulate long-term strategies for ECPS and bring budding crises to the attention of the ECPS leadership. It could also propose and manage the agenda of ECPS itself, helping to transform it into the decision-making body anticipated in the Secretary-General’s initial reforms. The Panel proposes that EISAS be created by consolidating the existing Situation Centre of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) with a number of small, scattered policy planning offices, and adding a small team of military analysts, experts in international criminal networks and information systems specialists. EISAS should serve the needs of all members of ECPS. Improved mission guidance and leadership (paras. 92-101) The Panel believes it is essential to assemble the leadership of a new mission as early as possible at United Nations Headquarters, to participate in shaping a mission’s concept of operations, support plan, budget, staffing and Headquarters mission guidance. To that end, the Panel recommends that the Secretary-General compile, in a systematic fashion and with input from Member States, a comprehensive list of potential special representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs), force commanders, civilian police commissioners, their potential deputies and potential heads of other components of a mission, representing a broad geographic and equitable gender distribution. Rapid deployment standards and “on-call” expertise (paras. 86-91 and 102-169) The first 6 to 12 weeks following a ceasefire or peace accord are often the most critical ones for establishing both a stable peace and the credibility of a new operation. Opportunities lost during that period are hard to regain. The Panel recommends that the United Nations define “rapid and effective deployment capacity” as the ability to fully deploy traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing such an operation, and within 90 days in the case of complex peacekeeping operations. The Panel recommends that the United Nations standby arrangements system (UNSAS) be developed further to include several coherent, multinational, brigadesiiz forces and the necessary enabling forces, created by Member States working in partnership, in order to better meet the need for the robust peacekeeping forces that the Panel has advocated. The Panel also recommends that the Secretariat send a team to confirm the readiness of each potential troop contributor to meet the requisite United Nations training and equipment requirements for peacekeeping operations, prior to deployment. Units that do not meet the requirements must not be deployed.xii A/55/305 S/2000/809 To support such rapid and effective deployment, the Panel recommends that a revolving “on-call list” of about 100 experienced, well qualified military officers, carefully vetted and accepted by DPKO, be created within UNSAS. Teams drawn from this list and available for duty on seven days’ notice would translate broad, strategic-level mission concepts developed at Headquarters into concrete operational and tactical plans in advance of the deployment of troop contingents, and would augment a core element from DPKO to serve as part of a mission start-up team. Parallel on-call lists of civilian police, international judicial experts, penal experts and human rights specialists must be available in sufficient numbers to strengthen rule of law institutions, as needed, and should also be part of UNSAS. Pre-trained teams could then be drawn from this list to precede the main body of civilian police and related specialists into a new mission area, facilitating the rapid and effective deployment of the law and order component into the mission. The Panel also calls upon Member States to establish enhanced national “pools” of police officers and related experts, earmarked for deployment to United Nations peace operations, to help meet the high demand for civilian police and related criminal justice/rule of law expertise in peace operations dealing with intra-State conflict. The Panel also urges Member States to consider forming joint regional partnerships and programmes for the purpose of training members of the respective national pools to United Nations civilian police doctrine and standards. The Secretariat should also address, on an urgent basis, the needs: to put in place a transparent and decentralized recruitment mechanism for civilian field personnel; to improve the retention of the civilian specialists that are needed in every complex peace operation; and to create standby arrangements for their rapid deployment. Finally, the Panel recommends that the Secretariat radically alter the systems and procedures in place for peacekeeping procurement in order to facilitate rapid deployment. It recommends that responsibilities for peacekeeping budgeting and procurement be moved out of the Department of Management and placed in DPKO. The Panel proposes the creation of a new and distinct body of streamlined field procurement policies and procedures; increased delegation of procurement authority to the field; and greater flexibility for field missions in the management of their budgets. The Panel also urges that the Secretary-General formulate and submit to the General Assembly, for its approval, a global logistics support strategy governing the stockpiling of equipment reserves and standing contracts with the private sector for common goods and services. In the interim, the Panel recommends that additional “start-up kits” of essential equipment be maintained at the United Nations Logistics Base (UNLB) in Brindisi, Italy. The Panel also recommends that the Secretary-General be given authority, with the approval of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) to commit up to $50 million well in advance of the adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing a new operation once it becomes clear that an operation is likely to be established.xiii A/55/305 S/2000/809 Enhance Headquarters capacity to plan and support peace operations (paras. 170-197) The Panel recommends that Headquarters support for peacekeeping be treated as a core activity of the United Nations, and as such the majority of its resource requirements should be funded through the regular budget of the Organization. DPKO and other offices that plan and support peacekeeping are currently primarily funded by the Support Account, which is renewed each year and funds only temporary posts. That approach to funding and staff seems to confuse the temporary nature of specific operations with the evident permanence of peacekeeping and other peace operations activities as core functions of the United Nations, which is obviously an untenable state of affairs. The total cost of DPKO and related Headquarters support offices for peacekeeping does not exceed $50 million per annum, or roughly 2 per cent of total peacekeeping costs. Additional resources for those offices are urgently needed to ensure that more than $2 billion spent on peacekeeping in 2001 are well spent. The Panel therefore recommends that the Secretary-General submit a proposal to the General Assembly outlining the Organization’s requirements in full. The Panel believes that a methodical management review of DPKO should be conducted but also believes that staff shortages in certain areas are plainly obvious. For example, it is clearly not enough to have 32 officers providing military planning and guidance to 27,000 troops in the field, nine civilian police staff to identify, vet and provide guidance for up to 8,600 police, and 15 political desk officers for 14 current operations and two new ones, or to allocate just 1.25 per cent of the total costs of peacekeeping to Headquarters administrative and logistics support. Establish Integrated Mission Task Forces for mission planning and support (paras. 198-245) The Panel recommends that Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs) be created, with staff from throughout the United Nations system seconded to them, to plan new missions and help them reach full deployment, significantly enhancing the support that Headquarters provides to the field. There is currently no integrated planning or support cell in the Secretariat that brings together those responsible for political analysis, military operations, civilian police, electoral assistance, human rights, development, humanitarian assistance, refugees and displaced persons, public information, logistics, finance and recruitment. Structural adjustments are also required in other elements of DPKO, in particular to the Military and Civilian Police Division, which should be reorganized into two separate divisions, and the Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD), which should be split into two divisions. The Lessons Learned Unit should be strengthened and moved into the DPKO Office of Operations. Public information planning and support at Headquarters also needs strengthening, as do elements in the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), particularly the electoral unit. Outside the Secretariat, the ability of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to plan and support the human rights components of peace operations needs to be reinforced.xiv A/55/305 S/2000/809 Consideration should be given to allocating a third Assistant Secretary-General to DPKO and designating one of them as “Principal Assistant Secretary-General”, functioning as the deputy to the Under-Secretary-General. Adapting peace operations to the information age (paras. 246-264) Modern, well utilized information technology (IT) is a key enabler of many of the above-mentioned objectives, but gaps in strategy, policy and practice impede its effective use. In particular, Headquarters lacks a sufficiently strong responsibility centre for user-level IT strategy and policy in peace operations. A senior official with such responsibility in the peace and security arena should be appointed and located within EISAS, with counterparts in the offices of the SRSG in every United Nations peace operation. Headquarters and the field missions alike also need a substantive, global, Peace Operations Extranet (POE), through which missions would have access to, among other things, EISAS databases and analyses and lessons learned. Challenges to implementation (paras. 265-280) The Panel believes that the above recommendations fall well within the bounds of what can be reasonably demanded of the Organization’s Member States. Implementing some of them will require additional resources for the Organization, but we do not mean to suggest that the best way to solve the problems of the United Nations is merely to throw additional resources at them. Indeed, no amount of money or resources can substitute for the significant changes that are urgently needed in the culture of the Organization. The Panel calls on the Secretariat to heed the Secretary-General’s initiatives to reach out to the institutions of civil society; to constantly keep in mind that the United Nations they serve is the universal organization. People everywhere are fully entitled to consider that it is their organization, and as such to pass judgement on its activities and the people who serve in it. Furthermore, wide disparities in staff quality exist and those in the system are the first to acknowledge it; better performers are given unreasonable workloads to compensate for those who are less capable. Unless the United Nations takes steps to become a true meritocracy, it will not be able to reverse the alarming trend of qualified personnel, the young among them in particular, leaving the Organization. Moreover, qualified people will have no incentive to join it. Unless managers at all levels, beginning with the Secretary-General and his senior staff, seriously address this problem on a priority basis, reward excellence and remove incompetence, additional resources will be wasted and lasting reform will become impossible. Member States also acknowledge that they need to reflect on their working culture and methods. It is incumbent upon Security Council members, for example, and the membership at large to breathe life into the words that they produce, as did, for instance, the Security Council delegation that flew to Jakarta and Dili in the wake of the East Timor crisis in 1999, an example of effective Council action at its best: res, non verba. We — the members of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations — call on the leaders of the world assembled at the Millennium Summit, as they renew their commitment to the ideals of the United Nations, to commit as well toxv A/55/305 S/2000/809 strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to fully accomplish the mission which is, indeed, its very raison d’être: to help communities engulfed in strife and to maintain or restore peace. While building consensus for the recommendations in the present report, we have also come to a shared vision of a United Nations, extending a strong helping hand to a community, country or region to avert conflict or to end violence. We see an SRSG ending a mission well accomplished, having given the people of a country the opportunity to do for themselves what they could not do before: to build and hold onto peace, to find reconciliation, to strengthen democracy, to secure human rights. We see, above all, a United Nations that has not only the will but also the ability to fulfil its great promise, and to justify the confidence and trust placed in it by the overwhelming majority of humankind.1 A/55/305 S/2000/809 I. The need for change 1. The United Nations was founded, in the words of its Charter, in order “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” Meeting this challenge is the most important function of the Organization, and, to a very significant degree, the yardstick by which it is judged by the peoples it exists to serve. Over the last decade, the United Nations has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge; and it can do no better today. Without significant institutional change, increased financial support, and renewed commitment on the part of Member States, the United Nations will not be capable of executing the critical peacekeeping and peace-building tasks that the Member States assign it in coming months and years. There are many tasks which the United Nations peacekeeping forces should not be asked to undertake, and many places they should not go. But when the United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence with the ability and determination to defeat them. 2. The Secretary-General has asked the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, composed of individuals experienced in various aspects of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace-building (Panel members are listed in annex I), to assess the shortcomings of the existing system and to make frank, specific and realistic recommendations for change. Our recommendations focus not only on politics and strategy but also on operational and organizational areas of need. 3. For preventive initiatives to reduce tension and avert conflict, the Secretary-General needs clear, strong and sustained political support from Member States. For peacekeeping to accomplish its mission, as the United Nations has discovered repeatedly over the last decade, no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force. However, force alone cannot create peace; it can only create a space in which peace can be built. 4. In other words, the key conditions for the success of future complex operations are political support, rapid deployment with a robust force posture and a sound peace-building strategy. Every recommendation in the present report is meant, in one way or another, to help ensure that these three conditions are met. The need for change has been rendered even more urgent by recent events in Sierra Leone and by the daunting prospect of expanded United Nations operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 5. These changes — while essential — will have no lasting impact unless the Member States of the Organization take seriously their responsibility to train and equip their own forces and to mandate and enable their collective instrument, so that together they may succeed in meeting threats to peace. They must summon the political will to support the United Nations politically, financially and operationally — once they have decided to act as the United Nations — if the Organization is to be credible as a force for peace. 6. The recommendations that the Panel presents balance principle and pragmatism, while honouring the spirit and letter of the Charter of the United Nations and the respective roles of the Organization’s legislative bodies. They are based on the following premises: (a) The essential responsibility of Member States for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the need to strengthen both the quality and quantity of support provided to the United Nations system to carry out that responsibility; (b) The pivotal importance of clear, credible and adequately resourced Security Council mandates; (c) A focus by the United Nations system on conflict prevention and its early engagement, wherever possible; (d) The need to have more effective collection and assessment of information at United Nations Headquarters, including an enhanced conflict early warning system that can detect and recognize the threat or risk of conflict or genocide; (e) The essential importance of the United Nations system adhering to and promoting international human rights instruments and standards and international humanitarian law in all aspects of its peace and security activities; (f) The need to build the United Nations capacity to contribute to peace-building, both preventive and post-conflict, in a genuinely integrated manner; (g) The critical need to improve Headquarters planning (including contingency planning) for peace operations;2A/55/305 S/2000/809 (h) The recognition that while the United Nations has acquired considerable expertise in planning, mounting and executing traditional peacekeeping operations, it has yet to acquire the capacity needed to deploy more complex operations rapidly and to sustain them effectively; (i) The necessity to provide field missions with high-quality leaders and managers who are granted greater flexibility and autonomy by Headquarters, within clear mandate parameters and with clear standards of accountability for both spending and results; (j) The imperative to set and adhere to a high standard of competence and integrity for both Headquarters and field personnel, who must be provided the training and support necessary to do their jobs and to progress in their careers, guided by modern management practices that reward meritorious performance and weed out incompetence; (k) The importance of holding individual officials at Headquarters and in the field accountable for their performance, recognizing that they need to be given commensurate responsibility, authority and resources to fulfil their assigned tasks. 7. In the present report, the Panel has addressed itself to many compelling needs for change within the United Nations system. The Panel views its recommendations as the minimum threshold of change needed to give the United Nations system the opportunity to be an effective, operational, twenty-first century institution. (Key recommendations are summarized in bold type throughout the text; they are also combined in a single summary in annex III.) 8. The blunt criticisms contained in the present report reflect the Panel’s collective experience as well as interviews conducted at every level of the system. More than 200 people were either interviewed or provided written input to the Panel. Sources included the Permanent Missions of Member States, including the Security Council members; the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations; and personnel in peace and security-related departments at United Nations Headquarters in New York, in the United Nations Office at Geneva, at the headquarters of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), at the headquarters of other United Nations funds and programmes; at the World Bank and in every current United Nations peace operation. (A list of references is contained in annex II.) II. Doctrine, strategy and decisionmakkin for peace operations 9. The United Nations system — namely the Member States, Security Council, General Assembly and Secretariat — must commit to peace operations carefully, reflecting honestly on the record of its performance over the past decade. It must adjust accordingly the doctrine upon which peace operations are established; fine-tune its analytical and decisionmakkin capacities to respond to existing realities and anticipate future requirements; and summon the creativity, imagination and will required to implement new and alternative solutions to those situations into which peacekeepers cannot or should not go. A. Defining the elements of peace operations 10. United Nations peace operations entail three principal activities: conflict prevention and peacemaking; peacekeeping; and peace-building. Longteer conflict prevention addresses the structural sources of conflict in order to build a solid foundation for peace. Where those foundations are crumbling, conflict prevention attempts to reinforce them, usually in the form of a diplomatic initiative. Such preventive action is, by definition, a low-profile activity; when successful, it may even go unnoticed altogether. 11. Peacemaking addresses conflicts in progress, attempting to bring them to a halt, using the tools of diplomacy and mediation. Peacemakers may be envoys of Governments, groups of States, regional organizations or the United Nations, or they may be unofficial and non-governmental groups, as was the case, for example, in the negotiations leading up to a peace accord for Mozambique. Peacemaking may even be the work of a prominent personality, working independently. 12. Peacekeeping is a 50-year-old enterprise that has evolved rapidly in the past decade from a traditional, primarily military model of observing ceasefires and force separations after inter-State wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements, military and3 A/55/305 S/2000/809 civilian, working together to build peace in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars. 13. Peace-building is a term of more recent origin that, as used in the present report, defines activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war. Thus, peace-building includes but is not limited to reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law (for example, through training and restructuring of local police, and judicial and penal reform); improving respect for human rights through the monitoring, education and investigation of past and existing abuses; providing technical assistance for democratic development (including electoral assistance and support for free media); and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques. 14. Essential complements to effective peacebuilldin include support for the fight against corruption, the implementation of humanitarian demining programmes, emphasis on human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) education and control, and action against other infectious diseases. B. Experience of the past 15. The quiet successes of short-term conflict prevention and peacemaking are often, as noted, politically invisible. Personal envoys and representatives of the Secretary-General (RSGs) or special representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs) have at times complemented the diplomatic initiatives of Member States and, at other times, have taken initiatives that Member States could not readily duplicate. Examples of the latter initiatives (drawn from peacemaking as well as preventive diplomacy) include the achievement of a ceasefire in the Islamic Republic of Iran-Iraq war in 1988, the freeing of the last Western hostages in Lebanon in 1991, and avoidance of war between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Afghanistan in 1998. 16. Those who favour focusing on the underlying causes of conflicts argue that such crisis-related efforts often prove either too little or too late. Attempted earlier, however, diplomatic initiatives may be rebuffed by a government that does not see or will not acknowledge a looming problem, or that may itself be part of the problem. Thus, long-term preventive strategies are a necessary complement to short-term initiatives. 17. Until the end of the cold war, United Nations peacekeeping operations mostly had traditional ceasefire-monitoring mandates and no direct peacebuilldin responsibilities. The “entry strategy” or sequence of events and decisions leading to United Nations deployment was straightforward: war, ceasefire, invitation to monitor ceasefire compliance and deployment of military observers or units to do so, while efforts continued for a political settlement. Intelligence requirements were also fairly straightforward and risks to troops were relatively low. But traditional peacekeeping, which treats the symptoms rather than sources of conflict, has no builtii exit strategy and associated peacemaking was often slow to make progress. As a result, traditional peacekeepers have remained in place for 10, 20, 30 or even 50 years (as in Cyprus, the Middle East and India/Pakistan). By the standards of more complex operations, they are relatively low cost and politically easier to maintain than to remove. However, they are also difficult to justify unless accompanied by serious and sustained peacemaking efforts that seek to transform a ceasefire accord into a durable and lasting peace settlement. 18. Since the end of the cold war, United Nations peacekeeping has often combined with peace-building in complex peace operations deployed into settings of intra-State conflict. Those conflict settings, however, both affect and are affected by outside actors: political patrons; arms vendors; buyers of illicit commodity exports; regional powers that send their own forces into the fray; and neighbouring States that host refugees who are sometimes systematically forced to flee their homes. With such significant cross-border effects by state and non-state actors alike, these conflicts are often decidedly “transnational” in character. 19. Risks and costs for operations that must function in such circumstances are much greater than for traditional peacekeeping. Moreover, the complexity of the tasks assigned to these missions and the volatility of the situation on the ground tend to increase together. Since the end of the cold war, such complex and risky mandates have been the rule rather than the exception: United Nations operations have been given reliefesccor duties where the security situation was so4A/55/305 S/2000/809 dangerous that humanitarian operations could not continue without high risk for humanitarian personnel; they have been given mandates to protect civilian victims of conflict where potential victims were at greatest risk, and mandates to control heavy weapons in possession of local parties when those weapons were being used to threaten the mission and the local population alike. In two extreme situations, United Nations operations were given executive law enforcement and administrative authority where local authority did not exist or was not able to function. 20. It should have come as no surprise to anyone that these missions would be hard to accomplish. Initially, the 1990s offered more positive prospects: operations implementing peace accords were time-limited, rather than of indefinite duration, and successful conduct of national elections seemed to offer a ready exit strategy. However, United Nations operations since then have tended to deploy where conflict has not resulted in victory for any side: it may be that the conflict is stalemated militarily or that international pressure has brought fighting to a halt, but in any event the conflict is unfinished. United Nations operations thus do not deploy into post-conflict situations so much as they deploy to create such situations. That is, they work to divert the unfinished conflict, and the personal, political or other agendas that drove it, from the military to the political arena, and to make that diversion permanent. 21. As the United Nations soon discovered, local parties sign peace accords for a variety of reasons, not all of them favourable to peace. “Spoilers” — groups (including signatories) who renege on their commitments or otherwise seek to undermine a peace accord by violence — challenged peace implementation in Cambodia, threw Angola, Somalia and Sierra Leone back into civil war, and orchestrated the murder of no fewer than 800,000 people in Rwanda. The United Nations must be prepared to deal effectively with spoilers if it expects to achieve a consistent record of success in peacekeeping or peacebuilldin in situations of intrastate/transnational conflict. 22. A growing number of reports on such conflicts have highlighted the fact that would-be spoilers have the greatest incentive to defect from peace accords when they have an independent source of income that pays soldiers, buys guns, enriches faction leaders and may even have been the motive for war. Recent history indicates that, where such income streams from the export of illicit narcotics, gemstones or other highvaalu commodities cannot be pinched off, peace is unsustainable. 23. Neighbouring States can contribute to the problem by allowing passage of conflict-supporting contraband, serving as middlemen for it or providing base areas for fighters. To counter such conflictsuppoortin neighbours, a peace operation will require the active political, logistical and/or military support of one or more great powers, or of major regional powers. The tougher the operation, the more important such backing becomes. 24. Other variables that affect the difficulty of peace implementation include, first, the sources of the conflict. These can range from economics (e.g., issues of poverty, distribution, discrimination or corruption), politics (an unalloyed contest for power) and resource and other environmental issues (such as competition for scarce water) to issues of ethnicity, religion or gross violations of human rights. Political and economic objectives may be more fluid and open to compromise than objectives related to resource needs, ethnicity or religion. Second, the complexity of negotiating and implementing peace will tend to rise with the number of local parties and the divergence of their goals (e.g., some may seek unity, others separation). Third, the level of casualties, population displacement and infrastructure damage will affect the level of wargeneerate grievance, and thus the difficulty of reconciliation, which requires that past human rights violations be addressed, as well as the cost and complexity of reconstruction. 25. A relatively less dangerous environment — just two parties, committed to peace, with competitive but congruent aims, lacking illicit sources of income, with neighbours and patrons committed to peace — is a fairly forgiving one. In less forgiving, more dangerous environments — three or more parties, of varying commitment to peace, with divergent aims, with independent sources of income and arms, and with neighbours who are willing to buy, sell and transit illicit goods — United Nations missions put not only their own people but peace itself at risk unless they perform their tasks with the competence and efficiency that the situation requires and have serious great power backing.5 A/55/305 S/2000/809 26. It is vitally important that negotiators, the Security Council, Secretariat mission planners, and mission participants alike understand which of these political-military environments they are entering, how the environment may change under their feet once they arrive, and what they realistically plan to do if and when it does change. Each of these must be factored into an operation’s entry strategy and, indeed, into the basic decision about whether an operation is feasible and should even be attempted. 27. It is equally important, in this context, to judge the extent to which local authorities are willing and able to take difficult but necessary political and economic decisions and to participate in the establishment of processes and mechanisms to manage internal disputes and pre-empt violence or the reemerrgenc of conflict. These are factors over which a field mission and the United Nations have little control, yet such a cooperative environment is critical in determining the successful outcome of a peace operation. 28. When complex peace operations do go into the field, it is the task of the operation’s peacekeepers to maintain a secure local environment for peacebuillding and the peacebuilders’ task to support the political, social and economic changes that create a secure environment that is self-sustaining. Only such an environment offers a ready exit to peacekeeping forces, unless the international community is willing to tolerate recurrence of conflict when such forces depart. History has taught that peacekeepers and peacebuilders are inseparable partners in complex operations: while the peacebuilders may not be able to function without the peacekeepers’ support, the peacekeepers have no exit without the peacebuilders’ work. C. Implications for preventive action 29. United Nations peace operations addressed no more than one third of the conflict situations of the 1990s. Because even much-improved mechanisms for creation and support of United Nations peacekeeping operations will not enable the United Nations system to respond with such operations in the case of all conflict everywhere, there is a pressing need for the United Nations and its Member States to establish a more effective system for long-term conflict prevention. Prevention is clearly far more preferable for those who would otherwise suffer the consequences of war, and is a less costly option for the international community than military action, emergency humanitarian relief or reconstruction after a war has run its course. As the Secretary-General noted in his recent Millennium Report (A/54/2000), “every step taken towards reducing poverty and achieving broad-based economic growth is a step toward conflict prevention”. In many cases of internal conflict, “poverty is coupled with sharp ethnic or religious cleavages”, in which minority rights “are insufficiently respected [and] the institutions of government are insufficiently inclusive”. Long-term preventive strategies in such instances must therefore work “to promote human rights, to protect minority rights and to institute political arrangements in which all groups are represented. ... Every group needs to become convinced that the state belongs to all people”. 30. The Panel wishes to commend the United Nations ongoing internal Task Force on Peace and Security for its work in the area of long-term prevention, in particular the notion that development entities in the United Nations system should view humanitarian and development work through a “conflict prevention lens” and make long-term prevention a key focus of their work, adapting current tools, such as the common country assessment and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), to that end. 31. To improve early United Nations focus on potential new complex emergencies and thus shortteer conflict prevention, about two years ago the Headquarters Departments that sit on the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) created the Inter-Agency/Interdepartmental Framework for Coordination, in which 10 departments, funds, programmes and agencies now participate. The active element, the Framework Team, meets at the Director level monthly to decide on areas at risk, schedule country (or situation) review meetings and identify preventive measures. The Framework mechanism has improved interdepartmental contacts but has not accumulated knowledge in a structured way, and does no strategic planning. This may have contributed to the Secretariat’s difficulty in persuading Member States of the advantages of backing their professed commitment to both long-and short-term conflict prevention measures with the requisite political and financial support. In the interim, the Secretary-General’s annual reports of 1997 and 1999 (A/52/1 and A/54/1) focused6A/55/305 S/2000/809 specifically on conflict prevention. The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict and the United Nations Association of the United States of America, among others, also have contributed valuable studies on the subject. And more than 400 staff in the United Nations have undergone systematic training in “early warning” at the United Nations Staff College in Turin. 32. At the heart of the question of short-term prevention lies the use of fact-finding missions and other key initiatives by the Secretary-General. These have, however, usually met with two key impediments. First, there is the understandable and legitimate concern of Member States, especially the small and weak among them, about sovereignty. Such concerns are all the greater in the face of initiatives taken by another Member State, especially a stronger neighbour, or by a regional organization that is dominated by one of its members. A state facing internal difficulties would more readily accept overtures by the Secretary-General because of the recognized independence and moral high ground of his position and in view of the letter and spirit of the Charter, which requires that the Secretary-General offer his assistance and expects the Member States to give the United Nations “every assistance” as indicated, in particular, in Article 2 (5) of the Charter. Fact-finding missions are one tool by which the Secretary-General can facilitate the provision of his good offices. 33. The second impediment to effective crisispreveentiv action is the gap between verbal postures and financial and political support for prevention. The Millennium Assembly offers all concerned the opportunity to reassess their commitment to this area and consider the prevention-related recommendations contained in the Secretary-General’s Millennium Report and in his recent remarks before the Security Council’s second open meeting on conflict prevention. There, the Secretary-General emphasized the need for closer collaboration between the Security Council and other principal organs of the United Nations on conflict prevention issues, and ways to interact more closely with non-state actors, including the corporate sector, in helping to defuse or avoid conflicts. 34. Summary of key recommendations on preventive action: (a) The Panel endorses the recommendations of the Secretary-General with respect to conflict prevention contained in the Millennium Report and in his remarks before the Security Council’s second open meeting on conflict prevention in July 2000, in particular his appeal to “all who are engaged in conflict prevention and development — the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, Governments and civil society organizations — [to] address these challenges in a more integrated fashion”; (b) The Panel supports the Secretary-General’s more frequent use of fact-finding missions to areas of tension, and stresses Member States’ obligations, under Article 2 (5) of the Charter, to give “every assistance” to such activities of the United Nations. D. Implications for peace-building strategy 35. The Security Council and the General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations have each recognized and acknowledged the importance of peace-building as integral to the success of peacekeeping operations. In this regard, on 29 December 1998 the Security Council adopted a presidential statement that encouraged the Secretary-General to “explore the possibility of establishing postconfflic peace-building structures as part of efforts by the United Nations system to achieve a lasting peaceful solution to conflicts ...”. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, in its own report earlier in 2000, stressed the importance of defining and identifying elements of peace-building before they are incorporated into the mandates of complex peace operations, so as to facilitate later consideration by the General Assembly of continuing support for key elements of peace-building after a complex operation draws to a close. 36. Peace-building support offices or United Nations political offices may be established as follow-ons to other peace operations, as in Tajikistan or Haiti, or as independent initiatives, as in Guatemala or Guinea-Bissau. They help to support the consolidation of peace in post-conflict countries, working with both Governments and non-governmental parties and complementing what may be ongoing United Nations development activities, which strive to remain apart from politics while nonetheless targeting assistance at the sources of conflict.7 A/55/305 S/2000/809 37. Effective peace-building requires active engagement with the local parties, and that engagement should be multidimensional in nature. First, all peace operations should be given the capacity to make a demonstrable difference in the lives of the people in their mission area, relatively early in the life of the mission. The head of mission should have authority to apply a small percentage of mission funds to “quick impact projects” aimed at real improvements in quality of life, to help establish the credibility of a new mission. The resident coordinator/humanitarian coordinator of the pre-existing United Nations country team should serve as chief adviser for such projects in order to ensure efficient spending and to avoid conflict with other development or humanitarian assistance programmes. 38. Second, “free and fair” elections should be viewed as part of broader efforts to strengthen governance institutions. Elections will be successfully held only in an environment in which a population recovering from war comes to accept the ballot over the bullet as an appropriate and credible mechanism through which their views on government are represented. Elections need the support of a broader process of democratization and civil society building that includes effective civilian governance and a culture of respect for basic human rights, lest elections merely ratify a tyranny of the majority or be overturned by force after a peace operation leaves. 39. Third, United Nations civilian police monitors are not peacebuilders if they simply document or attempt to discourage by their presence abusive or other unacceptable behaviour of local police officers — a traditional and somewhat narrow perspective of civilian police capabilities. Today, missions may require civilian police to be tasked to reform, train and restructure local police forces according to international standards for democratic policing and human rights, as well as having the capacity to respond effectively to civil disorder and for self-defence. The courts, too, into which local police officers bring alleged criminals and the penal system to which the law commits prisoners also must be politically impartial and free from intimidation or duress. Where peace-building missions require it, international judicial experts, penal experts and human rights specialists, as well as civilian police, must be available in sufficient numbers to strengthen rule of law institutions. Where justice, reconciliation and the fight against impunity require it, the Security Council should authorize such experts, as well as relevant criminal investigators and forensic specialists, to further the work of apprehension and prosecution of persons indicted for war crimes in support of United Nations international criminal tribunals. 40. While this team approach may seem self-evident, the United Nations has faced situations in the past decade where the Security Council has authorized the deployment of several thousand police in a peacekeeping operation but has resisted the notion of providing the same operations with even 20 or 30 criminal justice experts. Further, the modern role of civilian police needs to be better understood and developed. In short, a doctrinal shift is required in how the Organization conceives of and utilizes civilian police in peace operations, as well as the need for an adequately resourced team approach to upholding the rule of law and respect for human rights, through judicial, penal, human rights and policing experts working together in a coordinated and collegial manner. 41. Fourth, the human rights component of a peace operation is indeed critical to effective peace-building. United Nations human rights personnel can play a leading role, for example, in helping to implement a comprehensive programme for national reconciliation. The human rights components within peace operations have not always received the political and administrative support that they require, however, nor are their functions always clearly understood by other components. Thus, the Panel stresses the importance of training military, police and other civilian personnel on human rights issues and on the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law. In this respect, the Panel commends the Secretary-General’s bulletin of 6 August 1999 entitled “Observance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian law” (ST/SGB/1999/13). 42. Fifth, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants — key to immediate post-conflict stability and reduced likelihood of conflict recurrence — is an area in which peace-building makes a direct contribution to public security and law and order. But the basic objective of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration is not met unless all three elements of the programme are implemented. Demobilized fighters (who almost never fully disarm) will tend to return to a life of violence if8A/55/305 S/2000/809 they find no legitimate livelihood, that is, if they are not “reintegrated” into the local economy. The reintegration element of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration is voluntarily funded, however, and that funding has sometimes badly lagged behind requirements. 43. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration has been a feature of at least 15 peacekeeping operations in the past 10 years. More than a dozen United Nations agencies and programmes as well as international and local NGOs, fund these programmes. Partly because so many actors are involved in planning or supporting disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, it lacks a designated focal point within the United Nations system. 44. Effective peace-building also requires a focal point to coordinate the many different activities that building peace entails. In the view of the Panel, the United Nations should be considered the focal point for peace-building activities by the donor community. To that end, there is great merit in creating a consolidated and permanent institutional capacity within the United Nations system. The Panel therefore believes that the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, in his/her capacity as Convener of ECPS, should serve as the focal point for peace-building. The Panel also supports efforts under way by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to jointly strengthen United Nations capacity in this area, because effective peace-building is, in effect, a hybrid of political and development activities targeted at the sources of conflict. 45. DPA, the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Department of Disarmament Affairs (DDA), the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), UNDP, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), OHCHR, UNHCR, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, and the United Nations Security Coordinator are represented in ECPS; the World Bank Group has been invited to participate as well. ECPS thus provides the ideal forum for the formulation of peace-building strategies. 46. Nonetheless, a distinction should be made between strategy formulation and the implementation of such strategies, based upon a rational division of labour among ECPS members. In the Panel's view, UNDP has untapped potential in this area, and UNDP, in cooperation with other United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and the World Bank, are best placed to take the lead in implementing peace-building activities. The Panel therefore recommends that ECPS propose to the Secretary-General a plan to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to develop peacebuilldin strategies and to implement programmes in support of those strategies. That plan should also indicate the criteria for determining when the appointment of a senior political envoy or representative of the Secretary-General may be warranted to raise the profile and sharpen the political focus of peace-building activities in a particular region or country recovering from conflict. 47. Summary of key recommendations on peacebuillding (a) A small percentage of a mission’s firstyeea budget should be made available to the representative or special representative of the Secretary-General leading the mission to fund quick impact projects in its area of operations, with the advice of the United Nations country team’s resident coordinator; (b) The Panel recommends a doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police, other rule of law elements and human rights experts in complex peace operations to reflect an increased focus on strengthening rule of law institutions and improving respect for human rights in post-conflict environments; (c) The Panel recommends that the legislative bodies consider bringing demobilization and reintegration programmes into the assessed budgets of complex peace operations for the first phase of an operation in order to facilitate the rapid disassembly of fighting factions and reduce the likelihood of resumed conflict; (d) The Panel recommends that the Executive Committee on Peace and Security discuss and recommend to the Secretary-General a plan to strengthen the permanent capacity of the United Nations to develop peace-building strategies and to implement programmes in support of those strategies.9 A/55/305 S/2000/809 E. Implications for peacekeeping doctrine and strategy 48. The Panel concurs that consent of the local parties, impartiality and use of force only in selfdeffenc should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping. Experience shows, however, that in the context of modern peace operations dealing with intra-State/transnational conflicts, consent may be manipulated in many ways by the local parties. A party may give its consent to United Nations presence merely to gain time to retool its fighting forces and withdraw consent when the peacekeeping operation no longer serves its interests. A party may seek to limit an operation’s freedom of movement, adopt a policy of persistent non-compliance with the provisions of an agreement or withdraw its consent altogether. Moreover, regardless of faction leaders’ commitment to the peace, fighting forces may simply be under much looser control than the conventional armies with which traditional peacekeepers work, and such forces may split into factions whose existence and implications were not contemplated in the peace agreement under the colour of which the United Nations mission operates. 49. In the past, the United Nations has often found itself unable to respond effectively to such challenges. It is a fundamental premise of the present report, however, that it must be able to do so. Once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandate professionally and successfully. This means that United Nations military units must be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission’s mandate. Rules of engagement should not limit contingents to stroke-forstrrok responses but should allow ripostes sufficient to silence a source of deadly fire that is directed at United Nations troops or at the people they are charged to protect and, in particularly dangerous situations, should not force United Nations contingents to cede the initiative to their attackers. 50. Impartiality for such operations must therefore mean adherence to the principles of the Charter and to the objectives of a mandate that is rooted in those Charter principles. Such impartiality is not the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time, which can amount to a policy of appeasement. In some cases, local parties consist not of moral equals but of obvious aggressors and victims, and peacekeepers may not only be operationally justified in using force but morally compelled to do so. Genocide in Rwanda went as far as it did in part because the international community failed to use or to reinforce the operation then on the ground in that country to oppose obvious evil. The Security Council has since established, in its resolution 1296 (2000), that the targeting of civilians in armed conflict and the denial of humanitarian access to civilian populations afflicted by war may themselves constitute threats to international peace and security and thus be triggers for Security Council action. If a United Nations peace operation is already on the ground, carrying out those actions may become its responsibility, and it should be prepared. 51. This means, in turn, that the Secretariat must not apply best-case planning assumptions to situations where the local actors have historically exhibited worst-case behaviour. It means that mandates should specify an operation’s authority to use force. It means bigger forces, better equipped and more costly, but able to pose a credible deterrent threat, in contrast to the symbolic and non-threatening presence that characterizes traditional peacekeeping. United Nations forces for complex operations should be sized and configured so as to leave no doubt in the minds of would-be spoilers as to which of the two approaches the Organization has adopted. Such forces should be afforded the field intelligence and other capabilities needed to mount a defence against violent challengers. 52. Willingness of Member States to contribute troops to a credible operation of this sort also implies a willingness to accept the risk of casualties on behalf of the mandate. Reluctance to accept that risk has grown since the difficult missions of the mid-1990s, partly because Member States are not clear about how to define their national interests in taking such risks, and partly because they may be unclear about the risks themselves. In seeking contributions of forces, therefore, the Secretary-General must be able to make the case that troop contributors and indeed all Member States have a stake in the management and resolution of the conflict, if only as part of the larger enterprise of establishing peace that the United Nations represents. In so doing, the Secretary-General should be able to give would-be troop contributors an assessment of risk that describes what the conflict and the peace are about, evaluates the capabilities and objectives of the local parties, and assesses the independent financial10 A/55/305 S/2000/809 resources at their disposal and the implications of those resources for the maintenance of peace. The Security Council and the Secretariat also must be able to win the confidence of troop contributors that the strategy and concept of operations for a new mission are sound and that they will be sending troops or police to serve under a competent mission with effective leadership. 53. The Panel recognizes that the United Nations does not wage war. Where enforcement action is required, it has consistently been entrusted to coalitions of willing States, with the authorization of the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter. 54. The Charter clearly encourages cooperation with regional and subregional organizations to resolve conflict and establish and maintain peace and security. The United Nations is actively and successfully engaged in many such cooperation programmes in the field of conflict prevention, peacemaking, elections and electoral assistance, human rights monitoring and humanitarian work and other peace-building activities in various parts of the world. Where peacekeeping operations are concerned, however, caution seems appropriate, because military resources and capability are unevenly distributed around the world, and troops in the most crisis-prone areas are often less prepared for the demands of modern peacekeeping than is the case elsewhere. Providing training, equipment, logistical support and other resources to regional and subregional organizations could enable peacekeepers from all regions to participate in a United Nations peacekeeping operation or to set up regional peacekeeping operations on the basis of a Security Council resolution. 55. Summary of key recommendation on peacekeeping doctrine and strategy: once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandates professionally and successfully and be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission’s mandate, with robust rules of engagement, against those who renege on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence. F. Clear, credible and achievable mandates 56. As a political body, the Security Council focuses on consensus-building, even though it can take decisions with less than unanimity. But the compromises required to build consensus can be made at the expense of specificity, and the resulting ambiguity can have serious consequences in the field if the mandate is then subject to varying interpretation by different elements of a peace operation, or if local actors perceive a less than complete Council commitment to peace implementation that offers encouragement to spoilers. Ambiguity may also paper over differences that emerge later, under pressure of a crisis, to prevent urgent Council action. While it acknowledges the utility of political compromise in many cases, the Panel comes down in this case on the side of clarity, especially for operations that will deploy into dangerous circumstances. Rather than send an operation into danger with unclear instructions, the Panel urges that the Council refrain from mandating such a mission. 57. The outlines of a possible United Nations peace operation often first appear when negotiators working toward a peace agreement contemplate United Nations implementation of that agreement. Although peace negotiators (peacemakers) may be skilled professionals in their craft, they are much less likely to know in detail the operational requirements of soldiers, police, relief providers or electoral advisers in United Nations field missions. Non-United Nations peacemakers may have even less knowledge of those requirements. Yet the Secretariat has, in recent years, found itself required to execute mandates that were developed elsewhere and delivered to it via the Security Council with but minor changes. 58. The Panel believes that the Secretariat must be able to make a strong case to the Security Council that requests for United Nations implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements need to meet certain minimum conditions before the Council commits United Nations-led forces to implement such accords, including the opportunity to have adviser-observers present at the peace negotiations; that any agreement be consistent with prevailing international human rights standards and humanitarian law; and that tasks to be undertaken by the United Nations are operationally achievable — with local responsibility for supporting11 A/55/305 S/2000/809 them specified — and either contribute to addressing the sources of conflict or provide the space required for others to do so. Since competent advice to negotiators may depend on detailed knowledge of the situation on the ground, the Secretary-General should be preauthoorize to commit funds from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund sufficient to conduct a preliminary site survey in the prospective mission area. 59. In advising the Council on mission requirements, the Secretariat must not set mission force and other resource levels according to what it presumes to be acceptable to the Council politically. By self-censoring in that manner, the Secretariat sets up itself and the mission not just to fail but to be the scapegoats for failure. Although presenting and justifying planning estimates according to high operational standards might reduce the likelihood of an operation going forward, Member States must not be led to believe that they are doing something useful for countries in trouble when — by under-resourcing missions — they are more likely agreeing to a waste of human resources, time and money. 60. Moreover, the Panel believes that until the Secretary-General is able to obtain solid commitments from Member States for the forces that he or she does believe necessary to carry out an operation, it should not go forward at all. To deploy a partial force incapable of solidifying a fragile peace would first raise and then dash the hopes of a population engulfed in conflict or recovering from war, and damage the credibility of the United Nations as a whole. In such circumstances, the Panel believes that the Security Council should leave in draft form a resolution that contemplated sizeable force levels for a new peacekeeping operation until such time as the Secretary-General could confirm that the necessary troop commitments had been received from Member States. 61. There are several ways to diminish the likelihood of such commitment gaps, including better coordination and consultation between potential troop contributors and the members of the Security Council during the mandate formulation process. Troop contributor advice to the Security Council might usefully be institutionalized via the establishment of ad hoc subsidiary organs of the Council, as provided for in Article 29 of the Charter. Member States contributing formed military units to an operation should as a matter of course be invited to attend Secretariat briefings of the Security Council pertaining to crises that affect the safety and security of the mission’s personnel or to a change or reinterpretation of a mission’s mandate with respect to the use of force. 62. Finally, the desire on the part of the Secretary-General to extend additional protection to civilians in armed conflicts and the actions of the Security Council to give United Nations peacekeepers explicit authority to protect civilians in conflict situations are positive developments. Indeed, peacekeepers — troops or police — who witness violence against civilians should be presumed to be authorized to stop it, within their means, in support of basic United Nations principles and, as stated in the report of the Independent Inquiry on Rwanda, consistent with “the perception and the expectation of protection created by [an operation’s] very presence” (see S/1999/1257, p. 51). 63. However, the Panel is concerned about the credibility and achievability of a blanket mandate in this area. There are hundreds of thousands of civilians in current United Nations mission areas who are exposed to potential risk of violence, and United Nations forces currently deployed could not protect more than a small fraction of them even if directed to do so. Promising to extend such protection establishes a very high threshold of expectation. The potentially large mismatch between desired objective and resources available to meet it raises the prospect of continuing disappointment with United Nations followthrroug in this area. If an operation is given a mandate to protect civilians, therefore, it also must be given the specific resources needed to carry out that mandate. 64. Summary of key recommendations on clear, credible and achievable mandates: (a) The Panel recommends that, before the Security Council agrees to implement a ceasefire or peace agreement with a United Nations-led peacekeeping operation, the Council assure itself that the agreement meets threshold conditions, such as consistency with international human rights standards and practicability of specified tasks and timelines; (b) The Security Council should leave in draft form resolutions authorizing missions with sizeable troop levels until such time as the Secretary-General has firm commitments of troops and other critical mission support elements,12 A/55/305 S/2000/809 including peace-building elements, from Member States; (c) Security Council resolutions should meet the requirements of peacekeeping operations when they deploy into potentially dangerous situations, especially the need for a clear chain of command and unity of effort; (d) The Secretariat must tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear, when formulating or changing mission mandates, and countries that have committed military units to an operation should have access to Secretariat briefings to the Council on matters affecting the safety and security of their personnel, especially those meetings with implications for a mission’s use of force. G. Information-gathering, analysis, and strategic planning capacities 65. A strategic approach by the United Nations to conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace-building will require that the Secretariat’s key implementing departments in peace and security work more closely together. To do so, they will need sharper tools to gather and analyse relevant information and to support ECPS, the nominal high-level decision-making forum for peace and security issues. 66. ECPS is one of four “sectoral” executive committees established in the Secretary-General’s initial reform package of early 1997 (see A/51/829, sect. A). The Committees for Economic and Social Affairs, Development Operations, and Humanitarian Affairs were also established. OHCHR is a member of all four. These committees were designed to “facilitate more concerted and coordinated management” across participating departments and were given “executive decision-making as well as coordinating powers.” Chaired by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, ECPS has promoted greater exchange of information across and cooperation between departments, but it has not yet become the decisionmakkin body that the 1997 reforms envisioned, which its participants acknowledge. 67. Current Secretariat staffing levels and job demands in the peace and security sector more or less preclude departmental policy planning. Although most ECPS members have policy or planning units, they tend to be drawn into day-to-day issues. Yet without significant knowledge generating and analytic capacity, the Secretariat will remain a reactive institution unable to get ahead of daily events, and ECPS will not be able to fulfil the role for which it was created. 68. The Secretary-General and the members of ECPS need a professional system in the Secretariat for accumulating knowledge about conflict situations, distributing that knowledge efficiently to a wide user base, generating policy analyses and formulating longteer strategies. That system does not exist at present. The Panel proposes that it be created as the ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat, or EISAS. 69. The bulk of EISAS should be formed by consolidation of the various departmental units that are assigned policy and information analysis roles related to peace and security, including the Policy Analysis Unit and the Situation Centre of DPKO; the Policy Planning Unit of DPA; the Policy Development Unit (or elements thereof) of OCHA; and the Media Monitoring and Analysis Section of the Department of Public Information (DPI). 70. Additional staff would be required to give EISAS expertise that does not exist elsewhere in the system or that cannot be taken from existing structures. These additions would include a head of the staff (at Director level), a small team of military analysts, police experts and highly qualified information systems analysts who would be responsible for managing the design and maintenance of EISAS databases and their accessibility to both Headquarters and field offices and missions. 71. Close affiliates of EISAS should include the Strategic Planning Unit of the Office of the Secretary-General; the Emergency Response Division of UNDP; the Peace-building Unit (see paras. 239-243 below); the Information Analysis Unit of OCHA (which supports Relief Web); the New York liaison offices of OHCHR and UNHCR; the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator; and the Monitoring, Database and Information Branch of DDA. The World Bank Group should be invited to maintain liaison, using appropriate elements, such as the Bank’s Post-Conflict Unit. 72. As a common service, EISAS would be of both short-term and long-term value to ECPS members. It would strengthen the daily reporting function of the DPKO Situation Centre, generating all-source updates13 A/55/305 S/2000/809 on mission activity and relevant global events. It could bring a budding crisis to the attention of ECPS leadership and brief them on that crisis using modern presentation techniques. It could serve as a focal point for timely analysis of cross-cutting thematic issues and preparation of reports for the Secretary-General on such issues. Finally, based on the prevailing mix of missions, crises, interests of the legislative bodies and inputs from ECPS members, EISAS could propose and manage the agenda of ECPS itself, support its deliberations and help to transform it into the decisionmakkin body anticipated in the Secretary-General’s initial reforms. 73. EISAS should be able to draw upon the best available expertise — inside and outside the United Nations system — to fine-tune its analyses with regard to particular places and circumstances. It should provide the Secretary-General and ECPS members with consolidated assessments of United Nations and other efforts to address the sources and symptoms of ongoing and looming conflicts, and should be able to assess the potential utility — and implications — of further United Nations involvement. It should provide the basic background information for the initial work of the Integrated Mission Task Forces (ITMFs) that the Panel recommends below (see paras. 198-217), be established to plan and support the set up of peace operations, and continue to provide analyses and manage the information flow between mission and Task Force once the mission has been established. 74. EISAS should create, maintain and draw upon shared, integrated, databases that would eventually replace the proliferated copies of code cables, daily situation reports, daily news feeds and informal connections with knowledgeable colleagues that desk officers and decision makers alike currently use to keep informed of events in their areas of responsibility. With appropriate safeguards, such databases could be made available to users of a peace operations Intranet (see paras. 255 and 256 below). Such databases, potentially available to Headquarters and field alike via increasingly cheap commercial broadband communications services, would help to revolutionize the manner in which the United Nations accumulates knowledge and analyses key peace and security issues. EISAS should also eventually supersede the Framework for Coordination mechanism. 75. Summary of key recommendation on information and strategic analysis: the Secretary-General should establish an entity, referred to here as the ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS), that would support the information and analysis needs of all members of ECPS; for management purposes, it should be administered by and report jointly to the heads of DPA and DPKO. H. The challenge of transitional civil administration 76. Until mid-1999, the United Nations had conducted just a small handful of field operations with elements of civil administration conduct or oversight. In June 1999, however, the Secretariat found itself directed to develop a transitional civil administration for Kosovo, and three months later for East Timor. The struggles of the United Nations to set up and manage those operations are part of the backdrop to the narratives on rapid deployment and on Headquarters staffing and structure in the present report. 77. These operations face challenges and responsibilities that are unique among United Nations field operations. No other operations must set and enforce the law, establish customs services and regulations, set and collect business and personal taxes, attract foreign investment, adjudicate property disputes and liabilities for war damage, reconstruct and operate all public utilities, create a banking system, run schools and pay teachers and collect the garbage — in a wardammage society, using voluntary contributions, because the assessed mission budget, even for such “transitional administration” missions, does not fund local administration itself. In addition to such tasks, these missions must also try to rebuild civil society and promote respect for human rights, in places where grievance is widespread and grudges run deep. 78. Beyond such challenges lies the larger question of whether the United Nations should be in this business at all, and if so whether it should be considered an element of peace operations or should be managed by some other structure. Although the Security Council may not again direct the United Nations to do transitional civil administration, no one expected it to do so with respect to Kosovo or East Timor either. Intra-State conflicts continue and future instability is hard to predict, so that despite evident ambivalence about civil administration among United Nations Member States and within the Secretariat, other such14 A/55/305 S/2000/809 missions may indeed be established in the future and on an equally urgent basis. Thus, the Secretariat faces an unpleasant dilemma: to assume that transitional administration is a transitory responsibility, not prepare for additional missions and do badly if it is once again flung into the breach, or to prepare well and be asked to undertake them more often because it is well prepared. Certainly, if the Secretariat anticipates future transitional administrations as the rule rather than the exception, then a dedicated and distinct responsibility centre for those tasks must be created somewhere within the United Nations system. In the interim, DPKO has to continue to support this function. 79. Meanwhile, there is a pressing issue in transitional civil administration that must be addressed, and that is the issue of “applicable law.” In the two locales where United Nations operations now have law enforcement responsibility, local judicial and legal capacity was found to be non-existent, out of practice or subject to intimidation by armed elements. Moreover, in both places, the law and legal systems prevailing prior to the conflict were questioned or rejected by key groups considered to be the victims of the conflicts. 80. Even if the choice of local legal code were clear, however, a mission’s justice team would face the prospect of learning that code and its associated procedures well enough to prosecute and adjudicate cases in court. Differences in language, culture, custom and experience mean that the learning process could easily take six months or longer. The United Nations currently has no answer to the question of what such an operation should do while its law and order team inches up such a learning curve. Powerful local political factions can and have taken advantage of the learning period to set up their own parallel administrations, and crime syndicates gladly exploit whatever legal or enforcement vacuums they can find. 81. These missions’ tasks would have been much easier if a common United Nations justice package had allowed them to apply an interim legal code to which mission personnel could have been pre-trained while the final answer to the “applicable law” question was being worked out. Although no work is currently under way within Secretariat legal offices on this issue, interviews with researchers indicate that some headway toward dealing with the problem has been made outside the United Nations system, emphasizing the principles, guidelines, codes and procedures contained in several dozen international conventions and declarations relating to human rights, humanitarian law, and guidelines for police, prosecutors and penal systems. 82. Such research aims at a code that contains the basics of both law and procedure to enable an operation to apply due process using international jurists and internationally agreed standards in the case of such crimes as murder, rape, arson, kidnapping and aggravated assault. Property law would probably remain beyond reach of such a “model code”, but at least an operation would be able to prosecute effectively those who burned their neighbours’ homes while the property law issue was being addressed. 83. Summary of key recommendation on transitional civil administration: the Panel recommends that the Secretary-General invite a panel of international legal experts, including individuals with experience in United Nations operations that have transitional administration mandates, to evaluate the feasibility and utility of developing an interim criminal code, including any regional adaptations potentially required, for use by such operations pending the re-establishment of local rule of law and local law enforcement capacity. III. United Nations capacities to deploy operations rapidly and effectively 84. Many observers have questioned why it takes so long for the United Nations to fully deploy operations following the adoption of a Security Council resolution. The reasons are several. The United Nations does not have a standing army, and it does not have a standing police force designed for field operations. There is no reserve corps of mission leadership: special representatives of the Secretary-General and heads of mission, force commanders, police commissioners, directors of administration and other leadership components are not sought until urgently needed. The Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) currently in place for potential government-provided military, police and civilian expertise has yet to become a dependable supply of resources. The stockpile of essential equipment recycled from the large missions of the mid-1990s to the United Nations Logistics Base (UNLB) at Brindisi, Italy, has been depleted by the current surge in missions and there is as yet no budgetary vehicle for rebuilding it quickly. The15 A/55/305 S/2000/809 peacekeeping procurement process may not adequately balance its responsibilities for cost-effectiveness and financial responsibility against overriding operational needs for timely response and mission credibility. The need for standby arrangements for the recruitment of civilian personnel in substantive and support areas has long been recognized but not yet implemented. And finally, the Secretary-General lacks most of the authority to acquire, hire and preposition the goods and people needed to deploy an operation rapidly before the Security Council adopts the resolution to establish it, however likely such an operation may seem. 85. In short, few of the basic building blocks are in place for the United Nations to rapidly acquire and deploy the human and material resources required to mount any complex peace operation in the future. A. Defining what “rapid and effective deployment” entails 86. The proceedings of the Security Council, the reports of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and input provided to the Panel by the field missions, the Secretariat and the Member States all agree on the need for the United Nations to significantly strengthen capacity to deploy new field operations rapidly and effectively. In order to strengthen these capacities, the United Nations must first agree on basic parameters for defining what “rapidity” and “effectiveness” entail. 87. The first six to 12 weeks following a ceasefire or peace accord is often the most critical period for establishing both a stable peace and the credibility of the peacekeepers. Credibility and political momentum lost during this period can often be difficult to regain. Deployment timelines should thus be tailored accordingly. However, the speedy deployment of military, civilian police and civilian expertise will not help to solidify a fragile peace and establish the credibility of an operation if these personnel are not equipped to do their job. To be effective, the missions’ personnel need materiel (equipment and logistics support), finance (cash in hand to procure goods and services) information assets (training and briefing), an operational strategy and, for operations deploying into uncertain circumstances, a military and political “centre of gravity” sufficient to enable it to anticipate and overcome one or more of the parties’ second thoughts about taking a peace process forward. 88. Timelines for rapid and effective deployment will naturally vary in accordance with the politico-military situations that are unique to each post-conflict environment. Nevertheless, the first step in enhancing the United Nations capacity for rapid deployment must begin with agreeing upon a standard towards which the Organization should strive. No such standard yet exists. The Panel thus proposes that the United Nations develop the operational capabilities to fully deploy “traditional” peacekeeping operations within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution, and complex peacekeeping operations within 90 days. In the case of the latter, the mission headquarters should be fully installed and functioning within 15 days. 89. In order to meet these timelines, the Secretariat would need one or a combination of the following: (a) standing reserves of military, civilian police and civilian expertise, materiel and financing; (b) extremely reliable standby capacities to be called upon on short notice; or (c) sufficient lead-time to acquire these resources, which would require the ability to foresee, plan for and initiate spending for potential new missions several months ahead of time. A number of the Panel’s recommendations are directed at strengthening the Secretariat’s analytical capacities and aligning them with the mission planning process in order to help the United Nations be better prepared for potential new operations. However, neither the outbreak of war nor the conclusion of peace can always be predicted well in advance. In fact, experience has shown that this is often not the case. Thus, the Secretariat must be able to maintain a certain generic level of preparedness, through the establishment of new standing capacities and enhancement of existing standby capacities, so as to be prepared for unforeseen demands. 90. Many Member States have argued against the establishment of a standing United Nations army or police force, resisted entering into reliable standby arrangements, cautioned against the incursion of financial expenses for building a reserve of equipment or discouraged the Secretariat from undertaking planning for potential operations prior to the Secretary-General having been granted specific, crisis-driven legislative authority to do so. Under these circumstances, the United Nations cannot deploy operations “rapidly and effectively” within the timelines suggested. The analysis that follows argues16 A/55/305 S/2000/809 that at least some of these circumstances must change to make rapid and effective deployment possible. 91. Summary of key recommendation on determining deployment timelines: the United Nations should define “rapid and effective deployment capacities” as the ability, from an operational perspective, to fully deploy traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days after the adoption of a Security Council resolution, and within 90 days in the case of complex peacekeeping operations. B. Effective mission leadership 92. Effective, dynamic leadership can make the difference between a cohesive mission with high morale and effectiveness despite adverse circumstances, and one that struggles to maintain any of those attributes. That is, the tenor of an entire mission can be heavily influenced by the character and ability of those who lead it. 93. Given this critical role, the current United Nations approach to recruiting, selecting, training and supporting its mission leaders leaves major room for improvement. Lists of potential candidates are informally maintained. RSGs and SRSGs, heads of mission, force commanders, civilian police commissioners and their respective deputies may not be selected until close to or even after adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing a new mission. They and other heads of substantive and administrative components may not meet one another until they reach the mission area, following a few days of introductory meetings with Headquarters officials. They will be given generic terms of reference that spell out their overall roles and responsibilities, but rarely will they leave Headquarters with mission-specific policy or operational guidance in hand. Initially, at least, they will determine on their own how to implement the Security Council’s mandate and how to deal with potential challenges to implementation. They must develop a strategy for implementing the mandate while trying to establish the mission’s political/military centre of gravity and sustain a potentially fragile peace process. 94. Factoring in the politics of selection makes the process somewhat more understandable. Political sensitivities about a new mission may preclude the Secretary-General’s canvassing potential candidates much before a mission has been established. In selecting SRSGs, RSGs or other heads of mission, the Secretary-General must consider the views of Security Council members, the States within the region and the local parties, the confidence of each of whom an RSG/SRSG needs in order to be effective. The choice of one or more deputy SRSGs may be influenced by the need to achieve geographic distribution within the mission’s leadership. The nationality of the force commander, the police commissioner and their deputies will need to reflect the composition of the military and police components, and will also need to consider the political sensitivities of the local parties. 95. Although political and geographic considerations are legitimate, in the Panel’s view managerial talent and experience must be accorded at least equal priority in choosing mission leadership. Based on the personal experiences of several of its members in leading field operations, the Panel endorses the need to assemble the leadership of a mission as early as possible, so that they can jointly help to shape a mission’s concept of operations, its support plan, its budget and its staffing arrangements. 96. To facilitate early selection, the Panel recommends that the Secretary-General compile, in a systematic fashion, and with input from Member States, a comprehensive list of potential SRSGs, force commanders, police commissioners and potential deputies, as well as candidates to head other substantive components of a mission, representing a broad geographic and equitable gender distribution. Such a database would facilitate early identification and selection of the leadership group. 97. The Secretariat should, as a matter of standard practice, provide mission leadership with strategic guidance and plans for anticipating and overcoming challenges to mandate implementation and, whenever possible, formulate such guidance and plans together with the mission leadership. The leadership should also consult widely with the United Nations resident country team and with NGOs working in the mission area to broaden and deepen its local knowledge, which is critical to implementing a comprehensive strategy for transition from war to peace. The country team’s resident coordinator should be included more frequently in the formal mission planning process.17 A/55/305 S/2000/809 98. The Panel believes that there should always be at least one member of the senior management team of a mission with relevant United Nations experience, preferably both in a field mission and at Headquarters. Such an individual would facilitate the work of those members of the management team from outside the United Nations system, shortening the time they would otherwise need to become familiar with the Organization’s rules, regulations, policies and working methods, answering the sorts of questions that predeplooymen training cannot anticipate. 99. The Panel notes the precedent of appointing the resident coordinator/humanitarian coordinator of the team of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes engaged in development work and humanitarian assistance in a particular country as one of the deputies to the SRSG of a complex peace operation. In our view, this practice should be emulated wherever possible. 100. Conversely, it is critical that field representatives of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes facilitate the work of an SRSG or RSG in his or her role as the coordinator of all United Nations activities in the country concerned. On a number of occasions, attempts to perform this role have been hampered by overly bureaucratic resistance to coordination. Such tendencies do not do justice to the concept of the United Nations family that the Secretary-General has tried hard to encourage. 101. Summary of key recommendations on mission leadership: (a) The Secretary-General should systematize the method of selecting mission leaders, beginning with the compilation of a comprehensive list of potential representatives or special representatives of the Secretary-General, force commanders, civilian police commissioners and their deputies and other heads of substantive and administrative components, within a fair geographic and gender distribution and with input from Member States; (b) The entire leadership of a mission should be selected and assembled at Headquarters as early as possible in order to enable their participation in key aspects of the mission planning process, for briefings on the situation in the mission area and to meet and work with their colleagues in mission leadership; (c) The Secretariat should routinely provide the mission leadership with strategic guidance and plans for anticipating and overcoming challenges to mandate implementation and, whenever possible, should formulate such guidance and plans together with the mission leadership. C. Military personnel 102. The United Nations launched UNSAS in the mid-1990s in order to enhance its rapid deployment capabilities and to enable it to respond to the unpredictable and exponential growth in the establishment of the new generation of complex peacekeeping operations. UNSAS is a database of military, civilian police and civilian assets and expertise indicated by Governments to be available, in theory, for deployment to United Nations peacekeeping operations at seven, 15, 30, 60 or 90 days’ notice. The database currently includes 147,900 personnel from 87 Member States: 85,000 in military combat units; 56,700 in military support elements; 1,600 military observers; 2,150 civilian police; and 2,450 other civilian specialists. Of the 87 participating States, 31 have concluded memoranda of understanding with the United Nations enumerating their responsibilities for preparedness of the personnel concerned, but the same memoranda also codify the conditional nature of their commitment. In essence, the memorandum of understanding confirms that States maintain their sovereign right to “just say no” to a request from the Secretary-General to contribute those assets to an operation. 103. The absence of detailed statistics on responses notwithstanding, many Member States are saying “no” to deploying formed military units to United Nationslle peacekeeping operations, far more often than they are saying “yes”. In contrast to the long tradition of developed countries providing the bulk of the troops for United Nations peacekeeping operations during the Organization’s first 50 years, in the last few years 77 per cent of the troops in formed military units deployed in United Nations peacekeeping operations, as of end-June 2000, were contributed by developing countries. 104. The five Permanent Members of the Security Council are currently contributing far fewer troops to United Nations-led operations, but four of the five have contributed sizeable forces to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led operations in Bosnia and18 A/55/305 S/2000/809 Herzegovina and Kosovo that provide a secure environment in which the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) can function. The United Kingdom also deployed troops to Sierra Leone at a critical point in the crisis (outside United Nations operational control), providing a valuable stabilizing influence, but no developed country currently contributes troops to the most difficult United Nations-led peacekeeping operations from a security perspective, namely the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). 105. Memories of peacekeepers murdered in Mogadishu and Kigali and taken hostage in Sierra Leone help to explain the difficulties Member States are having in convincing their national legislatures and public that they should support the deployment of their troops to United Nations-led operations, particularly in Africa. Moreover, developed States tend not to see strategic national interests at stake. The downsizing of national military forces and the growth in European regional peacekeeping initiatives further depletes the pool of well-trained and well-equipped military contingents from developed countries to serve in United Nations-led operations. 106. Thus, the United Nations is facing a very serious dilemma. A mission such as UNAMSIL would probably not have faced the difficulties that it did in spring 2000 had it been provided with forces as strong as those currently keeping the peace as part of KFOR in Kosovo. The Panel is convinced that NATO military planners would not have agreed to deploy to Sierra Leone with only the 6,000 troops initially authorized. Yet, the likelihood of a KFOR-type operation being deployed in Africa in the near future seems remote given current trends. Even if the United Nations were to attempt to deploy a KFOR-type force, it is not clear, given current standby arrangements, where the troops and equipment would come from. 107. A number of developing countries do respond to requests for peacekeeping forces with troops who serve with distinction and dedication according to very high professional standards, and in accord with new contingent-owned equipment (COE) procedures (“wet lease” agreements) adopted by the General Assembly, which provide that national troop contingents are to bring with them almost all the equipment and supplies required to sustain their troops. The United Nations commits to reimburse troop contributors for use of their equipment and to provide those services and support not covered under the new COE procedures. In return, the troop contributing nations undertake to honour the memoranda of understanding on COE procedures that they sign. 108. Yet, the Secretary-General finds himself in an untenable position. He is given a Security Council resolution specifying troop levels on paper, but without knowing whether he will be given the troops to put on the ground. The troops that eventually arrive in theatre may still be underequipped: Some countries have provided soldiers without rifles, or with rifles but no helmets, or with helmets but no flak jackets, or with no organic transport capability (trucks or troops carriers). Troops may be untrained in peacekeeping operations, and in any case the various contingents in an operation are unlikely to have trained or worked together before. Some units may have no personnel who can speak the mission language. Even if language is not a problem, they may lack common operating procedures and have differing interpretations of key elements of command and control and of the mission’s rules of engagement, and may have differing expectations about mission requirements for the use of force. 109. This must stop. Troop-contributing countries that cannot meet the terms of their memoranda of understanding should so indicate to the United Nations, and must not deploy. To that end, the Secretary-General should be given the resources and support needed to assess potential troop contributors’ preparedness prior to deployment, and to confirm that the provisions of the memoranda will be met. 110. A further step towards improving the current situation would be to give the Secretary-General a capability for assembling, on short notice, military planners, staff officers and other military technical experts, preferably with prior United Nations mission experience, to liaise with mission planners at Headquarters and to then deploy to the field with a core element from DPKO to help establish a mission’s military headquarters, as authorized by the Security Council. Using the current Standby Arrangements System, an “on-call list” of such personnel, nominated by Member States within a fair geographic distribution and carefully vetted and accepted by DPKO, could be formed for this purpose and for strengthening ongoing missions in times of crisis. Personnel assigned to this19 A/55/305 S/2000/809 on-call list of about 100 officers would be at the rank of Major to Colonel and would be treated, upon their short-notice call-up, as United Nations military observers, with appropriate modifications. 111. Personnel selected for inclusion in the on-call list would be pre-qualified medically and administratively for deployment worldwide, would participate in advance training and would incur a commitment of up to two years for immediate deployment within 7-days notification. Every three months, the on-call list would be updated with some 10 to 15 new personnel, as nominated by Member States, to be trained during an initial three-month period. With continuous updating every three months, the on-call list would contain about five to seven teams ready for short-notice deployment. Initial team training would include at the outset a pre-qualification and education phase (brief one-week classroom and apprentice instruction in United Nations systems), followed by a hands-on professional development phase (deployment to an ongoing United Nations peacekeeping operation as a military observer team for about 10 weeks). After this initial three-month team training period, individual officers would then return to their countries and assume an on-call status. 112. Upon Security Council authorization, one or more of these teams could be called up for immediate duty. They would travel to United Nations Headquarters for refresher orientation and specific mission guidance, as necessary, and interaction with the planners of the Integrated Mission Task Force (see paras. 198-217 below) for that operation, before deploying to the field. The teams’ mission would be to translate the broad strategic-level concepts of the mission developed by IMTF into concrete operational and tactical plans, and to undertake immediate coordination and liaison tasks in advance of the deployment of troop contingents. Once deployed, an advance team would remain operational until replaced by deploying contingents (usually about 2 to 3 months, but longer if necessary, up to a six-month term). 113. Funding for a team's initial training would come from the budget of the ongoing mission in which the team is deployed for initial training, and funding for an on-call deployment would come from the prospective peacekeeping mission budget. The United Nations would incur no costs for such personnel while they were on on-call status in their home country as they would be performing normal duties in their national armed forces. The Panel recommends that the Secretary-General outline this proposal with implementing details to the Member States for immediate implementation within the parameters of the existing Standby Arrangements System. 114. Such an emergency military field planning and liaison staff capacity would not be enough, however, to ensure force coherence. In our view, in order to function as a coherent force the troop contingents themselves should at least have been trained and equipped according to a common standard, supplemented by joint planning at the contingents’ command level. Ideally, they will have had the opportunity to conduct joint training field exercises. 115. If United Nations military planners assess that a brigade (approximately 5,000 troops) is what is required to effectively deter or deal with violent challenges to the implementation of an operation’s mandate, then the military component of that United Nations operation ought to deploy as a brigade formation, not as a collection of battalions that are unfamiliar with one another’s doctrine, leadership and operational practices. That brigade would have to come from a group of countries that have been working together as suggested above to develop common training and equipment standards, common doctrine, and common arrangements for the operational control of the force. Ideally, UNSAS should contain several coherent such brigade-size forces, with the necessary enabling forces, available for full deployment to an operation within 30 days in the case of traditional peacekeeping operations and within 90 days in the case of complex operations. 116. To that end, the United Nations should establish the minimum training, equipment and other standards required for forces to participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Member States with the means to do so could form partnerships, within the context of UNSAS, to provide financial, equipment, training and other assistance to troop contributors from less developed countries to enable them to reach and maintain that minimum standard, with the goal that each of the brigades so established should be of comparably high quality and be able to call upon effective levels of operational support. Such a formation has been the objective of the Standing High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) group of States, who have also established a command-level planning element that works together routinely. However, the20 A/55/305 S/2000/809 proposed arrangement is not intended as a mechanism for relieving some States from their responsibilities to participate actively in United Nations peacekeeping operations or for precluding the participation of smaller States in such operations. 117. Summary of key recommendations on military personnel: (a) Member States should be encouraged, where appropriate, to enter into partnerships with one another, within the context of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS), to form several coherent brigade-size forces, with necessary enabling forces, ready for effective deployment within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing a traditional peacekeeping operation and within 90 days for complex peacekeeping operations; (b) The Secretary-General should be given the authority to formally canvass Member States participating in UNSAS regarding their willingness to contribute troops to a potential operation once it appeared likely that a ceasefire accord or agreement envisaging an implementing role for the United Nations might be reached; (c) The Secretariat should, as a standard practice, send a team to confirm the preparedness of each potential troop contributor to meet the provisions of the memoranda of understanding on the requisite training and equipment requirements, prior to deployment; those that do not meet the requirements must not deploy; (d) The Panel recommends that a revolving “on-call list” of about 100 military officers be created in UNSAS to be available on seven days’ notice to augment nuclei of DPKO planners with teams trained to create a mission headquarters for a new peacekeeping operation. D. Civilian police 118. Civilian police are second only to military forces in numbers of international personnel involved in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Demand for civilian police operations dealing with intra-State conflict is likely to remain high on any list of requirements for helping a war-torn society restore conditions for social, economic and political stability. The fairness and impartiality of the local police force, which civilian police monitor and train, is crucial to maintaining a safe and secure environment, and its effectiveness is vital where intimidation and criminal networks continue to obstruct progress on the political and economic fronts. 119. The Panel has accordingly argued (see paras. 39, 40 and 47 (b) above) for a doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police in United Nations peace operations, to focus primarily on the reform and restructuring of local police forces in addition to traditional advisory, training and monitoring tasks. This shift will require Member States to provide the United Nations with even more well-trained and specialized police experts, at a time when they face difficulties meeting current requirements. As of 1 August 2000, 25 per cent of the 8,641 police positions authorized for United Nations operations remained vacant. 120. Whereas Member States may face domestic political difficulties in sending military units to United Nations peace operations, Governments tend to face fewer political constraints in contributing their civilian police to peace operations. However, Member States still have practical difficulties doing so, because the size and configuration of their police forces tend to be tailored to domestic needs alone. 121. Under the circumstances, the process of identifying, securing the release of and training police and related justice experts for mission service is often time-consuming, and prevents the United Nations from deploying a mission’s civilian police component rapidly and effectively. Moreover, the police component of a mission may comprise officers drawn from up to 40 countries who have never met one another before, have little or no United Nations experience, and have received little relevant training or mission-specific briefings, and whose policing practices and doctrines may vary widely. Moreover, civilian police generally rotate out of operations after six months to one year. All of those factors make it extremely difficult for missions’ civilian police commissioners to transform a disparate group of officers into a cohesive and effective force. 122. The Panel therefore calls upon Member States to establish national pools of serving police officers (augmented, if necessary, by recently retired police officers who meet the professional and physical requirements) who are administratively and medically21 A/55/305 S/2000/809 ready for deployment to United Nations peace operations, within the context of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System. The size of the pool will naturally vary with each country’s size and capacity. The Civilian Police Unit of DPKO should assist Member States in determining the selection criteria and training requirements for police officers within these pools, by identifying the specialities and expertise required and issuing common guidelines on the professional standards to be met. Once deployed in a United Nations mission, civilian police officers should serve for at least one year to ensure a minimum level of continuity. 123. The Panel believes that the cohesion of police components would be further enhanced if policecontriibutin States were to develop joint training exercises, and therefore recommends that Member States, where appropriate, enter into new regional training partnerships and strengthen existing ones. The Panel also calls upon Member States in a position to do so to offer assistance (e.g., training and equipment) to smaller police-contributing States to maintain the requisite level of preparedness, according to guidelines, standard operating procedures and performance standards promulgated by the United Nations. 124. The Panel also recommends that Member States designate a single point of contact within their governmental structures to be responsible for coordinating and managing the provision of police personnel to United Nations peace operations. 125. The Panel believes that the Secretary-General should be given a capability for assembling, on short notice, senior civilian police planners and technical experts, preferably with prior United Nations mission experience, to liaise with mission planners at Headquarters and to then deploy to the field to help establish a mission’s civilian police headquarters, as authorized by the Security Council, in a standby arrangement that parallels the military headquarters oncaal list and its procedures. Upon call-up, members of the on-call list would have the same contractual and legal status as other civilian police in United Nations operations. The training and deployment arrangements for members of the on-call list also could be the same as those of its military counterpart. Furthermore, joint training and planning between the military and civilian police officers on the respective lists would further enhance mission cohesion and cooperation across components at the start-up of a new operation. 126. Summary of key recommendations on civilian police personnel: (a) Member States are encouraged to each establish a national pool of civilian police officers that would be ready for deployment to United Nations peace operations on short notice, within the context of the United Nations standby arrangements system; (b) Member States are encouraged to enter into regional training partnerships for civilian police in the respective national pools in order to promote a common level of preparedness in accordance with guidelines, standard operating procedures and performance standards to be promulgated by the United Nations; (c) Members States are encouraged to designate a single point of contact within their governmental structures for the provision of civilian police to United Nations peace operations; (d) The Panel recommends that a revolving on-call list of about 100 police officers and related experts be created in UNSAS to be available on seven days’ notice with teams trained to create the civilian police component of a new peacekeeping operation, train incoming personnel and give the component greater coherence at an early date; (e) The Panel recommends that parallel arrangements to recommendations (a), (b) and (c) above be established for judicial, penal, human rights and other relevant specialists, who with specialist civilian police will make up collegial “rule of law” teams. E. Civilian specialists 127. To date, the Secretariat has been unable to identify, recruit and deploy suitably qualified civilian personnel in substantive and support functions either at the right time or in the numbers required. Currently, about 50 per cent of field positions in substantive areas and up to 40 per cent of the positions in administrative and logistics areas are vacant, in missions that were established six months to one year ago and remain in desperate need of the requisite specialists. Some of those who have been deployed have found themselves in positions that do not match their previous experience, such as in the civil administration22 A/55/305 S/2000/809 components of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and UNMIK. Furthermore, the rate of recruitment is nearly matched by the rate of departure by mission personnel fed up with the working conditions that they face, including the short-staffing itself. High vacancy and turnover rates foreshadow a disturbing scenario for the start-up and maintenance of the next complex peacekeeping operation, and hamper the full deployment of current missions. Those problems are compounded by several factors. 1. Lack of standby systems to respond to unexpected or high-volume surge demands 128. Each new complex task assigned to the new generation of peacekeeping operations creates demands that the United Nations system is not able to meet on short notice. This phenomenon first emerged in the early 1990s, with the establishment of the following operations to implement peace accords: the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) and the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). The system struggled to recruit experts on short notice in electoral assistance, economic reconstruction and rehabilitation, human rights monitoring, radio and television production, judicial affairs and institution-building. By middeccade the system had created a cadre of individuals, which had acquired on-the-job expertise in these areas, hitherto not present in the system. However, for reasons explained below, many of those individuals have since left the system. 129. The Secretariat was again taken by surprise in 1999, when it had to staff missions with responsibilities for governance in East Timor and Kosovo. Few staff within the Secretariat, or within United Nations agencies, funds or programmes possess the technical expertise and experience required to run a municipality or national ministry. Neither could Member States themselves fill the gap immediately, because they, too, had done no advance planning to identify qualified and available candidates within their national structures. Moreover, the understaffed transitional administration missions themselves took some time to even specify precisely what they required. Eventually, a few Member States offered to provide candidates (some at no cost to the United Nations) to satisfy substantial elements of the demand. However, the Secretariat did not fully avail itself of those offers, partly to avoid the resulting lopsided geographic distribution in the missions’ staffing. The idea of individual Member States taking over entire sectors of administration (sectoral responsibility) was also floated, apparently too late in the process to iron out the details. This idea is worth revisiting, at least for the provision of small teams of civil administrators with specialized expertise. 130. In order to respond quickly, ensure quality control and satisfy the volume of even foreseeable demands, the Secretariat would require the existence and maintenance of a roster of civilian candidates. The roster (which would be distinct from UNSAS) should include the names of individuals in a variety of fields, who have been actively sought out (on an individual basis or through partnerships with and/or the assistance of the members of the United Nations family, governmental, intergovernmental and nongovernnmenta organizations), pre-vetted, interviewed, pre-selected, medically cleared and provided with the basic orientation material applicable to field mission service in general, and who have indicated their availability on short notice. 131. No such roster currently exists. As a result, urgent phone calls have to be made to Member States, United Nations departments and agencies and the field missions themselves to identify suitable candidates at the last minute, and to then expect those candidates to be in a position to drop everything overnight. Through this method, the Secretariat has managed to recruit and deploy at least 1,500 new staff over the last year, not including the managed reassignments of existing staff within the United Nations system, but quality control has suffered. 132. A central Intranet-based roster should be created, along the lines proposed above, that is accessible to and maintained by the relevant members of ECPS. The roster should include the names of their own staff whom ECPS members would agree to release for mission service. Some additional resources would be required to maintain these rosters, but accepted external candidates could be reminded automatically to update their own records via the Internet, particularly as regards availability, and they should be able to access on-line briefing and training materials via the Internet, as well. Field missions should be granted access and delegated the authority to recruit candidates23 A/55/305 S/2000/809 from the roster, in accordance with guidelines to be promulgated by the Secretariat for ensuring fair geographic and gender distribution. 2. Difficulties in attracting and retaining the best external recruits 133. As ad hoc as the recruitment system has been, the United Nations has managed to recruit some very qualified and dedicated individuals for field assignments throughout the 1990s. They have managed ballots in Cambodia, dodged bullets in Somalia, evacuated just in time from Liberia and came to accept artillery fire in former Yugoslavia as a feature of their daily life. Yet, the United Nations system has not yet found a contractual mechanism to appropriately recognize and reward their service by offering them some job security. While it is true that mission recruits are explicitly told not to harbour false expectations about future employment because external recruits are brought in to fill a “temporary” demand, such conditions of service do not attract and retain the best performers for long. In general, there is a need to rethink the historically prevailing view of peacekeeping as a temporary aberration rather than a core function of the United Nations. 134. Thus, at least a percentage of the best external recruits should be offered longer-term career prospects beyond the limited-duration contracts that they are currently offered, and some of them should be actively recruited for positions in the Secretariat’s complex emergency departments in order to increase the number of Headquarters staff with field experience. A limited number of mission recruits have managed to secure positions at Headquarters, but apparently on an ad hoc and individual basis rather than according to a concerted and transparent strategy. 135. Proposals are currently being formulated to address this situation by enabling mission recruits who have served for four years in the field to be offered “continuing appointments”, whenever possible; unlike current contracts, these would not be restricted to the duration of a specific mission mandate. Such initiatives, if adopted, would help to address the problem for those who joined the field in mid-decade and remain in the system. They might not, however, go far enough to attract new recruits, who would generally have to take up six-month to one-year assignments at a time, without necessarily knowing if there would be a position for them once the assignment had been completed. The thought of having to live in limbo for four years might be inhibiting for some of the best candidates, particularly for those with families, who have ample alternative employment opportunities (often with more competitive conditions of service). Consideration should therefore be given to offering continuing appointments to those external recruits who have served with particular distinction for at least two years in a peace operation. 3. Shortages in administrative and support functions at the mid-to senior-levels 136. Critical shortfalls in key administrative areas (procurement, finance, budget, personnel) and in logistics support areas (contracts managers, engineers, information systems analysts, logistics planners) plagued United Nations peace operations throughout the 1990s. The unique and specific nature of the Organization’s administrative rules, regulations and internal procedures preclude new recruits from taking on these administrative and logistics functions in the dynamic conditions of mission start-up, without a substantial amount of training. While ad hoc training programmes for such personnel were initiated in 1995, they have yet to be institutionalized because the most experienced individuals, the would-be trainers, could not be spared from their full-time line responsibilities. In general, training and the production of user-friendly guidance documents are the first projects to be set aside when new missions have to be staffed on an urgent basis. Accordingly, the updated version of the 1992 field administration handbook still remains in draft form. 4. Penalizing field deployment 137. Headquarters staff who are familiar with the rules, regulations and procedures do not readily deploy to the field. Staff in both administrative and substantive areas must volunteer for field duty and their managers must agree to release them. Heads of departments often discourage, dissuade and/or refuse to release their best performers for field assignments because of shortages of competent staff in their own offices, which they fear temporary replacements cannot resolve. Potential volunteers are further discouraged because they know colleagues who were passed over for promotion because they were “out of sight, out of mind.” Most field operations are “non-family assignments” given security considerations, another factor which reduces24 A/55/305 S/2000/809 the numbers of volunteers. A number of the fieldorieente United Nations agencies, funds and programmes (UNHCR, the World Food Programme (WFP), UNICEF, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), UNDP) do have a number of potentially well qualified candidates for peacekeeping service, but also face resource constraints, and the staffing needs of their own field operations generally take first priority. 138. The Office of Human Resources Management, supported by a number of interdepartmental task forces, has proposed a series of progressive reforms that address some of these problems. They require mobility within the Secretariat, and aim to encourage rotation between Headquarters and the field by rewarding mission service during promotion considerations. They seek to reduce recruitment delays and grant full recruitment authority to heads of departments. The Panel feels it is essential that these initiatives be approved expeditiously. 5. Obsolescence in the Field Service category 139. The Field Service is the only category of staff within the United Nations designed specifically for service in peacekeeping operations (and whose conditions of service and contracts are designed accordingly and whose salaries and benefits are paid for entirely from mission budgets). It has lost much of its value, however, because the Organization has not dedicated enough resources to career development for the Field Service Officers. This category was developed in the 1950s to provide a highly mobile cadre of technical specialists to support in particular the military contingents of peacekeeping operations. As the nature of the operations changed, so too did the functions the Field Service Officers were asked to perform. Eventually, some ascended through the ranks by the late 1980s and early 1990s to assume managerial functions in the administrative and logistics components of peacekeeping operations. 140. The most experienced and seasoned of the group are now in limited supply, deployed in current missions, and many are at or near retirement. Many of those who remain lack the managerial skills or training required to effectively run the key administrative components of complex peace operations. Others’ technical knowledge is dated. Thus, the Field Service’s composition no longer matches all or many of the administrative and logistics support needs of the newer generation of peacekeeping operations. The Panel therefore encourages the urgent revision of the Field Service’s composition and raison d’être, to better match the present and future demands of field operations, with particular emphasis on mid-to seniorleeve managers in key administrative and logistics areas. Staff development and training for this category of personnel, on a continual basis, should also be treated as a high priority, and the conditions of service should be revised to attract and retain the best candidates. 6. Lack of a comprehensive staffing strategy for peace operations 141. There is no comprehensive staffing strategy to ensure the right mix of civilian personnel in any operation. There are talents within the United Nations system that must be tapped, gaps to be filled through external recruitment and a range of other options that fall in between, such as the use of United Nations Volunteers, subcontracted personnel, commercial services, and nationally-recruited staff. The United Nations has turned to all of these sources of personnel throughout the past decade, but on a case-by-case basis rather than according to a global strategy. Such a strategy is required to ensure cost-effectiveness and efficiency, as well as to promote mission cohesion and staff morale. 142. This staffing strategy should address the use of United Nations Volunteers in peacekeeping operations, on a priority basis. Since 1992, more than 4,000 United Nations Volunteers have served in 19 different peacekeeping operations. Approximately 1,500 United Nations Volunteers have been assigned to new missions in East Timor, Kosovo and Sierra Leone in the last 18 months alone, in civil administration, electoral affairs, human rights, administrative and logistics support roles. United Nations Volunteers have historically proven to be dedicated and competent in their fields of work. The legislative bodies have encouraged greater use of United Nations Volunteers in peacekeeping operations based on their exemplary past performance, but using United Nations Volunteers as a form of cheap labour risks corrupting the programme and can be damaging to mission morale. Many United Nations Volunteers work alongside colleagues who are making three or four times their salary for similar functions. DPKO is currently in discussion with the United Nations Volunteers Programme on the conclusion of a global memorandum of understanding for the use of25 A/55/305 S/2000/809 United Nations Volunteers in peacekeeping operations. It is essential that such a memorandum be part of a broader comprehensive staffing strategy for peace operations. 143. This strategy should also include, in particular, detailed proposals for the establishment of a Civilian Standby Arrangements System (CSAS). CSAS should contain a list of personnel within the United Nations system who have been pre-selected, medically cleared and committed by their parent offices to join a mission start-up team on 72 hours’ notice. The relevant members of the United Nations family should be delegated authority and responsibility, for occupational groups within their respective expertise, to initiate partnerships and memoranda of understanding with intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, for the provision of personnel to supplement mission start-up teams drawn from within the United Nations system. 144. The fact that responsibility for developing a global staffing strategy and civilian standby arrangements has rested solely within the Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD), acting on its own initiative whenever there are a few moments to spare, is itself an indication that the Secretariat has not dedicated enough attention to this critical issue. The staffing of a mission, from the top down, is perhaps one of the most important building blocks for successful mission execution. This subject should therefore be accorded the highest priority by the Secretariat’s senior management. 145. Summary of key recommendations on civilian specialists: (a) The Secretariat should establish a central Internet/Intranet-based roster of pre-selected civilian candidates available to deploy to peace operations on short notice. The field missions should be granted access to and delegated authority to recruit candidates from it, in accordance with guidelines on fair geographic and gender distribution to be promulgated by the Secretariat; (b) The Field Service category of personnel should be reformed to mirror the recurrent demands faced by all peace operations, especially at the mid-to senior-levels in the administrative and logistics areas; (c) Conditions of service for externally recruited civilian staff should be revised to enable the United Nations to attract the most highly qualified candidates, and to then offer those who have served with distinction greater career prospects; (d) DPKO should formulate a comprehensive staffing strategy for peace operations, outlining, among other issues, the use of United Nations Volunteers, standby arrangements for the provision of civilian personnel on 72 hours’ notice to facilitate mission start-up, and the divisions of responsibility among the members of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security for implementing that strategy. F. Public information capacity 146. An effective public information and communications capacity in mission areas is an operational necessity for virtually all United Nations peace operations. Effective communication helps to dispel rumour, to counter disinformation and to secure the cooperation of local populations. It can provide leverage in dealing with leaders of rival groups, enhance security of United Nations personnel and serve as a force multiplier. It is thus essential that every peace operation formulate public information campaign strategies, particularly for key aspects of a mission’s mandate, and that such strategies and the personnel required to implement them be included in the very first elements deployed to help start up a new mission. 147. Field missions need competent spokespeople who are integrated into the senior management team and project its daily face to the world. To be effective, the spokesperson must have journalistic experience and instincts, and knowledge of how both the mission and United Nations Headquarters work. He or she must also enjoy the confidence of the SRSG and establish good relationship with other members of the mission leadership. The Secretariat must therefore increase its efforts to develop and retain a pool of such personnel. 148. United Nations field operations also need to be able to speak effectively to their own people, to keep staff informed of mission policy and developments and to build links between components and both up and down the chain of command. New information technology provides effective tools for such communications, and should be included in the start-up kits and equipment reserves at UNLB in Brindisi.26 A/55/305 S/2000/809 149. Resources devoted to public information and the associated personnel and information technology required to get an operation’s message out and build effective internal communications links, which now infrequently exceed one per cent of a mission’s operating budget, should be increased in accordance with a mission’s mandate, size and needs. 150. Summary of key recommendation on rapidly deployable capacity for public information: additional resources should be devoted in mission budgets to public information and the associated personnel and information technology required to get an operation’s message out and build effective internal communications links. G. Logistics support, the procurement process and expenditure management 151. The depletion of the United Nations reserve of equipment, long lead-times even for systems contracts, bottlenecks in the procurement process and delays in obtaining cash in hand to conduct procurement in the field further constrain the rapid deployment and effective functioning of missions that do actually manage to reach authorized staffing levels. Without effective logistics support, missions cannot function effectively. 152. The lead-times required for the United Nations to provide field missions with basic equipment and commercial services required for mission start-up and full deployment are dictated by the United Nations procurement process. That process is governed by the Financial Regulations and Rules promulgated by the General Assembly and the Secretariat’s interpretations of those regulations and rules (known as “policies and procedures” in United Nations parlance). The regulations, rules, policies and procedures have been translated into a roughly eight-step process that Headquarters must follow to provide field missions with the equipment and services it requires, as follows: 1. Identify the requirements and raise a requisition. 2. Certify that finances are available to procure the item. 3. Initiate an invitation to bid (ITB) or request for proposal (RFP). 4. Evaluate tenders. 5. Present cases to the Headquarters Committee on Contracts (HCC). 6. Award a contract and place an order for production. 7. Await production of the item. 8. Deliver the item to the mission. 153. Most governmental organizations and commercial companies follow similar processes, though not all of them take as long as that of the United Nations. For example, this entire process in the United Nations can take 20 weeks in the case of office furniture, 17 to 21 weeks for generators, 23 to 27 weeks for prefabricated buildings, 27 weeks for heavy vehicles and 17 to 21 weeks for communications equipment. Naturally, none of these lead-times enable full mission deployment within the timelines suggested if the majority of the processes are commencing only after an operation has been established. 154. The United Nations launched the “start-up kit” concept during the boom in peacekeeping operations in the mid-1990s to partially address this problem. The start-up kits contain the basic equipment required to establish and sustain a 100-person mission headquarters for the first 100 days of deployment, prepurchhased packaged and waiting and ready to deploy at a moment’s notice at Brindisi. Assessed contributions from the mission to which the kits are deployed are then used to reconstitute new start-up kits, and once liquidated a mission’s non-disposable and durable equipment is returned to Brindisi and held in reserve, in addition to the start-up kits. 155. However, the wear and tear on light vehicles and other items in post-war environments may sometimes render the shipping and servicing costs more expensive than selling off the item or cannibalizing it for parts and then purchasing a new item altogether. Thus, the United Nations has moved towards auctioning such items in situ more frequently, although the Secretariat is not authorized to use the funds acquired through this process to purchase new equipment but must return it to Member States. Consideration should be given to enabling the Secretariat to use the funds acquired through these means to purchase new equipment to be held in reserve at Brindisi. Furthermore, consideration should also be given to a general authorization for field missions to donate, in consultation with the United Nations resident coordinator, at least a percentage of27 A/55/305 S/2000/809 such equipment to reputable local non-governmental organizations as a means of assisting the development of nascent civil society. 156. Nonetheless, the existence of these start-up kits and reserves of equipment appears to have greatly facilitated the rapid deployment of the smaller operations mounted in the mid-to-late 1990s. However, the establishment and expansion of new missions has now outpaced the closure of existing operations, so that UNLB has been virtually depleted of the long lead-time items required for full mission deployment. Unless one of the large operations currently in place closes down today and its equipment is all shipped to UNLB in good condition, the United Nations will not have in hand the equipment required to support the start-up and rapid full deployment of a large mission in the near future. 157. There are, of course, limits to how much equipment the United Nations can and should keep in reserve at UNLB or elsewhere. Mechanical equipment in storage needs to be maintained, which can be an expensive proposition, and if not addressed properly can result in missions receiving long awaited items that are inoperable. Furthermore, the commercial and public sectors at the national level have moved increasingly towards “just-in-time” inventory and/or “just-in-time delivery” because of the high opportunity costs of keeping funds tied up in equipment that may not be deployed for some time. Furthermore, the current pace of technological advancements renders certain items, such as communications equipment and information systems hardware, obsolete within a matter of months, let alone years. 158. The United Nations has accordingly also moved in that direction over the past few years, and has concluded some 20 standing commercial systems contracts for the provision of common equipment for peace operations, particularly those required for mission start-up and expansion. Under the systems contracts, the United Nations has been able to cut down lead-times considerably by selecting the vendors ahead of time, and keeping them on standby for production requests. Nevertheless, the production of light vehicles under the current systems contract takes 14 weeks and requires an additional four weeks for delivery. 159. The General Assembly has taken a number of steps to address this lead-time issue. The establishment of the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, which when fully capitalized amounts to $150 million, provided a standing pool of money from which to draw quickly. The Secretary-General can seek the approval of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) to draw up to $50 million from the Fund to facilitate the start-up of a new mission or for unforeseen expansion of an existing one. The Fund is then replenished from the mission budgets once it has been approved or increased. For commitment requests in excess of $50 million, the General Assembly’s approval is required. 160. In exceptional cases, the General Assembly, on the advice of ACABQ, has granted the Secretary-General authority to commit up to $200 million in spending to facilitate the start-up of larger missions (UNTAET, UNMIK and MONUC), pending submission of the necessary detailed budget proposals, which can take months of preparation. These are all welcome developments and are indicative of the Member States’ support for enhancing the Organization’s rapid deployment capacities. 161. At the same time, all of these developments are only applicable after a Security Council resolution has been adopted authorizing the establishment of a mission or its advance elements. Unless some of these measures are applied well in advance of the desired date of mission deployment or are modified to help and maintain a minimum reserve of equipment requiring long lead-times to procure, the suggested targets for rapid and effective deployment cannot be met. 162. The Secretariat should thus formulate a global logistics support strategy to enable rapid and effective mission deployment within the deployment timelines proposed. That strategy should be formulated based on a cost-benefit analysis of the appropriate level of long lead-time items that should be kept in reserve and those best acquired through standing contracts, factoring in the cost of compressed delivery times, as required, to support such a strategy. The substantive elements of the peace and security departments would need to give logistics planners an estimate of the number and types of operations that might need to be established over 12 to 18 months. The Secretary-General should submit periodically to the General Assembly, for its review and approval, a detailed proposal for implementing that strategy, which could entail considerable financial implications.28 A/55/305 S/2000/809 163. In the interim, the General Assembly should authorize and approve a one-time expenditure for the creation of three new start-up kits at Brindisi (for a total of five), which would then automatically be replenished from the budgets of the missions that drew upon the kits. 164. The Secretary-General should be given authority to draw up to $50 million from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, prior to the adoption of a Security Council resolution authorizing a mission’s establishment but with the approval of ACABQ, to facilitate the rapid and effective deployment of operations within the proposed timelines. The Fund should be automatically replenished from assessed contributions to the missions that used it. The Secretary-General should request that the General Assembly consider augmenting the size of the Fund, should he determine that it had been depleted due to the establishment of a number of missions in rapid succession. 165. Well beyond mission start-up, the field missions often wait for months to receive items that they need, particularly when initial planning assumptions prove to be inaccurate or mission requirements change in response to new developments. Even if such items are available locally, there are several constraints on local procurement. First, field missions have limited flexibility and authority, for example, to quickly transfer savings from one line item in a budget to another to meet unforeseen demands. Second, missions are generally delegated procurement authority for no more than $200,000 per purchase order. Purchases above that amount must be referred to Headquarters and its eight-step decision process (see para. 152 above). 166. The Panel supports measures that reduce Headquarters micro-management of the field missions and provide them with the authority and flexibility required to maintain mission credibility and effectiveness, while at the same time holding them accountable. Where Headquarters’ involvement adds real value, however, as with respect to standing contracts, Headquarters should retain procurement responsibility. 167. Statistics from the Procurement Division indicate that of the 184 purchase orders raised by Headquarters in 1999 in support of peacekeeping operations, for values of goods and services between US$ 200,000 and US$ 500,000, 93 per cent related to aircraft and shipping services, motor vehicles and computers, which were either handled through international tenders or are currently covered under systems contracts. Provided that systems contracts are activated quickly and result in the timely provision of goods and services, it appears that the Headquarters’ involvement in those instances makes good sense. The systems contracts and international tenders presumably enable bulk purchases of items and services more cheaply than would be possible locally, and in many instances involve goods and services not available in the mission areas at all. 168. However, it is not entirely clear what real value Headquarters involvement adds to the procurement process for those goods and services that are not covered under systems contracts or standing commercial services contracts and are more readily available locally at cheaper prices. In such instances, it would make sense to delegate the authority to the field to procure those items, and to monitor the process and its financial controls through the audit mechanism. Accordingly, the Secretariat should assign priority to building capacity in the field to assume a higher level of procurement authority as quickly as possible (e.g., through recruitment and training of the appropriate field personnel and the production of user-friendly guidance documents) for all goods and services that are available locally and not covered under systems contracts or standing commercial services contracts (up to US$ 1 million, depending on mission size and needs). 169. Summary of key recommendations on logistics support and expenditure management: (a) The Secretariat should prepare a global logistics support strategy to enable rapid and effective mission deployment within the timelines proposed and corresponding to planning assumptions established by the substantive offices of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; (b) The General Assembly should authorize and approve a one-time expenditure to maintain at least five mission start-up kits in Brindisi, which should include rapidly deployable communications equipment. The start-up kits should then be routinely replenished with funding from the assessed contributions to the operations that drew on them;29 A/55/305 S/2000/809 (c) The Secretary-General should be given authority to draw up to US$ 50 million from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund once it became clear that an operation was likely to be established, with the approval of ACABQ but prior to the adoption of a Security Council resolution; (d) The Secretariat should undertake a review of the entire procurement policies and procedures (with proposals to the General Assembly for amendments to the Financial Rules and Regulations, as required), to facilitate in particular the rapid and full deployment of an operation within the proposed timelines; (e) The Secretariat should conduct a review of the policies and procedures governing the management of financial resources in the field missions with a view to providing field missions with much greater flexibility in the management of their budgets; (f) The Secretariat should increase the level of procurement authority delegated to the field missions (from $200,000 to as high as $1 million, depending on mission size and needs) for all goods and services that are available locally and are not covered under systems contracts or standing commercial services contracts. IV. Headquarters resources and structure for planning and supporting peacekeeping operations 170. Creating effective Headquarters support capacity for peace operations means addressing the three issues of quantity, structure and quality, that is, the number of staff needed to get the job done; the organizational structures and procedures that facilitate effective support; and quality people and methods of work within those structures. In the present section, the Panel examines and makes recommendations on primarily the first two issues; in section VI below, it addresses the issue of personnel quality and organizational culture. 171. The Panel sees a clear need for increased resources in support of peacekeeping operations. There is particular need for increased resources in DPKO, the primary department responsible for the planning and support of the United Nations’ most complex and highproofil field operations. A. Staffing-levels and funding for Headquarters support for peacekeeping operations 172. Expenditures for Headquarters staffing and related costs to plan and support all peacekeeping operations in the field can be considered the United Nations direct, non-field support costs for peacekeeping operations. They have not exceeded 6 per cent of the total cost of peacekeeping operations in the last half decade (see table 4.1). They are currently closer to three per cent and will fall below two per cent in the current peacekeeping budget year, based on existing plans for expansion of some missions, such as MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the full deployment of others, such as UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, and the establishment of a new operation in Eritrea and Ethiopia. A management analyst familiar with the operational requirements of large organizations, public or private, that operate substantial field-deployed elements might well conclude that an organization trying to run a field-oriented enterprise on two per cent central support costs was undersupporting its field people and very likely burning out its support structures in the process. 173. Table 4.1 lists the total budgets for peacekeeping operations from mid-1996 through mid-2001 (peacekeeping budget cycles run from July to June, offset six months from the United Nations regular budget cycle). It also lists total Headquarters costs in support of peacekeeping, whether inside or outside of DPKO, and whether funded from the regular budget or the Support Account for Peacekeeping Operations (the regular budget covers two years and its costs are apportioned among Member States according to the regular scale of assessment; the Support Account covers one year — the intent being that Secretariat staffing levels should ebb and flow with the level of field operations — and its costs are apportioned according to the peacekeeping scale of assessment).30 A/55/305 S/2000/809 Table 4.1 Ratio of total Headquarters support costs to total peacekeeping operations budgets, 1996-2001 (Millions of United States dollars) July 1996-June 1997 July 1997-June 1998 July 1998-June 1999 July 1999-June 2000 July 2000-June 2001a Peacekeeping budgets 1 260 911.7 812.9 1 417 2 582b Related Headquarters support costsc 49.2 52.8 41.0 41.7 50.2 Headquarters: field cost ratio 3.90% 5.79% 5.05% 2.95% 1.94% a Based on financing reports of the Secretary-General; excluding missions completed by 30 June 2000; including rough estimate for full deployment of MONUC, for which a budget has not yet been prepared. b Estimated. c Figures obtained from the Financial Controller of the United Nations, including all posts in the Secretariat (primarily in DPKO) funded through the regular biennium budget and the Support Account; figures also factor in what the costs would have been for in-kind contributions or “gratis personnel” had they been fully funded. 174. The Support Account funds 85 per cent of the DPKO budget, or about $40 million annually. Another $6 million for DPKO comes from the regular biennium budget. This $46 million combined largely funds the salaries and associated costs of DPKO’s 231 civilian, military and police Professionals and 173 General Service staff (but does not include the Mine Action Service, which is funded through voluntary contributions). The Support Account also funds posts in other parts of the Secretariat engaged in peacekeeping support, such as the Peacekeeping Financing Division and parts of the Procurement Division in the Department of Management, the Office of Legal Affairs and DPI. 175. Until mid-decade, the Support Account was calculated as 8.5 per cent of the total civilian staff costs of peacekeeping operations, but it did not take into consideration the costs of supporting civilian police personnel and United Nations Volunteers, or the costs of supporting private contractors or military troops. The fixed-percentage approach was replaced by the annual justification of every post funded by the Support Account. DPKO staffing levels grew little under the new system, however, partly because the Secretariat seems to have tailored its submissions to what it thought the political market would bear. 176. Clearly, DPKO and the other Secretariat offices supporting peacekeeping should expand and contract to some degree in relation to the level of activity in the field, but to require DPKO to rejustify, every year, seven out of eight posts in the Department is to treat it as though it were a temporary creation and peacekeeping a temporary responsibility of the Organization. Fifty-two years of operations would argue otherwise and recent history would argue further that continuing preparedness is essential, even during downturns in field activity, because events are only marginally predictable and staff capacity and experience, once lost, can take a long time to rebuild, as DPKO has painfully learned in the past two years. 177. Because the Support Account funds virtually all of DPKO on a year-by-year basis, that Department and the other offices funded by the Support Account have no predictable baseline level of funding and posts against which they can recruit and retain staff. Personnel brought in from the field on Support Account-funded posts do not know if those posts will exist for them one year later. Given current working conditions and the career uncertainty that Support Account funding entails, it is impressive that DPKO has managed to hold together at all. 178. Member States and the Secretariat have long recognized the need to define a baseline staffing/funding level and a separate mechanism to enable growth and retrenchment in DPKO in response to changing needs. However, without a review of DPKO staffing needs based on some objective management and productivity criteria, an appropriate baseline is difficult to define. While it is not in a position to conduct such a methodical management review of DPKO, the Panel believes that such a review should be conducted. In the meantime, the Panel believes that certain current staff shortages are plainly obvious and merit highlighting. 179. The Military and Civilian Police Division in DPKO, headed by the United Nations Military Adviser, has an authorized strength of 32 military officers and nine civilian police officers. The Civilian Police Unit has been assigned to support all aspects of United Nations international police operations, from doctrinal development through selection and deployment of31 A/55/305 S/2000/809 officers into field operations. It can, at present, do little more than identify personnel, attempt to pre-screen them with visiting selection assistance teams (an effort that occupies roughly half of the staff) and then see that they get to the field. Moreover, there is no unit within DPKO (or any other part of the United Nations system) that is responsible for planning and supporting the rule of law elements of an operation that in turn support effective police work, whether advisory or executive. 180. Eleven officers in the Military Adviser’s office support the identification and rotation of military units for all peacekeeping operations, and provide military advice to the political officers in DPKO. DPKO’s military officers are also supposed to find time to “train the trainers” at the Member State level, to draft guidelines, manuals and other briefing material, and to work with FALD to identify the logistics and other operational requirements of the military and police components of field missions. However, under existing staffing levels, the Training Unit consists of only five military officers in total. Ten officers in the Military Planning Service are the principal operational-level military mission planners within DPKO; six more posts have been authorized but have not yet all been filled. These 16 planning officers combined represent the full complement of military staff available to determine force requirements for mission start-up and expansion, participate in technical surveys and assess the preparedness of potential troop contributors. Of the 10 military planners originally authorized, one was assigned to draft the rules of engagement and directives to force commanders for all operations. Only one officer is available, part time, to manage the UNSAS database. 181. Table 4.2 contrasts the deployed strength of military and police contingents with the authorized strength of their respective Headquarters support staffs. No national Government would send 27,000 troops into the field with just 32 officers back home to provide them with substantive and operational military guidance. No police organization would deploy 8,000 police officers with only nine headquarters staff to provide them with substantive and operational policing support. Table 4.2 Ratio of military and civilian police staff at Headquarters to military and civilian police personnel in the fielda Military personnel Civilian police Peacekeeping operations 27 365 8 641 Headquarters 32 9 Headquarters: field ratio 0.1% 0.1% a Authorized military strength as of 15 June 2000 and civilian police as of 1 August 2000. 182. The Office of Operations in DPKO, in which the political Desk Officers or substantive focal points for particular peacekeeping operations reside, is another area that seems considerably understaffed. It currently has 15 Professionals serving as the focal points for 14 current and two potential new peace operations, or less than one officer per mission on average. While one officer may be able to handle the needs of one or even two smaller missions, this seems untenable in the case of the larger missions, such as UNTAET in East Timor, UNMIK in Kosovo, UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone and MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Similar circumstances apply to the logistics and personnel officers in DPKO’s Field Administration and Logistics Division, and to related support personnel in the Department of Management, the Office of Legal Affairs, the Department of Public Information and other offices which support their work. Table 4.3 depicts the total number of staff in DPKO and elsewhere in the Secretariat dedicated, full-time, to supporting the larger missions, along with their annual mission budgets and authorized staffing levels. 183. The general shortage of staff means that in many instances key personnel have no back-up, no way to cover more than one shift in a day when a crisis occurs six to 12 time zones away except by covering two shifts themselves, and no way to take a vacation, get sick or visit the mission without leaving their32 A/55/305 S/2000/809 Table 4.3 Total staff assigned on a full-time basis to support complex peacekeeping operations established in 1999 UNMIK (Kosovo) UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone) UNTAET (East Timor) MONUC (Democratic Republic of the Congo) Budget (estimated) July 2000-June 2001 $410 million $465 million $540 million $535 million Current authorized strength of key components 4 718 police 1 000-plus international civilians 13 000 military 8 950 military 1 640 police 1 185 international civilians 5 537 military 500 military observers Professional staff at Headquarters assigned full-time to support the operation Total Headquarters support staff 1 political officer 2 civilian police 1 logistics coord. 1 civilian recruitment specialist 1 finance specialist _______ 6 1 political officer 2 military 1 logistics coord. 1 finance specialist _______ 5 1 political officer 2 military 1 civilian police 1 logistics coord. 1 civilian recruitment specialist 1 finance specialist _______ 7 1 political officer 3 military 1 civilian police 1 logistics coord. 1 civilian recruitment specialist 1 finance specialist _______ 8 backstopping duties largely uncovered. In the current arrangements, compromises among competing demands are inevitable and support for the field may suffer as a result. In New York, Headquarters-related tasks, such as reporting obligations to the legislative bodies, tend to get priority because Member States’ representatives press for action, often in person. The field, by contrast, is represented in New York by an emaail a cable or the jotted notes of a phone conversation. Thus, in the war for a desk officer’s time, field operations often lose out and are left to solve problems on their own. Yet they should be accorded first priority. People in the field face difficult circumstances, sometimes life-threatening. They deserve better, as do the staff at Headquarters who wish to support them more effectively. 184. Although there appears to be some duplication in the functions performed by desk officers in DPKO and their counterparts in the regional divisions of DPA, closer examination suggests otherwise. The UNMIK desk officer’s counterpart in DPA, for example, follows developments in all of Southeastern Europe and the counterpart in OCHA covers all of the Balkans plus parts of the Commonwealth of Independent States. While it is essential that the officers in DPA and OCHA be given the opportunity to contribute what they can, their efforts combined yield less than one additional full-time-equivalent officer to support UNMIK. 185. The three Regional Directors in the Office of Operations should be visiting the missions regularly and engaging in a constant policy dialogue with the SRSGs and heads of components on the obstacles that Headquarters could help them overcome. Instead, they are drawn into the processes that occupy their desk officers’ time because the latter need the back-up. 186. These competing demands are even more pronounced for the Under-Secretary-General and Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. The Under-Secretary-General and Assistant Secretary-General provide advice to the Secretary-General, liaise with Member State delegations and capitals, and one or the other vets every report on peacekeeping operations (40 in the first half of 2000) submitted to the Secretary-General for his approval and signature, prior to submission to the legislative bodies. Since January 2000, the two have briefed the Council in person over 50 times, in sessions lasting up to three hours and requiring several hours of staff preparation in the field and at Headquarters. Coordination meetings take further time away from substantive dialogue with the field missions, from field visits, from reflection on ways to improve the United Nations conduct of peacekeeping and from attentive management.33 A/55/305 S/2000/809 187. The staff shortages faced by the substantive side of DPKO may be exceeded by those in the administrative and logistics support areas, particularly in FALD. At this juncture, FALD provides support not only to peacekeeping operations but also to other field offices, such as the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories (UNSCO) in Gaza, the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) and a dozen other small offices, not to mention continuing involvement in managing and reconciling the liquidation of terminated missions. All of FALD adds approximately 1.25 per cent to the total cost of peacekeeping and other field operations. If the United Nations were to subcontract the administrative and logistics support functions performed by FALD, the Panel is convinced that it would be hard pressed to find a commercial company to take on the equivalent task for the equivalent fee. 188. A few examples will illustrate FALD’s pronounced staff shortages: the Staffing Section in FALD’s Personnel Management and Support Service (PMSS), which handles recruitment and travel for all civilian personnel as well as travel for civilian police and military observers, has just 10 professional recruitment officers, four of whom have been assigned to review and acknowledge the 150 unsolicited employment applications that the office now receives every day. The other six officers handle the actual selection process: one full-time and one half-time for Kosovo, one full-time and one half-time for East Timor, and three to cover all other field missions combined. Three recruitment officers are trying to identify suitable candidates to staff two civil administration missions that need hundreds of experienced administrators across a multitude of fields and disciplines. Nine to 12 months after they got under way, neither UNMIK nor UNTAET is fully deployed. 189. The Member States must give the Secretary-General some flexibility and the financial resources to bring in the staff he needs to ensure that the credibility of the Organization is not tarnished by its failure to respond to emergencies as a professional organization should. The Secretary-General must be given the resources to increase the capacity of the Secretariat to react immediately to unforeseen demands. 190. The responsibility for providing the people in the field the goods and services they need to do their jobs falls primarily on FALD’s Logistics and Communications Service (LCS). The job description of one of the 14 logistics coordinators in LCS might help to illustrate the workload that the entire Service currently endures. This individual is the lead logistics planner for the expansion of both the mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) and for the expansion of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in Lebanon. The same individual is also responsible for drafting the logistics policies and procedures for the critical United Nations Logistics Base in Brindisi and for coordinating the preparation of the entire Service’s annual budget submissions. 191. Based on this cursory review alone and bearing in mind that the total support cost for DPKO and related Headquarters peacekeeping support offices does not even exceed $50 million per annum, the Panel is convinced that additional resources for that Department and the others which support it would be an essential investment to ensure that the over $2 billion the Member States will spend on peacekeeping operations in 2001 will be well spent. The Panel therefore recommends a substantial increase in resources for this purpose, and urge the Secretary-General to submit a proposal to the General Assembly outlining the Organization’s requirements in full. 192. The Panel also believes that peacekeeping should cease to be treated as a temporary requirement and DPKO a temporary organizational structure. It requires a consistent and predictable baseline of funding to do more than keep existing missions afloat. It should have resources to plan for potential contingencies six months to a year down the road; to develop managerial tools to help missions perform better in the future; to study the potential impact of modern technology on different aspects of peacekeeping; to implement the lessons learned from previous operations; and to implement recommendations contained in the evaluation reports of the Office of Internal Oversight Services over the past five years. Staff should be given the opportunity to design and conduct training programmes for newly recruited staff at Headquarters and in the field. They should finish the guidelines and handbooks that could help new mission personnel do their jobs more professionally and in accordance with United Nations rules, regulations and procedures, but that now sit half finished in a dozen offices all around DPKO, because their authors are busy meeting other needs. 193. The Panel therefore recommends that Headquarters support for peacekeeping be treated as a34 A/55/305 S/2000/809 core activity of the United Nations, and as such that the majority of its resource requirements be funded through the mechanism of the regular biennial programme budget of the Organization. Pending the preparation of the next regular budget, it recommends that the Secretary-General approach the General Assembly as soon as possible with a request for an emergency supplemental increase to the last Support Account submission. 194. The specific allocation of resources should be determined according to a professional and objective review of requirements, but gross levels should reflect historical experience of peacekeeping. One approach would be to calculate the regular budget baseline for Headquarters support of peacekeeping as a percentage of the average cost of peacekeeping over the preceding five years. The resulting baseline budget would reflect the expected level of activity for which the Secretariat should be prepared. Based on the figures provided by the Controller (see table 4.1), the average for the last five years (including the current budget year) is $1.4 billion. Pegging the baseline at five per cent of the average cost would yield, for example, a baseline budget of $70 million, roughly $20 million more than the current annual Headquarters support budget for peacekeeping. 195. To fund above-average or “surge” activity levels, consideration should be given to a simple percentage charge against missions whose budgets carry peacekeeping operations spending above the baseline level. For example, the roughly $2.6 billion in peacekeeping activity estimated for the current budget year exceeds the $1.4 billion hypothetical baseline by $1.2 billion. A one per cent surcharge on that $1.2 billion would yield an additional $12 million to enable Headquarters to deal effectively with that increase. A two per cent surcharge would yield $24 million. 196. Such a direct method of providing for surge capacity should replace the current, annual, post-bypoos justification required for the Support Account submissions. The Secretary-General should be given the flexibility to determine how such funds should best be utilized to meet a surge in activity, and emergency recruitment measures should apply in such instances so that temporary posts associated with surge requirements could be filled immediately. 197. Summary of key recommendations on funding headquarters support for peacekeeping operations: (a) The Panel recommends a substantial increase in resources for Headquarters support of peacekeeping operations, and urges the Secretary-General to submit a proposal to the General Assembly outlining his requirements in full; (b) Headquarters support for peacekeeping should be treated as a core activity of the United Nations, and as such the majority of its resource requirements for that purpose should be funded through the mechanism of the regular biennium programme budget of the Organization; (c) Pending the preparation of the next regular budget submission, the Panel recommends that the Secretary-General approach the General Assembly with a request for an emergency supplemental increase to the Support Account to allow immediate recruitment of additional personnel, particularly in DPKO. B. Need and proposal for the establishment of Integrated Mission Task Forces 198. There is currently no integrated planning or support cell in DPKO in which those responsible for political analysis, military operations, civilian police, electoral assistance, human rights, development, humanitarian assistance, refugees and displaced persons, public information, logistics, finance and personnel recruitment, among others, are represented. On the contrary, as described above, DPKO has no more than a handful of officers dedicated full-time to planning and supporting even the large complex operations, such as those in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), Kosovo (UNMIK) and East Timor (UNTAET). In the case of a political peace mission or peace-building office, these functions are discharged within DPA, with equally limited human resources. 199. DPKO’s Office of Operations is responsible for pulling together an overall concept of operations for new peacekeeping missions. In this regard, it bears a heavy dual burden for political analysis and for internal coordination with the other elements of DPKO that are responsible for military and civilian police matters, logistics, finance and personnel. But each of these other elements has a separate organizational reporting chain, and many of them, in fact, are physically scattered across several different buildings. Moreover,35 A/55/305 S/2000/809 DPA, UNDP, OCHA, UNHCR, OHCHR, DPI, and several other departments, agencies, funds and programmes have an increasingly important role to play in planning for any future operation, especially complex operations, and need to be formally included in the planning process. 200. Collaboration across divisions, departments and agencies does occur, but relies too heavily on personal networks and ad hoc support. There are task forces convened for planning major peacekeeping operations, pulling together various parts of the system, but they function more as sounding boards than executive bodies. Moreover, current task forces tend to meet infrequently or even disperse once an operation has begun to deploy, and well before it has fully deployed. 201. Reversing the perspective, once an operation has been deployed, SRSGs in the field have overall coordinating authority for United Nations activities in their mission area but have no single working-level focal point at Headquarters that can address all of their concerns quickly. For example, the desk officer or his/her regional director in DPKO fields political questions for peacekeeping operations but usually cannot directly respond to queries about military, police, humanitarian, human rights, electoral, legal or other elements of an operation, and they do not necessarily have a ready counterpart in each of those areas. A mission impatient for answers will eventually find the right primary contacts themselves and may do so in dozens of instances, building its own networks with different parts of the Secretariat and relevant agencies. 202. The missions should not feel the need to build their own contact networks. They should know exactly who to turn to for the answers and support that they need, especially in the critical early months when a mission is working towards full deployment and coping with daily crises. Moreover, they should be able to contact just one place for those answers, an entity that includes all of the backstopping people and expertise for the mission, drawn from an array of Headquarters elements that mirrors the functions of the mission itself. The Panel would call that entity an Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF). 203. This concept builds upon but considerably extends the cooperative measures contained in the guidelines for implementing the “lead” department concept that DPKO and DPA agreed to in June 2000, in a joint departmental meeting chaired by the Secretary-General. The Panel would recommend, for example, that DPKO and DPA jointly determine the leader of each new Task Force but not necessarily limit their choice to the current staff of either Department. There may be occasions when the existing workloads of the regional directors or political officers in either department preclude them from taking on the role fulltiime In those instances, it might be best to bring in someone from the field for this purpose. Such flexibility, including the flexibility to assign the task to the most qualified person for the job, would require the approval of funding mechanisms to respond to surge demands, as recommended above. 204. ECPS or a designated subgroup thereof should collectively determine the general composition of an IMTF, which the Panel envisages forming quite early in a process of conflict prevention, peacemaking, prospective peacekeeping or prospective deployment of a peace-building support office. That is, the notion of integrated, one-stop support for United Nations peaceanndsecurity field activities should extend across the whole range of peace operations, with the size, substantive composition, meeting venue and leadership matching the needs of the operation. 205. Leadership and the lead department concept have posed some problems in the past when the principal focus of United Nations presence on the ground has changed from political to peacekeeping or vice versa, causing not only a shift in the field’s primary Headquarters contact but a shift in the whole Headquarters supporting cast. As the Panel sees the IMTF working, the supporting cast would remain substantially the same during and after such transitions, with additions or subtractions as the nature of the operation changed but with no changes in core Task Force personnel for those functions that bridge the transition. IMTF leadership would pass from one member of the group to another (e.g., from a DPKO regional director or political officer to his or her DPA counterpart). 206. Size and composition would match the nature and the phase of the field activity being supported. Crisisrellate preventive action would require well informed political support that would keep a United Nations envoy apprised of political evolution within the region and other factors key to the success of his or her effort. Peacemakers working to end a conflict would need to know more about peacekeeping and peace-building36 A/55/305 S/2000/809 options, so that their potential and their limitations are both reflected in any peace accord that would involve United Nations implementation. Adviser-observers from the Secretariat working with the peacemaker would be affiliated with the IMTF that supports the negotiations, and keep it posted on progress. The IMTF leader could, in turn, serve as the peacemaker’s routine contact point at Headquarters, with rapid access to higher echelons of the Secretariat for answers to sensitive political queries. 207. An IMTF of the sort just described could be a “virtual” body, meeting periodically but not physically co-located, its members operating from their workday offices and tied together by modern information technology. To support their work, each should feed as well as have access to the data and analyses created and placed on the United Nations Intranet by EISAS, the ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat proposed in paragraphs 65 to 75 above. 208. IMTFs created to plan potential peace operations could also begin as virtual bodies. As an operation seemed more likely to go forward, the Task Force should assume physical form, with all of its members co-located in one space, prepared to work together as a team on a continuing basis for as long as needed to bring a new mission to full deployment. That period may be up to six months, assuming that the rapid deployment reforms recommended in paragraphs 84-169 above have been implemented. 209. Task Force members should be formally seconded to IMTF for such duration by their home division, department, agency, fund or programme. That is, an IMTF should be much more than a coordinating committee or task force of the type now set up at Headquarters. It should be a temporary but coherent staff created for a specific purpose, able to be increased or decreased in size or composition in response to mission needs. 210. Each Task Force member should be authorized to serve not only as a liaison between the Task Force and his or her home base but as its key working-level decision maker for the mission in question. The leader of the IMTF — reporting to the Assistant Secretary-General for Operations of DPKO in the case of peacekeeping operations, and the relevant Assistant Secretary-General of DPA in the case of peacemaking efforts, peace-building support offices and special political missions — should in turn have line authority over his or her Task Force members for the period of their secondment, and should serve as the first level of contact for the peace operations for all aspects of their work. Matters related to long-term policy and strategy should be dealt with at the Assistant Secretary-General/Under-Secretary-General level in ECPS, supported by EISAS. 211. For the United Nations system to be prepared to contribute staff to an IMTF, responsibility centres for each major substantive component of peace operations need to be established. Departments and agencies need to agree in advance on procedures for secondment and on their support for the IMTF concept, in writing if necessary. 212. The Panel is not in a position to suggest “lead” offices for each potential component of a peace operation but believes that ECPS should think through this issue collectively and assign one of its members responsibility for maintaining a level of preparedness for each potential component of a peace operation other than the military, police and judicial, and logistics/administration areas, which should remain DPKO’s responsibility. The designated lead agency should be responsible for devising generic concepts of operations, job descriptions, staffing and equipment requirements, critical path/deployment timetables, standard databases, civilian standby arrangements and rosters of other potential candidates for that component, as well as for participation in the IMTFs. 213. IMTFs offer a flexible approach to dealing with time-critical, resource-intensive but ultimately temporary requirements to support mission planning, start-up and initial sustainment. The concept borrows heavily from the notion of “matrix management”, used extensively by large organizations that need to be able to assign the necessary talent to specific projects without reorganizing themselves every time a project arises. Used by such diverse entities as the RAND Corporation and the World Bank, it gives each staff member a permanent “home” or “parent” department but allows — indeed, expects — staff to function in support of projects as the need arises. A matrix management approach to Headquarters planning and support of peace operations would allow departments, agencies, funds and programmes — internally organized as suits their overall needs — to contribute staff to coherent, interdepartmental/inter-agency task forces built to provide that support.37 A/55/305 S/2000/809 214. The IMTF structure could have significant implications for how DPKO’s Office of Operations is currently structured, and in effect would supplant the Regional Divisions structure. For example, the larger operations, such as those in Sierra Leone, East Timor and Kosovo, each would warrant separate IMTFs, headed by Director-level officers. Other missions, such as the long-established “traditional” peacekeeping operations in Asia and the Middle East, might be grouped into another IMTF. The number of IMTFs that could be formed would largely depend on the amount of additional resources allocated to DPKO, DPA and related departments, agencies, funds and programmes. As the number of IMTFs increased, the organizational structure of the Office of Operations would become flatter. There could be similar implications for the Assistant Secretaries-General of DPA, to whom the heads of the IMTFs would report during the peacemaking phase or when setting up a large peacebuilldin support operation either as a follow-on presence to a peacekeeping operation or as a separate initiative. 215. While the regional directors of DPKO (and DPA in those cases where they were appointed as IMTF heads) would be in charge of overseeing fewer missions than at present, they would actually be managing a larger number of staff, such as those seconded full-time from the Military and Civilian Police Advisers’ Offices, FALD (or its successor divisions) and other departments, agencies, funds and programmes, as required. The size of the IMTFs will also depend on the amount of additional resources provided, without which participating entities would not be in a position to second their staff on a full-time basis. 216. It should also be noted that in order for the IMTF concept to work effectively, its members must be physically co-located during the planning and initial deployment phases. This will not be possible at present without major adjustments to current office space allocations in the Secretariat. 217. Summary of key recommendation on integrated mission planning and support: Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs), with members seconded from throughout the United Nations system, as necessary, should be the standard vehicle for mission-specific planning and support. IMTFs should serve as the first point of contact for all such support, and IMTF leaders should have temporary line authority over seconded personnel, in accordance with agreements between DPKO, DPA and other contributing departments, programmes, funds and agencies. C. Other structural adjustments required in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations 218. The IMTF concept would strengthen the capacity of DPKO’s Office of Operations to function as a real focal point for all aspects of a peacekeeping operation. However, structural adjustments are also required in other elements of DPKO, in particular to the Military and Civilian Police Division, FALD and the Lessons Learned Unit. 1. Military and Civilian Police Division 219. All civilian police officials interviewed at Headquarters and in the field expressed frustration with having police functions in DPKO included in a military reporting chain. The Panel agrees that there seems to be little administrative or substantive value added in this arrangement. 220. Military and civilian police officers in DPKO serve for three years because the United Nations requires that they be on active duty. If they wish to remain longer and would even leave their national military or police services to do so, United Nations personnel policy precludes their being hired into their previous position. Hence the turnover rate in the military and police offices of DPKO is high. Since lessons learned in Headquarters practice are not routinely captured, since comprehensive training programmes for new arrivals are non-existent and since user-friendly manuals and standard operating procedures remain half-complete, high turnover means routine loss of institutional memory that takes months of on-the-job learning to replace. Current staff shortages also mean that military and civilian police officers find themselves assigned to functions that do not necessarily match their expertise. Those who have specialized in operations (J3) or plans (J5) might find themselves engaged in quasi-diplomatic work or functioning as personnel and administration officers (J1), managing the continual turnover of people and units in the field, to the detriment of their ability to monitor operational activity in the field.38 A/55/305 S/2000/809 221. DPKO’s lack of continuity in these areas may also explain why, after over 50 years of deploying military observers to monitor ceasefire violations, DPKO still does not have a standard database that could be provided to military observers in the field to document ceasefire violations and generate statistics. At present, if one wanted to know how many violations had occurred over a six-month period in a particular country where an operation is deployed, someone would have to physically count each one in the paper copies of the daily situation reports for that period. Where such databases do exist, they have been created by the missions themselves on an ad hoc basis. The same applies to the variety of crime statistics and other information common to most civilian police missions. Technological advances have also revolutionized the way in which ceasefire violations and movements in demilitarized zones and removal of weapons from storage sites can be monitored. However, there is no one in DPKO’s Military and Civilian Police Division currently assigned to addressing these issues. 222. The Panel recommends that the Military and Police Division be separated into two separate entities, one for the military and the other for the civilian police. The Military Adviser’s Office of DPKO should be enlarged and restructured to correspond more closely to the way in which the military headquarters in United Nations peacekeeping operations are structured, so as to provide more effective support to the field and better informed military advice to senior officials in the Secretariat. The Civilian Police Unit should also be provided with substantial additional resources, and consideration should be given to upgrading the rank and level of the Civilian Police Adviser. 223. To ensure a minimum of continuity of DPKO’s military and civilian police capacity, the Panel recommends that a percentage of the added positions in these two units be reserved for military and civilian police personnel who have prior United Nations experience and have recently left their national services, to be appointed as regular staff members. This would follow the precedent set in the Logistics and Communications Service of FALD, which includes a number of former military officers. 224. Civilian police in the field are increasingly involved in the restructuring and reform of local police forces, and the Panel has recommended a doctrinal shift that would make such activities a primary focus for civilian police in future peace operations (see paras. 39, 40 and 47 (b) above). However, to date, the Civilian Police Unit formulates plans and requirements for the police components of peace operations without the benefit of the requisite legal advice on local judicial structures, criminal laws, codes and procedures in effect in the country concerned. This is vital information for civilian police planners, yet it is not a function for which resources have hitherto been allocated from the Support Account, either to OLA, DPKO or any other department in the Secretariat. 225. The Panel therefore recommends that a new, separate unit be established in DPKO, staffed with the requisite experts in criminal law, specifically for the purpose of providing advice to the Civilian Police Adviser’s Office on those rule of law issues that are critical to the effective use of civilian police in peace operations. This unit should also work closely with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva, the Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention in Vienna, and other parts of the United Nations system that focus on the reform of rule of law institutions and respect for human rights. 2. Field Administration and Logistics Division 226. FALD does not have the authority to finalize and present the budgets for the field operations that it plans, nor to actually procure the goods and services they need. That authority rests with the Peacekeeping Financing and Procurement Divisions of DM. All Headquarters-based procurement requests are processed by the 16 Support Account-funded procurement officers in the Procurement Division, who prepare the larger contracts (roughly 300 in 1999) for presentation to the Headquarters Committee on Contracts, negotiate and award contracts for goods and services not procured locally by the field missions, and formulate United Nations policies and procedures for both global and local mission procurement. The combination of staffing constraints and the extra steps entailed in this process appears to contribute to the procurement delays reported by field missions. 227. Procurement efficiency could be enhanced by delegating peacekeeping budgeting and presentation, allotment issuance and procurement authority to DPKO for a two-year trial period, with the corresponding transfer of posts and staff. In order to ensure accountability and transparency, DM should retain authority for accounts, assessment of Member States and treasury functions. It should also retain its overall39 A/55/305 S/2000/809 policy setting and monitoring role, as it has in the case of recruitment and administration of field personnel, authority and responsibility, which are already delegated to DPKO. 228. Furthermore, to avoid allegations of impropriety that may arise from having those responsible for budgeting and procurement working in the same division as those identifying the requirements, the Panel recommends that FALD be separated into two divisions: one for Administrative Services, in which the personnel, budget/finance and procurement functions would reside, and the other for Integrated Support Services (e.g., logistics, transport, communications). 3. Lessons Learned Unit 229. All are agreed on the need to exploit cumulating field experience but not enough has been done to improve the system’s ability to tap that experience or to feed it back into the development of operational doctrine, plans, procedures or mandates. The work of DPKO’s existing Lessons Learned Unit does not seem to have had a great deal of impact on peace operations practice, and the compilation of lessons learned seems to occur mostly after a mission has ended. This is unfortunate because the peacekeeping system is generating new experience — new lessons — on a daily basis. That experience should be captured and retained for the benefit of other current operators and future operations. Lessons learned should be thought of as a facet of information management that contributes to improving operations on a daily basis. Post-action reports would then be just one part of a larger learning process, the capstone summary rather than the principal objective of the entire process. 230. The Panel feels that this function is in urgent need of enhancement and recommends that it be located where it can work closely with and contribute effectively to ongoing operations as well as mission planning and doctrine/guidelines development. The Panel suggests that this might best be in the Office of Operations, which will oversee the functions of the Integrated Mission Task Forces that the Panel has proposed to integrate Headquarters planning and support for peace operations (see paras. 198-217 above). Located in an element of DPKO that will routinely incorporate representatives from many departments and agencies, the unit could serve as the peace operations “learning manager” for all of those entities, maintaining and updating the institutional memory that missions and task forces alike could draw upon for problem solving, best practices and practices to avoid. 4. Senior management 231. There are currently two Assistant Secretaries-General in DPKO: one for the Office of Operations and the other for the Office of Logistics, Management and Mine Action (FALD and the Mine Action Service). The Military Adviser, who concurrently serves as the Director of the Military and Civilian Police Division, currently reports to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations through one of the two Assistant Secretaries-General or directly to the Under-Secretary-General, depending on the nature of the issue concerned. 232. In the light of the various staff increases and structural adjustments proposed in the preceding sections, the Panel believes that there is a strong case to be made for the Department to be provided with a third Assistant Secretary-General. The Panel further believes that one of the three Assistant Secretaries-General should be designated as a “Principal Assistant Secretary-General” and function as deputy to the Under-Secretary-General. 233. Summary of key recommendations on other structural adjustments in DPKO: (a) The current Military and Civilian Police Division should be restructured, moving the Civilian Police Unit out of the military reporting chain. Consideration should be given to upgrading the rank and level of the Civilian Police Adviser; (b) The Military Adviser’s Office in DPKO should be restructured to correspond more closely to the way in which the military field headquarters in United Nations peacekeeping operations are structured; (c) A new unit should be established in DPKO and staffed with the relevant expertise for the provision of advice on criminal law issues that are critical to the effective use of civilian police in United Nations peace operations; (d) The Under-Secretary-General for Management should delegate authority and responsibility for peacekeeping-related budgeting and procurement functions to the Under-Secretary40 A/55/305 S/2000/809 General for Peacekeeping Operations for a two-year trial period; (e) The Lessons Learned Unit should be substantially enhanced and moved into a revamped DPKO Office of Operations; (f) Consideration should be given to increasing the number of Assistant Secretaries-General in DPKO from two to three, with one of the three designated as the “Principal Assistant Secretary-General” and functioning as the deputy to the Under-Secretary-General. D. Structural adjustments needed outside the Department of Peacekeeping Operations 234. Public information planning and support at Headquarters needs strengthening, as do elements in DPA that support and coordinate peace-building activities and provide electoral support. Outside the Secretariat, the ability of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to plan and support the human rights components of peace operations needs to be reinforced. 1. Operational support for public information 235. Unlike military, civilian police, mine action, logistics, telecommunications and other mission components, no unit at Headquarters has specific line responsibility for the operational requirements of public information components in peace operations. The most concentrated responsibility for missionrellate public information rests with the Office of the Spokesman of the Secretary General and the respective spokespersons and public information offices in the missions themselves. At Headquarters, four professional officers in the Peace and Security Section, nested within the Promotion and Planning Service of the Public Affairs Division in DPI, are responsible for producing publications, developing and updating web site content on peace operations, and dealing with other issues ranging from disarmament to humanitarian assistance. While the Section produces and manages information about peacekeeping, it has had little capacity to create doctrine, strategy or standard operating procedures for public information functions in the field, other than on a sporadic and ad hoc basis. 236. The DPI Peace and Security Section is being expanded somewhat through internal DPI redeployment of staff, but it should either be substantially expanded and made operational or the support function should be moved into DPKO, with some of its officers perhaps seconded from DPI. 237. Wherever the function is located, it should anticipate public information needs and the technology and people to meet them, set priorities and standard field operating procedures, provide support in the startuu phase of new missions, and provide continuing support and guidance through participation in the Integrated Mission Task Forces. 238. Summary of key recommendation on structural adjustments in public information: a unit for operational planning and support of public information in peace operations should be established, either within DPKO or within a new Peace and Security Information Service in DPI reporting directly to the Under-Secretary-General for Communication and Public Information. 2. Peace-building support in the Department of Political Affairs 239. The Department of Political Affairs (DPA) is the designated focal point for United Nations peacebuilldin efforts and currently has responsibility for setting up, supporting and/or advising peace-building offices and special political missions in a dozen countries, plus the activities of five envoys and representatives of the Secretary-General who have been given peacemaking or conflict prevention assignments. Regular budget funds that support these activities through the next calendar year are expected to fall $31 million or 25 per cent below need. Such assessed funding is in fact relatively rare in peace-building, where most activities are funded by voluntary donations. 240. DPA’s nascent Peace-building Support Unit is one such activity. In his capacity as Convener of ECPS and focal point for peace-building strategies, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs must be able to coordinate the formulation of such strategies with the members of ECPS and other elements of the United Nations system, particularly those in the development and humanitarian fields given the cross-cutting nature of peace-building itself. To do so, the Secretariat is assembling voluntary funds from a number of donors41 A/55/305 S/2000/809 for a three-year pilot project in support of the unit. As the planning for this pilot unit evolves, the Panel urges DPA to consult with all stakeholders in the United Nations system that can contribute to its success, in particular UNDP, which is placing renewed emphasis on democracy/governance and other transition-related areas. 241. DPA’s executive office supports some of the operational efforts for which it is responsible, but it is neither designed nor equipped to be a field support office. FALD also provides support to some of the field missions managed by DPA, but neither those missions’ budgets nor DPA’s budget allocate additional resources to FALD for this purpose. FALD attempts to meet the demands of the smaller peace-building operations but acknowledges that the larger operations make severe, high-priority demands on its current staffing. Thus the needs of smaller missions tend to suffer. DPA has had satisfactory experience with support from the United Nations Office of Project Services (UNOPS), a fiveyeearold spin-off from UNDP that manages programmes and funds for many clients within the United Nations system, using modern management practices and drawing all of its core funding from a management charge of up to 13 per cent. UNOPS can provide logistics, management and recruitment support for smaller missions fairly quickly. 242. DPA’s Electoral Assistance Division (EAD) also relies on voluntary money to meet growing demand for its technical advice, needs assessment missions and other activities not directly involving electoral observation. As of June 2000, 41 requests for assistance were pending from Member States but the trust fund supporting such “non-earmarked” activities held just 8 per cent of the funding required to meet current requests through the end of calendar year 2001. So, as demand surges for a key element of democratic institution-building endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 46/137, EAD staff must first raise the programme funds needed to do their jobs. 243. Summary of key recommendations for peacebuilldin support in the Department of Political Affairs: (a) The Panel supports the Secretariat’s effort to create a pilot Peace-building Unit within DPA in cooperation with other integral United Nations elements, and suggests that regular budgetary support for the unit be revisited by the membership if the pilot programme works well. The programme should be evaluated in the context of guidance the Panel has provided in paragraph 46 above, and if considered the best available option for strengthening United Nations peace-building capacity it should be presented to the Secretary-General as per the recommendation contained in paragraph 47 (d) above; (b) The Panel recommends that regular budget resources for Electoral Assistance Division programmatic expenses be substantially increased to meet the rapidly growing demand for its services, in lieu of voluntary contributions; (c) To relieve demand on FALD and the executive office of DPA, and to improve support services rendered to smaller political and peacebuilldin field offices, the Panel recommends that procurement, logistics, staff recruitment and other support services for all such smaller, non-military field missions be provided by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). 3. Peace operations support in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 244. OHCHR needs to be more closely involved in planning and executing the elements of peace operations that address human rights, especially complex operations. At present, OHCHR has inadequate resources to be so involved or to provide personnel for service in the field. If United Nations operations are to have effective human rights components, OHCHR should be able to coordinate and institutionalize human rights field work in peace operations; second personnel to Integrated Mission Task Forces in New York; recruit human rights field personnel; organize human rights training for all personnel in peace operations, including the law and order components; and create model databases for human rights field work. 245. Summary of key recommendation on strengthening the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: the Panel recommends substantially enhancing the field mission planning and preparation capacity of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, with funding partly from the42 A/55/305 S/2000/809 regular budget and partly from peace operations mission budgets. V. Peace operations and the information age 246. Threaded through many parts of the present report are references to the need to better link the peace and security system together; to facilitate communications and data sharing; to give staff the tools that they need to do their work; and ultimately to allow the United Nations to be more effective at preventing conflict and helping societies find their way back from war. Modern, well utilized information technology (IT) is a key enabler of many of these objectives. The present section notes the gaps in strategy, policy and practice that impede the United Nations effective use of IT, and offers recommendations to bridge them. A. Information technology in peace operations: strategy and policy issues 247. The problem of IT strategy and policy is bigger than peace operations and extends to the entire United Nations system. That larger IT context is generally beyond the Panel’s mandate, but the larger issues should not preclude the adoption of common IT user standards for peace operations and for the Headquarters units that give support to them. FALD’s Communications Service can provide the satellite links and the local connectivity upon which missions can build effective IT networks and databases, but a better strategy and policy needs to be developed for the user community to help it take advantage of the technology foundations that are now being laid. 248. When the United Nations deploys a mission into the field, it is critical that its elements be able to exchange data easily. All complex peace operations bring together many different actors: agencies, funds, and programmes from throughout the United Nations system, as well as the Departments of the Secretariat; mission recruits who are new to the United Nations system; on occasion, regional organizations; frequently, bilateral aid agencies; and always, dozens to hundreds of humanitarian and development NGOs. All of them need a mechanism that makes it easier to share information and ideas efficiently, the more so because each is but the small tip of a very large bureaucratic iceberg with its own culture, working methods and objectives. 249. Poorly planned and poorly integrated IT can pose obstacles to such cooperation. When there are no agreed standards for data structure and interchange at the application level, the “interface” between the two is laborious manual recoding, which tends to defeat the purposes of investing in a networked and computerheeav working environment. The consequences can also be more serious than wasted labour, ranging from miscommunication of policy to a failure to “get the word” on security threats or other major changes in the operational environment. 250. The irony of distributed and decentralized data systems is that they need such common standards to function. Common solutions to common IT problems are difficult to produce at higher levels — between substantive components of an operation, between substantive offices at Headquarters, or between Headquarters and the rest of the United Nations system — in part because existing operational information systems policy formulation is scattered. Headquarters lacks a sufficiently strong responsibility centre for user-level IT strategy and policy in peace operations, in particular. In government or industry, such responsibility would rest with a “Chief Information Officer”. The Panel believes the United Nations needs someone at Headquarters, most usefully in EISAS, to play such a role, supervising development and implementation of IT strategy and user standards. He or she should also develop and oversee IT training programmes, both field manuals and hands-on training — the need for which is substantial and not to be underestimated. Counterparts in the SRSG’s office in each field mission should oversee implementation of the common IT strategy and supervise field training, both complementing and building on the work of FALD and the Information Technology Services Division (ITSD) in the Department of Management in providing basic IT structures and services. 251. Summary of key recommendation on information technology strategy and policy: Headquarters peace and security departments need a responsibility centre to devise and oversee the implementation of common information technology strategy and training for peace operations, residing in EISAS. Mission counterparts to that responsibility centre should also be appointed to43 A/55/305 S/2000/809 serve in the offices of the SRSGs in complex peace operations to oversee the implementation of that strategy. B. Tools for knowledge management 252. Technology can help to capture as well as disseminate information and experience. It could be much better utilized to help a wide variety of actors working in a United Nations mission’s area of operation to acquire and share data in a systematic and mutually supportive manner. United Nations development and humanitarian relief communities, for example, work in most of the places where the United Nations has deployed peace operations. These United Nations country teams, plus the NGOs that do complementary work at the grass-roots level, will have been in the region long before a complex peace operation arrives and will remain after it has left. Together, they hold a wealth of local knowledge and experience that could be helpful to peace operations planning and implementation. An electronic data clearing house, managed by EISAS to share this data, could assist mission planning and execution and also aid conflict prevention and assessment. Proper melding of these data and data gathered subsequent to deployment by the various components of a peace operation and their use with geographic information systems (GIS) could create powerful tools for tracking needs and problems in the mission area and for tracking the impact of action plans. GIS specialists should be assigned to every mission team, together with GIS training resources. 253. Current examples of GIS applications can be seen in the humanitarian and reconstruction work done in Kosovo since 1998. The Humanitarian Community Information Centre has pooled GIS data produced by such sources as the Western European Satellite Centre, the Geneva Centre for Humanitarian Demining, KFOR, the Yugoslav Institute of Statistics and the International Management Group. Those data have been combined to create an atlas that is available publicly on their web site, on CD-ROMs for those with slow or non-existent Internet access and in hard copy. 254. Computer simulations can be powerful learning tools for mission personnel and for the local parties. Simulations can, in principle, be created for any component of an operation. They can facilitate group problem-solving and reveal to local parties the sometimes unintended consequences of their policy choices. With appropriate broadband Internet links, simulations can be part of distance learning packages tailored to a new operation and used to pre-train new mission recruits. 255. An enhanced peace and security area on the United Nations Intranet (the Organization’s information network that is open to a specified set of users) would be a valuable addition to peace operations planning, analysis, and execution. A subset of the larger network, it would focus on drawing together issues and information that directly pertain to peace and security, including EISAS analyses, situation reports, GIS maps and linkages to lessons learned. Varying levels of security access could facilitate the sharing of sensitive information among restricted groups. 256. The data in the Intranet should be linked to a Peace Operations Extranet (POE) that would use existing and planned wide area network communications to link Headquarters databases in EISAS and the substantive offices with the field, and field missions with one another. POE could easily contain all administrative, procedural and legal information for peace operations, and could provide single-point access to information generated by many sources, give planners the ability to produce comprehensive reports more quickly and improve response time to emergency situations. 257. Some mission components, such as civilian police and related criminal justice units and human rights investigators, require added network security, as well as the hardware and software that can support the required levels of data storage, transmission and analysis. Two key technologies for civilian police are GIS and crime mapping software, used to convert raw data into geographical representations that illustrate crime trends and other key information, facilitate recognition of patterns of events, or highlight special features of problem areas, improving the ability of civilian police to fight crime or to advise their local counterparts. 258. Summary of key recommendations on information technology tools in peace operations: (a) EISAS, in cooperation with ITSD, should implement an enhanced peace operations element on the current United Nations Intranet and link it44 A/55/305 S/2000/809 to the missions through a Peace Operations Extranet (POE); (b) Peace operations could benefit greatly from more extensive use of geographic information systems (GIS) technology, which quickly integrates operational information with electronic maps of the mission area, for applications as diverse as demobilization, civilian policing, voter registration, human rights monitoring and reconstruction; (c) The IT needs of mission components with unique information technology needs, such as civilian police and human rights, should be anticipated and met more consistently in mission planning and implementation. C. Improving the timeliness of Internetbaase public information 259. As the Panel noted in section III above, effectively communicating the work of United Nations peace operations to the public is essential to creating and maintaining support for current and future missions. Not only is it essential to develop a positive image early on to promote a conducive working environment but it is also important to maintain a solid public information campaign to garner and retain support from the international community. 260. The body now officially responsible for communicating the work of United Nations peace operations is the Peace and Security Section of DPI in Headquarters, as discussed in section IV above. One person in DPI is responsible for the actual posting of all peace and security content on the web site, as well as for posting all mission inputs to the web, to ensure that information posted is consistent and compatible with Headquarters web standards. 261. The Panel endorses the application of standards but standardized need not mean centralized. The current process of news production and posting of data to the United Nations web site slows down the cycle of updates, yet daily updates could be important to a mission in a fast-moving situation. It also limits the amount of information that can be presented on each mission. 262. DPI and field staff have expressed interest in relieving this bottleneck through the development of a “web site co-management” model. This seems to the Panel to be an appropriate solution to this particular information bottleneck. 263. Summary of key recommendation on timeliness of Internet-based public information: the Panel encourages the development of web site comanaggemen by Headquarters and the field missions, in which Headquarters would maintain oversight but individual missions would have staff authorized to produce and post web content that conforms to basic presentational standards and policy. * * * 264. In the present report, the Panel has emphasized the need to change the structure and practices of the Organization in order to enable it to pursue more effectively its responsibilities in support of international peace and security and respect for human rights. Some of those changes would not be feasible without the new capacities that networked information technologies provide. The report itself would have been impossible to produce without the technologies already in place at United Nations Headquarters and accessible to members of the Panel in every region of the world. People use effective tools, and effective information technology could be much better utilized in the service of peace. VI. Challenges to implementation 265. The present report targets two groups in presenting its recommendations for reform: the Member States and the Secretariat. We recognize that reform will not occur unless Member States genuinely pursue it. At the same time, we believe that the changes we recommend for the Secretariat must be actively advanced by the Secretary-General and implemented by his senior staff. 266. Member States must recognize that the United Nations is the sum of its parts and accept that the primary responsibility for reform lies with them. The failures of the United Nations are not those of the Secretariat alone, or troop commanders or the leaders of field missions. Most occurred because the Security Council and the Member States crafted and supported ambiguous, inconsistent and under-funded mandates and then stood back and watched as they failed, sometimes even adding critical public commentary as45 A/55/305 S/2000/809 the credibility of the United Nations underwent its severest tests. 267. The problems of command and control that recently arose in Sierra Leone are the most recent illustration of what cannot be tolerated any longer. Troop contributors must ensure that the troops they provide fully understand the importance of an integrated chain of command, the operational control of the Secretary-General and the standard operating procedures and rules of engagement of the mission. It is essential that the chain of command in an operation be understood and respected, and the onus is on national capitals to refrain from instructing their contingent commanders on operational matters. 268. We are aware that the Secretary-General is implementing a comprehensive reform programme and realize that our recommendations may need to be adjusted to fit within this bigger picture. Furthermore, the reforms we have recommended for the Secretariat and the United Nations system in general will not be accomplished overnight, though some require urgent action. We recognize that there is a normal resistance to change in any bureaucracy, and are encouraged that some of the changes we have embraced as recommendations originate from within the system. We are also encouraged by the commitment of the Secretary-General to lead the Secretariat toward reform even if it means that long-standing organizational and procedural lines will have to be breached, and that aspects of the Secretariat’s priorities and culture will need to be challenged and changed. In this connection, we urge the Secretary-General to appoint a senior official with responsibility for overseeing the implementation of the recommendations contained in the present report. 269. The Secretary-General has consistently emphasized the need for the United Nations to reach out to civil society and to strengthen relations with non-governmental organizations, academic institutions and the media, who can be useful partners in the promotion of peace and security for all. We call on the Secretariat to take heed of the Secretary-General’s approach and implement it in its work in peace and security. We call on them to constantly keep in mind that the United Nations they serve is the universal organization. People everywhere are fully entitled to consider that it is their organization, and as such to pass judgement on its activities and the people who serve in it. 270. There is wide variation in quality among Secretariat staff supporting the peace and security functions in DPKO, DPA and the other departments concerned. This observation applies to the civilians recruited by the Secretariat as well as to the military and civilian police personnel proposed by Member States. These disparities are widely recognized by those in the system. Better performers are given unreasonable workloads to compensate for those who are less capable. Naturally, this can be bad for morale and can create resentment, particularly among those who rightly point out that the United Nations has not dedicated enough attention over the years to career development, training and mentoring or the institution of modern management practices. Put simply, the United Nations is far from being a meritocracy today, and unless it takes steps to become one it will not be able to reverse the alarming trend of qualified personnel, the young among them in particular, leaving the Organization. If the hiring, promotion and delegation of responsibility rely heavily on seniority or personal or political connections, qualified people will have no incentive to join the Organization or stay with it. Unless managers at all levels, beginning with the Secretary-General and his senior staff, seriously address this problem on a priority basis, reward excellence and remove incompetent staff, additional resources will be wasted and lasting reform will become impossible. 271. The same level of scrutiny should apply to United Nations personnel in the field missions. The majority of them embody the spirit of what it means to be an international civil servant, travelling to war-torn lands and dangerous environments to help improve the lives of the world’s most vulnerable communities. They do so with considerable personal sacrifice, and at times with great risks to their own physical safety and mental health. They deserve the world’s recognition and appreciation. Over the years, many of them have given their lives in the service of peace and we take this opportunity to honour their memory. 272. United Nations personnel in the field, perhaps more than any others, are obliged to respect local norms, culture and practices. They must go out of their way to demonstrate that respect, as a start, by getting to know their host environment and trying to learn as much of the local culture and language as they can. They must behave with the understanding that they are guests in someone else’s home, however destroyed that46 A/55/305 S/2000/809 home might be, particularly when the United Nations takes on a transitional administration role. And they must also treat one another with respect and dignity, with particular sensitivity towards gender and cultural differences. 273. In short, we believe that a very high standard should be maintained for the selection and conduct of personnel at Headquarters and in the field. When United Nations personnel fail to meet such standards, they should be held accountable. In the past, the Secretariat has had difficulty in holding senior officials in the field accountable for their performance because those officials could point to insufficient resources, unclear instructions or lack of appropriate command and control arrangements as the main impediments to successful implementation of a mission’s mandate. These deficiencies should be addressed but should not be allowed to offer cover to poor performers. The future of nations, the lives of those whom the United Nations has come to help and protect, the success of a mission and the credibility of the Organization can all hinge on what a few individuals do or fail to do. Anyone who turns out to be unsuited to the task that he or she has agreed to perform must be removed from a mission, no matter how high or how low they may be on the ladder. 274. Member States themselves acknowledge that they, too, need to reflect on their working culture and methods, at least as concerns the conduct of United Nations peace and security activities. The tradition of the recitation of statements, followed by a painstaking process of achieving consensus, places considerable emphasis on the diplomatic process over operational product. While one of the United Nations main virtues is that it provides a forum for 189 Member States to exchange views on pressing global issues, sometimes dialogue alone is not enough to ensure that billiondollla peacekeeping operations, vital conflict prevention measures or critical peacemaking efforts succeed in the face of great odds. Expressions of general support in the form of statements and resolutions must be followed up with tangible action. 275. Moreover, Member States may send conflicting messages regarding the actions they advocate, with their representatives voicing political support in one body but denying financial support in another. Such inconsistencies have appeared between the Fifth Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Matters on the one hand, and the Security Council and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations on the other. 276. On the political level, many of the local parties with whom peacekeepers and peacemakers are dealing on a daily basis may neither respect nor fear verbal condemnation by the Security Council. It is therefore incumbent that Council members and the membership at large breathe life into the words that they produce, as did the Security Council delegation that flew to Jakarta and Dili in the wake of the East Timor crisis last year, an example of effective Council action at its best: res, non verba. 277. Meanwhile, the financial constraints under which the United Nations labours continue to cause serious damage to its ability to conduct peace operations in a credible and professional manner. We therefore urge that Member States uphold their treaty obligations and pay their dues in full, on time and without condition. 278. We are also aware that there are other issues which, directly or indirectly, hamper effective United Nations action in the field of peace and security, including two unresolved issues that are beyond the scope of the Panel’s mandate but critical to peace operations and that only the Member States can address. They are the disagreements about how assessments in support of peacekeeping operations are apportioned and about equitable representation on the Security Council. We can only hope that the Member States will find a way to resolve their differences on these issues in the interests of upholding their collective international responsibility as prescribed in the Charter. 279. We call on the leaders of the world assembled at the Millennium Summit, as they renew their commitment to the ideals of the United Nations, to commit as well to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to fully accomplish the mission which is, indeed, its very raison d’être: to help communities engulfed in strife and to maintain or restore peace. 280. While building consensus for the recommendations in the present report, we — the members of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations — have also come to a shared vision of a United Nations, extending a strong helping hand to a community, country or region to avert conflict or to end violence. We see an SRSG ending a mission well accomplished, having given the people of a country the opportunity to do for themselves what they could not47 A/55/305 S/2000/809 do before: to build and hold onto peace, to find reconciliation, to strengthen democracy, to secure human rights. We see, above all, a United Nations that has not only the will but also the ability to fulfil its great promise and to justify the confidence and trust placed in it by the overwhelming majority of humankind.48 A/55/305 S/2000/809 Annex I Members of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations Mr. J. Brian Atwood (United States), President, Citizens International; former President, National Democratic Institute; former Administrator, United States Agency for International Development. Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria), former Foreign Minister; Chairman of the Panel. Ambassador Colin Granderson (Trinidad and Tobago), Executive Director of Organization of American States (OAS)/United Nations International Civilian Mission in Haiti, 1993-2000; head of OAS election observation missions in Haiti (1995 and 1997) and Suriname (2000). Dame Ann Hercus (New Zealand), former Cabinet Minister and Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United Nations; Head of Mission of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), 1998-1999. Mr. Richard Monk (United Kingdom), former member of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Government adviser on international policing matters; Commissioner of the United Nations International Police Task Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1998-1999. General (ret.) Klaus Naumann (Germany), Chief of Defence, 1991-1996; Chairman of the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1996-1999, with oversight responsibility for NATO Implementation Force/Stabilization Force operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the NATO Kosovo air campaign. Ms. Hisako Shimura (Japan), President of Tsuda College, Tokyo; served for 24 years in the United Nations Secretariat, retiring from United Nations service in 1995 as Director, Europe and Latin America Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Ambassador Vladimir Shustov (Russian Federation), Ambassador at large, with 30 years association with the United Nations; former Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York; former representative of the Russian Federation to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. General Philip Sibanda (Zimbabwe), Chief of Staff, Operations and Training, Zimbabwe Army Headquarters, Harare; former Force Commander of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) and the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), 1995-1998. Dr. Cornelio Sommaruga (Switzerland), President of the Foundation of Moral Rearmament, Caux, and of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining; former President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 1987-1999. * * *49 A/55/305 S/2000/809 Office of the Chairman of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations Dr. William Durch, Senior Associate, Henry L. Stimson Center; Project Director Mr. Salman Ahmed, Political Affairs Officer, United Nations Secretariat Ms. Clare Kane, Personal Assistant, United Nations Secretariat Ms. Caroline Earle, Research Associate, Stimson Center Mr. J. Edward Palmisano, Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow, Stimson Center50 A/55/305 S/2000/809 Annex II References United Nations documents Annan, Kofi A. Preventing war and disaster: a growing global challenge. Annual report on the work of the Organization, 1999. (A/54/1) ________ Partnerships for global community. Annual report on the work of the Organization, 1998. (A/53/1) ________ Facing the humanitarian challenge: towards a culture of prevention. (ST/DPI/2070) ________ We the peoples: the role of the United Nations in the twenty-first century. The Millennium Report. (A/54/2000) Economic and Social Council: Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services entitled “In-depth evaluation of peacekeeping operations: start-up phase”. (E/AC.51/1995/2 and Corr.1) ________ Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services entitled “In-depth evaluation of peacekeeping operations: termination phase”. (E/AC.51/1996/3 and Corr.1) ________ Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services entitled “Triennial review of the implementation of the recommendations made by the Committee for Programme and Coordination at its thirty-fifth session on the evaluation of peacekeeping operations: start-up phase”. (E/AC.51/1998/4 and Corr.1) ________ Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services entitled “Triennial review of the implementation of the recommendations made by the Committee for Programme and Coordination at its thirty-sixth session on the evaluation of peacekeeping operations: termination phase”. (E/AC.51/1999/5) General Assembly. Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the review of the Field Administration and Logistics Division, Department of Peacekeeping Operations. (A/49/959) ________ Report of the Secretary-General entitled “Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform”. (A/51/950) ________ Report of the Secretary-General on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa. (A/52/871) ________ Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. (A/54/87 and Corr.1) ________ Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the audit of the management of service and ration contracts in peacekeeping missions. (A/54/335) ________ Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the annual report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services for the period 1 July 1998 to 30 June 1999. (A/54/393) ________ Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict entitled “Protection of children affected by armed conflict”. (A/54/430) ________ Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/55, entitled “The fall of Srebrenica”. (A/54/549) ________ Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. (A/54/839) ________ Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. (A/54/670) General Assembly and Security Council. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, entitled “An Agenda for Peace: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping”. (A/47/277-S/24111)51 A/55/305 S/2000/809 ________ Position paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, entitled “Supplement to an Agenda for Peace”. (A/50/60-S/1995/1) ________ Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict. (A/55/163-S/2000/712) Security Council. Report of the Secretary-General on protection for humanitarian assistance to refugees and others in conflict situations. (S/1998/883) ________ Report of the Secretary-General on the enhancement of African peacekeeping capacity. (S/1999/171) ________ Progress report of the Secretary-General on standby arrangements for peacekeeping. (S/1999/361) ________ Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. (S/1999/957) ________ Letter dated 15 December 1999 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, enclosing the report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. (S/1999/1257) ________ Report of the Secretary-General on the role of United Nations peacekeeping in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. (S/2000/101) Letter dated 10 March 2000 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning the situation in Angola addressed to the President of the Security Council, enclosing the report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions against UNITA. (S/2000/203) Secretary-General’s press release. Statement made by the Secretary-General at Georgetown University. (SG/SM/6901) Secretary-General’s Bulletin. Observance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian law. (ST/SGB/1999/13) United Nations Development Programme. Governance foundations for post-conflict situations: UNDP’s experience. Discussion paper prepared by the UNDP Management Development and Governance Division, January 2000. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Annual appeal 2000: overview of activities and financial requirements. Geneva. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Catalogue of emergency response tools. Document prepared by the Emergency Preparedness and Response Section. Geneva, 2000. United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), Institute of Policy Studies of Singapore (IPS) and National Institute for Research Advancement of Japan. Report of the 1997 Singapore Conference: humanitarian action and peacekeeping operations. New York, 1997. UNITAR, IPS and Japan Institute of International Affairs. The nexus between peacekeeping and peace-building: debriefing and lessons. Draft report of the 1999 Singapore Conference. New York, 2000. Goulding, Marrack. Practical measures to enhance the United Nations effectiveness in the field of peace and security. Report submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. New York, 30 June 1997. Other sources Berdal, Mats, and David M. Malone, eds. Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000. Berman, Eric G., and Katie E. Sams. Peacekeeping in Africa: capabilities and culpabilities. (UNIDIR/2000/3) Bigombe, Betty, Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis. Policies for building post-conflict peace. Paper presented at an ad hoc expert group meeting on the economics of civil conflicts in Africa, 7 and 8 April 2000, organized by the Economic Commission for Africa. Blechman, Barry M., William J. Durch, Wendy Eaton and Julie Werbel. Effective transitions from peace operations to sustainable peace: final report. DFI International, Washington, D.C., September 1997. Childers, Erskine, and Brian Urquhart. Towards a More Effective United Nations: Two Studies. Uppsala, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1992.52 A/55/305 S/2000/809 Collier, Paul. Economic causes of civil conflict and their implications for policy. In Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, Managing Global Chaos. Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace, forthcoming. Cousens, Elizabeth M., Donald Rothchild and Stephen John Stedman, eds. Ending Civil Wars, vol. II, Evaluating Peace Implementation. New York, Center for International Security and Cooperation of Stanford University and International Peace Academy, forthcoming. DeSoto, Alvaro, and Graciana del Castillo. Implementation of comprehensive peace agreements: staying the course in El Salvador. Global Governance, vol. 1, No. 2 (May-June 1995). Doyle, Michael W., and Nicholas Sambanis. International peace-building: a theoretical and quantitative analysis. Paper presented at a conference of the Center of International Studies and the World Bank, Princeton University, 17 and 18 March 2000. Fafo Programme for International Cooperation and Conflict Resolution. Command from the saddle: managing United Nations peace-building missions. Recommendations report of a forum on special representatives of the Secretary-General on the theme “Shaping the United Nations role in peace implementation”. Oslo, Peace Implementation Network, 1999. Fainberg, Anthony, Alan Shaw, Dean Cheng, Xavier Maruyama and Donald Gallagher. Technology for international peace operations. Washington, D.C., Institute for Technology Assessment, March 1998. Forman, Shepard, Stewart Patrick and Dirk Salomons. Recovering from conflict: strategy for an international response. New York University, Center on International Cooperation, February 2000. Government of Canada. Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations. Ottawa, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and Department of National Defence, 1995. Griffin, Michèle and Bruce Jones. Building peace through transitional authority: new directions, major challenges. International Peacekeeping, vol. 7, No. 3 (Summer 2000). Henkin, Alice H., ed. Honouring Human Rights and Keeping the Peace: Lessons from El Salvador, Cambodia and Haiti. Washington, D.C., Aspen Institute, 1995. ________ Honouring Human Rights, from Peace to Justice: Recommendations to the International Community. Summary edition of Henkin, op. cit., Washington, D.C., Aspen Institute, 1999. Holm, Tor Tanke, and Espen Barth Eide, eds. Peacebuilding and Police Reform. International Peacekeeping, vol. 6, No. 4 (Special issue, Winter 1999). Humanitarian Community Information Centre, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat. Kosovo atlas. Pristina, February 2000. Jett, Dennis C. Why Peacekeeping Fails. New York, St. Martin’s Press, 2000. Latter, Richard. Monitoring and verifying peace agreements. Report based on a Wilton Park conference 597 on the monitoring and verification of peace agreements, 24-26 March 2000, April 2000. Lehman, Ingrid A. Peacekeeping and Public Information: Caught in the Crossfire. London, Frank Cass, 1999. Lord Christopher. Advisory note for Stimson Center/United Nations Panel on Peace Operations. Prague, Prague Project on Emergency Criminal Justice Principles, Institute of International Relations, 27 June 2000. Moore, Jonathan, ed. Hard Choices. Lanham, Maryland, Rowman and Littlefield for the International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1998. Plunkett, Mark. Justice re-establishment in United Nations peacekeeping: methods and techniques for the re-establishment of the rule of law in United Nations peace operations. 18 April 2000. Salerno, Reynolds M., Michael G. Vannoni, David S. Barber, Randall R. Parish and Rebecca L.53 A/55/305 S/2000/809 Frerichs. Enhanced peacekeeping with monitoring technologies. Sandia report. Albuquerque, Sandia National Laboratories, 2000. Smillie, Ian, Lansana Gberie and Ralph Hazleton. The heart of the matter: Sierra Leone, diamonds and human security. Ottawa, Partnership Africa Canada, January 2000. Stedman, Stephen John. Spoiler problems in peace processes. International Security, vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997). Stewart, Frances and A. Berry. The real causes of inequality. Challenge, vol. 43, No. 1 (2000). Stewart, Frances, Frank P. Humphreys and Nick Lee. Civil conflict in developing countries over the last quarter of a century: an empirical overview of economic and social consequences. Oxford Journal of Development Studies, vol. 25, No. 1 (February 1997). Thant, Myint-U and Elizabeth Sellwood. Knowledge and Multilateral Interventions: The United Nations Experiences in Cambodia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Royal Institute of International Affairs Discussion Paper, No. 83. London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000. Wallensteen, Peter, and Margareta Sollenberg. Armed conflict and regional conflict complexes, 1989-1997. Journal of Peace Research, vol. 35, No. 5 (1998). World Bank Institute and Interworks. The Transition from War to Peace: An Overview. Washington, D.C., 1999.54 A/55/305 S/2000/809 Annex III Summary of recommendations 1. Preventive action: (a) The Panel endorses the recommendations of the Secretary-General with respect to conflict prevention contained in the Millennium Report and in his remarks before the Security Council’s second open meeting on conflict prevention in July 2000, in particular his appeal to “all who are engaged in conflict prevention and development — the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, Governments and civil society organizations — [to] address these challenges in a more integrated fashion”; (b) The Panel supports the Secretary-General’s more frequent use of fact-finding missions to areas of tension, and stresses Member States’ obligations, under Article 2(5) of the Charter, to give “every assistance” to such activities of the United Nations. 2. Peace-building strategy: (a) A small percentage of a mission’s first-year budget should be made available to the representative or special representative of the Secretary-General leading the mission to fund quick impact projects in its area of operations, with the advice of the United Nations country team’s resident coordinator; (b) The Panel recommends a doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police, other rule of law elements and human rights experts in complex peace operations to reflect an increased focus on strengthening rule of law institutions and improving respect for human rights in post-conflict environments; (c) The Panel recommends that the legislative bodies consider bringing demobilization and reintegration programmes into the assessed budgets of complex peace operations for the first phase of an operation in order to facilitate the rapid disassembly of fighting factions and reduce the likelihood of resumed conflict; (d) The Panel recommends that the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) discuss and recommend to the Secretary-General a plan to strengthen the permanent capacity of the United Nations to develop peace-building strategies and to implement programmes in support of those strategies. 3. Peacekeeping doctrine and strategy: once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandates professionally and successfully and be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission’s mandate, with robust rules of engagement, against those who renege on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence. 4. Clear, credible and achievable mandates: (a) The Panel recommends that, before the Security Council agrees to implement a ceasefire or peace agreement with a United Nations-led peacekeeping operation, the Council assure itself that the agreement meets threshold conditions, such as consistency with international human rights standards and practicability of specified tasks and timelines; (b) The Security Council should leave in draft form resolutions authorizing missions with sizeable troop levels until such time as the Secretary-General has firm commitments of troops and other critical mission support elements, including peace-building elements, from Member States; (c) Security Council resolutions should meet the requirements of peacekeeping operations when they deploy into potentially dangerous situations, especially the need for a clear chain of command and unity of effort;(d) The Secretariat must tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear, when formulating or changing mission mandates, and countries that have committed military units to an operation should have access to Secretariat briefings to the Council on matters affecting the safety and security of their personnel, especially those meetings with implications for a mission’s use of force. 5. Information and strategic analysis: the Secretary-General should establish an entity, referred to here as the ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS), which would support the information and analysis needs of all members of ECPS; for management purposes, it should be administered by and report jointly to the heads of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).55 A/55/305 S/2000/809 6. Transitional civil administration: the Panel recommends that the Secretary-General invite a panel of international legal experts, including individuals with experience in United Nations operations that have transitional administration mandates, to evaluate the feasibility and utility of developing an interim criminal code, including any regional adaptations potentially required, for use by such operations pending the reestabllishmen of local rule of law and local law enforcement capacity. 7. Determining deployment timelines: the United Nations should define “rapid and effective deployment capacities” as the ability, from an operational perspective, to fully deploy traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days after the adoption of a Security Council resolution, and within 90 days in the case of complex peacekeeping operations. 8. Mission leadership: (a) The Secretary-General should systematize the method of selecting mission leaders, beginning with the compilation of a comprehensive list of potential representatives or special representatives of the Secretary-General, force commanders, civilian police commissioners, and their deputies and other heads of substantive and administrative components, within a fair geographic and gender distribution and with input from Member States; (b) The entire leadership of a mission should be selected and assembled at Headquarters as early as possible in order to enable their participation in key aspects of the mission planning process, for briefings on the situation in the mission area and to meet and work with their colleagues in mission leadership; (c) The Secretariat should routinely provide the mission leadership with strategic guidance and plans for anticipating and overcoming challenges to mandate implementation, and whenever possible should formulate such guidance and plans together with the mission leadership. 9. Military personnel: (a) Member States should be encouraged, where appropriate, to enter into partnerships with one another, within the context of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS), to form several coherent brigade-size forces, with necessary enabling forces, ready for effective deployment within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing a traditional peacekeeping operation and within 90 days for complex peacekeeping operations; (b) The Secretary-General should be given the authority to formally canvass Member States participating in UNSAS regarding their willingness to contribute troops to a potential operation, once it appeared likely that a ceasefire accord or agreement envisaging an implementing role for the United Nations, might be reached; (c) The Secretariat should, as a standard practice, send a team to confirm the preparedness of each potential troop contributor to meet the provisions of the memoranda of understanding on the requisite training and equipment requirements, prior to deployment; those that do not meet the requirements must not deploy; (d) The Panel recommends that a revolving “on-call list” of about 100 military officers be created in UNSAS to be available on seven days’ notice to augment nuclei of DPKO planners with teams trained to create a mission headquarters for a new peacekeeping operation. 10. Civilian police personnel: (a) Member States are encouraged to each establish a national pool of civilian police officers that would be ready for deployment to United Nations peace operations on short notice, within the context of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System; (b) Member States are encouraged to enter into regional training partnerships for civilian police in the respective national pools, to promote a common level of preparedness in accordance with guidelines, standard operating procedures and performance standards to be promulgated by the United Nations; (c) Members States are encouraged to designate a single point of contact within their governmental structures for the provision of civilian police to United Nations peace operations; (d) The Panel recommends that a revolving on-call list of about 100 police officers and related experts be created in UNSAS to be available on seven days’ notice with teams trained to create the civilian police component of a new peacekeeping operation, train incoming personnel and give the component greater coherence at an early date;56 A/55/305 S/2000/809 (e) The Panel recommends that parallel arrangements to recommendations (a), (b) and (c) above be established for judicial, penal, human rights and other relevant specialists, who with specialist civilian police will make up collegial “rule of law” teams. 11. Civilian specialists: (a) The Secretariat should establish a central Internet/Intranet-based roster of pre-selected civilian candidates available to deploy to peace operations on short notice. The field missions should be granted access to and delegated authority to recruit candidates from it, in accordance with guidelines on fair geographic and gender distribution to be promulgated by the Secretariat; (b) The Field Service category of personnel should be reformed to mirror the recurrent demands faced by all peace operations, especially at the mid-to senior-levels in the administrative and logistics areas; (c) Conditions of service for externally recruited civilian staff should be revised to enable the United Nations to attract the most highly qualified candidates, and to then offer those who have served with distinction greater career prospects; (d) DPKO should formulate a comprehensive staffing strategy for peace operations, outlining, among other issues, the use of United Nations Volunteers, standby arrangements for the provision of civilian personnel on 72 hours' notice to facilitate mission startuup and the divisions of responsibility among the members of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security for implementing that strategy. 12. Rapidly deployable capacity for public information: additional resources should be devoted in mission budgets to public information and the associated personnel and information technology required to get an operation’s message out and build effective internal communications links. 13. Logistics support and expenditure management: (a) The Secretariat should prepare a global logistics support strategy to enable rapid and effective mission deployment within the timelines proposed and corresponding to planning assumptions established by the substantive offices of DPKO; (b) The General Assembly should authorize and approve a one-time expenditure to maintain at least five mission start-up kits in Brindisi, which should include rapidly deployable communications equipment. These start-up kits should then be routinely replenished with funding from the assessed contributions to the operations that drew on them; (c) The Secretary-General should be given authority to draw up to US$50 million from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, once it became clear that an operation was likely to be established, with the approval of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) but prior to the adoption of a Security Council resolution; (d) The Secretariat should undertake a review of the entire procurement policies and procedures (with proposals to the General Assembly for amendments to the Financial Rules and Regulations, as required), to facilitate in particular the rapid and full deployment of an operation within the proposed timelines; (e) The Secretariat should conduct a review of the policies and procedures governing the management of financial resources in the field missions with a view to providing field missions with much greater flexibility in the management of their budgets; (f) The Secretariat should increase the level of procurement authority delegated to the field missions (from $200,000 to as high as $1 million, depending on mission size and needs) for all goods and services that are available locally and are not covered under systems contracts or standing commercial services contracts. 14. Funding Headquarters support for peacekeeping operations: (a) The Panel recommends a substantial increase in resources for Headquarters support of peacekeeping operations, and urges the Secretary-General to submit a proposal to the General Assembly outlining his requirements in full; (b) Headquarters support for peacekeeping should be treated as a core activity of the United Nations, and as such the majority of its resource requirements for this purpose should be funded through the mechanism of the regular biennial programme budget of the Organization; (c) Pending the preparation of the next regular budget submission, the Panel recommends that the57 A/55/305 S/2000/809 Secretary-General approach the General Assembly with a request for an emergency supplemental increase to the Support Account to allow immediate recruitment of additional personnel, particularly in DPKO. 15. Integrated mission planning and support: Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs), with members seconded from throughout the United Nations system, as necessary, should be the standard vehicle for mission-specific planning and support. IMTFs should serve as the first point of contact for all such support, and IMTF leaders should have temporary line authority over seconded personnel, in accordance with agreements between DPKO, DPA and other contributing departments, programmes, funds and agencies. 16. Other structural adjustments in DPKO: (a) The current Military and Civilian Police Division should be restructured, moving the Civilian Police Unit out of the military reporting chain. Consideration should be given to upgrading the rank and level of the Civilian Police Adviser; (b) The Military Adviser’s Office in DPKO should be restructured to correspond more closely to the way in which the military field headquarters in United Nations peacekeeping operations are structured; (c) A new unit should be established in DPKO and staffed with the relevant expertise for the provision of advice on criminal law issues that are critical to the effective use of civilian police in the United Nations peace operations; (d) The Under-Secretary-General for Management should delegate authority and responsibility for peacekeeping-related budgeting and procurement functions to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations for a two-year trial period; (e) The Lessons Learned Unit should be substantially enhanced and moved into a revamped DPKO Office of Operations; (f) Consideration should be given to increasing the number of Assistant Secretaries-General in DPKO from two to three, with one of the three designated as the “Principal Assistant Secretary-General” and functioning as the deputy to the Under-Secretary-General. 17. Operational support for public information: a unit for operational planning and support of public information in peace operations should be established, either within DPKO or within a new Peace and Security Information Service in the Department of Public Information (DPI) reporting directly to the Under-Secretary-General for Communication and Public Information. 18. Peace-building support in the Department of Political Affairs: (a) The Panel supports the Secretariat’s effort to create a pilot Peace-building Unit within DPA, in cooperation with other integral United Nations elements, and suggests that regular budgetary support for this unit be revisited by the membership if the pilot programme works well. This programme should be evaluated in the context of guidance the Panel has provided in paragraph 46 above, and if considered the best available option for strengthening United Nations peace-building capacity it should be presented to the Secretary-General within the context of the Panel’s recommendation contained in paragraph 47 (d) above; (b) The Panel recommends that regular budget resources for Electoral Assistance Division programmatic expenses be substantially increased to meet the rapidly growing demand for its services, in lieu of voluntary contributions; (c) To relieve demand on the Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD) and the executive office of DPA, and to improve support services rendered to smaller political and peacebuilldin field offices, the Panel recommends that procurement, logistics, staff recruitment and other support services for all such smaller, non-military field missions be provided by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). 19. Peace operations support in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: the Panel recommends substantially enhancing the field mission planning and preparation capacity of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, with funding partly from the regular budget and partly from peace operations mission budgets. 20. Peace operations and the information age: (a) Headquarters peace and security departments need a responsibility centre to devise and58 A/55/305 S/2000/809 oversee the implementation of common information technology strategy and training for peace operations, residing in EISAS. Mission counterparts to the responsibility centre should also be appointed to serve in the offices of the special representatives of the Secretary-General in complex peace operations to oversee the implementation of that strategy; (b) EISAS, in cooperation with the Information Technology Services Division (ITSD), should implement an enhanced peace operations element on the current United Nations Intranet and link it to the missions through a Peace Operations Extranet (POE); (c) Peace operations could benefit greatly from more extensive use of geographic information systems (GIS) technology, which quickly integrates operational information with electronic maps of the mission area, for applications as diverse as demobilization, civilian policing, voter registration, human rights monitoring and reconstruction; (d) The IT needs of mission components with unique information technology needs, such as civilian police and human rights, should be anticipated and met more consistently in mission planning and implementation; (e) The Panel encourages the development of web site co-management by Headquarters and the field missions, in which Headquarters would maintain oversight but individual missions would have staff authorized to produce and post web content that conforms to basic presentational standards and policy.联合国 A/55/305–S/2000/809 大 会 安全理事会 Distr.: General 21 August 2000 Chinese Original: English 00-59469 (C) 180800 180800 大 会 安全理事会 第五十五届会议 第五十五年 临时议程 项目87 整个维持和平行动问题所有方面的全盘审查 2000 年8 月21 日秘书长给大会主席和安全理事会主席的同文信 2000年3月7日我召集举行了高级别小组会议目的是对联合国的和平与安全活动进行彻底的审查并提出一套可帮助联合国在今后更好地从事这些活动的清楚明确具体而切实的建议我请阿尔及利亚前外交部长拉赫达尔卜拉希米先生主持该小组的工作该小组成员包括来自世界各地的下列知名人士他们在维持和平建设和平发展和人道主义援助等领域有着广泛的经验布赖恩阿特伍德先生科林格兰德森大使安赫克斯女士理查德蒙克先生克劳斯瑙曼将军已退役志村尚子女士弗拉基米尔舒斯托夫大使菲利普西班达将军和科尔内利奥索马鲁加博士 本文件所附2000 年8 月17 日该小组主席的来函中转递了该小组的报告请将该报告提请各会员国注意为荷该小组的分析是坦率而又公正的其各项建议含意深远而又合乎情理和切合实际我认为该小组各项建议的迅速实施对于使联合国真正具备作为和平力量的信誉而言极其重要 该小组的许多建议涉及完全属秘书长权限范围的事项而其余建议则需要联合国各立法机构的批准和支持我敦促所有会员国同我一起审查批准和支持这些建议的实施在这方面我要高兴地通知你我已指定常务副秘书长负责落实该报告的建议并指导制订一份详细的实施计划我将把这份计划提交给大会和安全理事会 A/55/150 ii A/55/305 S/2000/809 我非常希望该小组的建议尤其是其执行摘要能受到将于2000 年9 月来纽约参加千年首脑会议的所有领导人的注意这次历史性的高级别会议提供了一个独特的机会使我们能够开启一个振兴联合国营造和建设和平的能力的进程我请大会和安全理事会提供支持将该报告所确立的含意深远的议程转变为现实 科菲安南(签名) iii A/55/305 S/2000/809 2000 年8 月17 日 联合国和平行动问题小组主席给秘书长的信 联合国和平行动问题小组2000 年3 月蒙你召集很荣幸接受你的请求对联合国有效执行维持和平行动的能力进行评价并就提高这种能力的方式提出坦率明确与切实的建议 布赖恩阿特伍德先生科林格兰代森大使安赫克斯女士理查德蒙克先生克劳斯瑙曼退役将军志村尚子女士符拉基米尔舒斯托夫大使菲利普西班达将军科尔内利奥索马鲁加博士和我因对你满怀敬意而且我们每一个人都坚信联合国系统在和平事业中可以做得更好所以接受了这项挑战先前对联合国在卢旺达和斯雷布雷尼察行动所做的尖锐批评分析你愿意接受我们非常钦佩这种高度的自我批评对任何大组织来说都是罕见的对联合国来说更是罕见 我们也要赞扬常务副秘书长路易斯弗雷谢特和主任伊克巴尔里扎他们自始至终列席我们的会议不厌其烦而又清楚明白地回答了我们提出的许多问题他们在我们身上了花了很多时间他们对联合国目前的局限与未来的要求的深刻了解也使我们受益匪浅 仅在短短的4 个月里对像联合国和平行动这样广泛而复杂的系统改革提出评论和建议是项极其艰巨的任务若非威廉杜尔博士在克史汀生中心工作人员的支持下和联合国的萨勒曼艾哈迈德先生全力以赴辛勤工作若非联合国整个系统的官员包括各特派团现任团长在约谈中以及常常是在对其组织及其经验所做的全面批评中道出他们的深知卓见这项任务就不可能完成和平行动先前领导人和部队指挥官学者和非政府组织代表也给予了同样的帮助 本小组进行了激烈的讨论和辩论一连数小时地审议各项建议和论证分析我们都清楚它们都需要详细的检查与阐释我们分别在纽约日内瓦和纽约举行了三次为期3 天的会议然后才形成了所附报告的文字与精神报告的分析及建议反映了我们要向你传达的共同意见希望它有助于系统改革和革新联合国这一核心职能的事业 如我们在报告中所说我们知道你在忙着全面改革秘书处因此我们希望我们的建议如有必要在稍加调整后就可以纳入这一更广泛的改革过程中我们明白我们的所有建议不可能一夜之间都得到落实但其中有许多项确实要求采取紧急行动需要各会员国予以明确支持 这几个月来我们看到了也听到了南方北方大大小小会员国激励的文字鼓励的话都强调必需紧急改进联合国处理冲突局势的方式我们促请它们果断行动将需要它们采取正式行动的建议付诸实施 iv A/55/305 S/2000/809 本小组绝对相信我们建议你任命监督秘书处和各会员国执行我们建议的官员会得到你的充分支持这是合乎你的信念的即想要把联合国改造成能有效对付世界和平当前和今后所面临的威胁而必须成为的一个二十一世纪的机构 最后如果可以让我说几句个人的话我要对本小组的每一位同事表达最深切的谢意他们一道为本项目提供了大量的知识与经验始终表现出了对本组织的最大承诺和对本组织需要的深刻理解无论是在我们的会议上还是远距离的接触同事们都一直对我极好总是欣然相助耐心而慷慨因此身为主席我也觉得这项否则令人害怕的工作比较容易做了做起来也真正有了乐趣 联合国和平行动问题小组主席 拉赫达尔卜拉希米签字 v A/55/305 S/2000/809 联合国和平行动问题小组的报告 目录 章次 段次 页次 执行摘要.................................................. .................. viii 一. 需要改变.... .................................................. ..... 1-8 1 二. 和平行动的学说战略和决策......................................... 9-83 2 A. 确定和平行动的要素.............................................. 10-14 2 B 过去的经验.................................................. .... 15-28 2 C. 对预防行动的影响................................................ 29-34 4 关于预防行动的主要建议摘要...................................... 34 5 D 对建设和平战略的影响............................................ 35-47 5 关于建设和平的主要建议的摘要..................................... 47 7 E. 对维持和平原则和战略的影响...................................... 48-55 7 维持和平原则和战略的主要建议摘要................................. 55 8 F. 明确可靠和可以完成的任务...................................... 56-64 8 关于明确可靠和可以完成的任务的主要建议摘要..................... 64 9 G. 信息的收集分析和战略规划能力.................................. 65-75 10 信息和战略分析关键建议摘要...................................... 75 11 H. 过渡时期民政管理面临的挑战...................................... 76-83 11 过渡时期民政管理关键建议摘要小组建议............................. 83 12 三. 联合国迅速有效部署行动的能力....................................... 84-169 12 A 界定迅速和有效部署的涵义.................................... 86-91 12 关于决定部署时间表的重要建议摘要................................. 91 13 B 特派团的有效领导................................................ 92-101 13 关于特派团领导的重要建议摘要..................................... 101 14 C. 军事人员.................................................. ...... 102-117 14 vi A/55/305 S/2000/809 目录(续) 章次 段次 页次 关于军事人员的重要建议摘要...................................... 117 16 D. 民警........................................................ ..... 118-126 17 关于民警人员的重要建议摘要...................................... 126 18 E. 文职专家.................................................. ....... 127-145 18 1. 缺乏待命系统以回应突然或暴增的需求............................ 128-132 18 2. 吸引和留住最佳外聘人员的困难.................................. 133-135 19 3. 担任中级和高级行政和支助职务的人员不足........................ 136 19 4. 有害无益的外地部署........................................... 137-138 20 5. 外勤业务类别的陈旧性...................................... 139-140 20 6. 和平行动缺乏员额配置通盘战略.................................. 141-144 20 关于文职专家的重要建议摘要...................................... 145 21 F. 新闻能力.................................................. ...... 146-150 21 关于快速部署新闻能力的重要建议摘要............................... 150 22 G. 后勤支助采购过程及开支的管理.................................. 151-169 22 关于后勤支助与开支管理的重要建议摘要............................. 169 24 四. 总部用来规划和支持维持和平行动的资源和结构......................... 170-245 24 A. 总部支持维持和平行动的人员编制水平和供资情况.................... 172-197 24 关于为总部维和行动支助工作供资的主要建议摘要..................... 197 29 B 关于建立特派团综合工作队的必要和建议............................ 198-217 29 有关特派团综合规划和支助工作的重要建议摘要....................... 217 31 C 维持和平部所需的其他结构调整.................................... 218-233 32 1 军事和民警司................................................. 219-225 32 2 外地行政和后勤司............................................. 226-228 33 3 总结经验股.................................................. . 229-230 33 4. 高级管理层.................................................. . 231-232 33 vii A/55/305 S/2000/809 目录(续) 章次 段次 页次 关于维和部其他结构调整的重要建议摘要............................. 233 33 D 维持和平行动部以外所需的结构调整................................ 234-245 34 1 对新闻工作的行动支助......................................... 235-238 34 有关新闻工作结构调整的重要建议摘要............................ 238 34 2 政治事务部的建设和平支助工作.................................. 239-243 34 有关政治事务部建设和平支助工作的重要建议摘要.................. 243 35 3 联合国人权事务高级专员办事处的和平行动支助.................... 244-245 35 有关加强联合国人权事务高级专员办事处的重要建议摘要............ 245 35 五. 和平行动和信息时代................................................. 246-264 35 A. 和平行动的信息技术战略和政策问题.............................. 247-251 35 信息技术战略和政策的建议摘要..................................... 251 36 B 知识管理工具.................................................. .. 252-258 36 关于和平行动信息技术工具的关键建议摘要........................... 258 37 C 改善互网新闻的及时性............................................ 259-264 37 关于互联网新闻及时性的关键建议摘要............................... 263 37 六. 执行方面的挑战.................................................. ... 265-280 38 附件 一. 联合国和平行动问题小组成员.................................................. 40 二. 参考资料.................................................. .................. 42 三. 建议摘要.................................................. .................. 46 viii A/55/305 S/2000/809 执行摘要 正如联合国宪章所言建立联合国是为了预免后世再遭战祸迎接这一挑战是联合国最重要的职能而且在很大程度上是它所服务的人民对其加以评判的尺度在过去十年中联合国屡次未能应对该挑战而且它现在的表现也未见改善如果会员国不能重新作出承诺不进行重大的体制改革又不增加财政支助那么联合国将无法执行会员国今后交给它的维持和平和建设和平的重要任务有许多任务不应要求联合国维持和平部队来承担而且许多地方他们也不应前往但是一旦联合国派遣其部队去维持和平他们就必须有准备地面对难以清除的战争和暴力势力并有能力和决心打败它们 秘书长请联合国和平行动问题小组评析现行体制的缺点并就改革该体制提出坦率具体和现实的建议本小组的成员在预防冲突维持和平和建设和平等方面具有丰富的经验我们的建议不仅集中于政治和战略方面而且更集中于需要改进的业务和组织领域的问题 要使预防性的主动行动成功地缓和紧张局势并避免冲突秘书长需要从会员国得到清楚有力和持续的政治支持此外联合国在过去十年中屡次痛苦地发现要想使维和行动特别是复杂的维和行动获得成功必须要有显示可信力量的根本能力这种能力是多少良好意图都无法替代的但是单靠显示力量还不能建立和平它只能建立一个可供建设和平的空间除此而外除非会员国有政治意愿在政治财政和业务上支助联合国帮助联合国成为一支真正的促进和平的可信力量否则本小组建议作出的改革将不会有长期的效果 本报告所载的各项建议是为了解决战略方向决策迅速部署行动筹划和支助以及使用现代信息技术方面存在的严重问题下文突出说明关键的评析和建议主要按照它们在正文中出现的位置先后排序括号中标明其在正文中的段次此外附件三载有各项建议的摘要 过去的经验第15 至28 段 大家不应感到惊奇的是过去十年中有一些特派团的任务特别难以完成这些特派团往往被部署到冲突各方均未取得胜利的任务地区在那里军事僵局或国际压力或者两方面的共同作用使战斗得以停止但至少有一些冲突方并没有对结束对抗作出认真承诺因而联合国的行动不是被部署到冲突后的局势而是要努力建立冲突后的局面维持和平人员在这种复杂的行动中努力维持一个安全的当地环境而建设和平人员则努力使这种环境得以自力维持只有在这样一种环境下维持和平部队才能撤离这使维持和平人员与建设和平人员成为不可分割的伙伴 ix A/55/305 S/2000/809 对预防行动和建设和平的影响对战略和支助的需要第29 至47 段 联合国及其会员国目前亟需建立一个更为有效的战略以便在长期和短期基础上预防冲突在这方面小组赞同秘书长在千年报告A/54/2000 中所提预防冲突的建议以及秘书长在2000 年7 月安全理事会关于冲突的第二次公开会议上的讲话它还鼓励秘书长向局势紧张的地区派遣更多实况调查团以支助短期的预防冲突行动 此外安全理事会和大会维持和平行动特别委员会意识到联合国将继续面临不得不帮助各社区和各国作出从战争到和平的转变的情况同时认识到并承认建设和平在复杂的和平行动中能发挥关键作用这就要求联合国系统应解决在制订资助和执行建设和平的战略和活动方面一直存在的一个根本性缺陷因此小组建议和平与安全执行委员会和安执委会向秘书长提出计划加强联合国制订建设和平战略并为支助这些战略而执行有关方案的长期能力 小组支持的改革措施包括转变在和平行动中使用民警及相关法治部门的原则强调采用团队方法维持法治和尊重人权并帮助脱离冲突的社区实现民族和解将解除武装复员和重返社会方案并入复杂和平行动第一阶段的分摊预算联合国和平行动负责人有权为速效项目提供资金使特派任务地区人民的生活发生真正的改变并更好地将选举援助纳入支助施政的广泛战略 对维持和平的影响需要制订强势维和的原则和现实的任务规定第48至64段 小组一致认为当地各方的同意不偏不倚和只在自卫时才使用武力的原则应继续作为维持和平的基本原则然而过去的经验表明在国内/跨国冲突中冲突各方可通过许多方式对它的同意巧妙地加以利用因此联合国行动的公正性必须表现为对宪章各项原则的遵守在和平协定的一方无可置疑地明显违反协定规定的情况下联合国继续对所有各方实行平等对待就会导致协定无效甚至可能会造成助纣为虐的后果联合国不愿对受害者和加害者实行区别对待这对联合国在1990 年代的维和行动的地位与可信性造成的破坏比任何其他失误都大 过去联合国经常发现自己无法对这种挑战作出及时反应然而本报告的一个基本前提是联合国必须有能力做到这一点联合国维持和平人员一旦部署就必须能够以专业方式成功执行其任务规定这意味着联合国的军事部门必须能够保护自己特派团的其他部门及特派团的任务规定接战规则应足够有力不应迫使联合国特遣队将主动权让给进攻者 这就意味着对于当地各方行为表现历来极差的局势秘书处在筹划时不应作最好情况的假设这意味着任务规定应具体规定一项行动有权使用武力这意味着特派团的规模更大装备更精良费用也就更高但却能成为一支有效的威x A/55/305 S/2000/809 慑力量执行复杂行动的联合国部队尤其应配备实地情报能力及其他所需能力用以有效抵御武力挑衅者 此外包括部队和警察在内的联合国维持和平人员如目击侵害平民的暴力行为应视为有权尽其所能阻止这种行为以维护联合国的基本原则然而如果有广泛而明确的任务规定要求和平行动保护平民就必须提供该行动执行这一任务规定所需的具体资源 当秘书处向安全理事会建议新特派团的兵力及其他资源标准时它必须将安理会需要知道而非它想听到的情况通报给安理会秘书处还必须根据现实的预测并考虑到对执行任务的可能挑战来确定这些标准因此安全理事会的任务规定应具备维持和平行动所需的明确性以便维和行动在部署到危险四伏的状况中时能保持步调一致 目前秘书长得到只是一份安全理事会决议在纸上对部队的兵力作出了规定秘书长不知道他是否会得到特派团有效运作所需的部队及其他人员也不知道这些人员是否会得到适当装备小组认为现实的任务规定一旦得到确定和商定安理会就应将其授权决议保留为草案形式以待秘书长确认他已从会员国得到足以满足这些规定部队及其他承诺 承诺为行动提供建制军事部队的会员国应当应邀在制订任务规定的过程中与安全理事会成员协商可按照宪章第二十九条的规定设立安理会特设附属机关将这种咨询意见制度化提供部队的国家也应当应邀参加秘书处就涉及影响特派团人员安全和保障的危机情况或改变或者涉及重新解释使用武力的任务规定的问题而为安全理事会参加介绍情况会议 总部进行情报管理和战略分析的新能力第65 至75 段 小组建议设立一个新的情报收集和分析实体满足秘书长及和平与安全执行委员会和安执委会对情报和分析的需要秘书处如不具备这种能力就仍将是一个被动的机构无法在日常事件之外未雨绸缪而且和安执委会也将无法发挥它应发挥的作用 小组提议建立的和安执委会信息和战略分析秘书处和安执委会信息战略秘书处将设立并保持关于和平与安全问题的综合数据库在联合国系统内高效分发该信息进行政策分析为和安执委会制订长期战略并提请和安执委会领导层注意初现端倪的危机情况它还可提议并管理和安执委会本身的议程这样有助于按照秘书长最初的改革方案的设想将该委员会转变为一个决策机构 小组提议和安执委会战略秘书处应由维持和平部维和部现有的情况中心与若干分散的小规模政策规划办公室合并而成再加上一小组军事分析员国xi A/55/305 S/2000/809 际犯罪网问题专家和信息系统专家和安执委会战略秘书处应为和安执委会所有成员的需要服务 改进对特派团的指导和领导第92至101段 小组认为必须尽早将新特派团的领导层召集到联合国总部以便参与制订特派团的行动原则支助计划预算人员配备和总部特派团指南为此小组建议秘书长根据会员国提供的资料有系统地编制一份综合名单列出秘书长特别代表部队指挥官民警专员及其副手以及特派团其他部门负责人的可能人选该名单应有广泛的地域分布和公平的男女比例 迅速部署的标准和待命专长第86 至91 段和第102 至169 段 对建立稳定和平并树立新特派团的可信性而言停火或和平协定签署后的头六至十二个星期通常是最为关键的几个星期在此期间丧失的机会很难重新获得 小组建议联合国应将迅速有效的部署能力定义为能分别在安全理事会确立这种行动的决议通过后30天和90 天之内完全部署传统的维持和平行动和复杂的维持和平行动的能力 小组建议应进一步发展联合国待命安排制度待命制度由会员国共同建立几支统一指挥的旅级多国部队以及必要的先遣队以便更好地满足对小组所主张的建立强势维和部队的需要小组还建议秘书处派遣一个小组去确认每个可能提供部队的国家是否已作好准备能否在部队部署之前满足联合国为维和行动所规定的培训和装备的必要要求绝不能部署未达要求的部队 为支助这种迅速而有效的部署小组建议通过联合国维和部的仔细遴选在待命制度内制订一个约由100 名经验丰富极其称职的军官组成的轮换待命名单从该名单中选定的小组应能在接获通知七天后到位他们将负责在部署部队特遣队之前把在总部制订的概括性的战略性的任务概念变成具体的行动和战术计划并从维和部抽调人员组成一个核心部门作为特派团开办小组的部分成员 待命的民警国际司法专家刑事专家和人权专家名单必须有足够的人数用以在需要时加强法治机构并应成为待命制度的一部分可从该名单中抽调事先经过培训的小组为民警和有关专家主力进入新的特派任务地区打前站便利迅速有效地在特派团中部署负责法律和秩序的部门 小组还吁请会员国设立加强的国家警官和有关专家人员库专门部署到联合国和平行动以满足处理国内冲突的和平行动对民警以及有关刑事司法/法治专家的需求小组还敦促会员国考虑成立联合区域伙伴关系和方案用于按照联合国制订的关于民警的原则和标准训练各自的国家人员库的成员 xii A/55/305 S/2000/809 秘书处也应立即解决下列需要为招聘文职外勤人员制订一个透明和事权分散的机制改进复杂的和平行动所需的文职专家的保留办法并设立迅速部署这些专家的待命安排 小组最后建议秘书处根本改革现有的维持和平采购制度和程序便利特派团的迅速部署小组建议编制维持和平的预算和采购的职责应从管理事务部划归维和部小组提议制订一整套独特简化的外地采购新政策和程序授予外地更多的采购权让外地特派团在管理其预算方面有更大的灵活性小组还敦促秘书长制订一个全面的后勤支助战略用于管理备用设备的储存和私营部门提供共同货物和服务的常设合同并将该战略提交大会核准小组建议应在意大利布林迪西的联合国后勤基地保持更多关键设备的开办包以此作为一种临时安排 小组还建议行政和预算问题咨询委员会(行预咨委会)核可授权秘书长在安全理事会通过决议确立新行动之前一旦看到该行动有可能获得设立即先行承付至多为5 千万美元的款额 提高总部筹划和支助和平行动的能力第170 至197 段 小组建议将总部对维和行动的支助视为联合国的一项核心活动因此其大部分的资源要求应由联合国经常预算供资目前主要是通过支助帐户向维和部以及负责筹划和支助维和行动的其他部门提供经费该帐户每年更新一次而且仅提供临时员额经费看来这种经费提供和人员配置的方法将具体行动的临时性与维持和平及其他和平行动作为联合国核心职能的明显长期性质相混淆这种状况显然难以为继 维和部以及支助维和行动的总部有关部门的费用总额每年不超过5 千万美元即约占维和费用总额的2 目前亟需向这些部门提供更多的资源以确保2001 年用于维和的20 多亿美元能物尽其用因此小组建议秘书长向大会提交一项提案扼要说明联合国在这方面的全部所需费用 小组认为应对维和部的管理方法进行审查但同时也认为某些领域缺乏工作人员的情况是显而易见的例如目前有32名军官负责为外地的27 000名士兵提供军事筹划和指导有九名负责民警工作的人员来确定检查并指导多达8 600 名警察有15 名主管政治干事负责14 个当前行动和两个新行动维持和平费用总额中只有1.25 用于总部的行政和后勤支助这些都是显然不够的 为特派团的筹划和支助工作设立特派团综合工作队第198 至245 段 小组建议设立特派团综合工作队负责筹划新的特派团并帮助其完成全面部署大幅提高总部对外地提供的支助该工作队应从整个联合国系统临时借调人员目前秘书处没有综合的筹划或支助部门来统一负责政治分析军事行动xiii A/55/305 S/2000/809 民警选举援助人权发展人道主义援助难民与流离失所者新闻后勤供资和招聘等工作 维和部的其他部门也需要进行结构调整特别是军事人员和民警司该司应重新组成两个单独的司外地行政和后勤司(后勤司)也应分为两个司总结经验股应予以加强并入维和部行动厅总部的新闻规划和支助也应加强政治事务部(政治部)内的部门亦需加强特别是选举股在秘书处之外应加强联合国人权事务高级专员办事处筹划并支助和平行动的人权部门的能力 同时还应考虑任命主管维和部的第三名助理秘书长并将其中一人任命为特等助理秘书长作为副秘书长的副手 使和平行动适应信息时代第246 至264 段 充分利用现代信息技术极为有助于实现上述许多目标然而战略政策和做法方面的差距阻碍了信息技术的有效利用总部尤其缺少一个足够有力的职能中心负责和平行动中用户一级的信息技术战略和政策应在和安执委会信息战略秘书处内任命一名在和平与安全领域承担这种职责的高级官员并应在负责每次和平行动的秘书长特别代表办公室中任命一名对等官员 此外总部与外地特派团均需要建立一个实务全面的和平行动外联网各特派团可上网浏览和安执委会数据库和分析结果以及总结的经验等内容 对执行的挑战第265 至280 段 小组认为上述建议完全属于对联合国会员国的合理要求的范围执行其中一些建议将需向联合国提供额外的经费但我们并不是想暗示解决联合国问题的最佳途径只是针对这些问题提供更多的经费实际上不管提供多少经费或资源都不能替代联合国文化迫切需要的重大改革 小组呼吁秘书处注意秘书长提出的联系民间社会各机构的倡议并时刻铭记他们所服务的联合国是独一无二的世界性组织世界各国人民完全有权将其视为他们自己的组织因此他们也完全有权对其活动及其工作人员做出评价 此外工作人员的素质也存在很大差异系统内的人员首先认识到这一点由于要承担能力较差的工作人员的一部分工作表现较好的工作人员的工作量不尽合理除非联合国采取步骤变成一个真正的由精英管理的组织否则联合国将无法逆转称职的人员特别是年轻的人员离开联合国这一令人警醒的趋势此外有资格的人员也不会有加入联合国的积极性除非自秘书长及其高级工作人员以下的各级管理者认真优先处理这一问题奖优汰劣否则更多的资源将被浪费持久的改革将无以实行 xiv A/55/305 S/2000/809 会员国也承认自己需要反思其工作文化和方法例如安全理事会成员及广大会员国有义务言出必行正如安全理事会在1999 年发生东帝汶危机之后派出代表团飞到雅加达和帝力这是安理会采取有效行动的一个最佳范例干实事勿空谈 我们联合国和平行动问题小组各成员呼吁齐聚千年首脑会议的世界各国领导人在重申其对联合国的理想的承诺时也同时承诺加强联合国全面完成其特派团任务的能力这实际上正是联合国存在之理由帮助陷于冲突的社区并维持或恢复和平 在就本报告中的建议形成一致意见的过程中我们也同时形成了关于联合国的一个共同构想它能向社区国家或区域伸出有力援手帮助它们避免冲突或结束暴力我们看到秘书长特别代表在圆满完成任务之后结束特派团的工作由于他们的努力一国人民才有机会完成以前自己所无法完成的任务建设并保持和平寻求和解加强民主并保障人权最主要的是我们看到一个既有意愿又有能力的联合国它能够履行其庄严承诺不辜负绝大多数人类对其寄予的信心和信任 1 A/55/305 S/2000/809 一. 需要改变 1. 以联合国宪章的话说成立联合国是为了欲免后世再遭战祸迎接这项挑战是本组织最重要的职能在相当大的程度上是它所要服务的人民据以判断它的准绳在过去十年间联合国一再未能负起这项职责今天它也仍然无法更好地负起这项职责没有重大的体制变革更多的财务支助以及会员国方面重新作出承诺联合国将无法执行会员国今后指派给它的维持和平和建设和平的重要任务有许多任务不应该要求联合国维持和平部队来承担也有许多地方它们不应该前往但是在联合国真的派遣部队去支持和平时它们必须有准备地对抗遗留下来的战争和暴力势力它们必须有能力和决心打败它们 2. 秘书长要求这个由在预防冲突维持和平问题和建设和平各方面有经验的个人组成的联合国和平行动问题小组(小组成员名单见附件一)评估现行制度的缺点及提出坦白具体和切合实际的改革建议我们的建议不仅针对政治和战略方面并且也针对业务和组织上需要改进的领域 3. 要使预防性倡议能缓和紧张局势和防止冲突秘书长需要得到会员国明白有力和持续的政治支持就象联合国在过去十年屡次发现的维持和平要完成任务不论有多大的善意都不能取代显示有效力量的基本能力然而光有力量不能创造和平它只能创造出可供建设和平的空间 4. 换言之未来的复杂行动成功的关键条件是政治支持迅速部署态势有力的部队以及健全的建设和平战略本报告的每项建议都旨在帮助确保这三个条件得到满足最近在塞拉利昂的事件以及可能需要扩大联合国在刚果民主共和国的行动的艰难前景使得这方面更加迫切需要改变 5. 这些改变虽然是必不可少的将不会有持久的影响除非本组织的会员国认真地负起责任训练和装备自己的部队规定它们并使它们能够成为集体的工具从而使它们能共同成功地克服和平受到的威胁它们必须具有在政治上财务上和运作上支持联合国的政治意志一旦它们决定以联合国的身份行事这样本组织才能成为有效的促进和平力量 6. 小组提出的建议兼顾原则和实用性同时尊重联合国宪章的精神和文字以及本组织各立法机关各自的作用它们以下列前提为根据 (a) 会员国负有维持国际和平与安全的基本责任而且必须加强向联合国系统提供的支助的质和量以使其履行这项责任 (b) 安全理事会的任务规定必须是明确的可靠的和有足够资源的 (c) 联合国系统将把力量集中在预防冲突上而且尽可能及早着手处理 (d) 联合国总部应更有效地收集和评价各种资料包括设置一套更能查出和确认冲突或种族灭绝的威胁或危险的冲突预警系统 (e) 联合国系统在其和平与安全活动的所有方面坚持遵守和促进国际人权文书和标准及国际人道主义法是极其重要的 (f) 必须以真正一体化的方式建立联合国对预防性和冲突后的建设和平作出贡献的能力 (g) 极需要加强总部对和平行动的规划工作包括应急规划工作 (h) 确认虽然联合国在规划展开和执行传统的维持和平行动方面已获得大量专门知识但它尚未获得迅速部署更复杂的行动和有效地维持它们所需的能力 (i) 必须向外地特派团提供素质高的领导人和管理人员总部应给予他们较大的弹性和自主性他们的任务范围应明确应对花费和成果规定明确的责任标准 (j) 必须为总部和外地工作人员制订和坚持高水平的能力和忠诚标准必须向他们提供工作和职业2 A/55/305 S/2000/809 进展所需的训练和支持以现代管理作法为指导奖励好成绩淘汰无能者 (k) 必须使总部和外地的每一个职员对自己的业绩负责确认到必须为履行他们被指派的任务给予他们相称的责任权力和资源 7. 在本报告里小组致力于讨论在联合国系统内许多迫切需要的改变小组认为它的建议是联合国系统要有机会成为一个有效的能运作的二十一世纪机构所需要进行的最低限度改变(在全文中各项主要建议均以粗体字摘述) 8. 本报告所载直率的批评是小组集体的经验以及在联合国系统各阶层上所进行的面谈的反映接受面谈或向小组提供书面投入的有200 多人资料来源包括会员国常驻代表团包括安全理事会成员维持和平行动特别委员会在纽约联合国总部在联合国日内瓦办事处在联合国人权事务高级专员总部办事处人权专员办事处和联合国难民事务高级专员办事处难民专员办事处总部在其他联合国基金和方案总部与和平和安全有关部门的工作人员在世界银行的工作人员以及当前每个联合国和平行动的工作人员(参考资料清单载于附件三) 二. 和平行动的学说战略和决策 9. 联合国系统即会员国安全理事会大会和秘书处必须审慎地从事和平行动诚实地在记录上反映出它在过去十年里的成绩它必须以此调整建立和平行动所依据的学说改进其分析和决策能力以响应目前的实际情况及预期未来的需要以及唤起执行新的和其他解决方法以解决维持和平者不能去或不应去的那些形势所需的创造力想象力和意志 A. 确定和平行动的要素 10. 联合国和平行动需要三种主要活动预防冲突和建立和平维持和平以及建设和平长期的预防冲突针对的是冲突的结构根源以期为和平建立巩固的基础在那些基础正在崩溃的地方预防冲突设图予以加强通常采取外交倡议的形式这种预防行动顾名思义是低姿态的活动成功时可能根本无人注意 11. 建立和平处理正在进行中的冲突利用外交和调解的手段试图使它们停止建立和平者可能是政府国家集团区域组织或联合国的使者或他们可能是非官方和非政府的团体例如导致莫桑比克和平协定的谈判就是如此建立和平甚至可能是一名杰出人士独立进行的工作 12. 维持和平是一个有50 年历史的事业它在过去十年里迅速从传统上主要是维持国家间战后停火和部队脱离接触的军事形式演变到在内战结束后的危险时期里利用军事和民事等许多因素共同建设和平的复杂形式 13. 建设和平是一个比较新的词在本报告里它指的是在远离冲突的方面进行活动重新建立和平的基础以及提供工具让人们能在那些基础上建设起不止是无战争的环境建设和平包括但不限于使前战斗员重返民间经济加强法治例如通过当地警察的训练和改组和司法和和刑法改革通过监测教育和调查过去和现在的侵犯人权状况加强对人权的尊重提供促进民主发展的技术援助包括选举援助和支持自由媒体以及促进解决冲突与和解的技巧 14. 有效的建设和平还必须包括支持打击贪污实施人道主义的排雷方案强调艾滋病毒/艾滋病的教育和控制和对付其他传染病的行动 B 过去的经验 15. 短期预防冲突和建立和平静静取得的成功如前面指出的往往是政治上看不见的秘书长的个人特使和代表或秘书长的特别代表有时候对会员国的外交倡议提供了补充有时候提出了会员国不易重复的倡议后一种倡议的例子有建立和平的也有预防性外交的包括1988 年伊朗伊拉克战争实现的停火1991 年释放在黎巴嫩的最后几名西方人质1998 年使伊朗伊斯兰共和国和阿富汗之间避免发生战争 3 A/55/305 S/2000/809 16. 主张集中注意冲突根源的人认为这种与危机有关的努力往往证明不是太少就是太迟然而如果过早作出偿试看不出或不承认问题正在出现的政府可能断然拒绝外交倡议或者它本身可能成为问题的一部分因此长期预防战略是短期倡议必要的补充 17. 直到冷战结束联合国维持和平行动的任务大部分是传统的停火监测没有直接的建设和平的责任进入战略或事件的次序及导致联合国部署的决定都是直截了当的战争停火邀请监测停火遵守情况和部署军事观察员或部队监测停火同时继续努力以求得政治解决情报方面的需要也是相当直截了当的部队面对的危险较低但是传统的维持和平所处理的是症状而非冲突的根源内在缺乏退出战略有关的建立和平工作往往进展缓慢结果传统的维持和平人员留在原地十年二十年三十年甚至五十年就象在塞浦路斯中东印度/巴基斯坦按照较复杂的行动的标准看来它们费用较低而且在政治上维持下去比撤走更容易然而也难以证明这样做是合理的除非伴以认真且持续的建立和平努力设法将停火协定变成持久的和平解决 18. 自冷战结束后在部署进入国内冲突的环境里的复杂和平行动中联合国维持和平行动往往同建设和平的工作合并然而那些冲突的环境对以下外在行动者发生了影响同时也被它们所影响政治资助人军火商非法出口商品的购买者派遣自己的部队加入冲突的区域大国以及收容那些有时候被有计划地强迫逃离家园的难民的邻国由于国家和非国家行动者都具有这种重要的跨界作用因此这些冲突在性质上常常确实无疑是跨国的 19. 必须在这种环境下运作的行动的危险性和费用都比传统的维持和平大得多此外指派给这些特派团的任务越复杂往往当地的形势也越不稳定自从冷战结束后这种复杂而且危险的任务已成为常规而非例外在当地安全状况非常危险人道主义行动如要继续下去则人道主义工作人员必然面临高度危险的地方指派联合国行动担任救济护送的职务在可能受害者面临的危险最大的地方指派它们保护冲突的平民受害者还指派它们负起控制地方派系拥有的重型武器的任务而那些武器正在被用来威胁特派团和当地人民在两个极端的情况下因地方当局不存在或无法运作而授予了联合国行动执法和行政的权力 20. 任何人对于这些特派团难以完成任务都不应感到意外最初的时候1990 年代为人们带来了较正面的前景执行和平协定的行动有一定期限而非无限期的,而且成功地举行全国性选举似乎是一个很好的退出战略然而联合国行动从那时起往往部署到冲突未导致任何一方获胜的环境这可能是因为冲突陷入军事僵局或国际压力迫使战争停止但无论如何冲突并未结束联合国行动较少部署到冲突后的环境里而是较常地部署它们去创造这种环境就是说它们努力将未结束的冲突以及将推动冲突的人员政治或其他议程从军事面转移到政治面并使这种转移成为永久性的 21. 联合国很快就发现地方派系会出于各种原因签署和平协定但不是全都赞成和平破坏者 违背自己的承诺或设法以暴力破坏和平协定的团体包括签署者阻挠在柬埔寨实施和平使安哥拉索马里和塞拉利昂再度陷入内战以及在卢旺达设计杀害了至少80 万人联合国必须准备有效地对付破坏者如果它希望在国内冲突和或跨国冲突的形势中在维持和平或建设和平方面一直保持成功的记录 22. 关于这种冲突越来越多的报告突出一件事实未来的破坏者在拥有了可以支付士兵购买枪支使派系领导人富裕起来的独立收入来源时就有了背叛和平协定的最大动机甚至可能有了发动战争的动机最近的历史显示出不能截断从出口非法麻醉药品宝石或其他高价值商品获得的源源不断的收入和平就无法维持下去 23. 邻国能使这个问题更严重因它们可以准许支持冲突的违禁品通过可作为违禁品的中间商或者可向战斗人员提供基地要对抗这种支持冲突的邻国4 A/55/305 S/2000/809 和平行动将需要在政治后勤和或军事上得到一个或多个大国或区域内主要国家的积极支持行动越困难这种支持就越重要 24. 影响执行和平的困难的其他变数包括第一冲突的起源它们的范围可以从经济例如贫穷分配歧视贪污等问题到政治纯粹夺权到资源及其他环境问题如争夺稀缺的水或到族裔宗教严重违反人权等问题政治和经济目标可能比与资源需要族裔或宗教有关的目标较有活动性比较能够折衷第二谈判和执行和平的复杂性似乎会随地方派系数目的增加及其目标的分歧例如有人要统一有人要分裂而升高第三伤亡人口流离失所和基本设施损坏的程度将影响到战争引起的怨愤程度从而影响到和解的困难和解需要使人权过去受到的侵犯得到解决以及影响到重建的费用和复杂性 25. 一种较不危险的环境只有两个当事方都致力于和平目标是竞争性的然而是一致的没有非法的收入来源邻国和资助者都致力于和平这是相当宽容的环境在较不宽容较危险的环境三个或更多当事方致力于和平的程度不同目的分歧有独立的收入和武器来源邻国愿意购买出售和转运非法货物联合国特派团不仅使自己的人员并且使和平本身处于危险之中除非它们能以形势所需的能力和效率履行任务并且获得大国的有力支持 26. 非常重要的是谈判者安全理事会秘书处特派团规划人员及特派团参与者都了解他们正在进入的是哪种政治军事环境他们一旦到达后他们所处的环境会如何改变如果环境真的改变了他们实际计划做什么这些每一个都必须作为因数计入一项行动的进入战略里更确切地说应当作为因数计入一项行动是否可行甚至应否偿试的基本决定里 27. 在这方面同样重要的是要判断地方当局在何种程度上愿意并且能够作出困难但必要的政治和经济决定以及参与建立进程和机制来管理内部纷争和预先制止暴力或冲突的重现这些是外地特派团和联合国不大能控制的因素然而这种合作的环境对于决定和平行动取得圆满结果是极其重要的 28. 在复杂的和平行动确实来到外地时行动的维持和平人员有责任为促进建设和平维持一个安全的当地环境建设和平人员则有责任支持政治社会和经济改变以创造一个能自我维持的安全环境唯有这种环境才能使维持和平部队顺利地退出除非国际社会愿意容忍在这种部队离去后再度发生冲突历史告诉我们在复杂的行动中维持和平人员和建设和平人员是不可分的伙伴建设和平人员没有维持和平人员的支持就无法运作维持和平人员没有建设和平人员的工作就无法退出 C. 对预防行动的影响 29 联合国和平行动涉及到的不超过1990 年代三分之一的冲突状况因为即使建立和支助联合国维持和平行动的机制得到大量改进仍无法使联合国系统以这种行动应付各地发生的所有冲突因此联合国及其会员国亟需为长期预防冲突建立一个更为有效的制度对于那些因没有预防行动就可能遭受战争后果的人来说预防行动显然可取得多而且对于国际社会来说预防行动比军事行动紧急人道主义救济或战后重建的代价更少秘书长在其最近的千年报告A/54/2000 中指出每一项减少贫穷和实现基础广泛的经济成长的步骤均有助于预防冲突在许多国内冲突的情况中在贫穷的同时还存在尖锐的族裔或宗教分裂其中少数群体的权利没有得到充分尊重[而且]政府体制的包容性不够因此长期预防战略在这种情况中必须致力于促进人权保护少数群体的权利建立吸收所有群体都有代表参加的政治安排各群体必须相信国家属于全体人民 30 小组愿赞扬联合国内部目前设立的和平与安全问题工作队在长期预防领域中的工作尤其要赞扬以下观念即联合国系统内的发展实体应通过预防冲突的角度看待人道主义和发展的工作并将长期预防作为其工作的一项重点同时为此目的调整诸如共同国家评析和联合国发展援助框架联发援框架等现有的手段 5 A/55/305 S/2000/809 31 为了加强联合国尽早地将重点放在可能出现的复杂紧急情况并因此将重点放在短期预防冲突方面约在两年前参与和平与安全执行委员会和安执委会的总部各部门成立了机构间/部门间协调框架目前共有10 个部门基金方案和机构参与作为该框架的积极组成部分框架小组每月在司长一级举行会议确定存在风险的领域安排国别或形势审查会议并确定预防措施该框架机制已加强了部门间的联络但尚未有条理地积累知识而且没有进行任何战略规划这或许已造成秘书处难以说服会员国相信通过必要的政治和财政支助支持它们公开表示的对长期和短期预防冲突措施所作承诺将会产生许多好处在这期间秘书长1997 年和1999 年的年度报告A/52/1 和A/54/1 均将重点具体放在预防冲突方面卡内基预防武装冲突委员会和美利坚合众国联合国协会等组织也已提供关于该主题的宝贵研究报告联合国有400 多位工作人员已在意大利都灵联合国职员学院进行关于预警的系统培训 32 短期预防问题的关键在于秘书长如何使用实况调查团和其他重要的主动行动然而这些主动行动通常会遇到两个主要障碍首先会员国尤其是小国和弱国会对主权问题产生合理的担忧这是可以理解的但当另一个会员国尤其是较强的邻国或由成员之一主导的某个区域组织采取主动行动时这种担忧则变得更加严重如果某国面临国内困难它可能更易于接受秘书长的提议因为大家公认秘书长的职位具有独立性和崇高的道德基础而且也符合宪章的文字和精神宪章要求秘书长提供协助并期待会员国对联合国尽力予以协助详见宪章第二条项及其他条款的规定实况调查团是秘书长可用来便利提供斡旋的手段之一 33 采取有效预防危机行动的第二项障碍是口头表态与财政和政治上对预防行动支助之间存在着差距千年大会让有关各方有机会重新评估它们对该领域的承诺并审议秘书长千年报告以及他最近在安全理事会关于预防冲突问题第二次公开会议上所作的发言提出的与预防有关的建议在这些建议中秘书长强调安全理事会与联合国其他主要机构之间需加强合作处理预防冲突的问题并探讨如何能与包括公司部门在内的非国家行动者建立更密切的互动关系以协助消除或防止冲突 34 关于预防行动的主要建议摘要 (a) 小组赞成秘书长千年报告及其在2000 年7 月安全理事会关于预防冲突问题第二次公开会议上所作发言提出的关于预防冲突的建议尤其是他呼吁致力于预防冲突和发展的所有行动者包括联合国布雷顿森林机构各国政府和民间组织都必须以更综合性的方式处理这些冲突 (b) 小组支持秘书长更经常地向出现紧张局势地区派遣实况调查团并强调会员国依照宪章第二条项的规定有义务对联合国的这种活动尽力予以协助 D 对建设和平战略的影响 35 安全理事会和大会维持和平行动特别委员会分别承认和确认建设和平至关重要是维持和平行动能获得成功的不可或缺的组成部分在这方面安全理事会于1998 年12 月29 日通过一项主席声明鼓励秘书长探讨可否建立冲突后建设和平的结构作为联合国系统持久和平解决冲突的一项努力维持和平行动特别委员会于2000 年年初在其报告中强调在将建设和平纳入复杂的和平行动的任务之前必须先界定和确定建设和平的内容以便以后有利于大会审议如何在一项复杂的行动结束之后继续支持建设和平的主要内容 36 可建立建设和平支助办事处或联合国政治事务办事处作为其他和平行动的继续如在塔吉克斯坦或海地或作为独立的主动行动如在危地马拉或几内亚比绍这类办事处有助于在冲突后的国家里支持巩固和平的工作与政府和非政府的有关各方协作并补充联合国可能正在进行的发展活动这些活动努力脱离政治然而同时将援助用于解决造成冲突的根源问题 6 A/55/305 S/2000/809 37 有效地进行和平建设需要当地有关各方的积极参与这种参与应该是多层面的首先所有和平行动应有能力在特派团较早阶段使特派团任务地区人民的生活出现明显改善特派团团长应有权力将特派团经费的一小部分用于速效项目以期真正改善生活品质邦助建立新成立的特派团的信誉联合国原先存在的国家小组的驻地协调员/人道主义协调员应作为这种项目的主要顾问以确保开支的效益并防止与其他发展或人道主义援助方案发生冲突 38 其次自由和公正的选举应被视为加强施政机构更为广泛的努力的组成部分只有当从战争中恢复过来的人民开始接受选票而非子弹是表达他们关于政府的看法的适当和可信的机制时才能在这种环境中成功进行选举选举需要得到民主化和建立公民社会更为广泛进程的支持该进程包括有效的文官治理和尊重基本人权的文化否则选举只是认可多数暴政或在一项和平行动结束之后通过武力推翻选举的结果 39 第三如果联合国民警监测人员只是记录或试图通过他们的存在防止当地警察滥用权力或其他令人无法接受的行为这是对民警能力的一种传统和有些狭隘的看法那么他们则不属于建设和平人员如今特派团可能要求民警负责根据以民主方式维持治安和人权的国际标准对当地警察部队进行改革培训和改组并有能力有效地应付民间动乱而且能够自卫地方警察将嫌犯交给法院法律则将囚犯交给刑罚系统因此法院和刑罚系统也必须在政治上处于中立地位而且不应受到恐吓或胁迫在建设和平特派团需要的情况下必须能够得到充分数量的国际司法专家刑罚专家和人权专家以及民警以加强法制机构当司法和解和对有罪不罚作斗争需要的情况下安全理事会应授权这类专家以及有关的刑事调查人员及法医专家促进逮捕和起诉被控犯有战争罪的人以支持联合国的国际刑事法庭 40 尽管这种派遣小组的办法可能看来好象是不言自明的联合国也曾在过去十年中遇到过以下情况即由安全理事会授权在维持和平行动中部署几千名警察却不愿意接受向维持和平行动提供甚至20 或30 名刑事司法专家的想法此外民警的现代作用需得到更好的理解和发展总而言之在联合国如何看待民警和利用他们参与和平行动方面需要改变理论根据而且需要采取派遣一支有充足资源小组的办法通过司法刑法人权和维持治安方面的专家以协调及分担责任的方式维护法治和对人权的尊重 41 第四和平行动的人权组成部分的确对于有效的和平建设至关重要例如联合国人权人员可发挥首要作用协助实施民族和解的综合方案然而和平行动中的人权组成部分并未一直得到所需的政治和行政支助其他组成部分也并非总能明确了解人权组成部分的职能因此小组强调必须对军事人员警察和其他文职人员进行关于人权问题和国际人道主义法律相关规定的培训在这方面小组赞扬1999 年8月6 日秘书长题为联合国部队遵守国际人道主义法的情况的公报ST/SGB/1999/13 42 第五前战斗人员解除的武装复员和重返社会对于冲突后不久的稳定和减少冲突再度发生的可能性是至关重要的也是建设和平能对公共安全以及法律和秩序作出直接贡献的领域只有在解除武装复员和重返社会这三个方案内容均能得到执行时该方案的基本目标才能实现如果复员战士几乎从来没有能够完全解除他们的武装寻找不到合法的生计换句话说如果他们无法重新融入地方经济他们通常会回到暴力生活然而重返社会的方案部分是由自愿提供的资金资助的而这方面的资金有时远远无法满足需要 43 在过去10年里至少有15 个维持和平行动具有解除武装复员和重返社会的内容联合国的十几个机构和规划署加上国际和地方的非政府组织资助了这些方案部分由于如此众多的单位参与规划和支助解除武装复员和重返社会的方案该方案在联合国系统内部缺乏一个指定的协调中心 44 有效的和平建设还要求有一个协调中心协调建设和平所产生的各种不同活动小组认为联合国应7 A/55/305 S/2000/809 被视为各捐助者进行的建设和平活动的协调中心为此在联合国系统内部建立一个经过整合和永久的机构能力会有很多好处因此小组认为主管政治事务副秘书长作为和安执委会的召集人应成为建设和平的协调中心小组还支持政治事务部政治部和联合国开发计划署开发计划署目前努力共同加强联合国在该领域的能力因为有效的和平建设事实上是旨在消除冲突根源的政治和发展活动的结合 45 政治部维持和平行动部维和部人道主义事务协调厅人道协调厅裁军事务部裁军部法律事务厅法律厅开发计划署联合国儿童基金会儿童基金会人权专员办事处和难民专员办事处负责儿童和武装冲突问题的秘书长特别代表以及联合国安全协调员均参加和安执委会世界银行集团也应邀参加因此和安执委会为制订建设和平战略提供了理想的论坛 46 然而应根据和安执委会成员的合理分工区分制订战略和执行这类战略的工作小组认为开发计划署在该领域的潜力尚未开发如果能与联合国其他机构基金和规划署以及世界银行进行合作开发计划署最适合在进行建设和平活动中发挥领导作用因此小组建议和安执委会向秘书长提出一项计划加强联合国在制订建设和平战略和执行支持这些战略的方案方面的能力该计划也应载有相关的标准以便确定何时可能需要任命一名高级政治特使或秘书长代表以便使正在从冲突中恢复的某个特定区域或国家的建设和平活动能够以更高的姿态出现并在政治上引起更多的关注 47 关于建设和平的主要建议的摘要: (a) 特派团第一年预算的一小部分应给予领导该特派团的秘书长代表或特别代表以便在联合国国家小组的驻地协调员建议之下资助特派团行动领域中的速效项目 (b) 小组建议应改变在复杂的和平行动中使用民警其他法治人员和人权专家的理论根据以反映出更加重视在冲突后的环境中加强法治机构和加强尊重人权 (c) 小组建议立法机构考虑将复员和重返社会方案纳入到复杂和平行动第一阶段的分摊预算中以期促进迅速解散作战派系并减少恢复冲突的可能性 (d) 小组建议和平与安全执行委员会讨论一项计划并向秘书长推荐该计划以加强联合国在制订建设和平战略和执行支助这些战略的方案方面的永久能力 E. 对维持和平原则和战略的影响 48. 小组同意维持和平的基本原则仍然是要征得当地当事各方同意要公正以及只有在自卫的情况下使用武力不过经验表明在牵涉国家内/跨国冲突的现代维持和平行动方面地方当事方可能利用同意玩弄各种花招一个当事方可能只因为要争取时间重新配备其战斗部队而同意联合国的存在一旦维持和平行动不再符合其需要时就撤回其承诺一个当事方可能设法限制维持和平行动人员的行动自由采取坚持不遵守协定规定的政策或干脆撤回其承诺此外不论派系领导人如何致力实现和平战斗人员受到的控制与传统的维持和平行动人员接触的常规军队相比可能松散得多而且这种部队可能分为派系而在规定联合国特派团行动性质的和平协定中却没有对它们的存在和所涉问题作出规定 49 过去联合国往往未能有效应付这种挑战不过本报告的基本前提之一就是联合国必须能够应付这种挑战联合国维持和平行动人员部署后必须能够专业地完成任务这就是说联合国军事部队必须能够保卫自己和特派团的其他组成部分并且使特派团的任务不受破坏接战规则不应限制特遣队只能进行一枪对一枪的还击而应容许在联合国部队或受其保护的人民受到致命攻击时作出有力的还击迫使对方停止攻击在情况危急时尤其如此不应强迫联合国特遣队将主动权交给攻击者 8 A/55/305 S/2000/809 50. 因此这种行动的公正性在于恪守宪章的原则和以这种原则为基础的任务目标这种公正性不等于中立性或等于在任何时候对所有各方一视同仁那种做法有时可能等于是姑息有时候各地方当事方在道义上不是相等的有些显然是侵略者有些是受害者维持和平人员不但在行动上有使用武力的理由而且基于道义也不得不这样做卢旺达灭绝种族事件能够发展到这种地步一部分的原因是国际社会未能动用或增援当时在该国当地的部队抵抗显然是罪恶的力量自那以后安全理事会在第1296 2000 号决议中规定在武装冲突情势中以平民为目标以及不准人道主义人员接触受战争创伤的平民人口的行为本身就构成为对国际和平与安全的威胁就能促使安全理事会采取行动如联合国和平行动已经在当地存在采取这种行动可能成为它的责任应当作好准备 51. 反过来说秘书处不应在当地行动者的行为一向极其恶劣的情况下以最佳情况的假设作为规划的基础这就是说在任务规定中应当具体规定维持和平行动有权使用武力这就需要更强大的部队更好的装备和更高的费用从而能够形成有效的阻吓力量而不是传统维持和平部队象征式和不具威胁力的力量进行复杂行动的联合国部队应有充分的规模和装备使可能的破坏者不会在考虑联合国会采取何种做法方面心存侥幸这种部队应具有搜集当地情报的能力和其他所需能力以抵御暴力挑衅者 52. 会员国如果愿意向这种有效的行动派遣部队就表示该国愿意接受该项任务可能造成伤亡的危险自从1990 年代中期执行各种困难的任务以来会员国越来越不愿意接受这种危险部分原因是会员国没有明确了解本国冒这种危险的利益何在另外的原因是它们本身可能对危险的认识不明确因此秘书长在谋求各国派遣部队时必须能够说明部队派遣国以及事实上所有会员国与该冲突的管理和解决都是利害攸关的即使那只是联合国建立和平这项较大的工作的一个部分秘书长应能够向可能的部队派遣国提供危险评估报告说明冲突与和平的实质评价各地方当事方的能力和目标并评估它们可用的独立财政资源以及那些资源对维持和平所造成的影响安全理事会和秘书处还必须能够使部队派遣国相信新任务行动有健全的战略和构想它们派遣的部队或警察将要服务的是一个领导有方能胜任其工作的特派团 53. 小组确认联合国是不进行战争的在需要增援行动时一贯的做法是经安全理事会授权由愿意的国家组成的联盟根据宪章第七章行事 54. 宪章明确鼓励与区域和分区域组织合作来解决冲突建立和维持和平与安全联合国在世界各地于下列领域积极而成功地从事了许多这种合作方案预防冲突建立和平选举和选举援助人权情况监测和人道主义工作以及其他建设和平活动不过就维持和平行动而言似乎应当小心谨慎因为世界各地的军事资源和能力分布不均匀在大多数发生危机的地区里的部队与其他地区相比其准备往往不足以应付现代维持和平行动的需求向区域和分区域组织提供训练装备后勤支助和其他资源可以使来自所有区域的维持和平行动人员参与联合国的维持和平行动或依照安全理事会的决议建立区域维持和平行动 55. 维持和平原则和战略的主要建议摘要联合国维持和平行动者一旦部署便必须能够专业地完成任务并且有能力保卫自己特派团的其他组成部队以强势的接战规则执行特派团的任务对付那些违反其对和平协定的承诺或企图以暴力破坏协定的当事方 F. 明确可靠和可以完成的任务 56. 作为一个政治机构安全理事会即使可以以非一致方式作出决定但仍应集中力量建立共识但建立共识所需要的妥协可能是由于避免作出具体规定而获得的由此产生的模糊规定可能对实地造成严重的影响如果和平行动的各不同方面后来对有关任务作出了不同诠释或当地的行动者认为安理会没有对执行和平作出彻底承诺因而助长了它破坏和平的意愿模糊不清的规定也可能掩盖了日后在危机的压力下会出现的分歧而使安理会不能采取紧急的行动9 A/55/305 S/2000/809 小组虽然承认政治妥协往往有其可取之处但它还是认为在这种情况下应作出明确的规定特别是对部署到危险环境的行动小组认为不应当在没有明确指示的情况下部署维和行动到危险的环境它促请安理会不要授权这种任务 57. 一项可能的联合国和平行动的大纲往往是在谈判者致力达成一项设想由联合国执行的协定时首先提出的虽然和平谈判者调解人可能在技巧方面是熟练的专业人员但他们很可能不知道联合国实地任务对士兵警察救济人员或选举顾问的需求的细节非联合国调解人可能对这种需求所知更少然而近年来秘书处被要求去执行在别处制订稍为改动后通过安全理事会交给它的任务 58. 小组认为秘书处必须能够向安全理事会提出有力理由说明向联合国提出的执行停火或和平协定的要求符合某些最低条件然后才由安理会承诺由联合国率领的部队执行这些协定其中包括让顾问-观察员有机会出席和平谈判任何协定要符合目前的国际人权标准和人道主义法联合国执行的任务在行动上是可以完成的其中具体规定当地有责任支助他们帮助处理冲突的来源或向其他人提供这样做所需的空间由于胜任的谈判顾问需要对实地情况有详细的了解应该先授权秘书长从维持和平储备基金承付足够经费以便在可能的任务地区进行初步实地调查 59. 秘书处在向安理会提供关于任务需求的咨询意见时不应根据它假设安理会在政治上可以接受的需求水平来制订执行任务的部队兵力和其他资源水平自我设限的做法使秘书处自我束缚特派团不但注定失败而且会成为失败的替罪羊虽然根据高行动标准提出规划概算可能减低行动获得批准的可能性但会员国不应被误导相信它们正在帮助处于困境的国家而实际上由于执行经费不足的任务它们更可能只是在浪费人力时间和金钱 60. 此外小组认为除非秘书长能够得到会员国切实承诺提供他认为进行行动所需的部队该行动根本不应进行部署不能够巩固脆弱的和平的部分兵力只会点燃陷于冲突或要从战争中复原人人民最终要破灭的希望并使整个联合国的信誉蒙受损害在这种情况下小组认为安全理事会应把为新的维持和平行动拟订一个相当庞大的部队兵力的决议保留在草案形式直至秘书长能够确定已从会员国得到所需的部队兵力的承诺 61. 减少这种承诺差距的可能性有几种方法包括在制订任务的过程中改进可能的部队派遣国与安全理事会成员之间的协调和协商不妨按照宪章第二十九条设立安理会的特设附属机关将部队派遣国向安全理事会提供咨询意见的过程制度化向一项行动提供建制军事部队的会员国应理所当然地获得邀请出席秘书处关于下列方面的简报会影响到特派团人员的安全的危机或就使用武力方面改变或重新诠释特派团的任务规定 62. 最后秘书长希望扩大保护武装冲突中的平民安全理事会采取行动明确授权联合国维持和平人员保护冲突中的平民这些都是积极的事态发展事实上维持和平人员部队或警察如果目击平民受暴力侵害理应有权以其可用的手段予以制止以维护联合国的基本原则同时如卢旺达问题独立调查报告所述符合由于[行动]的存在而带来的提供保护的想法和期望见S/1999/1257 第55 页 63. 不过小组关注在这一领域的全面任务是否可靠以及能否落实的问题在联合国目前的任务地区中数十万的平民面临暴力的危险即使目前部署的联合国部队根据指示这样做也只能保护其中一小部分的人答应提供这种保护会引起人们抱着很高的期望由于期望的目标和实现这一目标的可用资源很可能存在很大的差距因此可能会使人们继续对联合国在这一领域不能贯彻行动而感到失望因此如果一项行动的任务规定提及保护平民就必须有执行该项任务所需的资源 64. 关于明确可靠和可以完成的任务的主要建议摘要 10 A/55/305 S/2000/809 (a) 小组建议在安全理事会同意执行或有联合国率领的维持和平行动的规定的停止或和平协定之前安理会应确保有关的协定满足一些起码的条件例如符合国际人道主义标准以及具体任务和时限的实际可行性 (b) 安全理事会应在授权拥有大量兵力的特派团的决议应保留为草案形式直至秘书长获得承诺确定可以从会员国得到所需部队和其他关键性的特派团支援部分包括建设和平的部分 (c) 安全理事会在部署维持和平行动到具有潜在危险性的地区时其决议应满足维持和平行动的需要尤其是需要有明确的指挥系统和统一的行动 (d) 秘书处在制订或改变特派团的任务时必须将安全理事会需要知道而不是它想要听的情况通报给安全理事会已承诺为一项行动派遣军事部队的国家应当能够出席秘书处就影响其人员的安全的事项为安理会举行的简报会特别是那些牵涉到特派团使用武力问题的会议 G. 信息的收集分析和战略规划能力 65 联合国进行的一项冲突预防维持和平与建设和平的战略办法将要求秘书处的各和平与安全主要执行部门更密切合作为此它们将须拥更有利的工具以期收集和分析有关信息并支助和安执委会即名义上的和平与安全问题高级别决策论坛 66 和安执委会是在秘书长1997 年初的一揽子初步改革办法见A/51/829 A节中设立的四个部门执行委员会之一还为经济和社会事务发展业务和人道主义事务设立了委员会人权专员办事处是所有四个委员会的成员这些委员会旨在有助于使整个参与部门进行更一贯协调的管理并获得执行决策及协调的权力和安执委会由主管政治事务副秘书长担任主席它促进了所有部门和各部门间更多的信息交流与合作但尚未成为1997 年改革中设想的决策机关这些改革已获参与者的承认 67 和平与安全部门内目前的秘书处各级员额和职务要求多少都把部门政策规划排除在外虽然多数和安执委会成员设有政策或规划单位这些单位侧重于日常问题但如果没有大量增进知识和分析的能力秘书处将一直是一个被动的机构无法在日常事务中之外未雨稠缪和安执委会也无法发挥它应发挥的作用 68. 秘书长及和安执委会成员需要在秘书处内有一个专业系统以供累积关于冲突情况的知识向广泛用户基有效散发此项知识促成政策分析以及拟订长期战略这项系统目前并不存在该小组提议设立这样一个系统成为和安执委会信息和战略分析秘书处或称作和安执委会信息战略秘书处 69. 在和安执委会信息战略秘书处中大部分应由担任有关和平与安全方面政策和信息分析工作各部门单位合并组成这些单位包括维和部政策分析股和情况中心政治部政策规划股人道协调厅政策发展股或其中部分以及新闻部媒体监测和分析科 70. 将须提供其他工作人员以使和安执委会信息战略秘书处具备系统内他处没有的或无法从现有结构中取得的专门知识这些增设人员将包括一名工作人员主管主任一级一小队军事分析人员警务专家和优秀的信息系统分析员分析员将负责管理设计和维修和安执委会信息战略秘书处的数据库使其供总部和外地办事处及特派团利用 71. 与和安执委会信息战略秘书处有紧密关联的机构应包括秘书长办公室战略规划股开发计划署应急司建设和平股见下文第239 至243 段人道协调厅信息分析股支助救济网人权专员办事处纽约联络处和难民专员办事处纽约联络处联合国安全协调专员办事处以及裁军部监测数据库和信息处应邀请世界银行集团使用诸如世界银行的冲突后单位等适当单位保持联络 72. 作为一项共同事务和安执委会信息战略秘书处将对和安执委会兼具短期和长期价值它将加强维和部情况中心的每日汇报工作根据所有来源提出关于11 A/55/305 S/2000/809 任务活动和有关的全球事务的最新消息它可将正在萌芽的危机提请和安执委会的领导人注意并使用现代化表述技术向他们汇报危机情况它可作为一个联络中心及时分析互相交叉的各主题问题并为秘书长编写关于这类问题的报告最后根据综合的任务危机立法机关的关注事务以及来自和安执委会成员的投入和安执委会信息战略秘书处可提议和处理和安执委会本身的议程支助其讨论并协助将其转变成秘书长的初步改革中所期望的决策机关 73. 和安执委会信息战略秘书处应可利用联合国系统内外现有的最佳专门知识对特定地点和周围情况的分析进行精细的调整它应向秘书长及和安执委会成员提出关于联合国和其他方面为化解进行中的和正在呈现出来的冲突的来源和征象而进行的各项努力的综合评价并应能够评估联合国进一步参与的可能效用和所涉及的问题它应对小组在下面见第198至217 段建议为计划和支助建立和平行动而设立的综合特派团工作队的初步工作提供基本背景资料并应在一旦设立特派团时继续提供分析和处理特派团与工作队之间的信息流动 74. 和安执委会信息战略秘书处应创设维持和利用共同分享的综合数据库这些数据库最终将取代主管干事和决策者等目前为随时了解其负责领域内事务现况所使用的密码电报每日情况报告每日新闻资料的大量复印件以及与干练同僚间的非正式联系这类数据库如有适当保障可予提供给某一和平行动内联网的用户见下面第255 和256 段这类数据库有可能经由日益廉价的商业宽带通信服务向总部和外地等提供它们将有助于革命性地改变联合国累积知识和分析关键和平与安全问题的方式和安执委会信息战略秘书处也应最终取代协调框架机制 75. 信息和战略分析关键建议摘要秘书长应设立一个实体本文称作和安执委会信息和战略分析秘书处和安执委会信息战略秘书处它将支助和安执委会所有成员的信息和分析需要为管理目的它应由政治事务部和维和部管理并向其首长一并提出报告 H. 过渡时期民政管理面临的挑战 76 直至1999 年中旬联合国只进行了一小部分的包括民政管理工作或监督的外地行动不过在1999 年6 月秘书处发现它在为科索沃设立一个过渡时期民政管理当局并在三个月后为东帝汶设立一个过渡时期民政管理当局联合国努力设置和管理这些行动是本报告关于快速部署及总部员额编制和结构的说明的一部分背景 77. 这些行动面临的挑战和责任在联合国外地行动中是独特的没有任何其他行动必须在一个被战争破坏社会中制定和执行法律制订海关事务和条例规定和收集商业和个人税吸引外国投资裁定财产争端和战争损害赔偿责任重建所有公用水电并使其运作创设一个银行业系统管理学校和支付教员薪金以及收取垃圾而且这样还必须使用自愿捐款因为摊派的特派团预算即使为这类过渡时期行政特派团摊派的预算都不会对地方行政工作本身提供经费除了这些任务外这些特派团还须在广泛不满和怨怼深切的地方重建民间社会和促进对人权的尊重 78. 除了这类挑战外更大的问题是到底联合国是否应插足此事如果是应该的是否应被视为一个和平行动的组成部分或应由某些其他结构来管理虽然安全理事会可能不再指示联合国进行过渡时期民政管理的事务但也没有人预料到它会在科索沃或东帝汶进行此事国内冲突仍继续在发生未来是否出现不稳定状况则难以预料因此尽管联合国会员国间和秘书处内对民政管理明显具有矛盾心理今后事实上仍有可能设立这类特派团而且是在同样迫切的情况下从而秘书处面临了一个不愉快的困境或是假设过渡时期行政当局是一种暂时性的责任不准备派遣其他的特派团如果再度陷入这种处境则无法好好地完成工作或是作好完善的准备更经常地应要求承担这项工作因为它作了充分准备当然如果秘书处预期今后将经常需要过渡时期行政管理而不是例外情况那么就必须在联合国系统内某处创设一个专门承担这些任务的独特责任中心在临时性质上维和部必须继续支助此一职务 12 A/55/305 S/2000/809 79. 同时过渡时期民政管理内的一项迫切问题也需要解决那就是适用的法律的问题在联合国行动目前负有执法责任的两个地点人们发现地方司法和法律能力或是不存在或是长时未实施或是会遭到武装分子的恐吓此外在这两个地方都出现了以下情况即被认为是冲突受害者的主要团体拒绝接受冲突前普遍适用的法律和法律系统 80. 不过即使当地法典的选择是明确的特派团的司法小组仍须充分学习该法典及其有关程序以便足以在法庭上起诉和裁定案件语言文化习俗和经验的差异意味着这个学习过程很容易地就要花掉六个月或更长的时间联合国目前对于这一行动当其法律和秩序小组在此一学习通路上缓慢前进的时候应怎么做的问题没有答案强大的地方政治派系能够而且也实际利用了这段学习期间来设立它们本身的平行行政当局罪犯辛迪加也欢喜地钻营任何可以找到的法律或执法空隙 81 如果有一个共同的联合国一揽子司法办法允许这些特派团在对可适用的法律的问题设法找到最后答案的时候适用一个临时的法典并让特派团人员预先接受培训那么这些特派团的任务将简单得多虽然目前在秘书处法律办公室内未进行关于此一问题的工作与研究人员的面谈指出联合国系统外已就处理此一问题作出一些进展其中强调了数十项有关人权人道主义法以及警察检察官和刑事系统准则的国际公约和宣言中所载的原则指导准则法典和程序 82. 这一研究旨在制订一项法典载有基本的法律和程序使一项行动得以在诸如谋杀强奸纵火绑架和严重攻击等罪案中使用国际法官和国际间商定的标准展开适当的法律程序财产法可能仍在此一示范法典的范围之外但至少一个和平行动将得以有效起诉那些烧毁其邻居房屋的人同时解决财产法问题 83. 过渡时期民政管理关键建议摘要小组建议秘书长邀请一个国际法律专家小组其中包括在联合国负有过渡时期行政任务的行动方面具有经验的个人以评价制订一项临时刑法典包括可能需要的任何区域调整的可行性和有效性以供这类行动使用直到重建了当地法治和当地执法能力 三. 联合国迅速有效部署行动的能力 84. 许多观察者询问为何联合国在安全理事会通过决议后要花相当长的时间才能全面部署行动这其中有若干原因联合国既没有常备军和执行外地行动的常备警察部队也没有特派团领导人的预备骨干只有在迫切需要时才物色秘书长特别代表和特派团团长部队指挥官警务专员行政主任及其他领导成员目前实行的联合国待命安排制度待命制度是供可能由各国政府提供军事人员警察和文职人员的制度它还未成为资源的可靠来源1990 年代中期的大型特派团使用之后转送到意大利布林迪西联合国后勤基地的主要设备储存因当前特派团数量激增而取用渐空目前尚无预算以供迅速补充维和采购程序也许不足以既顾及成本效益和财务责任又能满足和平行动压倒一切的需要即保证特派团及时做出反应并确保其信用人们很早就认识到有必要在征聘实务领域和支助领域的文职人员方面实行待命安排但这一安排尚未得到执行最后不管看上去和平行动多有可能获得通过秘书长多半无权在安全理事会通过决议设立特派团之前获得聘用并预先部署所需货物和人员以便迅速部署和平行动 85. 简言之要使联合国快速得到并部署所需人力和物质资源以便今后开展任何复杂和平行动目前几乎不具备任何基本条件 A 界定迅速和有效部署的涵义 86. 安全理事会的会议记录维持和平行动特别委员会的报告外地特派团秘书处和会员国向本小组提供的资料一致认为联合国有必要显著加强迅速和有效部署新的外地行动的能力为加强这些能力联合国必须首先商定有关的基本参数界定迅速和有效的涵义 13 A/55/305 S/2000/809 87. 对于建立稳定和平并树立维持和平人员的信用而言停火或和平协定签署后的头六至十二个星期通常是最为至关重要的时期在这段时期丧失的信用和政治势头多半难以重新获得因此应相应专门制订出相配的部署时间表然而如果军事人员民警和文职人员得不到执行任务的装备那么即使迅速部署这些人员也无助于巩固脆弱的和平并树立行动的信用特派团要行之有效其人员就需要得到物资装备和后勤支助经费采购货物和服务的现金情报资源培训和情况介绍和行动战略而且对于部署到情况不明局势中的行动还需要有一个军事和政治重心足以使其能够预见并克服一方或多方产生反悔不愿推进和平进程的情况 88. 由于每个冲突后环境均有独特的政治军事状况迅速有效部署的时间表自然会有所不同然而要提高联合国迅速部署的能力首先必须商定联合国应努力实现的一个标准目前尚没有这种标准因此小组提议联合国应建立行动能力以便在安全理事会决议通过之后30天和90天之内分别全面部署传统的维和行动和复杂的维和行动对后者而言特派团总部应在十五天之内完全设立并运作 89. 为赶上这些时限秘书处将需要满足一个或数个下列条件(a)常备的军事人员民警和文职专家物资和经费(b)极为可靠的待命能力接到通知即可征召或(c)足够的筹备时间来获得这些资源这将需要有能力提前几个月为可能的新特派团预测开支为之筹划并开始支用小组许多建议的目的在于加强秘书处的分析能力并与特派团筹划程序相协调帮助联合国更妥善地筹备可能的新行动然而战争的爆发与和平的缔结并不总是老早就能预测实际上过去的经验表明情况经常并非如此因此秘书处必须能够通过建立新的常备能力并加强现有的待命能力保持某种一般水平的准备状态为不时之需做好准备 90. 许多会员国反对建立一支联合国常备军或警察部队不愿意做出可靠的待命安排告诫不应为建立装备储备引起财务支出或者劝阻秘书处在秘书长因发生危机而获得明确的立法授权之前为可能的行动着手筹划在这种情况下联合国无法在所建议的时间表内迅速而有效地部署行动以下的分析指出这些情况至少有一些必须改变才能使迅速有效地部署行动成为可能 91. 关于决定部署时间表的重要建议摘要: 联合国应将迅速而有效部署的能力从行动角度界定为能够分别在安全理事会决议通过后30天和90天之内完全部署传统的维和行动和复杂的维和行动 B 特派团的有效领导 92. 特派团如有生气蓬勃的有效灵活的领导就会富有凝聚力即便在不利的情况下仍然士气高涨卓有成效否则特派团就难以保持上述任何优势换言之特派团领导人的性格和能力能够深刻影响整个特派团的状态 93. 鉴于特派团领导所起的这一关键作用联合国目前的征聘遴选培训和支助其特派团领导的方法很有改进的余地可能的候选人名单被非正式保存可能要等到临近安全理事会通过决议设立新的特派团甚至在通过有关决议之后方可选定秘书长代表或秘书长特别代表特派团团长部队指挥官民警专员及其各自的副手他们与实务和行政部门的其他负责人也许要到与总部官员举行几天介绍性会议后到了特派任务地区才能见面他们将得到一般性的职权范围其中规定其总的作用和职责但是很少有人能在离开总部时就得到具体的特派团政策或行动指南至少在开始时他们将自行决定如何执行安全理事会的任务规定及如何处理执行任务规定时面临的潜在挑战他们必须制订任务规定的执行战略同时努力建立特派团的政治/军事重心并维持可能是十分脆弱的和平进程 94. 对遴选人员的政治动作进行详细分析会使该程序更容易为人所理解对一个新特派团的政治敏感性可能使秘书长无法在设立特派团之前老早就物色到可能的候选人秘书长在选定秘书长特别代表秘书14 A/55/305 S/2000/809 长代表或特派团其他负责人时必须考虑安全理事会成员该区域内各国及当地各方的意见秘书长代表/秘书长特别代表需要获得所有各方的信任才能有效工作特派团领导的地域分布均衡的需要可能影响对一名或多名秘书长副特别代表的选择部队指挥官警务专员及其副手的国籍要反映军事和警察部门人员的组成而且还要考虑到当地各方的政治敏感性 95. 尽管政治和地域分布的考虑是合理的但本小组认为在选定特派团领导时也必须给予管理能力和经验至少同等的优先地位基于小组一些成员领导外地行动的个人经验小组同意有必要尽早将特派团的领导层召集起来以便他们为制订特派团的行动概念其支助计划预算和人员配置的安排做出共同努力 96. 小组建议为便利尽早选定人员秘书长应根据各会员国提供的资料有系统地编制一份综合名单列出秘书长特别代表部队指挥官民警局长及其副手以及特派团其他实务部门负责人的可能人选该名单要有广泛的地域分布而且男女比例要公平这种数据库将便利尽早找到并选定领导小组 97. 秘书处应向特派团领导提供战略指南和计划以预见并克服对执行任务规定的挑战并应尽可能与特派团领导共同制订这种指南和计划秘书处应将这种做法作为标准做法特派团领导还应广泛咨询联合国驻地小组和在特派任务地区工作的各非政府组织的意见以扩大并加深对当地的了解这对执行从战争向和平过渡的综合战略至关重要国家小组的驻地协调员应更频繁地参与特派团的正式筹划程序 98. 小组认为特派团的高级管理小组中应总是至少有一名成员具备联合国的相关经验最好既有在外地特派团又有在总部工作的经验这名成员将便利管理小组中来自联合国系统之外的成员的工作缩短他们熟悉联合国各种规章政策和工作方法所需的时间并回答部署前培训所无法预见的各种问题 99. 小组注意到以前曾有先例将在一国从事发展工作和人道主义援助的联合国各机构基金和规划署的驻地协调员/人道主义协调员任命为复杂和平行动的秘书长特别代表的副手小组认为该做法应尽可能加以推广 100. 相反联合国各机构基金和规划署的外地代表必须便利秘书长特别代表或秘书长代表作为联合国在有关国家所有活动的协调员而开展的工作在许多情况下履行该职责的努力因官僚主义对协调的过分抵制而受到损害这种倾向不符合秘书长一向大加鼓励的联合国大家庭的概念 101. 关于特派团领导的重要建议摘要: (a) 秘书长应按照公平的地域分布和男女比例以及会员国提供的资料着手编制一份综合名单列出秘书长代表或特别代表部队指挥官民警专员及其副手以及实务和行政部门的其他负责人的可能人选以此作为第一步将选定特派团领导的方法系统化 (b) 特派团的整个领导层应尽早选定并召集到总部以便参与特派团筹划程序的关键方面听取特派任务地区的情况介绍并与其在特派团领导层的同事见面和共事 (c) 秘书处应经常向特派团领导提供战略指南和计划以预见并克服对执行任务规定的挑战并应尽可能与特派团领导共同制订这种指南和计划 C. 军事人员 102. 联合国在1990年代中期创立了待命制度以便提高其快速部署能力使之能够应付在开展新一代错综复杂的维和行动方面始料不及的暴增局面待命制度是一个数据库储存着各国政府指出从理论上讲在接到通知之后7 天15天30天60天或90天内可以调派到联合国维和行动的军事人员民警民有资源和专门知识等资料目前数据库存有87 个会员国的147 900名人员军事战斗单位85 000名军事支援小单位56 700人军事观察员1 600名民警2 150 名其他文职专家2 450 名87 个参与国中有31 个与联合国签署了谅解备忘录列举了它们为使有关人员做好准备应承担的种种职责同15 A/55/305 S/2000/809 一备忘录可也明文规定它们的承诺是有条件的谅解备忘录从本质上确认各国接到秘书长为维和行动提供上述资源的请求时保留其一口回绝的主权权利 103. 虽然没有有关回应的详细统计资料许多会员国都拒绝调遣建制军事部队参与联合国领导的维和行动次数远远多于它们答应的次数在本组织创立后的头50 年里参与联合国维和行动的部队大多来自发达国家但近几年来一改此一长期传统截至2000 年6 月底联合国维和行动部署的建制军事部队有77 的军事人员是由发展中国家派遣的 104. 安全理事会五个常任理事国目前派遣参加联合国所领导维和行动的部队要比以往少得多但其中有四个常任理事国曾派遣相当庞大的部队参加以北约为首在波斯尼亚和科索沃的军事行动它为联合国行动波黑特派团和科索沃特派团正常开展工作提供一个安全的环境联合王国还在危机的关键时刻派遣军队前往塞拉利昂不受联合国的作战控制起到了稳定局势的宝贵作用但是目前没有一个发达国家从安全角度考虑派遣军队参加联合国领导的最困难的维和行动即在塞拉利昂的维和行动联塞特派团和刚果民主共和国维和行动(联刚特派团) 105. 维和人员在摩加迪沙和基加利惨遭杀害在塞拉利昂被扣为人质给人们留下了不良的印象因此不难理解各会员国要使本国立法机关和公众相信它们应当支持派遣军队参加联合国所领导尤其是在非洲开展的维和行动确实有种种困难而且发达国家往往看到对攸关的国家战略利益视而不见各国军队日益裁减欧洲区域维和行动日盛使得发达国家备用的一批训练有素装备精良的军事特遣队中可为联合国所领导行动服务的部队进一步锐减 106. 因此联合国目前面临非常严重的困境诸如联塞特派团之类特派团它所得到的部队如果同作为驻科部队一部分目前在科索沃维持和平的军队一样强大大概就不会遭遇今年春季的种种困难本小组深信北约军事规划人员不会同意单单把原先核准派遣的6 000 名部队部署到塞拉利昂鉴于目前的趋势近期内要在非洲部署驻科部队式的行动可能性似乎微乎其微即使联合国试图部署一支驻科部队式的军队由于目前的待命安排部队与装备从何而来也很难说 107. 不少发展中国家确实对派遣维和部队的请求作出了回应这些军队遵照才分高的专业标准恪守大会所通过要求各国特遣队自行携带维持其作业所需的几乎全部装备与给养的特遣队所属装备新程序湿租赁协定表现优异尽心尽力联合国承诺利用部队派遣国的装备一定向其偿还费用并为特遣队所属装备新程序未列入的那些服务与支助提供经费反过来部队派遣国承诺奉行它们所签署的特遣队所属装备谅解备忘录 108. 但是秘书长发现自己处于难以维持的境地他接到了安全理事会的一份决议明文规定部队人数但又不知道他是否会得到可部署到现场的部队最后终于抵达战区的部队仍可能装备不足有些国家没有给士兵配备枪支或配备了枪支而没有头盔或配备了头盔而没有防弹片茄克没有建制运输能力卡车或部队运输车辆部队未接受维和行动的训练而且不管怎么说参加行动的各特遣队以前不可能在一起训练或工作过有些单位可能没有会讲特派团所用语言的人纵使语言不成问题它们也可能缺乏共同的作业程序对命令和指挥的要点对特派团的接战规各有不同的解释而且对特派团使用武力的要求也可能有不同的期待 109. 再也不能这样下去了不能履行其谅解备忘录条款的部队派遣国应当向联合国言明因而也不应部署部队为此秘书长应当得到必要的资源与支助以便在部署之前评价可能派遣部队国家的准备程度确认将能履行谅解备忘录的各项规定 110. 改善现状可采取的另一措施是按安全理事会的授权让秘书长能够迅速召集军事规划人员参谋人员和其他军事技术专家先前曾在联合国特派团工作过的更佳与总部的特派团规划人员联络然后与16 A/55/305 S/2000/809 一名维和部骨干一起派往现场协助建立特派团的军事指挥部利用现行的待命安排制度拟订一份待征召名单列明在公平地域分配的范围内经会员国提名由联合国维和部仔细审查和认可的这类人员以达到上述目的也可以在危机之时增援现有特派团这份待征召名单指定大约100名军官有少校至上校军衔一接到紧急征召作一些适当调整后即可担任联合国军事观察员 111. 选入待征召名单的人员在体格和行政两方面都要符合部署到世界各地的要求而且还要参加先期训练承诺在至多两年内一接到通知后7天内即可立即赴任每3个月待征召名单会更新一次按会员国的提名换上10 至15 名新人在最初3 个月内接受训练由于持续每3个月更新一次所以待征召名单将会有大约五到七个一接通知即可部署的小队初期集训包括一开始进行的资格预审与教育阶段在联合国系统进行短短一周的课堂和见习指导接着是专业发展实习阶段作为一个军事观察员小组部署参与联合国现行维和行动为期10 周最初3 个月集训期结束以后参训个人就要返回本国取得待征召地位 112. 经安全理事会授权可以征召一个以上上述小队立即执行任务必要的话他们可以来联合国总部再次听取复习概况介绍和具体任务指导与负责这一行动的特派团综合工作队见下面第198-217 段的规划人员交流切磋然后派往现场各小队的任务就是把特派团综合工作队制订的对任务的广泛战略设想化为具体的作业和战术计划并开展直接的协调与联络工作以迎接特遣部队的部署先遣队一旦部署就要工作下去直到部署特遣队来接替通常为2至3个月但可以酌情延长最长不超过6个月 113. 小队初期训练的经费由小队所属的现有特派团的预算筹供待征召人员部署的经费由预期维和特派团预算筹供这些人员等待征召的地位待在其本国之时联合国不负担任何费用因为他们将在本国军队中履行正常的职务本小组建议秘书长向会员国概要介绍这项建议连同执行细则以便在现行待命安排制度参数范围内立即执行 114. 然而这种应急军事外勤规划和联络人员能力还不足以确保部队的协调一致我们认为要成为一支协调一致的部队各特遣部队本身至少应按共同的标准装备和接受训练再由各特遣队指挥层级的共同规划予以补充最理想的是他们能有机会进行联合野战演习训练 115. 如果联合国的军事计划人员评定在执行一项行动任务时需要一个旅约5 000人才足以有效地阻止或应付暴力挑战那么联合国行动的军事部门就应当编制一个旅予以部署而不应由一些彼此互不熟悉对方原则领导和行动惯例的营混合编成这个旅的人员应来自如上所述在制订共同训练与装备标准共同原则共同的部队行动指挥安排方面一直协力合作的一组国家最理想的当然就是联合国待命安排制度应有几支旅级统一指挥部队外加必要的支援部队如需开展传统的维和行动则可以在30 天内全面部署如需开展复杂的行动则可以在90 天内全面部署 116. 为此联合国应当制订部队参加联合国维和行动所需满足的最低训练装备及其它标准会员国若有财力可以结成合作伙伴在联合国待命安排制度下向较不发达的部队派遣国提供财政装备训练或其它援助使它们能够达到并维持上述最低标准目的是让如此组建的每一个旅都有比较高的素质都能够召集有效的业务支助这样的编队一直是一组创建常设高度戒备旅的国家的目标这些国家已经在指挥一级建立了日常一起工作的规划单位不过目的不是要以这种拟议安排为手段解除某些国家积极参与联合国维和行动的责任或者阻止较小的国家参与这种行动 117. 关于军事人员的重要建议摘要 (a) 应当酌情鼓励各会员国彼此合作在联合国待命安排制度待命制度的范围内组成几支旅级统一指挥部队外加必要的支援部队随时准备在安17 A/55/305 S/2000/809 全理事会通过决议设立传统维和行动的30 天内或设立复杂维和行动的90 天内进行有效部署 (b) 应当授权秘书长一旦看来可能达成停火协议或协定设想联合国发挥执行作用就正式征求参加待命制度的会员国的意见问它们是否愿意派遣部队参加可能开展的行动 (c) 秘书处作为标准措施应当在部署之前派遣一个小组核实每个可能派遣部队的国家是否作好准备履行谅解备忘录有关必要训练和装备要求的各项规定不符合要求的国家就不应调派部队 (d) 小组建议在待命制度中拟订一个大约包括100 名军官的循环待征召名单以备在接到通知7 天内用接受过为新的维和行动建立特派团总部训练的小队扩充维和部核心规划人员 D. 民警 118. 就参与联合国维持和平行动的国际人员人数而言民警仅次于军队在处理国内冲突的行动方面, 可能仍非常需要民警来协助一个饱受战祸蹂躏社会恢复各种条件以促进社会经济和政治稳定由民警监测和培训的地方警察部队公平和公正对于维持一个安全和稳定的环境极为重要并且当恐吓和犯罪网络继续妨碍政治和经济方面的进展时地方警察部队发挥功效是不可或缺的 119. 因此小组见上文第39 40和47 b 段极力主张在利用民警从事联合国和平行动方面作出原则性的改变除了传统的咨询培训和监测任务之外主要集中注意地方警察部队的改革和重组在各会员国为满足目前的需求都已面临种种困难时上述改变将需要它们向联合国提供更加有素和专业的警务专家截至2000 年8 月1 日为止为联合国各项行动核准的8 641个警察员额仍有25 的空缺 120. 虽然各会员国派遣军事单位参与联合国和平行动可能会面临种种国内政治困难但各国政府为和平行动提供民警所面临的政治牵制则比较少不过各会员国在这方面仍有一些实际困难因为各国的警察力量的规模和结构往往只适合本国需求 121. 在这种情况下为特派团服务选定警察和相关的司法专家让其离职再加以训练的过程通常相当耗时使联合国无法迅速有效地部署特派团的民警部门况且特派团的警察部门可能由从多至40 个国家抽调来的警察组成他们彼此从未见过几乎没有任何联合国工作经验相关的训练或针对特派团任务的简报并且他们维持治安的做法和原则也可能大不相同此外民警通常在六个月至一年之后即调离行动所有这些因素都使各特派团的民警专员很难将这一批散乱的员警转变成团结有效的力量 122. 因此小组吁请各会员国在联合国待命安排制度范围内设立一批国家服勤警察备选人员如有必要可由符合专业和体格要求的最近退休警察予以支援这些警察符合行政和体格要求随时备供联合国和平行动部署这批备选人员的规模自然随每个国家的大小和实力而各不相同维和部民警股应通过确定所需的专长和专门知识并公布关于专业标准的共同准则协助各会员国决定这批备选警察的选择标准和训练需求一些部署于联合国特派团民警应至少服务一年以确保最低限度的连续性 123. 小组认为如果警察派遣国开展联合培训操练则可进一步促进警察部门的团结因此建议各会员国斟酌建立新的区域性训练伙伴关系并加强目前的伙伴关系根据联合国颁布的准则标准作业程序和业绩标准小组也吁请能够提供援助的各会员国向较小的警察派遣国提供援助训练和设备以维持必要程度的待命状态 124. 小组也建议各会员国在其政府结构中指定单一的联络点负责协调和管理向联合国和平行动提供警务人员的工作 125. 小组认为秘书长应当能够在很短时间内集合高级民警规划人员和技术专家最好预先具备联合国特派团经验同总部的特派团规划人员联络然后调至外地按照安全理事会所核准的方式协助设立特18 A/55/305 S/2000/809 派团的民警总部采取类似军事总部待征召名单和程序的待命安排一旦被征召待征召名单上人员将同联合国行动中其他民警享有相同的合同和法律地位待征召名单人员的训练和部署安排也可同与其对应的军事人员相同此外在开始一项新的行动时军方和个别名单上民警间的联合训练和规划将进一步促进特派团各部门间的团结与合作 126. 关于民警人员的重要建议摘要 (a) 鼓励各会员国在联合国待命安排制度范围内各自设立国家民警备选人员库一接通知即随时备供联合国和平行动调度 (b) 鼓励各会员国为各自国家备选人员库内的民警建立区域性训练伙伴关系以便根据联合国将颁布的准则标准作业程序和业绩标准提高待命状态的共同水平 (c) 鼓励各会员国在其政府结构内指定单一的联络点负责向联合国和平行动提供民警 (d) 小组建议在待命制度内编制一份包括约100 名警察和有关专家的循环待征召名单在接到通知七天后即可提供经过训练的工作队以创设新的维持和平行动的民警部门训练即将到来的人员和及早促使该部门更为团结一致 (e) 小组建议为司法刑事人权和其他相关专家作出类似上面建议a (b)和(c)的安排他们将同专家民警组成综合法治工作队 E. 文职专家 127. 迄今为止秘书处一直未能适时地物色征聘和部署足够的适当合格文职人员来从事实务和支助职务目前在六个月至一年前成立仍急需必要专家的各特派团中实务领域约有50 的外地员额和行政和后勤领域多达40 的员额仍然出缺有些已部署的人员发现他们的职位与其过去的经验不符合例如在联合国东帝汶过渡行政当局东帝汶过渡当局和科索沃特派团的民政管理部门此外征聘率几乎与离职率相当因为特派团人员对其所处工作条件感到厌倦包括对工作人员不足这一现象本身的不满出缺率和更替率偏高预示开展和维持下一个复杂的维持和平行动的前景颇不乐观并妨碍目前各特派团的充分部署这些问题还由于一些因素而益形严重 1. 缺乏待命系统以回应突然或暴增的需求 128. 向新一代维持和平行动指派的每一项新的复杂任务都引起联合国系统无法一接通知即可满足的需求这种现象最初是在1990 年代初期出现当时为执行和平协定创建了下列行动柬埔寨过渡时期联合国权力机构联合国萨尔瓦多观察团联合国安哥拉核查团和联合国莫桑比克行动联合国系统尽力设法在接到通知后立即征聘下列方面的专家选举援助经济重建和复兴人权监测无线电和电视制作司法事务和机构建立到九十年代中期该系统已建立一批骨干人员他们在这些领域内取得在职专门知识这是该系统内前所未见的不过由于将在下面说明的一些理由他们当中许多人已离开联合国系统 129. 1999 年秘书处再次意外接获任务当时它必须为特派团配置人员承担在东帝汶和科索沃的治理职责秘书处内或联合国各机构基金或规划署内很少有人具备管理市政府或国家部会所需的技术专门知识和经验各会员国本身也无法立即填补所缺人员因为它们也没有事先规划在各本国机构内物色现成的合格人选此外人员不足的过渡行政特派团本身甚至花了些时间才能确定它们究竟需要什么最后有几个会员国主动提出人选有些无需联合国支付费用以满足需求的一些重要要素不过秘书处并没有完全采用这些人选部分是为了避免在特派团人员配置上发生一边倒的地域分配现象个别会员国接管整个行政部门部门责任的想法也得到支持但显然由于提出太迟以致未能搞定细节至少对提供具备专门知识的小型民政人员工作队而言这个想法值得重新考虑 19 A/55/305 S/2000/809 130. 秘书处需要编制和维持一份文职人选名册以便迅速回应确保质量控制甚至满足可预见的需求量这一名册与待命制度分开应包括经积极物色在个人基础上选出或是通过联合国大家庭成员政府政府间和非政府组织的夥伴关系和/或协助选出经事先审查约谈事先选定和体检合格的各种不同领域的个别人士的姓名以及向其提供一般适用于外地特派团服务的基本情况材料并且这些人选已表明当他们接到通知立即可以报到 131. 目前还没有这样的名册因此必须给各会员国联合国各部门和机构以及各特派团本身打紧急电话在最后一分钟确定适当人选然后指望这些人选能够立即放下一切通过这种办法秘书处在去年勉力征聘和部署了至少1 500名新工作人员其中不包括联合国系统内管理下调动的现有工作人员但质量控制有所减损 132. 应按照上面提议的方式建立利用中央内联网编制的名册由和平与安全执行委员会有关成员加以利用和维持该名册应包括该委员会成员同意让他们离职以便为特派团服务的其本身工作人员的姓名将需要增拨资源来维持这些名册但可通过互联网自动提醒获选的外部人员刷新他们自己的档案,特别是关于是否可任职的信息也应可从互联网取得联机简报和训练材料根据秘书处为确保公平地域和性别分配将颁布的准则应当授权外地特派团利用名册进行征聘 2. 吸引和留住最佳外聘人员的困难 133. 虽然征聘制度一直采用个案处理办法但联合国在整个1990 年代勉力征聘到一些杰出和忠于职守的个人从事外地任务他们在柬埔寨管理投票在索马里闪避子弹及时撤离利比里亚并来到前南斯拉夫接受炮火洗礼这些都成为他们日常生活的一部分然而联合国系统迄今尚未找出一种合同机制适当地确认和酬谢他们的服务为他们提供工作保障虽然的确曾经明确告诉特派团征聘人员,不要对未来雇用抱有幻想因为外聘人员是用来满足临时需求这种服务条件不可能长期吸引和留住绩优工作者一般而言需要重新考虑历来对维持和平所持的一种流行看法即视之为一种短暂的异常现象而不是联合国的核心职责 134. 因此至少对一部分的最佳外聘人员应当在他们目前的限期合同之外给予较长期的职业前途并且应当积极征聘其中一些人来充任秘书处复杂紧急情况部门的职位以增加总部具有外地经验的工作人员人数人数有限的特派团征聘人员已经设法在总部得到工作但显然属个别个案性质而且非按照一种一致的透明战略得到的 135. 目前正在拟定建议处理这种情况只要有可能将使在外地服务四年的特派团征聘人员获得继续任命不象目前的合同这些任命将不限于特定的任务期限这种倡议如被采纳将有助于解决那些于九十年代中期加入外地工作现在仍然留在系统内的工作人员的问题不过这些建议可能还不足以吸引新的征聘人员他们通常一次只能接受六个月至一年的外派任务而不一定知道一旦外派任务完成后他们是否还有职位必须过着四年提心吊胆的日子这种想法可能吓跑了了一些最佳人选特别是那些有家有眷又有很多其他就业机会往往具有更具竞争性的服务条件的人因此应当考虑对在和平行动中至少服务两年表现优异的外聘人员给予继续任命 3. 担任中级和高级行政和支助职务的人员不足 136. 整个1990 年代期间联合国和平行动一直为主要行政领域采购财务预算人事和后勤支助领域合同管理人员工程师信息系统分析后勤规划人员的人员短缺现象所困扰本组织的行政规则条例和内部程序的独特和特定性质使未经充分训练的新聘人员无法在特派团开办阶段的不断变化情况下承担这些行政和后勤职务虽在1995 年开展了这些人员的特别培训方案这些方案尚待制度化因为最有经验的人亦即未来的训练员放不下他们的专任职责一般来说当新的特派团急需配置工作人20 A/55/305 S/2000/809 员时首先搁置的项目就是培训和编制方便用户的准则文件因此1992 年外勤行政手册的增订本仍然只是草稿 4. 有害无益的外地部署 137. 熟悉各项规则条例和程序的总部工作人员并不轻易地被部署到外地行政和实务两个领域的工作人员都必须自愿申请到外地工作而且必须经过其主管同意让这些人离职各部门的主管人员常常阻止劝阻和/或拒绝让其工作成绩最好的人员调往外地工作因为其本身办公室称职的人员短缺主管担心临时替换的人员无法解决这种短缺问题同时可能的志愿申请人失去兴趣的原因是还有他们知道有些同事就是因为没见到就没想到而错过了升级出于安全因素外勤业务大多属于不带家属的任务这也使自愿申请的人数减少有一些比较侧重外地业务的联合国机构基金和规划署如难民专员办事处世界粮食计划署粮食计划署儿童基金会联合国人口基金人口基金开发计划署确实拥有一些在维持和平业务方面可能很合格的候选人但是也面临着资源短缺的牵制而且一般都优先考虑其本身外地业务的工作人员配置需要 138. 人力资源管理厅在一些部门间工作组的支持下建议了一系列循序渐进的改革以处理其中的一些问题改革需要在秘书处内部具有流动性旨在通过考虑晋升时奖励外地出差服务经历以鼓励总部与外地之间人员的轮调改革力图缩短征聘过程中的耽搁并且授予部门主管充分的征聘权力小组认为尽快批准这些倡议是至关重要的 5. 外勤业务类别的陈旧性 139. 外勤业务是联合国内部专门为维持和平行动服务制订的唯一类别其服务条件与合同也相应地制订而薪金和福利完全由特派团的预算来支付但是这一类别现已没有多大价值因为联合国组织没有拨出足够的资源用于外勤事务干事的职业发展这一类别是1950 年代设立的以便特别为支助维持和平行动的军事特遣队提供具有高度机动性的一支技术专家骨干随着维和行动性质的变化要求外勤事务干事发挥的职能也有了变化到1980年代末和1990 年代初有些人员最终逐级晋升并在维持和平行动的行政与后勤方面担任了管理职务 140. 现在这批人中最有经验和最有经历的人数有限部署在目前的维和特派团而许多已到达或接近退休年龄剩下的许多人缺乏有效经管复杂和平行动关键行政部门所需的管理技能或训练其他一些人的技术知识已经过时因此外勤部门的人员组成已不再符合较新一代维持和平行动的所有或许多行政与后勤支助需要因此小组鼓励紧急修改外勤事务处的组成和设置的理由以便更密切地配合现在和今后外地行动的需求并特别重视关键行政与后勤方面的中层和高层管理人员对这一类别人员进行的持续性工作人员发展与培训也应当作为高度优先来对待并应当修订其服务条件以便吸引并挽留最佳人选 6. 和平行动缺乏员额配置通盘战略 141. 任何行动都没有一套保证文职人员适当组合的全面性工作员额配置战略联合国系统内部有些人才必须挖掘利用并通过对外征聘填补空缺而两者之间还有各种各样的其他选择例如使用联合国志愿人员分包合同人员商业性服务机构以及在各国国内征聘的工作人员联合国在过去十年已经利用了所有这些工作人员的来源但所用的方法是个案考虑而非依据一项全球性战略需要这样一种战略来保证成本效用并促进特派团的连贯性和工作人员的士气 142. 这项员额配置战略应当优先处理维持和平行动中使用联合国志愿人员的问题自1992 年以来已有4 千多名联合国志愿人员在19 个不同的和平行动中服务仅在过去18 个月内就有大约1 500 名联合国志愿人员被派往驻东帝汶科索沃和塞拉利昂的新的特派团在民政管理选举事务人权行政与后勤支助方面起了作用联合国志愿人员在其工作领域里历来证明是忠心耿耿而且十分称职的立法机21 A/55/305 S/2000/809 构已根据联合国志愿人员过去可资典范的工作表现而鼓励在维持和平行动多加利用此类人员但是将联合国志愿人员当作廉价劳力使用就可能损害这一方案并可能破坏特派团人员的积极性与许多联合国志愿人员并肩工作的一些同事尽管职务相类似但薪金是志愿人员的三至四倍维和部目前正与联合国志愿人员方案商讨准备缔结一项关于在维持和平行动中使用联合国志愿人员的全球性谅解备忘录将这一项备忘录纳入更广泛的和平行动员额配置通盘战略是至关重要的 143. 这项战略尤其还应当包括关于设立文职人员待命安排制度的详尽建议该项制度应当包括编制一份经事先选定通过体格检查并取得其本单位承诺派遣的联合国系统内工作人员名单以便能在接到通知后72 小时内加入特派团的开办小组应当把权力和职责授予联合国大家庭的各相关成员让各种职业群组在其各自专业知识的范围内主动与政府间组织和非政府组织结成合作伙伴关系并签订谅解备忘录以便提供人员补充由联合国系统内部抽调组成的特派团开办小组 144. 外地行政和后勤司后勤司只要有一点时间就自行采取行动独力担负起制订全球员额配置战略及文职人员待命安排的责任这事实本身就表明秘书处没有充分重视这一至关重要的问题特派团由上而下的员额配置也许是特派团任务取得成功的最重要基石之一因此这一问题应得到秘书处高级管理人员最优先的关注 145. 关于文职专家的重要建议摘要 (a) 秘书处应当利用中央因特网/内联网编制一份事先选定,接到通知后即可调派到和平行动的文职候选人名册应当授权各外地特派团利用这一名册根据秘书处即将颁发的公平地域和性别分配指导方针从名册上征聘人选 (b) 应当重新组成外勤业务类别人员以反映所有和平行动经常面临的需求特别是对行政与后勤方面中高级人员的需求 (c) 外聘文职工作人员的服务条件应予修订使联合国能够吸引最合格的候选人并在此后向工作杰出的人员提供更好的职业前途 (d) 维和部应当为和平行动制订一项员额配置通盘战略其中除其他问题外概要规定联合国志愿人员的使用接到通知后72 小时内提供文职人员的待命安排从而便利特派团的开办以及如何在和平与安全执行委员会各成员之间分担执行这项战略的责任 F. 新闻能力 146. 在特派任务地区建设有效的新闻和通讯能力是使联合国几乎所有和平行动开展业务的必要条件有效的通讯有助于破除谣言纠正误传并取得当地居民的合作它可以在与相互抗争的集团领袖打交道时提供讨价还价的手段加强联合国人员的安全并作为一种增加力量的工具因此每一项和平行动都必须特别是为特派团任务的关键方面制订发动新闻宣传的战略而且这类战略以及为执行战略所需要的人员必须纳入第一批部署的人员以便帮助开办新的特派团 147. 外地特派团需要称职的发言人发言人应当纳入高层管理小组并每天向全世界反映该团的面貌为有效开展工作发言人必须具有新闻采访经验和本能并了解特派团和联合国总部的运作方式此人还必须得到秘书长特别代表的信任并与特派团其他领导成员建立良好关系因此秘书处必须加紧努力罗致并挽留一批这种备选人员 148. 联合国外勤业务还必须能够有效地与其本身的人员通话使工作人员随时了解特派团的政策与事态发展并且在各部门之间以及在由下到上和由上到下的指令发布各环节之间建立联系新的信息技术为这种通讯提供了有效的工具应当包括布林迪西联合国后勤基地所储存的开办装备包和设备储存内 149. 应当按照特派团的任务规模和需要并为了传播和平行动的信息建立有效的内部通讯联系之需22 A/55/305 S/2000/809 要增拨专用于新闻的资源和有关工作人员以及信息技术的资源而这方面的资源现在很少超过特派团业务预算的百分之一 150. 关于快速部署新闻能力的重要建议摘要在特派团预算中应当增拨专用于新闻有关工作人员和信息技术的资源以便传播和平行动的信息并建立有效的内部通讯联系 G. 后勤支助采购过程及开支的管理 151. 由于联合国设备储存用罄甚至连系统合同的筹备时间都十分冗长采购过程中的瓶颈以及为在外地进行采购取得手头现金的时间被耽搁进一步阻碍特派团的快速部署和有效运作尽管该团已经达到了核准的工作人员数量如果没有有效的后勤支助特派团就无法有效开展工作 152. 联合国为特派团的开办和全面部署需要而向外地特派团提供基本设备与商业服务所需的筹备时间受联合国采购程序的左右这一程序又受到大会颁布的财务条例和细则以及秘书处对这些条例和细则联合国术语称之为政策与程序的解释的规范这些条例细则政策与程序转化成总部在向外地特派团提供设备与服务时所必须遵循的大致八个步骤 1. 确定需求提出请购单 2. 证明有采购物品的资金可用 3. 发布招标书或报价征求书 4. 评价投标 5. 向总部合同委员会提案 6. 发放合同并发出生产的定单 7. 等待物品的生产 8. 向工作团运交物品 153. 多数政府组织和商业公司也遵循类似的程序但并非都象向联合国那样耗时冗长例如按联合国的这整个程序采购办公室家具需要长达24个星期发电机需要17 至21 个星期预制营房需要23 至27 个星期重型车辆需要27 个星期而通讯设备需要17 至21 个星期当然,如果大多数采购仅能在和平行动设立之后才开始那么这样的筹备时间就无法使特派团在规定时限内全面部署 154. 联合国是于1990 年代中期维持和平行动高潮阶段开始创设开办装备包概念以便部分地解决这一问题开办装备包含设立并在部署后最初100天内维持100人的特派团和总部的基本设备需要所需物品已事先购置包装妥善在布林迪西随时准备部署到实地然后把装备包所部署特派团的摊款用于设置新的开办装备包特派团结束之后可再用和耐用设备就送回布林迪西成为开办装备包以外的设备储存 155. 但是由于轻型车辆和其他物品在战后环境经历磨损有时候可能使运送和维修费用比转售该项物品或拆除使用零件,然后购买全新物品更为昂贵因此联合国逐渐趋向于更经常地就地拍卖这些物品尽管秘书处未获授权使用此一程序所得资金购买新设备而是必须把资金退还会员国应当考虑帮助秘书处使用通过这些方式所取得的资金来购买在布林迪西储备的新设备此外还应当在联合国驻地协调员的协商之下考虑普通授权各外地特派团至少将此类设备的某个百分比捐赠给当地声誉较好的非政府组织作为援助新生公民社会发展的一种方式 156. 无论如何这些开办装备包和设备的储备看来已大大便利了1990 年代中期和末期较小型和平行动的快速部署工作不过新特派团的设立和扩大现在速度已超过现有和平行动的关闭结束以至于联合国后勤基地几乎已用罄特派团全面部署所需筹备期较长的物品除非目前进行的一个大型和平行动今天结束其设备全部完好地运回后勤基地联合国手头将不会有在不久将来为支助部署大型特派团的开办和快速全面部署所需的设备 157. 当然联合国在后勤基地或其他地方能够和应当储备的设备数量是有限度的储存的机械设备需要23 A/55/305 S/2000/809 维修而这是费用高昂的办法如果处理不当会使特派团接到长期等待但无法使用的设备此外国家一级的商业和公共部门已越来越趋向于现用现到的存货和/或现用现到的交货因为让可能在相当一段时间内不会调用的设备占用资金其机会成本高昂而且由于目前技术发展速度很快有些物品例如通讯设备和信息系统硬件在几个月内更不用说几年内便过时了 158. 因此联合国在过去几年内也朝这一方向发展并且订立了大约20 项长期性的商业系统合同以便为和平行动提供通用设备特别是特派团开办和扩大所需设备根据系统合同联合国已能通过事先选定供应商并指示它们随时待命进行生产而大大缩短了筹备时间但是根据目前的系统合同轻型车辆的生产需要14 个星期而送货另外需要4 个星期 159. 大会采取了一些步骤解决这一筹备时间问题维持和平储备基金的设立其全额核定资金将达1亿5 千万美元提供了一笔常备备用款项可以迅速提取秘书长可以征求行政和预算问题咨询委员会行预咨委会批准从基金提取高达5 千万美元的款额以便利新特派团的开办或现有特派团事先未能预见的扩充一旦特派团预算得到批准或者增加该基金就从预算得到补充超过5 千万美元的承付要求则需大会批准 160. 在例外情况下大会根据行预咨委会的意见授权秘书长在提交需时数月才能编妥的必要详尽概算编列之前便先承付最多达2 亿美元开支用于帮助较大型特派团的开办东帝汶过渡当局科索沃特派团和联刚特派团这些都是令人欢迎的发展并表明会员国支持加强联合国组织快速部署的能力 161. 同时所有这些发展都只是在通过了安全理事会决议批准设置特派团或其先遣队之后才适用的除非某些上述措施在斯望的特派团部署日期以前早已采用或者稍作修改以便帮助和维持采购需要很长筹备时间的设备的最低储备那么所建议快速和有效部署的目标就无法达成 162. 因此秘书处应当制定一项全球后勤支助战略使之能够在所拟议的部署时间安排范围内快速有效地部署特派团制定这一战略的依据应当是对应当储存的长筹备期物品的适当储存量和那些在考虑到必要时缩短交货时间所造成的费用之后仍认为最好通过长期合同购置的物品进行成本效益分析以便支持这种战略和平与安全部门的实务单位将需要向后勤计划人员提供设置时间可能需要12至18个月的和平行动的估计数量与类型秘书长应当定期向大会提交执行这项战略的详尽建议供其审查和批准这项战略将会引起相当多的经费问题 163. 目前阶段大会应当授权和批准一项一次性开支以便在布林迪西设置三个新的开办装备包使总数达到五套其后将由调用开办装备包的特派团的预算自动补充 164. 应当授权秘书长在安全理事会通过一项决议批准设立特派团以前但经行预咨委会核准从维持和平储备基金提取最多达5 千万美元以便在拟议的时间安排范围内便利快速有效地部署行动基金应当自动由使用上述款项的特派团以其分摊会费来补充如果秘书长认为由于非常迅速地陆续设立好几个特派团以致用尽了基金的资金则应当请大会考虑扩大基金的规模 165. 外地特派团常常在开办以后很久仍须等待好几个月才能收到所需的物品特别是如果原先的规划假定不准确或者特派团的需要由于新发展有了变化情况更是如此即使这些物品可以在当地获得但当地采购也受一些限制首先外地特派团的灵活性和权力有限例如不能将某一预算项目下节余的资金转用于支付意外需求第二特派团一般仅受权在每次订购中采购最多20 万美元的物资超过这一数额的采购必须转送总部按上述八个步骤决策程序进行 166. 小组支持采取一些措施减少总部对外地特派团的琐碎管理并使各团能够有必要的权力和灵活性维持该团的信用和效率而同时又要它们对工作负责但是如果总部的参与能够实际增加价值例24 A/55/305 S/2000/809 如在长期合同方面的价值总部就应保留采购方面的职责 167. 采购司的统计数字表明1999 年总部为支助和平行动所提交采购价值20万至50万美元的货物与服务的184 张定购订单93 涉及飞机和运输服务机动车辆和计算机其采购或者是通过国际投标进行或者目前列在系统合同内提供只要系统合同能迅速执行从而能及时提供货物和服务总部参与这类工作看来是有理的一般推测系统合同与国际投标使得大宗购买货物与服务可以比在当地采购更便宜而且在许多情况下还涉及特派任务地区完全没有的货物与服务 168. 但是对于系统合同或者长期商业服务合同不包括而且在当地能够很容易以较低价格购得的货物与服务总部的参与能为采购程序增加多少实际价值就不完全清楚了在这种情况下授权外地采购这些物品并通过审计机制监督采购程序及其财务管制大有道理因此秘书处应当将外地的能力建设列为高度优先例如通过征聘和训练适当的外地人员和编制方便用户的指导文件使之对于当地现有而且系统合同或长期商业服务合同并不包括的货物与服务尽快承担更高层级的采购权力依特派团的规模和需要最多达1 百万美元 169. 关于后勤支助与开支管理的重要建议摘要 (a) 秘书处应当制订一项全球后勤支助战略以便能在所建议的时间安排范围内并根据维持和平行动部实务性办事处所制订的规划假定迅速有效地部署特派团 (b) 大会应当授权和批准一笔一次性开支以便在布林迪西至少维持5 份特派团开办装备包其中应包括能可迅速部署的通讯设备这些开办装备包随后应当由高调用这些装备包的和平行动的摊款拨供资金进行例行补充 (c) 一旦明确可能设置和平行动则应授权秘书长经行预咨委会核准在安全理事会通过决议之前便可从维持和平储备基金提取最多不超过5千万美元的款项 (d) 秘书处应当审查整个采购政策与程序酌情向大会建议对财务条例和细则的修正以便利特别是在所建议的时间安排范围内快速全面地部署和平行动 (e) 秘书处应当审查指导外地特派团财务资源管理的政策与程序以便使外地特派团在管理其预算时能更加灵活得多 (f) 秘书处应当增加授权外地特派团采购的数额按特派团的规模和需要从20 万美元至100 万美元之巨以采购当地现有而系统合同或长期商业服务合同又不包括的所有货物与服务 四. 总部用来规划和支持维持和平行动的资源和结构 170. 为和平行动创立有效的总部支持能力意味着解决数量结构和质量三大问题即派遣这项工作所需的工作人员人数能够促使提供有效支持的组织结构和程序以及这些结构内高质量的工作人员和工作方法小组在本节大体上就头两个问题展开审查和提出建议小组在下文第六节讨论人员质素和组织文化的问题 171. 小组认为明确需要增加用于支持维持和平行动的资源维持和平行动部 (维和部)尤其需要增加资源该部门是负责规划和支持联合国最复杂最明确的外地行动的首要部门 A. 总部支持维持和平行动的人员编制水平和供资情况 172. 总部为了规划和支持外地的所有维持和平行动而在人员编制和有关费用方面的开支可以视为联合国用于维持和平行动的直接非外地支持费用在过去的五年中这些开支从来没有超出维持和平行动费用总额的6 见表4.1 现在所占的比例接近3 在目前的维持和平预算年将降到2 以下其依25 A/55/305 S/2000/809 据是一些特派团现在制定了扩展计划如刚果民主共和国境内的联刚观察团其他特派团得到充分部署如塞拉利昂境内的联塞特派团并在厄立特里亚和埃塞俄比亚设立一个新的特派团对于一名熟悉庞大组织不管是公共组织还是私营组织的运作要求的管理分析人员来说如果该组织运作大量部署在外地的单位那么该分析人员完全可以得出结论即一个组织如果努力用2 的中央支持费用来运作以外地为中心的宏伟计划那么向外地人员提出的支持就会不足在这一过程中很可能会耗尽该组织的支持结构 173. 表4.1列出了1996年中期至2001年中期维持和平行动的预算总额维持和平的预算周期为每年7 月至第二年6 月有6 个月与联合国的经常预算周期并列该表还列举了总部支持维持和平行动的费用总额不管这些费用是来自维和部内部还是外部也不管是来自经常预算还是来自维持和平行动支助帐户经常预算为期两年预算费用由会员国根据经常会费分摊比额表进行分摊支助帐户为期一年预算费用按照维持和平会费分摊比额表进行分摊期限设定为一年的目的是秘书处的人员编制情况应该随着外地行动的情况而上下波动 表4.1 1996 年2001 年总部支持费用总额与维持和平行动预算总额的比率 以百万美元计 1996 年7 月-1997年6月 1997 年7 月-1998年6月 1998 年7 月-1999年6月 1999 年7 月-2000年6月 2000 年7 月-2001年6月 a 维持和平预算 1 260 911.7 812.9 1 417 2 582b 相关的总部 支持费用 c 49.2 52.8 41.0 41.7 50.2 总部外地 费用比率 3.90% 5.79% 5.05% 2.95% 1.94% a 根据秘书长提出的各份经费筹措报告不包括2000年6月30日之前已完成的特派团包括为充分部署联刚观察团而作出的大致概算该团还没有拟订预算 b 估计数 c 数字来自联合国财务主任包括由两年期经常预算和支助帐户供资的秘书处所有员额主要在维和部以及由于一些国家提供实物捐助或免费提供的人员而在经费方面的节省等因素 174. 支助帐户向维和部提供85 的预算经费即每年4000 万美元另外拨给维和部的600 万美元来自两年期经常预算两笔加起来共4600 万美元为维和部的231名文职军事和警察专业人员以及173名一般事务人员但不包括排雷行动处该处由自愿捐助供资的薪金和相关费用提供大部分经费支助帐户也为秘书处其他部门从事维持和平支持工作的员额提供经费如管理事务部采购司的某些部分及维持和平经费筹措司法律事务厅和新闻部 175. 直至1990 年代中期支助帐户一直是按维持和平行动文职工作人员费用总额的8.5%计算但没有考虑到做支持工作的民警人员和联合国志愿人员的费用也没有考虑到做支持工作的私人承包商或军队的费用固定百分比的方法由一种新方法取代即每年要对该帐户供资的每个员额提出正当的理由然而维和部的人员编制水平在新制度下没有什么增加部分原因是秘书处似乎过于容忍谦让完全不超出它认为政治市场所能承受的限度 176. 很明显维和部以及向维持和平工作提供支持的秘书处其他各厅应该在一定程度上随着外地活动的水平而进行扩展和收缩但要求维和部每年都要对该部门八分之七的员额重新考虑似乎是把该部门作为临时设置的部门来对待似乎维持和平是本组织的一个临时职责五十二年的行动说明正好相反而最近的历史将进一步证明持续地做好准备是至关重要的即使在外地活动处于低潮时也是如此正如维和部在过去的两年里痛苦地学到的那样很难预料将发生什么事情而一旦丧失工作人员的能力和经验就需要很长时间才能重新积累起来 177. 由于支助帐户向维和部的供资几乎都是逐年进行的因此由支助帐户供资的维和部和其他各厅在经费和员额方面没有可以预料的基准水平使他们无法征聘和留住工作人员通过支助帐户供资员额从外地调入的人员不知道一年之后那些员额是否还会存在在支助帐户供资所造成的目前工作条件差和职业不稳定的情况下维和部能维持下去就很不错了 26 A/55/305 S/2000/809 178. 各会员国和秘书处早就认识到必须确定一个人员编制/经费基准水平并界定使维和部能够根据不断变化的需求进行增长和收缩的另一种机制然而如果不能根据一些客观的管理和生产力标准来审查维和部的人员编制需求就难以确定一个适当的基准尽管现在还无法从方法上对维和部进行一次管理审查小组认为这样一次审查还是应该进行的同时小组认为某些目前存在的工作人员短缺现象非常明显应该得到突出强调 179. 由联合国军事顾问领导的维和部军事人员和民警司的核准人数为32 名军官和9 名民警警官民警股被派去支持联合国国际警察行动的各个方面从提出理论到挑选并部署警官到外地行动目前该股能做的只不过是确定人员努力用来访的甄选援助小组对这些人员进行预先筛选这项工作占用了大约一半工作人员然后力求他们抵达外地不过在维和部内部或者联合国系统的任何其他部门都没有一个股来负责维和行动法治部分的规划和支持工作反过来说不管是在咨询方面还是在执行方面这种工作都能支持有效的警察工作 180. 军事顾问办公室的十一名干事支持所有维和行动中军事单位的确定和轮换事宜向维和部的政治干事提供军事方面的建议人们还希望维和部的军事干事能找出时间在会员国一级培训培训者起草各种准则手册和其它情况介绍材料并与后勤司一起确定外地特派团军事和警察部分的后勤和其它业务需求然而根据目前的人员编制水平培训股总共只有五名军事干事军事规划处的十名干事是维和部内主要的业务一级军事特派团规划人员还有六个员额已经核准但还没有人填补总共16 名规划干事就是现有的军事工作人员的全部编制他们负责确定特派团的启动和扩充的所需兵力参与进行技术调查并且评估潜在的部队派遣国的准备情况在原来核准的10 名军事规划人员中一个被派去起草给所有行动的部队指挥官的接触规则和命令目前只有一名干事负责管理待命制度数据库他还是兼职的 181. 表4.2 对军事和警察特遣队已经部署的人数与各自的总部支持人员核准人数进行了比较没有一个国家的政府会派遣27000 名士兵到外地而总部只有32名军官向他们提供实质性和行动上的军事指导没有任何警察组织会部署8000名警官而总部只有9 名工作人员向他们提供实质性和行动上的警务支助 表4.2 总部的军事和民警工作人员与外地的军事和民警工作人员的比率a 军事人员 民警 维持和平行动 27 365 8 641 总部 32 9 总部与外地的比率 0.1% 0.1% a 2000年6月15日的核准军事人员人数2000年8月1日的民警核准人数 182. 特定维持和平行动的政治主管干事或实质性协调中心由维和部的行动厅负责该厅的人员看起来也严重缺编该厅目前只有15 名专业人员负责作为14 个现有的和2 个可能设置的新和平行动的协调中心平均每个特派团不到一名干事尽管一名干事能够处理一个甚至两个较小的特派团的需要但对于较大的特派团来说如东帝汶境内的东帝汶过渡当局科索沃的科索沃特派团塞拉利昂的联塞特派团和刚果民主共和国的联刚观察团这种情况就难以维持维和部外地行政和后勤司的后勤和人事干事面临的情况与此类似在管理事务部法律事务厅新闻部以及向支持其工作的其它各厅有关支持人员也面临类似的情况表4.3描述了维和部和秘书处其它部门里专门向大型特派团提供支持的全职工作人员总数以及他们每年的特派团预算及核准人员编制水平 183. 工作人员全面短缺的状况意味着在许多情况下关键的人员没有后援当危机在六到十二个时区以外的地点发生时无法派人一天之内值一个班以上除非自己值两个班无法休假生病如果要到特派团看一下自己的大部分后盾工作就要撂下来没27 A/55/305 S/2000/809 人管按照目前的安排各种相互冲突的需求之间进行妥协是不可避免的对外地的支持可能会因此而受到影响在纽约与总部有关的各项任务如向立法机关提交报告等任务往往优先处理因为会员国的代表经常会亲自催促采取行动而相比之下外地在纽约的代表形同一个电子邮件一个电报号码或者一些匆匆记下的电话记录因此在主管干事工作繁忙的情况下外地行动事务常常受到忽略只能靠自己设法解决然而应该给予他们最优先的权利外地的人面临着困难的处境有时会威胁到生命他们应该得到更好的支持希望更有效地支持他们的总部工作人员也应该得到更好的支持 表4.3 派去支持1999 年设立的综合维持和平行动的全职工作人员总数 科索沃特派团科索沃 联塞特派团塞拉利昂 东帝汶过渡当局东帝汶 联刚观察团刚果民主共和国 2000年7月2001年6 月预算概算 4.1 亿美元 4.65亿美元 5.4亿美元 5.35亿美元 目前关键部分的核准人数 4718 名警察 1000 多名国际文职人员 13000 名军事人员 8950名军事人员 1640 名警察 1185 名国际文职人员 5537 名军事人员 500 名军事观察员 总部负责支持这一行动的全职专业人员 1 名政治干事 2 名民警 1 名后勤协调员1名文职征聘专家1 名经费筹措专家 1 名政治干事 2 名军事人员 1 名后勤协调员 1 名经费筹措专家 1 名政治干事 2 名军事人员 1 名民警 1 名后勤协调员 1 名文职征聘专家 1 名经费筹措专家 1 名政治干事 3 名军事人员 1 名民警 1 名后勤协调员 1 名文职征聘专家 1 名经费筹措专家 总部支助工作人员共计 6 5 7 8 184. 尽管维和部的主管干事履行的职能与他们在政治事务部(政治部)各区域司的对手的职能似乎有重叠之处但再仔细审查一下就会发现情况不是这样例如科索沃特派团主管干事在政治部的对手负责跟踪东南欧整个地区的事态发展情况人道协调厅的对手负责整个巴尔干地区加上独立国家联合体部分地区的事务尽管政治部和人道协调厅的干事们也应该有机会各尽所能但他们的工作总和在支持科索沃特派团方面所产生的效果要少于另外增设一名全职同等干事所能产生的效果 185. 行动厅的三个区域主任应该定期访问各特派团并与秘书长特别代表和各部分的领导经常进行政策对话以便了解总部能帮助他们克服哪些障碍相反他们卷入了占用他们主管干事时间的进程因为主管干事们需要后援 186. 这些相互冲突的需求对于主管维持和平行动的副秘书长和助理秘书长来说就更加突出副秘书长和助理秘书长向秘书长提出建议与会员国代表团和各国首都进行联络其中一人对提请秘书长批准签署的每一份维持和平行动报告2000 年前半年有40 份报告进行审查然后再提交给立法机构2000年1 月以来副秘书长和助理秘书长亲自向安理会介绍情况达50 多次会议的持续时间有时达三小时需要外地和总部的工作人员准备若干小时协调会议进一步占用了与外地特派团进行实质性对话的时间占用了访问外地的时间占用了考虑如何改进联合国的维持和平方式的时间也占用了专心进行管理的时间 187. 维和部的实质业务部门面临着人员短缺问题行政和后勤支助领域就更为严重尤其是后勤司在这个关头后勤司不仅向维持和平行动提供支助还28 A/55/305 S/2000/809 向其它外地办事处如被占领土协调员办事处加沙联合国危地马拉核查团联危核查团以及十来个其它小型办事处提供支助无庸赘言还要继续参已结束特派团的清理工作中的管理与调和事务整个后勤司为维持和平及其它外地行动的费用总额大约增加了1.25%的费用如果联合国要将后勤司履行的行政和后勤支助职能分包出去小组相信要用同样的费用找到一个商业公司来承担同样的工作是很困难的 188. 有几个例子可说明后勤司所宣布的工作人员短缺状况后勤司人事管理和支助处(人事处)的员额配置科负责处理所有文职人员的招聘和旅行以及民警和军事观察员的旅行事务该科只有10 名专业人员征聘干事已分配其中四名从事审查该办公室每天收到的150份主动交来的就业申请和发出收信通知的工作另六名干事从事实际的甄选工作科索沃方面一名专职和一名半职东帝汶方面也有一名专职和一名半职还有三名则负责所有其它外地特派团方面的征聘工作这两个文职管理特派团都需要数百名跨越多个领域和学科的有经验行政人员三名征聘干事为这两个特派团配置人员寻找合适候选人而不断努力从开始时至今已有九到十二个月但科索沃特派团和东帝汶过渡当局都还没有全员部署 189. 会员国必须给予秘书长一定的灵活度和财政资源以便招聘他所需要的工作人员确保联合国不会因无法应付一个专业机构应能应付的紧急状况而名誉受损秘书长必须获得资源以提高秘书处对无法预见的需求立即作出反应的能力 190. 为外地的工作人员提供他们工作所需的物品和服务主要是后勤司后勤和通讯处(后勤处)的职责后勤处14 名后勤协调员之一的职务说明也许有助于说明整个后勤处目前所承担的工作量该名协调员不仅是负责在刚果民主共和国特派团(联刚特派团)的扩大工作而且是负责黎巴嫩的联合国驻黎巴嫩临时部队联黎部队的扩增工作的后勤主管规划员该工作人员还要负责为重要的联合国布林迪西后勤基地起草后勤政策和程序并负责协调整个后勤处年度预算报告的编写工作 191. 仅根据这一粗略的描述同时铭记维和部及总部有关的维和支助单位的全部支助费用每年甚至不超过5 000万美元小组深信为该部及其支助单位增加资源将是一项必不可少的投资以确保2001 年会员国在维和行动上花费的20 多亿美元是值得的因此小组建议大幅度增加用于这一目的的资源并促请秘书长向大会提交一份建议充分概述联合国的需求 192. 小组还认为维持和平不应再视为一种临时需求维和部也不应再视为一个临时性的组织结构它要求有一个一贯和可预见的供资基准以便比维持现有的特派团做出更多的事它应拥有足够的资源以便为今后六个月至一年的时间里可能出现的应急情况进行规划研拟管理工具以帮助特派团未来更好地执勤研究现代技术对维和各个方面的潜在影响落实以前维和行动所吸取的经验以及实施内部监督事务厅过去五年来各评价报告所载的建议工作人员应当有机会设计和开展培训班以在总部和外地培训新聘的工作人员他们应当完成那些可以帮助特派团的新聘人员更加专业地和按照联合国的细则条例和程序从事自己的工作的准则和手册但这些准则和手册在维和部的许多办公室里仍处于半完成状态因为它们的编写者在忙于应付其它需求 193. 因此小组建议将总部支助维和的工作视为联合国的核心工作这样其所需经费的绝大部分就应通过联合国的两年期经常方案预算机制来供资它建议在编制下一个经常预算之前秘书长应尽快联络大会要求紧急增补上一次支助帐户的提交数额 194. 资源的具体分配应根据对经费需求进行专业和客观审查的结果来决定但总的水平应反映维持和平的以往经验方法之一是以过去五年里维和之平均费用的某一百分比算出总部维和支助费用的经常预算基准数额这样得出的基准预算将反映秘书处准备承受的预期的工作量根据主计长提供的数字表29 A/55/305 S/2000/809 4.1 过去五年包括本预算年的平均费用为14 亿美元假如将基准数额定为平均费用的5 则得出的基准预算额为7 000万美元大致比目前每年的总部维和支助预算多出2 000 万美元 195. 为给高于平均量或激增的工作量提供经费应当考虑按一简单的百分比对那些维和行动开支预算超过基准数额的特派团计费例如本预算年维和工作约26亿美元的估计经费比14亿美元的假定基准数额超出12 亿美元如果对此12 亿美元附加计费用1 则可增加1 200 万美元这可使总部有效地应付这种工作量的增加如果附加计费用2 则可得出2 400 万美元 196. 这种预备激增能力的直接方法应当取代现行的每年为支助帐户的呈报数额提交必要的员额逐一解释的做法秘书长应当享有灵活度以确定应当怎样最佳利用这些经费以应付工作的激增而且在此种情况下应当采取紧急招聘措施以便与激增经费有关的临时员额可以立即得到填补 197. 关于为总部维和行动支助工作供资的主要建议摘要: (a) 小组建议大幅度增加用于总部维和行动支助工作的资源并促请秘书长向大会提交一份建议充分概述他的需求 (b) 应将总部支助维和的工作视为联合国的核心活动从而用于这方面的所需经费的绝大部分就应通过联合国的两年期经常方案预算机制来提供 (c) 在编制下一个经常预算之前小组建议秘书长尽快联络大会要求紧急增补支助帐户的经费以便立即增聘人员特别是增聘维和部人员 B 关于建立特派团综合工作队的必要和建议 198. 目前维和部没有任何综合规划或综合支助的单位这种综合单位通常包含负责政治分析军事行动民警协助选举人权发展人道主义援助难民和流离失所者新闻后勤财政以及人员征聘等各种事务的人员恰恰相反正如前面所述维和部只有少数几个专职干事从事大型复杂行动的规划和支助工作甚至如塞拉利昂境内联塞特派团科索沃境内科索沃特派团以及东帝汶境内东帝汶过渡当局的规划和支助工作如果是一个政治和平特派团或建立和平办事处的情况则这些职能往往由政治部的人员履行但该部的人力资源同样十分有限 199. 维和部的行动厅负责为新的维和特派团归纳全面的行动设想在这方面它承担了进行政治分析和与维和部内负责军事和民警事项后勤财政以及人事等的其它单位进行内部协调沉重的双重负担但维和部的其它单位都有单独的机构报告链其中许多实际上分布在几个不同的大楼里而且政治部开发计划署人道协调厅难民专员办事处人权专员办事处新闻部以及若干其它部机构基金和方案规划署等都可在任何未来行动特别是复杂行动的规划方面发挥日益重要的作用因而需要正式纳入规划过程 200. 跨司跨部和跨机构的协作确实存在但它们太多依赖个人关系网和临时支助有一些召集起来的工作队目的是为了规划重大的维和行动将系统内的不同部分集合在一起但它们的运作与其说象执行机关不如说是宣传机构而且现有的工作队通常很少开会或者在维和行动一旦开始部署时但离完全部署尚远之前这种工作队甚至就解散了 201. 从相反的角度来说一项行动一旦部署后在外地的秘书长特别代表在特派团地区拥有全面协调联合国活动的权力但在总部却没有一个能够迅速致力解决他们所关心的所有问题的工作协调中心例如维和部里的主管干事或其区域主任负责应付维和行动的政治问题但通常不能直接答复人们对一项行动的军事警察人道主义人权选举法律或其它部分的询问而且在这每个方面他们不一定有现成的对应人员急于寻求答案的特派团最终自己找到应找的主要人员或单位可能要重复数十次才能与秘书处及有关机构的不同单位建立起自己的网络 30 A/55/305 S/2000/809 202. 特派团不应当感到有必要建立自己的联络网他们应当确切地知道应找谁去寻求答案和他们所需的支助这在至关重要的最初几个月里当特派团在努力完成全面部署和应付日常危机时情况尤其是如此而且他们应能够只联系一个地方就得到这些答案这个地方应是包含抽调自总部内与该特派团有着类似职能的各部门/单位的该特派团所需的所有支助人员和专家知识的一个机构小组称该机构为特派团综合工作队 203. 这一概念吸取并大大延伸了维和部与政治部在2000 年6 月的部级联席会议上商定的主导部概念的执行准则所载的合作措施联席会议由秘书长主持小组将会建议例如由维和部与政治部联合确定每一个新工作队的领导人但不一定要将其选择限于该两部现有的工作人员有时候这两个部的区域主任或政治干事现有的工作量使他们无法专门承担这一角色在这种情况下也许最好从外地邀请某人来担任为具有这种灵活度包括将该任务分配给最有资格从事该项工作的人的灵活度就需要如上文所建议的核准应付激增需求的供资机制 204. 和平与安全执行委员会或该委员会的一个指定小组应当集体地确定一个特派团综合工作队的一般构成按照联合国和平行动小组的设想这种工作队应当在预防冲突建立和平预期维持和平或建设和平的支助办事处的预期部署等过程的较早阶段成立也就是说在一个机构里为联合国和平与安全的外地活动提供全面综合支助的设想应当延伸到和平行动的整体范围并且应当具有可以应付和平行动需求的规模实质性构成会议场所以及领导人 205. 领导人和主导部的概念当联合国在维和地区的存在的主要重点从政治变为维持和平或从维持和平转变为政治时曾经造成一些问题不仅引起外地的总部主要联系人发生变化而且使总部的整个支助班子也发生变化按照小组所设想的特派团综合工作队的作业方式支助班子在这种转变期间和以后大体上都保持不变虽然随着行动的性质发生变化会有人员增减但为实现转变履行职能的工作队核心人员不会有任何变化特派团综合工作队的领导职责将从该团体的一名成员移交另一名成员例如从维和部的某区域主任或政治干事移交其在政治部的对手 206. 规模和构成将与受支助的外地活动的性质和阶段相称有关危机的预防行动将需要及时知情的政治支助使联合国特使随时了解有关区域内的政治事态演变以及对其努力的成功至关重要的其它因素为结束一项冲突而努力的调停人将需要更多地了解维持和平与建设和平的种种选择以便联合国参与实施的任何和平协定反映这些选择的潜力和局限性秘书处内同调停人协作的顾问-观察员将与支助谈判的特派团综合工作队保持密切联系并经常向该工作队通报最新进展情况而特派团综合工作队的领导人则可成为调停人在总部的日常联系人这样可迅速联系到秘书处较高级别的支助人员以寻求敏感政治问题的答案 207. 刚才所描述的这种特派团综合工作队可以是一个虚拟机构其成员从自己的日常办公室里工作他们靠现代通讯技术结合在一起定期开会但却不是身处同一个地方为支助他们的工作每个成员应当提供并可获得上文第65 至75 段所述由信息战略秘书处即和平与安全执行委员会的信息和战略分析秘书处在联合国内联网上设置和提供的数据及分析 208. 为规划可能的和平行动而设立的特派团综合工作队开始时也可以是虚拟机构当一项行动显然较有可能开展时该工作队应成为实际机构其所有成员都身处同一场所准备作为一个团队不断地共同努力直到新的特派团完全部署时为止该段工作时间可能最长为六个月其假定前提是上文第84 至169 段所建议的迅速部署改革措施已得到实施 209. 在这段工作时期工作队的成员应当由其所属的司部机构基金或计划署正式借调到该特派团综合工作队也就是说一个特派团综合工作队应当远远超过目前在总部已设立的协调委员会或工作队的类型它应当是为某一具体目的而设立的临时但统31 A/55/305 S/2000/809 一的工作人员团队能够根据特派团的需求扩大或削减其人员或构成 210. 工作队的每一位成员都应获得授权不仅可作为其所属机构与工作队之间的联络人而且可以是负责有关特派团的关键工作的决策人特派团综合工作队的领导人在维和行动情况下向主管维和行动/ 维和部的助理秘书长汇报工作在建立和平的措施建设和平的支助办事处以及特别政治特派团等情况下向政治部的有关负责人汇报工作则应对工作队借调期间的成员拥有各级权力并应成为他们在维和行动工作的各方面的一级联络人与长期政策和战略有关的事项应当在EISAS的支助下在和平与安全执行委员会内的助理秘书长/副秘书长的层面处理 211. 为了使联合国系统向特派团综合工作队提供工作人员有必要建立负责和平行动的每个重大实质性构成的责任中心各部和各机构有必要事先商定借调程序和它们将为特派团综合工作队设想提供的支助必要时应书面商定这种协议 212. 小组不能建议由哪些主导厅处为一项和平行动提供每项可能的构成部分但认为和平与安全执行委员会应当集体地彻底考虑这一问题并分派一名成员负责为一项和平行动的各项可能的构成部分准备但军事警察和司法以及后勤/行政等方面除外这些方面仍应是维和部的职责指定的主导机构应当负责设计出行动的全面设想职务说明人员配置和装备需求重要的路径/部署时间表标准数据库文职待命安排以及该构成部分的其他可能候选人的名册并负责参与特派团综合工作队的事务 213. 特派团综合工作队机动灵活可以应付时间紧需要人手多的临时需求以支助特派团的规划启动和初步维持这一概念在很大程度上参照了母体管理的构想许多大机构需要分派必要的人员参加具体项目但又要避免每次出现新项目时都要作一次机构调整于是普遍使用母体管理方法使用这一方法的实体多种多样既有兰德公司也有世界银行按照这一方法每个工作人员都永久性地属于本单位或母单位但可以事实上也应当在必要时支助各个项目总部在进行和平行动的规划和支助工作时如果采取母体管理办法就能够让各部机构基金和计划署内部按照其总体需求加以组织派遣人员参加为提供上述支助而组建的部门间/机构间协调一致的工作队 214. 特派团综合工作队结构可以对维和部行动厅目前的结构方式产生重大影响其实还会取代区域司结构例如在塞拉利昂东帝汶和科索沃等地开展的较大型行动就应当分别安排单独的特派团综合工作队由主任一级的干事担任队长亚洲和中东长久的传统维持和平行动等其它特派团可以联合参加另外一个特派团综合工作队可以组建多少特派团综合工作队的问题在很大程度上取决于已为维和部政治部和有关部机构基金和计划署增拨多少资源随着特派团综合工作队数目的增加行动厅的组织结构将变得更加平稳这对于政治部的各位助理秘书长也会产生类似的影响在建立和平阶段或者在建立建设和平大规模支助行动以作为某项维持和平行动的后续存在或作为一项单独倡议时特派团综合工作队队长向政治部的各位助理秘书长汇报工作 215. 虽然维和部的区域主任以及政治部受命出任综合工作队队长的区域主任主管的特派团数目将较现在为少但他们实际领导的工作人员数目将更多其中包括从军事顾问办事处和民警顾问办事处后勤司或取代后勤司的各个司以及视情况需要从其他部机构基金和计划署全时借调的工作人员特派团综合工作队的规模也将取决于增拨资源数额而定若无增拨资源各个实体就无法将其工作人员全时外借 216. 还应当指出为求综合工作队的构想有效运作其成员在规划和初步部署阶段就要把办公地点安排在一起这在目前办不到因为秘书处内办公空间的现有分配状况无法进行重大调整 217. 有关特派团综合规划和支助工作的重要建议摘要: 特派团综合工作队综合工作队视情况需要从整个联合国系统借调人员它应当成为具体特派团规划和支助工作的主要执行者综合工作队应当一概32 A/55/305 S/2000/809 成为此种支助工作的第一接触点综合工作队的领导人按照维和部政治部同其他派遣人员各部计划署基金和机构之间的协议对借调人员应当拥有临时指挥权 C 维持和平部所需的其他结构调整 218. 综合工作队的构想将提高维和部行动厅真正作为维持和平行动所有方面工作协调中心的能力但维和部其他单位也需要作出结构调整军事和民警司后勤司和总结经验股尤其如此 1 军事和民警司 219. 在总部以及外地接受面谈的民警官员对维和部的警察职能归入军事报告系统内全都有意见小组也认为这种安排看来不会增加多少行政或实际价值 220. 维和部的军事和民警干事任期只有三年因为联合国要求他们是现职人员如果他们想留下来再工作一段时间为此甚至脱离其本国军队和警察部门联合国的人事政策也不允许雇用他们担任从前的工作因此维和部军事和警察部门更替率很高鉴于总部工作中的经验教训得不到定期总结鉴于新工作人员综合培训方案根本就不存在鉴于方便使用的手册和标准作业程序仍然只编了一半高更换率就意味着机构的经验一直得不到传承而这种经验需要在职学习几个月才能掌握目前人手短缺还意味着军事干事和民警干事奉派去做与自己专门知识不一定相称的工作专门从事行动J3 或规划J5 的人可能去搞具有外交性质的工作或担任人事及行政干事J1 管理外地人员和单位的不断更替却荒废了他们监测外地业务活动的能力 221. 维和部在这些方面缺乏延续性正好说明为什么维和部部署军事观察员监测违反停火的情况已有五十多年却没有一个标准的数据基可以供外地军事观察员作为记录违反停火情况和积累统计数据之用目前,如果有人要了解某项行动的具体所在国在六个月期间发生了多少起违反事件就得动手查阅这一期间的每日情况报告本逐件数下去有时制订了此类数据基不过那是各特派团自己特别制作的民警特派团常常涉及五花八门的犯罪数据和其他资料情况也是一样技术上的进步使得监测违反停火情况和非军事区动态以及武器移出储存场址情况的方式有了革命性的变化但维和部军事和民警司目前没有指定任何人分管这些问题 222. 小组建议把军事和民警司分为两个实体一个管理军事人员另一个管理民警维和部军事顾问办公室要扩大和改组使之更适应联合国维持和平行动军事总部的组建方式以便为外地提供更有效的支助并向秘书处高级官员提供更有事实根据的军事咨询意见还应当向民警股增拨大量资源而且应当考虑提高民警顾问的级别和职等 223. 为确保维和部军事人员和民警能力保持起码的延续性小组建议这两个单位的职位总和中保留一定比例给那些在联合国工作过最近已脱离其本国工作的军事人员和民警人员任用他们为正规工作人员这样做有例可循后勤司的后勤和通讯处就有若干名前退役军官 224. 外地民警人员越来越多地参与当地警察部队的重组和改革小组建议来一个理论上的转变把这类活动作为未来和平行动中民警的主要工作重点见上文第39 40 和47 b 段但迄今为止民警股为和平行动的警察部门制订规划和规定时却得不到关于该国当地司法机构所实行的刑法法典和刑事诉讼的必要法律知识对于民警规划者而言这是极为重要的资料但从支助帐户划拨的资源不论是给法律厅维和部还是给秘书处其他任何部的都不是供这项工作之用 225. 因此小组建议维和部内另外增设一个股配置所必需的刑法专家目的就是针对那些对于和平行动有效使用民警而言至关重要的法治问题向民警顾问办公室提出咨询意见该股应同日内瓦的人权事务高级专员办事处维也纳的药物管制和预防犯罪办事处以及联合国系统从事法治机构改革及尊重人权工作的其它部门密切合作 33 A/55/305 S/2000/809 2 外地行政和后勤司 226. 后勤司对其规划的外勤业务并没有最终制订并提出预算的权力也无权实际采购这些业务所需的货物及服务这一权力属于管理事务部管理部维持和平经费筹措司和采购司总部提出的所有采购请求都由采购司16 名由支助帐户提供经费的采购干事处理他们编制数额较大的合同1999年约300份提交总部合同委员会并就不是由外地特派团在当地采购的货物和服务的合同进行谈判和签订合同并制订有关特派团国际采购和当地采购的联合国政策及程序由于人手不够加上这一程序需要采取额外步骤似乎是外地特派团报称采购延误的部分原因 227. 在两年的试验期内把维持和平的预算编制经费划拨和采购权下放给维和部并相应地进行员额和工作人员的调动就有可能提高采购工作的效率为确保责有攸归确保透明度管理部应保留关于帐户各会员国摊款以及财务的职权管理部还应当同外地人员征聘和管理工作的情形一样保留其全面政策制订和监测的作用而此种工作的权力和责任已经下放到维和部 228. 此外负责预算编制和采购工作的人同确定各项采购需求的人在同一个司工作可能会招致安排不当的指责为避免出现这一情况小组建议把后勤司一分为二一个主管行政事务发挥人事预算/财政和采购方面的职能另一个主管综合支助事务如后勤运输通讯 3 总结经验股 229. 大家都认为必须利用外地的积累经验但在提高本系统利用这一经验的能力方面或在将这种经验反馈到业务理论规划程序或任务规定的制订过程方面工作做得还不够目前维和部总结经验股的工作似乎未对和平行动工作产生很大影响总结经验的归纳工作往往也是在特派团工作结束后才进行这一点是令人遗憾的因为维持和平系统每一天都在产生新的经验新的经验和教训新的经验应当加以记载和保存以方便目前其他行动的负责人和将来的各项行动应当把总结出来的经验当作信息管理工作的一部分它有利于改进日常业务这样事后的报告就只会是较广泛的学习进程的一个部分即终点总结而不是整个进程的主要目标 230. 小组认为这项职能急需得到提高并建议安排该股在密切配合工作的单位设立以便有效地帮助各项现行活动以及以促进特派团的规划和理论/指南的编写工作小组建议最好把它安排在行动厅该厅将监督特派团综合工作队的各项职能小组提议这些职能包括把总部规划及支助和平行动的工作结合起来见上文第198 至217 段该股如果设于维和部一个经常有许多部和机构的代表参与的部门就能成为所有这些实体的和平行动学习经理负责维持和更新机构的经验各特派团和工作队都可以利用该经验来解决问题实施最佳做法和避免一些做法 4. 高级管理层 231. 维和部现有两名助理秘书长一名主管行动厅另一名主管后勤管理和排雷行动厅后勤司和排雷行动处军事顾问兼任军事和民警司司长目前通过两名助理秘书长之一向主管维持和平行动副秘书长汇报工作或直接向该名副秘书长汇报工作具体视有关问题的性质而定 232 鉴于上文各节提议作出各种人员增加和结构调整小组认为有充分理由为维和部再配备一名助理秘书长小组进一步认为这三名助理秘书长中应指定一人为首席助理秘书长起副秘书长副手的作用 233 关于维和部其他结构调整的重要建议摘要 (a) 现有的军事和民警司应当加以改组把民警股调出军事报告系统应当考虑提高民警顾问的级别和职等 (b) 维和部军事顾问办公室应当加以调整进一步适应联合国维持和平行动外地军事总部的组建方式 34 A/55/305 S/2000/809 (c) 维和部应当增设一股配备就刑法问题提出咨询意见的有关专门知识这方面对于联合国和平行动中有效利用民警是至关重要的 (d) 主管管理事务的副秘书长应当在两年的试验期内把有关维持和平的预算编制及采购职能方面的权力和责任下放给主管维持和平行动副秘书长 (e) 应大幅度加强总结经验股调入维和部经过调整的行动厅 (f) 应当考虑把维和部助理秘书长的人数由二人增至三人应指定其中一人为首席助理秘书长行使副秘书长副手的职能 D 维持和平行动部以外所需的结构调整 234 总部的新闻规划和支助工作需要得到加强政治部支助和协调建设和平活动并且提供选举支助因此也需要得到加强在秘书处以外需要提高人权事务高级专员办事处对和平行动的人权部分进行规划和支助的能力 1 对新闻工作的行动支助 235 与军事民警排雷行动后勤电信以及特派团其他组成部分不同总部没有任何一个单位具体负责和平行动中新闻部门的行动需求有关特派团的新闻工作方面最为集中的责任在于秘书长发言人办公室以及各特派团自身的发言人和新闻办公室总部的新闻部公共事务司宣传和规划处下设的和平和安全科有四名专业干事负责编写出版物起草并更新有关和平行动的网址内容和处理从裁军到人道主义援助的各种其他问题该科也编写并管理有关维持和平的资料但没有多少力量来编制外地新闻工作的理论战略或标准作业程序只是零星地和临时进行编制 236 由于新闻部内部的人员调动新闻部和平和安全科正在得到扩大但该科如果不大量增员并投入工作支助职能就要分给维和部而维和部的一些干事也许是从新闻部借调过来的 237 不论把这项职能放在什么地方都应预期新闻方面的需求并要满足这些需求所需的技术和人员确定优先事项和制定标准外地作业程序在新特派团启动阶段提供支助并通过参加特派团综合工作队不断提供支助和指导 238 有关新闻工作结构调整的重要建议摘要: 和平行动应建立一个新闻工作行动规划和支助股设于维和部或新闻部新设的和平和安全新闻处内直接向主管通信和新闻的副秘书长汇报工作 2 政治事务部的建设和平支助工作 239 政治事务部政治部是联合国建设和平工作指定的协调中心目前负责在十几个国家建立支助此类办事处并或向它们提出建立和平的咨询意见还负责推动秘书长五位从事建立和平或防止冲突任务的特使或代表的活动直到下一个历年期间支助这些活动的经常预算经费预期将比需要数额少3 100 万美元即25 在建设和平工作中这种摊派经费的做法实际上是比较少见的这方面的活动经费多由自愿捐助提供 240 政治部新成立的建设和平支助股就是这样一项活动主管政治事务副秘书长作为方案和协调扩大委员会召集人以及建设和平战略的协调人必须能够同方案和协调扩大委员会的成员及联合国系统其他部门特别是发展和人道主义领域的部门协调此类战略的制定工作因为建设和平工作本身就具有跨部门的性质要做到这一点秘书处正在向一些捐助者募集自愿捐款开展一项支助该股的三年期试验项目随着这一试验股规划工作的展开小组建议政治部同联合国系统所有能够推动该股取得成功的利益攸关者特别是开发计划署进行协商开发计划署正在重新强调民主/治理和其他与过渡有关的领域 241 政治部执行办公室对该部负责的一些业务活动进行支助但该办公室的原始规划和能力配置都不适于作为外地支助办事处后勤司也向政治部管理的一些外地特派团提供支助这些特派团的预算以及政治部的预算都没有为此向后勤司增拨资源后勤司努力35 A/55/305 S/2000/809 满足规模较小的建设和平行动的需求但表示规模较大的行动对其现有人员配置带来严重的高度优先需求方面的压力这样规模较小的特派团的需求往往就受到影响政治部在接受联合国项目事务厅项目厅支助方面有着成功的经验该厅是开发计划署的附设机构成立已有五年采用现代管理方法为联合国系统内许多客户管理各项方案和基金其核心经费全都来自最高为13 的管理费项目厅可以为规模较小的特派团比较快速地提供后勤管理和征聘方面的支助 242 政治部选举援助司还依赖自愿经费来满足各方对其技术建议需要评价团以及其他不直接涉及选举观察的活动的越来越大的需求截至2000 年6 月各会员国提出的41 项援助请求有待办理但支助此类未拨专款的活动的信托基金现有经费只够满足现有各项需求至2001历年终了所需经费的8 因此随着对大会第46/137 号决议所赞同的民主机构建设的一项重要内容的需求剧增选举援助司工作人员首先必须筹集他们开展工作所需要的项目经费 243 有关政治事务部建设和平支助工作的重要建议摘要 (a) 小组支持秘书处努力同联合国系统其他部门合作在政治部内设立试验性的建设和平股并建议如试验性方案一旦运作良好各会员国即须重新讨论经常预算对该股的支助该方案应按照小组在上文第46 段所提供的指导予以评价如果认为它是加强联合国建设和平能力的现有最佳方案就应按照上文第47 d 段所载的建议提交秘书长 (b) 小组建议大量增加经常预算用作选举援助司方案经费的资源以此取代自愿捐款以满足各方对该司各项事务激剧增长的需求 (c) 为减轻对后勤司和政治部执行办公室的压力并改进为规模较小的政治和建设和平外地事务处提供的支助事务小组建议由联合国项目事务厅项目厅向所有此类规模较小的非军事性的外地特派团提供采购后勤工作人员征聘和其他支助事务 3 联合国人权事务高级专员办事处的和平行动支助 244 人权专员办事处必须更加紧密地参与涉及人权的和平行动特别是复杂行动各项内容的规划和执行目前人权专员办事处的资源不足以密切参与该项工作或提供人员参与外地服务如要联合国的行动有有效的人权部分则该办事处就应能够对和平行动中的人权外地工作进行协调并使之制度化借调人员到纽约的特派团综合工作队征聘人权事务外地人员为和平行动中的所有人员包括法律和秩序部门的人员举办人权培训并设立人权外地工作范本数据基 245 有关加强联合国人权事务高级专员办事处的重要建议摘要小组建议大力提高联合国人权事务高级专员办事处进行外地特派团规划和筹备的能力经费部分由经常预算提供部分由和平行动特派团预算提供 五和平行动和信息时代 246. 本报告许多部分提到必须使和平与安全系统更好地联系起来促进通信和数据交流向工作人员提供工作所需的工具以及最终使联合国更有效地预防冲突和帮助社会摆脱战争妥善利用新的信息技术是达到上述许多目标的关键因素本节说明在战略政策和妨碍联合国有效利用信息技术的做法之间存在的差距以及提出弥补这些差距的建议 A. 和平行动的信息技术战略和政策问题 247. 信息技术的战略和政策问题意义比和平行动更为重大这个问题伸延到整个联合国系统意义较为重大的信息技术内容一般超越小组的任务范围但不能因为意义重大的问题而不采用信息技术用户共同标准供和平行动和支助和平行动的总部各单位使用外地行政和后勤司通讯事务处可以提供人造卫星联系和局域联通性特派团可据此建立有效的信息技术网络和数据库但必须为用户社区制订更佳的战略和政策以协助它们利用正在奠定的技术基础 36 A/55/305 S/2000/809 248. 当联合国在外地部署一个特派团时特派团各个组成部分须能顺利地交换数据所有复杂的和平行动都涉及许多不同的行动者即整个联合国系统内的机构基金和计划署以及秘书处各部门联合国系统征聘的新的特派团人员有时也涉及区域组织而且经常涉及双边援助机构和几十个或几百个人道主义和发展非政府组织所有这些行动者都需要一套能使它们更易有效地交换信息和想法的机制因为每个行动者只不过是一个庞大的行政系统一个很小的部分它们有各自的文化工作方式和目标 249. 设计拙劣和结合不善的信息技术妨碍这种合作如果在数据结构和应用一级交流方面没有商定的标准两者之间的接口只是重新编码的费力操作对于电脑联网工作环境的投资往往毫无效益其后果比浪费劳力更严重因为其中涉及的诸多问题包括错误传达政策乃至无法传递有关安全威胁或行动环境方面的其他重大变化的信息 250. 数据系统分散会产生出乎意料的结果即这些系统的运作需要共同的标准在较高一级即一项行动的实质性组成部分之间总部各实务办事处之间或总部与联合国系统其他部门之间很难找到解决信息技术的常见问题常用办法因为目前行动信息系统的政策拟订工作是分散的总部没有一个责任重大的中心负责和平行动的用户一级信息技术战略和政策在政府或企业中这项责任往往落在首席新闻干事身上小组认为联合国总部最好是信息战略秘书处需要有一个人担任这种角色负责监测信息技术战略和用户标准的制订及执行该名人员也应制订和监督信息技术培训方案包括外地手册和实地训练这方面需求之大确实不容低估各外地特派团秘书长特别代表办事处的对手都应监督信息技术共同战略的执行和外地培训并提供基本的信息技术结构和服务以配合和利用管理事务部后勤司和信息技术事务司的工作 251. 信息技术战略和政策的建议摘要总部各个和平与安全部门均需设立一个责任中心以制订和监督信息技术共同战略的执行与和平行动的训练这个中心应设在信息战略秘书处应当任命责任中心的特派团对手担任秘书长特别代表办事处的工作负责在复杂和平行动中监督该项战略的执行情况 B 知识管理工具 252. 技术可以帮助我们搜集和传播信息及经验技术可以更好地用于帮助在联合国特派团行动区工作的各种行动者以有系统和互助方式取得数据和分享数据例如联合国的发展社区和人道主义救济社区都在联合国部署和平行动的大多数地区从事工作这些联合国国别小组与从事基层配合工作的非政府组织将于复杂的和平行动人员尚未抵达前早就在该区开展工作并于和平行动结束后继续留在该地区这些国别小组和非政府组织拥有丰富的知识和经验可用于和平行动规划和执行在信息战略秘书处管理下负责分享这种数据的电子数据交换所可以协助进行规划和执行以及预防冲突和进行评价将这些数据适当地加以合并并于和平行动各个组成部分部署后收集数据以及利用地理信息系统可为查明任务区的需要和问题以及追查行动计划的影响方面提供有力的工具应将信息系统专家分配各个特派团小组并应提供地理信息系统的训练资源 253. 地理信息系统的现有应用例子可见于1998 年以来在科索沃进行的人道主义和重建工作人道主义信息中心已将西欧人造卫星中心日内瓦人道主义排雷中心驻科部队南斯拉夫统计研究所和国际管理集团及其他来源所编制的地理信息系统数据集中起来这些数据已加以合并编成一本图册供公众上网查阅上网速度慢或无法上网时可查阅光盘和印制品 254. 电脑模拟是供特派团人员和当地机构人员学习的有用工具原则上可为一项行动的任何组成部分进行电脑模拟电脑模拟可以帮助集体解决问题并向当地机构人员阐明它们的政策选择有时会产生预料不到的后果通过宽带与互联网联系电脑模拟可以成为远程学习课程的一部分能够迎合新的行动需要并可用于预先训练特派团的新聘人员 37 A/55/305 S/2000/809 255. 联合国内联网向指定用户的联合国信息网络开放设置增强效果的和平与安全网页对和平行动的规划分析和执行也有助益作为大型网络内的一个小网络它可以着重阐述与和平与安全直接有关的问题和信息其中包括信息战略秘书处的分析形势报告地理信息系统图并与取得的经验产生联系提供各级安全上网服务可为受限制用户分享敏感资料提供便利 256. 内联网的数据应与和平行动内联网联系和平行动内联网将利用现有的或拟设的广域网络通讯将总部信息战略秘书处和实务办事处的数据库与外地数据库联系起来或将各地的外地特派团数据库联系起来和平行动内联网可提供和平行动的所有行政程序性和法律资料以单一存取方式查阅许多来源所编制的资料以及使规划者能够更快地编制综合报告对紧急情况更快地作出反应 257. 有些特派团的组成部分如民警和相关的刑事司法单位以及人权调查员需要增加网络安全需要数据储存传送和分析的硬件和软件民警两项关键技术是地理信息系统和犯罪绘图软件利用这两项技术可将原始数据按地域分列以阐明犯罪趋势及其他关键资料以及便于识别事件发生的形态或突出说明问题的特点和增强民警打击犯罪和向其当地对手提供咨询意见的能力 258. 关于和平行动信息技术工具的关键建议摘要: (a) 信息战略秘书处应与信息技术事务司合作在联合国现有内联网实施增强效果的和平行动组成部分并通过和平行动外联网将其与特派团的数据联系起来 (b) 更广泛利用地理信息系统技术会对和平行动大有助益这种技术可以很快地将行动信息与任务区内的电子图合并以用于解除武装民警登记选举人监测人权和重建等各种工作 (c) 特派团的各部分例如民警和人权在信息技术方面有独特的需要应在特派团展开规划和执行时 预料到这种需要并应更一贯地予以满足 C 改善互网新闻的及时性 259. 如小组在上文第三节所述向民众宣传联合国和平行动的工作对支助现有的和今后的各特派团十分重要不仅要及早塑造正面的形象以创造有利的工作环境而且必须维持健全的新闻活动以争取和保留国际社会的支持 260. 如上文第四节所述目前正式负责宣传联合国和平行动工作的机构是总部新闻部和平与安全科新闻部有一人负责将所有和平与安全的资料内容登载于网址上并将特派团所有资料输进万维网以确保登载的资料符合总部网页的标准和相互兼容 261. 小组赞同采用标准但标准化并非意味着集中化新闻制作和在联合国网址登载数据的现有过程减慢了资料增订周期的速度但在事态发展迅速的情况下特派团往往需要每日增订资料现有的过程还使有关每个特派团的资料数量受到限制 262. 新闻部和外地工作人员对通过制订网址共同管理模式来消除这个瓶颈表示感到兴趣对小组来说这似乎是消除这种信息瓶颈的适当办法 263. 关于互联网新闻及时性的关键建议摘要: 小组鼓励总部和外地特派团制订网址共同管理办法按照这种办法总部将继续进行监督但各特派团将授权工作人员编制和登载符合基本报告标准和政策的万维网资料 * * * 264. 小组在本报告强调必须改变联合国的结构和做法使它能够更有效地履行其支持国际和平与安全和尊重人权的责任如果没有网络信息技术所提供的新的能力有些改变是不能实现的如果联合国总部没有设置这种技术并使小组成员在世界各地区都能利用这种技术本报告的工作将无法完成更好地利用有效工具和有效的信息技术可以促进和平 38 A/55/305 S/2000/809 六. 执行方面的挑战 265. 本报告针对会员国和秘书处两个方面提出改革建议我们认为除非会员国真正愿意否则改革将无法推行同时我们认为秘书长必须积极推行我们提出的改革秘书处建议其高级工作人员应执行这些工作 266. 会员国必须承认联合国是由各个部分组成的整体必须承认改革的首要责任由各个部分承担联合国的失败不应仅仅归咎于秘书处或部队指挥官或外地特派团的领导人大多数失败的原因是安全理事会及会员国所拟订和支持的任务规定往往含糊不清前后不一和经费不足产生问题时它们往往补袖手旁观和坐视不理有时甚至在公开场合多加批语以致联合国的信誉受到严重的考验 267. 最近在塞拉利昂产生的指挥和控制问题说明这种情况不能再容忍下去部队派遣国必须确保所派的部队充分了解综合指挥系统秘书长的业务控制以及特派团标准作业程序和作战规约的重要意义在一项行动中必须了解和尊重指挥系统各国政府有义务避免向其特遣队指挥官发布行动方面的指示 268. 我们知道秘书长正在执行一项综合改革方案并认为我们的建议可能需要调整以便配合较全面的范畴此外我们提出改革秘书处和整个联合国系统的建议不会旦夕之间就能实现尽管有些改革需要采取紧急行动我们确认任何行政系统的改革通常都会遇到阻力令人鼓舞的是在我们已经接受的改革建议中有些源自联合国系统内部而且秘书长也致力指导秘书处进行改革即使这种改革意味着必须打破长期存在的组织和程序界限秘书处优先项目和文化的各个方面将受到考验并且必须改变在这方面我们促请秘书长任命一位高级人员负责监督执行本报告所载各项建议的工作 269. 秘书长一贯强调联合国的活动必须深入到民间社会必须加强与非政府组织学术机构和传媒的关系在促进人类和平与安全方面它们是有用的伙伴我们呼吁秘书处注意秘书长采用的办法并在促进和平与安全的工作中推行这种办法我们促请它们铭记联合国是一个全民组织各地人民都有充分权利视联合国为他们的组织可对联合国的活动和为其工作人员作出评价 270. 支助维和部政治部及其他相关部门的和平与安全职责的秘书处工作人员品质参差不齐这种看法也适用于秘书处征聘的文职人员和会员国提名的军事人员和民警人员联合国系统内的人普遍承认这种差异情况工作表现较佳者往往分配的工作量过多这是为了弥补能力较差者的欠缺这样做当然会影响士气并引起不满特别有些人曾经正确地指出联合国过去一直没有注意职业发展培训和指导也没有注意制订新的管理措施简言之联合国目前不是一个量才任用的机构除非联合国成为这样的一个机构合格人员尤其是年轻人纷纷离职的趋势将无法扭转如果征聘提升和职责分配过份依赖年资或个人与政治关系将无法鼓励合格人员参加联合国或留在联合国工作从秘书长及其高级工作人员开始各级管理人员必须认真地优先注意这个问题奖励优秀人员并撤换不称职者否则将浪费更多的资源持久的改革将无法实现 271. 对外地特派团的联合国人员也应采用同样的标准他们大多数都能发扬国际公务员所应具备的精神为了帮助改善世界上最易受害的群体的生活前往饱经战祸的地区身陷危机重重的环境他们作出了相当大的个人牺牲有时自己的人身安全和精神健康也遭受极大的危险他们应受世界人民的赏识和赞扬过去多年来这些人员中有许多人为和平献出了生命我要借此机会向他们表示敬意 272. 联合国外地工作人员可能比任何其他人都更加需要尊重当地的规范文化和习惯他们一开始就应认识东道国的环境学习当地文化和语言以表示尊重他们必须认识到他们是在别人家里作客当联合国执行过渡时期行政任务时尤应如此他们必须互相尊重不失尊严尤其必须注意性别和文化方面的差异 39 A/55/305 S/2000/809 273. 简言之我们认为在甄选总部和外地工作人员方面以及工作人员的行为均应当保持最高的标准如果联合国人员不能达到这种标准就应对其追究责任过去秘书处很难对外地高级人员的工作表现追究责任因为这些人员往往以资源不足指示不明确或缺乏适当指挥和控制安排作为妨碍特派团圆满执行任务的主要理由这些缺点应予克服但不应以此作为工作表现不佳的借口国家前途和需要联合国协助和保护的人民的生命以及特派团工作的成败和联合国的信誉都系于几个人的工作成败无论职位高低不称职者应由特派团开除 274. 会员国自己承认他们也必须反省其工作作风和方式起码对联合国和平与安全活动的执行问题方面进行反省它们一向的做法是首先发表声明然后煞费苦心地设法达成一致的意见这种做法十分重视外交过程而不注意行动的后果联合国的一种主要优点是为188个会员国提供一个论坛就紧迫的全球问题交换意见但有时仅靠对话也无法确保几亿美元的维和行动重要的预防冲突措施以及关键的建设和平工作在极其不利的情况下能够获得成果除了以发表声明和决议的方式表示普遍支持之外还必须采取实际行动 275. 此外会员国可能会传达自相矛盾的信息无法明确阐明它们所支持的行动它们的代表可能在一个机构发表言论声称给予政治上的支持但在另一个机构中则拒绝提供财政支助行政和预算问题第五委员会与安全理事会和维持和平行动特别委员会都有这种脱节现象 276. 在政治一级每天与维持和平人员和建设和平人员交涉的许多当地机构既不尊重安全理事会也不惧怕安全理事会的口头谴责因此安理会成员和全体会员国必须言出必行去年东帝汶危机发生后安全理事会就派遣代表团前往雅加达和帝力这就是安全理事会采取实际行动的最佳实例力求务实勿作空论 277. 联合国的财政拮据状况继续严重削弱其以可靠方式执行和平行动的能力因此我们呼吁会员国坚持履行其条约义务无条件地及时全额付清其摊款 278. 我们也知道还有其他问题直接或间接地妨碍联合国在和平与安全领域采取行动其中两个未决问题超越小组的任务范围但对和平行动极其重要只有会员国才能设法解决这两个问题就是维持和平行动的经费如何分摊安全理事会席位如何公平分配在这方面意见纷纭我们只能希望会员国坚决履行宪章所规定的集体国际义务设法解决它们在这些问题上的分歧 279. 我们呼吁在千年首脑会议聚首一堂的世界领导人重申他们对联合国各项理想所作的承诺支持并加强联合国充分完成其任务的能力事实上这是联合国存在的理由协助发生冲突的社区维持或恢复和平 280. 我们联合国和平行动问题小组的成员除了争取就本报告提出的各项建议达成一致意见外同时又对联合国产生了共同的新构想向社区国家或区域伸出有力的援手帮助它们防止冲突或制止暴力我们已看到秘书长特别代表圆满地完成其任务使一个国家的人民有机会从事以前无法完成的事业即建立并维持和平谋求和解加强民主保护人权最重要的是我们看到联合国不仅具有意志而且有能力履行其重大的承诺证明不会辜负绝大多数人民对它的信任 40 A/55/305 S/2000/809 附件一 联合国和平行动问题小组成员 布赖恩阿特伍德先生美国公民国际主席国家民主研究所前所长和美国国际开发署前署长 拉赫达尔卜拉希米先生阿尔及利亚前外交部长本小组主席 科林格兰代森大使特立尼达和多巴哥1993 年至2000 年美洲国家组织/联合国驻海地国际文职人员特派团执行主任美洲国家组织驻海地1995年和1997 年和苏里南2000 年选举观察团团长 安赫克斯女士新西兰前内阁部长和新西兰常驻联合国代表1998 1999 年联合国驻塞浦路斯维持和平部队(联塞部队)特派团团长 理查德蒙克先生联合王国英国警官管辖区检查团前成员和政府国际警务问题顾问1998 1999年联合国驻波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那国际警察工作队专员 克劳斯瑙曼将军退役德国1991-1996 年担任国防部长1996-1999 年任北大西洋公约组织北约军事委员会主席负责监督北约执行部队/稳定部队在波斯尼亚和黑塞可维那的行动和北约对科索沃的空中攻击 志村尚子女士日本东京津田塾大学校长在联合国秘书处工作24年1995 年以维持和平行动部欧洲和拉丁美洲司司长的身份退休 弗拉基米尔舒斯托夫大使俄罗斯联邦巡回大使与联合国交往30年前任常驻联合国副代表纽约俄罗斯联邦驻欧洲安全与合作组织前任代表 菲利普西班达将军津巴布韦哈拉雷津巴布韦陆军总部作战与训练参谋长1995-1998 年任第三期联合国安哥拉核团第三期联安核查团和联合国安哥拉观察团联安观察团前任指挥官 科尔内利奥索马鲁加博士瑞士科村道德重振基金会会长日内瓦国际人道主义排雷中心主任红十字国际委员会前主席1987-1999 年 * * * 41 A/55/305 S/2000/809 联合国和平行动问题小组主席办公室 威廉杜尔克博士亨利 史汀生中心资深成员项目主任 萨勒曼艾哈迈德先生联合国秘书处政治干事 克莱尔凯恩女士联合国秘书处个人助理 卡罗琳厄尔女士史汀生中心研究助理 爱德华帕尔米萨诺先生史汀生中心小赫伯特斯科维尔和平研究员 42 A/55/305 S/2000/809 附件二 参考资料 联合国文件 科菲安南防战防灾与日俱增的全球挑战关于联合国工作的年度报告1999年A/54/1 全球社会伙伴关系关于联合国工作的年度报告1998 年A/53/1 面临人道主义挑战争取建立一种预防文化ST/DPI/2070 我们人民二十一世纪联合国的作用千年报告A/54/2000 经济及社会理事会关于深入评价维持和平行动起始阶段E/AC.51/1995/2 和Corr.1 关于深入评价维持和平行动结束阶段E/AC.51/1996/3 和Corr.1 秘书长的说明转递内部监督事务厅题为对方案和协调委员会第三十五届会关于评价维持和平行动起始阶段的各项建议的执行情况进行的三年期审查的报告E/AC.51/ 1998/4 和Corr.1 秘书长的说明转递内部监督事务厅题为对方案和协调委员会第三十六届会议关于评价维持和平行动结束阶段的各项建议的执行情况进行的三年期审查的报告E/AC.51/ 1999/5 大会秘书长的说明转递内部监督事务厅审查维持和平行动部外地行政和后勤司的报告A/49/959 秘书长题为革新联合国改革方案的报告A/51/950 秘书长关于非洲境内冲突起因和促进持久和平与可持续发展的报告A/52/871 维持和平行动特别委员会的报告A/54/87 和Corr.1 秘书长的说明转递内部监督事务厅对维持和平特派团服务和口粮合同管理的审计A/54/335 秘书长的说明转递1998年7月1日至1999 年6月30日期间内部监督事务厅的年度报告A/54/393 秘书长的报告转递负责儿童和武装冲突问题的秘书长特别代表题为关于保护受武装冲突影响的儿童的报告A/54/430 秘书长依照大会题为斯雷布雷尼察的陷落的第53/35 号决议提出的报告A/54/549 维持和平行动特别委员会的报告A/54/ 839 秘书长关于维持和平行动特别委员会的建议执行情况的报告A/54/670 大会和安全理事会秘书长依照1992 年1月31 日安全理事会首脑会议通过的声明提出的题为和平纲领预防外交建立和平与维持和平的报告A/47/277-S/24111 秘书长在联合国五十周年提出的题为和平纲领补编的立场文件A/50/60-S/1995/1 秘书长关于儿童与武装冲突的报告A/55/ 163-S/2000/712 安全理事会秘书长关于保护在冲突情况下向难民和其他人提供的人道主义援助的报告S/1998/883 秘书长关于提高非洲维持和平能力的报告S/1999/171 秘书长关于维持和平待命安排的进度报告S/1999/361 43 A/55/305 S/2000/809 秘书长关于武装冲突中保护平民问题的报告S/1999/957 1999 年12 月15 日秘书长致安全理事会主席的信转递题为对1994 年卢旺达境内发生灭绝种族罪期间联合国行动的独立调查报告S/1999/1257 秘书长关于联合国维持和平行动在解除武装复员和重返社会方面的作用的报告S/2000/101 2000年3月10 日安全理事会关于安哥拉问题的第864 1993 号决议所设委员会主席给安全理事会主席的信其中附上违反安全理事会对安盟的制裁问题专家小组的报告 秘书长新闻稿秘书长在乔治顿大学的讲话SG/SM/6901 秘书长简报联合国部队遵守国际人道主义法ST/SGB/1999/13 联合国开发计划署冲突后形势管理基金开发计划署的经验开发计划署管理发展和施政司提出的讨论文件2000年1月 联合国人权事务高级专员办事处2000 年年度呼吁各种活动和所需经费概览日内瓦 联合国难民事务高级专员办事处应急工具目录紧急准备和反应科提出的文件,日内瓦,2000年 联合国训练研究所(训研所) 新加坡政策研究所政研所和日本国家研究促进研究所1997 年新加坡会议报告人道主义行为与维持和平行动纽约1997 年 训研所政研所和日本国际事务研究所维持和平与建设和平的关系情况汇报与经验1999 年新加坡会议报告草稿纽约2000 年 马拉克古尔丁增进联合国在和平与安全领域的效力的实际措施秘书长提交的报告纽约1977 年6 月30 日 其它资料 Berdal, Mats, and David M. 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Washington, D.C., 1999. 46 A/55/305 S/2000/809 附件三 建议摘要 1. 预防行动 (a) 小组赞成秘书长千年报告及其在2000 年7 月安全理事会关于预防冲突问题第二次公开会议上所作发言提出的关于预防冲突的建议尤其是他呼吁致力于预防冲突和发展的所有行动者包括联合国布雷顿森林机构各国政府和民间组织都必须以更综合性的方式处理这些冲突 (b) 小组支持秘书长更经常地向出现紧张局势地区派遣实况调查团并强调会员国依照宪章第二条项的规定有义务对联合国的这种活动尽力予以协助 2. 建设和平战略 (a) 特派团第一年预算的一小部分应给予领导该特派团的秘书长代表或特别代表以便在联合国国家小组的驻地协调员建议之下资助特派团行动领域中的速效项目 (b) 小组建议应改变在复杂的和平行动中使用民警其他法治人员和人权专家的理论根据以反映出更加重视在冲突后的环境中加强法治机构和加强尊重人权 (c) 小组建议立法机构考虑将复员和重返社会方案纳入到复杂和平行动第一阶段的分摊预算中以期促进迅速解散作战派系并减少恢复冲突的可能性 (d) 小组建议和平与安全执行委员会讨论一项计划并向秘书长推荐该计划以加强联合国在制订建设和平战略和执行支助这些战略的方案方面的永久能力 3. 维持和平原则和战略 联合国维持和平行动者一旦部署便必须能够专业地完成任务并且有能力保卫自己特派团的其他组成部队以强势的接战规则执行特派团的任务对付那些违反其对和平协定的承诺或企图以暴力破坏协定的当事方 4. 明确可靠和可以完成的任务 (a) 小组建议在安全理事会同意执行或有联合国率领的维持和平行动的规定的停止或和平协定之前安理会应确保有关的协定满足一些起码的条件例如符合国际人道主义标准以及具体任务和时限的实际可行性 (b) 安全理事会应在授权拥有大量兵力的特派团的决议应保留为草案形式直至秘书长获得承诺确定可以从会员国得到所需部队和其他关键性的特派团支援部分包括建设和平的部分 (c) 安全理事会在部署维持和平行动到具有潜在危险性的地区时其决议应满足维持和平行动的需要尤其是需要有明确的指挥系统和统一的行动 (d) 秘书处在制订或改变特派团的任务时必须将安全理事会需要知道而不是它想要听的情况通报给安全理事会已承诺为一项行动派遣军事部队的国家应当能够出席秘书处就影响其人员的安全的事项为安理会举行的简报会特别是那些牵涉到特派团使用武力问题的会议 5. 信息和战略分析 秘书长应设立一个实体本文称作和安执委会信息和战略分析秘书处信息战略秘书处它将支助和安执委会所有成员的信息和分析需要为管理目的它应由政治事务部政治部和维持和平行动部维和部管理并向其首长一并提出报告 6. 过渡民政管理 小组建议秘书长邀请一个国际法律专家小组其中包括具有在联合国负有过渡行政任务的行动方47 A/55/305 S/2000/809 面经验的个人以评价制订一项临时刑法典包括可能需要的任何区域调整的可行性和有效性以供这类行动使用直至重建了当地法治和当地执法能力 7. 决定部署时间表 联合国应将迅速而有效部署的能力从行动角度界定为能够分别在安全理事会决议通过后30天和90 天之内完全部署传统的维和行动和复杂的维和行动 8. 特派团领导 (a) 秘书长应按照公平的地域分布和男女比例以及会员国提供的资料着手编制一份综合名单列出秘书长代表或特别代表部队指挥官民警专员及其副手以及实务和行政部门的其他负责人的可能人选以此作为第一步将选定特派团领导的方法系统化 (b) 特派团的整个领导层应尽早选定并召集到总部以便参与特派团筹划程序的关键方面听取特派任务地区的情况介绍并与其在特派团领导层的同事见面和共事 (c) 秘书处应经常向特派团领导提供战略指南和计划以预见并克服对执行任务规定的挑战并应尽可能与特派团领导共同制订这种指南和计划 9. 军事人员 (a) 应当酌情鼓励各会员国彼此合作在联合国待命安排制度待命制度的范围内组成几支旅级统一指挥部队外加必要的支援部队随时准备在安全理事会通过决议设立传统维和行动的30 天内或设立复杂维和行动的90 天内进行有效部署 (b) 应当授权秘书长一旦看来可能达成停火协议或协定设想联合国发挥执行作用就正式征求参加待命制度的会员国的意见问它们是否愿意派遣部队参加可能开展的行动 (c) 秘书处作为标准措施应当在部署之前派遣一个小组核实每个可能派遣部队的国家是否作好准备履行谅解备忘录有关必要训练和装备要求的各项规定不符合要求的国家就不应调派部队 (d) 小组建议在待命制度中拟订一个大约包括100 名军官的循环待征召名单以备在接到通知7 天内用接受过为新的维和行动建立特派团总部训练的小队扩充维和部核心规划人员 10. 民警人员 (a) 鼓励各会员国在联合国待命安排制度范围内各自设立国家民警备选人员库一接通知即随时备供联合国和平行动调度 (b) 鼓励各会员国为各自国家备选人员库内的民警建立区域性训练伙伴关系以便根据联合国将颁布的准则标准作业程序和业绩标准提高待命状态的共同水平 (c) 鼓励各会员国在其政府结构内指定单一的联络点负责向联合国和平行动提供民警 (d) 小组建议在待命制度内编制一份包括约100 名警察和有关专家的循环待征召名单在接到通知七天后即可提供经过训练的工作队以创设新的维持和平行动的民警部门训练即将到来的人员和及早促使该部门更为团结一致 (e) 小组建议为司法刑事人权和其他相关专家作出类似上面建议a (b)和(c)的安排他们将同专家民警组成综合法治工作队 11. 文职专家 (a) 秘书处应当利用中央因特网/内联网编制一份事先选定,接到通知后即可调派到和平行动的文职候选人名册应当授权各外地特派团利用这一名册根据秘书处即将颁发的公平地域和性别分配指导方针从名册上征聘人选 (b) 应当重新组成外勤业务类别人员以反映所有和平行动经常面临的需求特别是对行政与后勤方面中高级人员的需求 48 A/55/305 S/2000/809 (c) 外聘文职工作人员的服务条件应予修订使联合国能够吸引最合格的候选人并在此后向工作杰出的人员提供更好的职业前途 (d) 维和部应当为和平行动制订一项员额配置通盘战略其中除其他问题外概要规定联合国志愿人员的使用接到通知后72 小时内提供文职人员的待命安排从而便利特派团的开办以及如何在和平与安全执行委员会各成员之间分担执行这项战略的责任 12. 迅速部署新闻工作能力 在特派团预算中应当增拨专用于新闻有关工作人员和信息技术的资源以便传播和平行动的信息并建立有效的内部通讯联系 13. 后勤支助与开支管理 (a) 秘书处应当制订一项全球后勤支助战略以便能在所建议的时间安排范围内并根据维持和平行动部实务性办事处所制订的规划假定迅速有效地部署特派团 (b) 大会应当授权和批准一笔一次性开支以便在布林迪西至少维持5 份特派团开办装备包其中应包括能可迅速部署的通讯设备这些开办装备包随后应当由高调用这些装备包的和平行动的摊款拨供资金进行例行补充 (c) 一旦明确可能设置和平行动则应授权秘书长经行政和预算问题咨询委员会行预咨委会核准在安全理事会通过决议之前便可从维持和平储备基金提取最多不超过5 千万美元的款项 (d) 秘书处应当审查整个采购政策与程序酌情向大会建议对财务条例和细则的修正以便利特别是在所建议的时间安排范围内快速全面地部署和平行动 (e) 秘书处应当审查指导外地特派团财务资源管理的政策与程序以便使外地特派团在管理其预算时能更加灵活得多 (f) 秘书处应当增加授权外地特派团采购的数额按特派团的规模和需要从20 万美元至100 万美元之巨以采购当地现有而系统合同或长期商业服务合同又不包括的所有货物与服务 14. 总部维持和平行动支助工作的筹资 (a) 小组建议大幅度增加用于总部维和行动支助工作的资源并促请秘书长向大会提交一份建议充分概述他的需求 (b) 应将总部支助维和的工作视为联合国的核心活动从而用于这方面的所需经费的绝大部分就应通过联合国的两年期经常方案预算机制来提供 (c) 在编制下一个经常预算之前小组建议秘书长尽快联络大会要求紧急增补支助帐户的经费以便立即增聘人员特别是增聘维和部人员 15. 特派团综合规划和支助 特派团综合工作队综合工作队视情况需要从整个联合国系统借调人员它应当成为具体特派团规划和支助工作的主要执行者综合工作队应当一概成为此种支助工作的第一接触点综合工作队的领导人按照维和部政治部同其他派遣人员各部计划署基金和机构之间的协议对借调人员应当拥有临时指挥权 16. 维和部其他结构调整 (a) 现有的军事和民警司应当加以改组把民警股调出军事报告系统应当考虑提高民警顾问的级别和职等 (b) 维和部军事顾问办公室应当加以调整进一步适应联合国维持和平行动外地军事总部的组建方式 (c) 维和部应当增设一股配备就刑法问题提出咨询意见的有关专门知识这方面对联合国和平行动中有效利用民警至关重要 49 A/55/305 S/2000/809 (d) 主管管理事务的副秘书长应当在两年的试验期内把有关维持和平的预算编制及采购职能方面的权力和责任下放给主管维持和平行动的副秘书长 (e) 应大幅度加强总结经验股调入维和部经过调整的行动厅 (f) 应当考虑把维和部助理秘书长的人数由二人增至三人应指定其中一人为首席助理秘书长行使副秘书长副手的职能 17. 新闻工作的业务支助 和平行动应建立一个新闻工作行动规划和支助股设于维和部或新闻部新设的和平和安全新闻处内直接向主管通信和新闻的副秘书长汇报工作 18. 政治事务部的建设和平支助工作 (a) 小组支持秘书处努力同联合国系统其他部门合作在政治部内设立试验性的建设和平股并建议如试验性方案一旦运作良好各会员国即须重新讨论经常预算对该股的支助该方案应按照小组在上文第46 段所提供的指导予以评价如果认为它是加强联合国建设和平能力的现有最佳方案就应按照上文第47 d 段所载的建议提交秘书长 (b) 小组建议大量增加经常预算用作选举援助司方案经费的资源以此取代自愿捐款以满足各方对该司各项事务激剧增长的需求 (c) 为减轻对外地行政和后勤司后勤司和政治部执行办公室的压力并改进为规模较小的政治和建设和平外地事务处提供的支助事务小组建议由联合国项目事务厅项目厅向所有此类规模较小的 非军事性的外地特派团提供采购后勤工作人员征聘和其他支助事务 19. 联合国人权事务高级专员办事处的维持和平行动支助工作 小组建议大力提高联合国人权事务高级专员办事处进行外地特派团规划和筹备的能力经费部分由经常预算提供部分由和平行动特派团预算提供 20. 和平行动与信息技术 (a) 总部各个和平与安全部门均需设立一个责任中心以制订和监督信息技术共同战略的执行与和平行动的训练这个中心应设在信息战略秘书处 (b) 信息战略秘书处应与信息技术事务司合作在联合国现有内联网实施增强效果的和平行动组成部分并通过和平行动外联网将其与特派团的数据联系起来 (c) 更广泛利用地理信息系统技术会对和平行动大有助益这种技术可以很快地将行动信息与任务区内的电子图合并以用于解除武装民警登记选举人监测人权和重建等各种工作 (d) 特派团的各部分例如民警和人权在信息技术方面有独特的需要应在特派团展开规划和执行时预料到这种需要并应更一贯地予以满足 (e) 小组鼓励总部和外地特派团制订网址共同管理办法按照这种办法总部将继续进行监督但各特派团将授权工作人员编制和登载符合基本报告标准和政策的万维网资料